Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
Why should we, as socialists or Marxists, adopt such a perspective? In what way does it contribute to the struggle for socialism? Lew Lew, The importance of dialectical materialism to the struggle for socialism is in my opinion twofold. First, people like Engles wanted to appeal to the broad and popular interest in science and philosophy which - although it is not as important as it was in the 19th century - is still an significant part of the political and ideological situation. This is even more important if one believes the Communist Manifesto claim that: 'A portion of the bourgeois goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.' This section (perhaps like Engels himself) clearly will not be won over by the economic circumstances but by the validity of Marxism as a science which is consistent, rational and comprehensive. Second, is the linked point, that Marxism is not just the same as some more moralistic socialist political ideologies which seek to win over sympathetic individuals who feel sorry for (or even responsible for) the misery of the poor. Such as Fabian socialism, social democracy, paternalism and forms of anarchism and liberalism. Marxism aimed to be a scientific socialism. It theories were based upon an actual explaination of the universe and human society which will operate regardless of our wishes. It does not argue what sought of society we OUGHT to have but what we will have. Fact replaces hope. Any science or philosophy (natural philosophy was still used to encompass both) which makes any sense and relates to the real world must, if it is to be accepted, be all inclusive. One cannot have a science of human society whose theories do not transfer correctly to the rest of the natural world (unless one argues that humans are super-natural). That (as perhaps a (peti-)'bourgeois ideologist' myself) is why I think dialectical materialism is still important to Marxism if it is not to be merely a utopian philosophy (which is how many still appear to think it is). Regards, John Walker. --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
From Reason and Revolt: Marxism and Science by Alan Woods and Ted Grant online @ http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~zac/maindex.htm Marxism and Darwinism Darwins Gradualism No Progress? Marxism and Darwinism Darwin and Malthus Social Darwinism "It is sometimes said that the standpoint of dialectics is identical with that of evolution. There can be no doubt that these two methods have points of contact. Nevertheless, between them there is a profound and important difference which, it must be admitted, is far from favouring the teaching of evolution. Modern evolutionists introduce a considerable admixture of conservatism into their teaching. They want to prove that there are no leaps either in nature or in history. Dialectics, on the other hand, knows full well that in nature and also in human thought and history leaps are inevitable. But it does not overlook the undeniable fact that the same uninterrupted process is at work in all phases of change. It only endeavours to make clear to itself the series of conditions under which gradual change must necessarily lead to a leap." (Plekhanov) (66) Darwin regarded the pace of evolution as a gradual process of orderly steps. It proceeded at a constant rate. He adhered to Linnaeus motto: "Nature does not make leaps." This conception was reflected elsewhere in the scientific world, most notably with Darwins disciple, Charles Lyell, the apostle of gradualism in the field of geology. Darwin was so committed to gradualism, that he built his whole theory on it. "The geological record is extremely imperfect," stated Darwin, "and this fact will to a large extent explain why we do not find interminable varieties, connecting together all the extinct and existing forms of life by the finest graduated steps. He who rejects these views on the nature of the geological record, will rightly reject my whole theory." This Darwinism gradualism was rooted in the philosophical views of Victorian society. From this evolution all the leaps, abrupt changes and revolutionary transformations are eliminated. This anti-dialectical outlook has he! ! ! ! ld sway over the sciences to this present day. "A deeply rooted bias of Western thought predisposes us to look for continuity and gradual change," says Gould. However, these views have given rise to a heated controversy. The present fossil record is full of gaps. It reveals long term trends, but they are also very jerky. Darwin believed that these jerks were due to the gaps in the record. Once the missing pieces were discovered, it would reveal a gradual smooth evolution of the natural world. Or would it? Against the gradualist approach, palaeontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould have put forward a theory of evolution called punctuated equilibria, suggesting that the fossil record is not as incomplete as had been thought. The gaps could reflect what really occurred. That evolution proceeds with leaps and jumps, punctuated with long periods of steady, gradual development. "The history of life is not a continuum of development, but a record punctuated by brief, sometimes geologically instantaneous, episodes of mass extinction and subsequent diversification," says Gould. Rather than a gradual transition, "modern multicellular animals make their first uncontested appearance in the fossil record some 570 million years agoand with a bang, not a protracted crescendo. This Cambrian explosion marks the advent (at least into direct evidence) of virtually all major groups of modern animalsand all within the minuscule span, geologically speaking, of a few million years." (67) Gould also points to the feature that the boundaries of geological time coincide with turning points in the evolution of life. This conception of evolution comes very close to the Marxist view. Evolution is not some smooth, gradual movement from lower to higher. Evolution takes place through accumulated changes which burst through in a qualitative change, through revolutions and transformations. Almost a century ago, the Marxist George Plekhanov polemicised against the gradual conception of evolution: "German idealist philosophy," he noted, "decisively revolted against such a misshapen conception of evolution. Hegel bitingly ridiculed it, and demonstrated irrefutably that both in nature and in human society leaps constituted just as essential a stage of evolution as gradual quantitative changes. Changes in being, he says, consists not only in the fact that one quantity passes into another quantity, but also that quality passes into quality, and vice versa. Each transition of the latter kind represents an interruption in gradualness, and gives the phenomenon a new aspect, qualitatively distinct from the previous one." (68) "Evolution" and "revolution" are two sides of the same process. In rejecting gradualism, Gould and Eldredge have sought an alternative explanation of evolution, and have been influenced by
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
Comrade Harry, I would say that part of the answer to your question is that an overall scientific worldview among the masses of workers is necessary for working class and socialist consciousness. A scientific worldview cannot be instilled based on consideration of the history of human society alone, but rather must include a conviction of the scientific nature of the natural world and some enthusiasm for the knowledge of modern natural science replacing a religious or idealist worldview. Only with this full scientific worldview will workers be convinced of a scientific understanding of society and human history, and consequently a historical materialist and communist standpoint toward social issues. One of the aspects of the Marxist conception of all of this that imputes to it a superior philosophical understanding of the whole matter is that dialectics is a profound insight into epistemology including that of the natural sciences. That Marxism has discovered a fundamental logic of reality t! ! hat even many highly successful natural scientists are not consciously aware of , but which is reflected in their work. So, the point is that Marxism relies on its superior understanding of science at a philosophical level to persuade people of its superior understanding of science as applied to human society in particular. It is part of legitimizing Marxism with the masses of workers whom Marxism seeks to get to move and change the world. Charles Brown Harry Feldman [EMAIL PROTECTED] 08/08/99 11:19AM Comrades, I'm not too sure what this argument is about. In my view, it doesn't matter whether we call the kind of reasoning marxists apply in understanding what's going on around us and how to intervene most effectively is called 'dialectical materialism', 'materialist dialectics', 'historical materialism', 'the materialist view of history' or what have you. Nor does it matter whether we, or Engels or Lenin, depart from exactly what Marx meant by it. What matters is whether its application, in the form we apply it, leads to a correct understanding and effective action (the test of whether our understanding is correct). I find the disagreement over whether the dialectic is applicable to 'the natural world' or not puzzling. For those of us who don't actually work in the 'natural sciences', obviously its application to the natural world is going to be marginal, particularly in contrast to how we apply it daily in understanding social phenomena and informing our practice. I reckon if there's one thing we need to learn from the dialectic, its the unity of theory and practice. I don't know whether it's the case that Marx thought mid-19th Century science adequate or not. But back in those days, 'science' had not yet come against quantum phenomena, superstrings and whatnot. Without pretending to understand this stuff, from what I read, one of the main barriers to scientists' understanding it is a futile attempt to address them mechanistically. Some scientists I've read (can't supply citation, I'm afraid, but probably something in Scientific American or New Scientist) seem to be on the verge of breaking with this, although they may not know where to turn. Evolutionary (punctuated equilibrium), geological and astronomical phenomena seem to me to unfold in a dialectical way and if we can understand such things dialectically, why should we hold back, whether or not the giants from whose shoulders we gain a wider perspective recognised it themselves? YFTR, Harry --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], Harry Feldman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes Evolutionary (punctuated equilibrium), geological and astronomical phenomena seem to me to unfold in a dialectical way and if we can understand such things dialectically, why should we hold back, whether or not the giants from whose shoulders we gain a wider perspective recognised it themselves? But why should we, as socialists or Marxists, adopt such a perspective? In what way does it contribute to the struggle for socialism? -- Lew --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
G'day Chas, I reckon you sound like a good historical materialist in this post - especially here: "Marx says that the chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism, Feuerbach included, is that it is contemplative and not active. " here: "History is made by active classes" here: "Feuerbachian and the other materialisms are errors of mechanical or vulgar materialism, treating history like a giant clock that mechanically unwinds without human agency." and here: "Engels says exactly that knowing something in nature is to change it from a thing-in-itself to a thing-for-us. This is the Marxist ( and Hegelian) solution to the Kantian problem of the unknowable thing-in-itself. Engels says we know something when we can make it." Welcome aboard! You also write: "Also, in the Preface to the First German edition he says that he treats economics like natural history." I'll take a tentative (somewhat vague) stab at this ... 'Economics' here is that of capitalism - a dynamic mode of production which he reckons hides its driving force behind our backs (the exchange relation). In that which human consciousness does not enter (ie that which we do not perceive as we live our lives), a natural science approach is tenable. His method is revolutionary because it unmasks the hidden and thus makes us conscious of it. Consciousness constitutes a systemic disruption to the giant clock. Natural science gives you the OCC, the corresponding TRPTF, and the tendency to periodic crises. Consciousness (arising where the once conducive social relations suddenly fall out of kilter with whatever developments the definitive drive for accumulation forces upon the mode) manifests in stuff like superstructural ameliorations of the base (such as the welfare state arising out of one such crisis), societal quakes (such as your beloved Bolshies arising out of another), and the spectre of democratic socialist transformation (well, we'll see). It's when (inevitably present) social relations are factored into the clockwork of (inevitably impossible) pristine capitalist economics that we arrive at the 'materialist conception of history'. History needs human society. Capitalism in its abstracted self (and it is capitalism that is the subject in *Das Kapital*), is a finite dynamic - its historical context and the concomitant question of what might succeed it - are matters outside that neat natural scientific box. History is social, and it is this dimension that reduces the apparently natural and everlasting to an episode of becoming and begoing (well, it *should* be a word!). "Also, the last time we discussed this, Chris Burford found many examples of Marx using natural science dialectics as heuristics in Capital to explain human historical dialectics." I've been using Gould's 'punctuated equilibrium' notion as a heuristic, too. And the processes of the San Andreas fault. And the dynamics of an arm wrestle. In none of these cases do I feel the need to demand identity with my object (social history), 'coz that's not what 'heuristic' means. That lot may not all make sense - and I wouldn't blame you if it didn't. But a bloke can but have a go. Cheers, Rob. --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism/activist materialism
Comrades, I'm not too sure what this argument is about. In my view, it doesn't matter whether we call the kind of reasoning marxists apply in understanding what's going on around us and how to intervene most effectively is called 'dialectical materialism', 'materialist dialectics', 'historical materialism', 'the materialist view of history' or what have you. Nor does it matter whether we, or Engels or Lenin, depart from exactly what Marx meant by it. What matters is whether its application, in the form we apply it, leads to a correct understanding and effective action (the test of whether our understanding is correct). I find the disagreement over whether the dialectic is applicable to 'the natural world' or not puzzling. For those of us who don't actually work in the 'natural sciences', obviously its application to the natural world is going to be marginal, particularly in contrast to how we apply it daily in understanding social phenomena and informing our practice. I reckon if there's one thing we need to learn from the dialectic, its the unity of theory and practice. I don't know whether it's the case that Marx thought mid-19th Century science adequate or not. But back in those days, 'science' had not yet come against quantum phenomena, superstrings and whatnot. Without pretending to understand this stuff, from what I read, one of the main barriers to scientists' understanding it is a futile attempt to address them mechanistically. Some scientists I've read (can't supply citation, I'm afraid, but probably something in Scientific American or New Scientist) seem to be on the verge of breaking with this, although they may not know where to turn. Evolutionary (punctuated equilibrium), geological and astronomical phenomena seem to me to unfold in a dialectical way and if we can understand such things dialectically, why should we hold back, whether or not the giants from whose shoulders we gain a wider perspective recognised it themselves? YFTR, Harry --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
Re: M-TH: Re: dialectical materialism
On Sat, 7 Aug 1999, Rob Schaap wrote:
(a) 'material': an analytic foundation conceived of as an integration of
two dynamics: the way a society reproduces its physical existence and the
relations that constitute that society;
Engels recognizes this in his best work, Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State (which was based on Marx's notes). This statement
as Rob puts it well is the basic premise of the historical materialist
approach. We should add that the reproduction of physical existence, both
individual and generational survival, as well as the social relations that
constitute society and produce history, presuppose society itself ('the
true is the whole'). These are axioms, not theories. This requirement that
existence and its perpetuation occur in society has a biological basis in
the absence of instinct; Homo sapiens emerged as a species within and
entirely dependent on the context of an already high level of
sociocultural development. We are not only human only in society, but
without society the species does not perpetuate. Therefore, for Marx,
materialism is not a physicalism (a position he explicitly condemned), but
rather the objective interchange between members of a collective in the
production of their existence. This is why the materialist dialectic in
Marx's hands--indeed, he is its originator--does not apply to the physical
world abstracted from history; the material dimension for Marx is the
objective basis for history, and this material dimension is the product of
human labor, which, again, presupposes society and history.
Dialectical materialism is, by contrast, that approach that resurrects
materialism as a form of physicalism/naturalism and then sees the
dialectic as suprahistorical laws of universal physical/natural
development. Therefore it represents a regression to objectivist idealism
but without the sophistication of Hegelianism. The paradox of dialectical
materialism is that its seeks to legitimate Marxism by transforming it
into a physical science but accomplishes instead the diametric opposite by
transforming the approach into a dogma, an ideology. Not only this, but by
subordinating materialist dialectics as conceived by Marx (i.e.,
historical materialism) to the dialectical materialist ideology (probably
more accurately called dialectical physicalism), dialectical materialists
reduce Marx's actual approach to ideology. In other words, dialectical
materialism is anti-Marxian.
Andy
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