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I think Petras' criticism, both of the CONAIE and Correa, is pretty
even-handed. He correctly delineates Correa's right turn in the wake
of economic difficulties, pursuing policies which alienated his base
of support. He also takes the CONAIE to task for failing to see the
larger picture. But the analysis of Correa below mirrors the analysis
of the CONAIE. Any president who backtracks on his promises to engage
the Indigenous sector on an equal basis, as enshrined in the
constitution, and refers to the leadership of the CONAIE as bandits
and backward elements, clearly a racist commentary, can certainly
expect to lose the support of the communities associated with CONAIE.
Although the MPD is not mentioned, one can also understand, though not
necessarily agree, with the fact that the UNE teacher's union was
present at the police protest in support of the cops.
Lets see: racist and demeaning rhetoric, inability to listen,
austerity measures, attacks on unions, opening up the countryside to
multinationals, yep, it's all there.
Greg
On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 8:04 PM, Fred Fuentes fred.fuen...@gmail.com wrote:
The leadership of the Indian movement varied in its response to the
coup. The most extreme position adopted by the near moribund
electoral party Pachacutik (US aid recipient) actually endorsed the
police coup and call on the masses to form a “united front”, a call
which fell on deaf ears. The bulk of the Indian movement (CONAIE)
adopted a complex position of denying that a coup was taking place,
yet rejecting the police violence and setting forth a series of
demands and criticisms of Correa’s policies and methods of governance.
No effort was made to either oppose the coup or to support it. In
other words, in contrast to its militant anti dictatorial past, CONAIE
was virtually a marginal actor.
The passivity of CONAIE and most of the trade unions has its roots in
profound policy disagreements with the Correa regime.
Correa’s Self-Induced Vulnerability: His Right Turn
During the emerging citizens-movement five years ago, Rafael Correa
played an important role in deposing the authoritarian, corrupt and
pro-imperialist regime of Lucio Gutierrez. Once elected President, he
put in practice some of his major electoral promises: evicting the US
from its military base in Manta; rejecting foreign debt payments based
on illicit accounts; raising salaries, the minimum wage, providing low
interest loans and credit to small business. He also promised to
consult with and take account of the urban social and Indian
movements, in the lead up to the election of a constitutional assembly
to write up a new constitution. In 2007 Correa’s list running with
his new party Alianza Pais (the country alliance) won a two thirds
majority in the legislature. However facing declining revenues due to
the world recession, Correa made a sharp turn to right. He signed
lucrative contracts with multi-national mining companies granting them
exploitation rights on lands claimed by indigenous communities without
consulting the latter, despite a past history of catastrophic
contamination of Indian lands, water and habitat. When local
communities acted to block the agreements, Correa sent in the army and
harshly repressed the protestors. In subsequent efforts to negotiate,
Correa only heard his own voice and dismissed the Indian leaders as a
“bunch of bandits”, and “backward elements” who were blocking the
“modernization of the country”.
Subsequently, Correa went on the offensive against the public
employees, pushing legislation reducing salaries, bonuses and
promotions, repudiating settlements based on agreements between unions
and legislators. In the same way Correa imposed new laws on
university governance, which alienated the professoriate,
administration and students. Equally damaging to Correa’s popularity
among the organized sectors of the wage and middle classes, was his
authoritarian style in pushing his agenda, the pejorative language he
used to label his interlocutors and his insistence that negotiations
were only a means to discredit his counterparts.
Contrary to Correa’s claim to be a pathfinder for “21st century
socialism”, he was, instead, the organizer of a highly personal
strategy for 21st century capitalism, one based on a dollarized
economy, large scale foreign Investments in mining, petroleum and
financial services and social austerity.
Correa’s ‘right turn’, however; also depended on political and
financial support from Venezuela and its Cuban and Bolivian allies.
As a result Correa fell between two chairs: he lost support from the
social left because of “pro-extractive” foreign economic policies and
austere domestic programs and did not
