Re: [pfSense] Problem with Chrome - HTTP trasnparent proxy with SSL filtering

2017-11-04 Thread Chris Bagnall 

On 4/11/17 11:41 pm, Jon Gerdes wrote:

We all need to have a deep think about what https *really* *really*
means.
* The aim of SSL/TLS is to ensure confidentiality from one point to
another
If I put up a website and I want to guarantee that the connection
between my website and the end user is secure then I would not be happy
if I found out that someone was breaking that link.  Using splice is an
attempt to break that link.
Have a deep think about what you are trying to do - whatever it is.


What Jon says is absolutely spot on. Remember, we (collectively, as 
network designers) are building networks that are going to be used by 
real people; we can't exist in a vacuum.


Think *very* carefully about what you are trying to achieve by breaking 
into HTTPS connections, why you think that is a good idea, and (most 
importantly) the risks involved.


Think about how your users are going to feel when they find out you're 
doing this - if you've not already told them.


Check very carefully whether you are opening yourself up to additional 
legal liability (depending on jurisdiction) - take proper legal advice 
if necessary. If you are breaking into your users' online banking 
sessions, for example, and one of them is compromised because something 
was inadvertently leaked by your proxy, you might find yourself in a 
whole world of legal unpleasantness.


Kind regards,

Chris
--
C.M. Bagnall, Director, Minotaur IT Limited
For full contact details please visit www.minotaur.it
This email is made from 100% recycled electrons
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Re: [pfSense] Problem with Chrome - HTTP trasnparent proxy with SSL filtering

2017-11-04 Thread Jon Gerdes 
Roberto

We all need to have a deep think about what https *really* *really*
means.  

* The aim of SSL/TLS is to ensure confidentiality from one point to
another

* In a browser, there is a trust store of Certification Authorities and
 a SSL/TLS certificate that is signed by a CA is trusted if signed by a
trusted CA

At this point, you could substitute a certificate from another CA,
using splice.

* There are standards such as HPKP - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-U
S/docs/Web/HTTP/Public_Key_Pinning .  

This is why you cannot subvert Google and other sites that take
additional steps to ensure that no one is attempting to break the
promise that SSL/TLS is designed for.

If I put up a website and I want to guarantee that the connection
between my website and the end user is secure then I would not be happy
if I found out that someone was breaking that link.  Using splice is an
attempt to break that link.

Have a deep think about what you are trying to do - whatever it is.

Cheers
Jon




On Fri, 2017-11-03 at 10:47 -0400, Yaroslav Samoylenko wrote:
> Public or private CA, the issue will persist.
> 
> On Nov 3, 2017 8:39 AM, "Roberto Carna" 
> wrote:
> 
> > OK Jon, thanks for your time and explanation.
> > 
> > So a last qustion please: now I put in Squid of pfSense a private
> > CA
> > certificate...is it the same if I put a public CA certificate? Will
> > I
> > experience the same HTTPS behaviour related to Chrome and Firefox?
> > 
> > Thanks a lot again.
> > 
> > ROBERTO
> > 
> > 2017-11-02 20:47 GMT-03:00 Jon Gerdes :
> > > Roberto
> > > 
> > > NFF: Product working as designed
> > > 
> > > When you use splice, you are doing a Man In The Middle (MitM)
> > > attack on
> > > your own users.  Chrome is a Google product and they have enabled
> > > https
> > > ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning and other things
> > > to
> > > detect this sort of thing.
> > > 
> > > This could be seen as an abuse by Google https://www.troyhunt.com
> > > /bypas
> > > sing-browser-security-warnings-with-pseudo-password-fields/ or
> > > you
> > > could consider that end users should have an expectation of
> > > privacy by
> > > default.  For example, what if your users do on line banking
> > > through
> > > your proxy?  You could easily grab usernames and passwords and
> > > other
> > > personal details or worse if you abuse the trust that SSL/TLS
> > > should
> > > allow.
> > > 
> > > Think very hard about the implications of attempting to break the
> > > contract that SSL/TLS is designed to provide - end to end
> > > encryption
> > > with no tampering and guaranteed privacy.
> > > 
> > > Cheers
> > > Jon
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Thu, 2017-11-02 at 12:00 -0300, Roberto Carna wrote:
> > > > People, I have pfSEnse 2.4 with Squid and Squidguard.
> > > > 
> > > > I enable HTTP transparent proxy and SSL filtering with Splice
> > > > All.
> > > > 
> > > > From our Android cell phones, if we use Firefox TO NAVIGATE
> > > > everything
> > > > is OK, but if we use Chrome we can't go to Google and some
> > > > other
> > > > HTTPS
> > > > sites.
> > > > 
> > > > We reviewed firewall rules, NAT and denied target categories
> > > > and
> > > > everything seems OK.
> > > > 
> > > > What can be the problem with Chrome ???
> > > > 
> > > > Thanks a lot,
> > > > 
> > > > ROBERTO
> > > > ___
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> 
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[pfSense] Squid [SSL Filter] + E2guardian.

2017-11-04 Thread Kleber Carvalho 
Hello,


   Someone with experience in Squid + E2guardian to do a simple
consulting "$" by Skype? I need this urgently.


Best Regards.
-- 

*Kleber da Silva CarvalhoProfissional Certificado.*
*CCNA R**  |  **CCNA Security  |  **CCNP Security  |  **LPIC-1  |
 LPIC-2 * *|*  *LPIC-3 * *|  * *LPIC-3 303 * *| **Novell CLA 11 * *|* * Novell
DCTS * *|* * ITIL v3 * *|* * COBIT 4.1*
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