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Very good article. I'd like to comment on some sweeping points in one
paragraph, I realise your article was not focused on these issues from
6-7 years ago, but I'm actually building up a challenge to a number of
alleged certainties that have dominated our thinking on this, even
those of us who are not uncritical romanticisers of the PYD. First,
"Instead, the Kurds were confronted by a Syrian National Coalition
that was dominated by Muslim Brotherhood figures that shared the
prejudices of the Baathist dictatorship." You mean Syrian National
Council (same acronym) in 2011-12 (the much broader Coalition was
formed Dec 2012, in which the SNCouncil was but one component). It is
true that the refusal of the Syrian opposition political leadership to
come fully round to recognising autonomy and self-determination was a
negative point that began the process of alienating sections of the
Kurds.
However, in Dec 2011 the SNC released a declaration in Tunis, which
was formalised in June 2012 as its 'National Charter on the Kurdish
Issue', which reads in part: 1.The SNC and signatories confirm their
commitment to *constitutional recognition of the national identity of
Kurdish people*, and consider the Kurdish issue part and parcel of the
national discourse, and recognize the *national rights of the Kurdish
people* within the framework of the unity of Syria's land and people.
2. Signatories will work toward the abolition of all discriminatory
policies, decrees, and measures applied against citizens, addressing
their effects and implications and compensating those affected. 7. The
SNC and signatories shall hold events and activities to work towards
the recognition of the Kurdish issue in Syria, and acknowledging the
suffering that Kurdish citizens have endured through decades of
deprivation and marginalization, in order to build a new Syrian
culture based on equality and mutual respect." Now, this may not be
“the full program” and does not specifically advocate the right to
self-determination, but given that this was a process, it is difficult
to see such a statement offering “constitutional recognition of the
*national* identity of the Kurdish people” and recognising the their
*national* rights – rather than just their equal rights as citizens –
as a re-statement of Arab nationalist prejudices on the Kurdish issue
or a capitulation to Turkish interests.
Next, "The Kurds were represented on the SNC by members of the Kurdish
National Council that was loyal to the tribal leaders in Iraq and
hardly representative of the more radical leaders of the PYD." The SNC
and the KNC were both formed in October 2011. At that time, three
Kurdish parties were in the SNC: The Kurdish Future Movement [ie the
party of Mashaal Tammo, who was assassinated in late 2011, who de Jong
says was one of the "more militant" Kurdish groups formed after 2004,
which saw the PYD as collaborationist, and which took a powerful
anti-Assad stance and strongly advocated working with the Arab
opposition], the Kurdish Yekti Party [another "more militant" party de
Jong says played a role in the 2004 uprising but was critical of the
PYD] and the Kurdish Azadi Party. The KNC consisted of 11 Kurdish
parties, not only the KDP (S), the one considered to be Barzanist, but
also parties such as the Kurdish Youth Movement, which de Jong says
"tried to launch the first armed resistance against the Baath regime.
They accused the PYD of working with the state." The KNC was not in
the SNC, but did its best to cooperate with it in the anti-Assad
uprising while trying to push the SNC to take a better position. In
January 2011, despite the SNC's Tunis declaration, the KNC decided it
was still not good enough and called on all Kurdish parties to quit
bot the SNC and the smaller, lame-duck, regime-tolerated, National
Coordination Body (NCB). The Yekti and Azadi parties did so and joined
the KNC, leaving only Tammo's Future Movement in the SNC, and the YPG
which refused to quit the NCB, despite the NCB having an almost
identical position to the SNC (not quite as good, actually).
It is hard to see how the PYD was "more radical" except in looking
after its own interests in the more narrow sense. The main difference
was that the KNC was fully in support of the anti-Assad uprising
whereas the PYD was ambivalent form the start. It is also difficult to
argue that the PYD's withdrawal from the revolution in mid-2012 (well,
unclear if it was ever "in" it, but its withdrawal of the Kurdish
regions which it had under its armed control) reflected a widespread
Kurdish mood of "alienation" from the opposition given that al across
the north in 2011 and 2012 there were joint A
