[Marxism-Thaxis] Alain Badiou in _New Left Review_ on The Communist Hypothesis

2008-03-10 Thread Charles Brown
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism/2008-March/024922.html

http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=articleview=2705 


What is the communist hypothesis? In its generic sense, given in its canonic
* Manifesto*, 'communist' means, first, that the logic of class-the
fundamental subordination of labour to a dominant class, the arrangement
that has persisted since Antiquity-is not inevitable; it can be overcome.
The communist hypothesis is that a different collective organization is
practicable, one that will eliminate the inequality of wealth and even the
division of labour. The private appropriation of massive fortunes and their
transmission by inheritance will disappear. The existence of a coercive
state, separate from civil society, will no longer appear a necessity: a
long process of reorganization based on a free association of producers will
see it withering away.

'Communism' as such denotes only this very general set of intellectual
representations. It is what Kant called an Idea, with a regulatory function,
rather than a programme. It is foolish to call such communist principles
utopian; in the sense that I have defined them here they are intellectual
patterns, always actualized in a different fashion. As a pure Idea of
equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed since the beginnings
of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of
egalitarian justice, rudiments or fragments of the hypothesis start to
appear. Popular revolts-the slaves led by Spartacus, the peasants led by
Müntzer-might be identified as practical examples of this 'communist
invariant'. With the French Revolution, the communist hypothesis then
inaugurates the epoch of political modernity.

What remains is to determine the point at which we now find ourselves in the
history of the communist hypothesis. A fresco of the modern period would
show two great sequences in its development, with a forty-year gap between
them. The first is that of the setting in place of the communist hypothesis;
the second, of preliminary attempts at its realization. The first sequence
runs from the French Revolution to the Paris Commune; let us say, 1792 to
1871. It links the popular mass movement to the seizure of power, through
the insurrectional overthrow of the existing order; this revolution will
abolish the old forms of society and install 'the community of equals'. In
the course of the century, the formless popular movement made up of
townsfolk, artisans and students came increasingly under the leadership of
the working class. The sequence culminated in the striking novelty-and
radical defeat-of the Paris Commune. For the Commune demonstrated both the
extraordinary energy of this combination of popular movement, working-class
leadership and armed insurrection, and its limits: the *communards* could
neither establish the revolution on a national footing nor defend it against
the foreign-backed forces of the counter-revolution.

The second sequence of the communist hypothesis runs from 1917 to 1976: from
the Bolshevik Revolution to the end of the Cultural Revolution and the
militant upsurge throughout the world during the years 1966-75. It was
dominated by the question: how to win? How to hold out-unlike the Paris
Commune-against the armed reaction of the possessing classes; how to
organize the new power so as to protect it against the onslaught of its
enemies? It was no longer a question of formulating and testing the
communist hypothesis, but of realizing it: what the 19th century had dreamt,
the 20th would accomplish. The obsession with victory, centred around
questions of organization, found its principal expression in the 'iron
discipline' of the communist party-the characteristic construction of the
second sequence of the hypothesis. The party effectively solved the question
inherited from the first sequence: the revolution prevailed, either through
insurrection or prolonged popular war, in Russia, China, Czechoslovakia,
Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and succeeded in establishing a new order.
But the second sequence in turn created a further problem, which it could
not solve using [...]

Full:  http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=articleview=2705 




___
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Alain Badiou in _New Left Review_ on The Communist Hypothesis

2008-03-10 Thread Ralph Dumain
Can't access the full article, but hopefully it 
is not as vacuous as this extract.

At 12:34 PM 3/10/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 
base64Content-Disposition: 
inlinehttp://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism/2008-March/024922.html

http://www.newleftreview.org/[EMAIL PROTECTED]


What is the communist hypothesis? In its generic sense, given in its canonic
* Manifesto*, 'communist' means, first, that the logic of class-the
fundamental subordination of labour to a dominant class, the arrangement
that has persisted since Antiquity-is not inevitable; it can be overcome.
The communist hypothesis is that a different collective organization is
practicable, one that will eliminate the inequality of wealth and even the
division of labour. The private appropriation of massive fortunes and their
transmission by inheritance will disappear. The existence of a coercive
state, separate from civil society, will no longer appear a necessity: a
long process of reorganization based on a free association of producers will
see it withering away.

'Communism' as such denotes only this very general set of intellectual
representations. It is what Kant called an Idea, with a regulatory function,
rather than a programme. It is foolish to call such communist principles
utopian; in the sense that I have defined them here they are intellectual
patterns, always actualized in a different fashion. As a pure Idea of
equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed since the beginnings
of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of
egalitarian justice, rudiments or fragments of the hypothesis start to
appear. Popular revolts-the slaves led by Spartacus, the peasants led by
Müntzer-might be identified as practical examples of this 'communist
invariant'. With the French Revolution, the communist hypothesis then
inaugurates the epoch of political modernity.

What remains is to determine the point at which we now find ourselves in the
history of the communist hypothesis. A fresco of the modern period would
show two great sequences in its development, with a forty-year gap between
them. The first is that of the setting in place of the communist hypothesis;
the second, of preliminary attempts at its realization. The first sequence
runs from the French Revolution to the Paris Commune; let us say, 1792 to
1871. It links the popular mass movement to the seizure of power, through
the insurrectional overthrow of the existing order; this revolution will
abolish the old forms of society and install 'the community of equals'. In
the course of the century, the formless popular movement made up of
townsfolk, artisans and students came increasingly under the leadership of
the working class. The sequence culminated in the striking novelty-and
radical defeat-of the Paris Commune. For the Commune demonstrated both the
extraordinary energy of this combination of popular movement, working-class
leadership and armed insurrection, and its limits: the *communards* could
neither establish the revolution on a national footing nor defend it against
the foreign-backed forces of the counter-revolution.

The second sequence of the communist hypothesis runs from 1917 to 1976: from
the Bolshevik Revolution to the end of the Cultural Revolution and the
militant upsurge throughout the world during the years 1966-75. It was
dominated by the question: how to [EMAIL PROTECTED] the Paris
Commune-against the armed reaction of the possessing classes; how to
organize the new power so as to protect it against the onslaught of its
enemies] was no longer a question of formulating and testing the
communist hypothesis, but of realizing it: what the 19th century had dreamt,
the 20th would accomplish. The obsession with victory, centred around
questions of organization, found its principal expression in the 'iron
discipline' of the communist party-the characteristic construction of the
second sequence of the hypothesis. The party effectively solved the question
inherited from the first sequence: the revolution prevailed, either through
insurrection or prolonged popular war, in Russia, China, Czechoslovakia,
Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and succeeded in establishing a new order.
But the second sequence in turn created a further problem, which it could
not solve using [...]

Full:  http://www.newleftreview.org/YÙOX\XÛIšY]ÏLÌ
H€


___
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


[Marxism-Thaxis] Dialectical Materialism

2008-03-10 Thread Charles Brown

Haines Brown 


--http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism/2008-March/024942.html--

At the risk of furthering a side thread, allow me to reply to Carrol
briefly.

 Carrol writes: may I suggest that dialectics not be invoked befrore
 the 6000th word, at a minimum, of your document.

 Why? It seems to me that dialectical materialism is a far more
 dodgy term than dialectic. Whatever one's understanding
 dialectics, I doubt that they should be invoked in ordinary
 conversation/writing on particular topics. As a rule of thumb may I
 suggest that dialectics not be invoked befrore the 6000th word, at a
 minimum, of your document.

Well, to some extent I agree. If the term is not being used
effectively, but only serves to add a politically correct tone to
otherwise empty verbiage, then that is bad style, a put-off, and best
avoided. 

Now, I wasn't sure what dodgy meant, and so had to look it up. There
are two meanings that roughly are a) risky, b) deceptive. I don't
think you quite meant either. I'll assume you meant something like
vague or empty.

Let's recall the meaning of dialectics. the application of logical
principles to discursive reasoning. Usually it means discussion by
dialogue as a method of scientific investigation. Etc. The term
dialectics has to do with _epistemology_; it refers to statements
about how we teach or learn the truth. Dialectical materialism, on the
other hand, is an _ontological_ statement about the nature of things,
the way the world works independently of us.

If this distinction holds water, dialectics and dialectical
materialism are completely unrelated terms. On the other hand, if it
does not hold water, then at least dialectical materialism would
seem to be a specification of the more general category of
dialectics and, unlike dialectics, one that emerged at a particular
time and place. Either way, dialects is a broader, more variable and
therefore vaguer term than dialectical materialism.

However, I have the feeling your objection is to the concept itself,
not the use of the term, and if so it would be more productive to
approach the issue directly. The overuse of jargon should be avoided,
but is a common a practice hardly worth of your attack unless it was
not this to which you object, but the concept to which the jargon
points. 

To me, to say in the present environment that we should look at things
dialectically is shorthand for saying that should be looking at them
in terms of dialectical materialism. This is not a Hegelian discussion
group. Such a recommendation is, in my mind, certainly valid, for, as
I pointed out before, it amounts to the suggestion that we view things
as processes (as a relation of causal powers and empirical
constraints) and we also understand how development depends on the
opposite process: the emergence of new potentials is necessarily tied
to the emergence of new needs. Because this is a technical mouthful,
it begs for appropriate jargon.

I offer this example of the use of the jargon just in case I've
misunderstood your objection and you need a target to shoot at.

Haines Brown



___
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


[Marxism-Thaxis] The Obama Bubble: Why Wall Street Needs a Presidential Brand

2008-03-10 Thread Charles Brown
Note critique of tech and housing bubbles.

CB

^^^

http://www.blackagendareport.com/index.php?option=com_contenttask=viewid=548Itemid=1


The Obama Bubble: Why Wall Street Needs a Presidential Brand
Wednesday, 05 March 2008  
by Pam Martens 

Despite Barack Obama's claim that his campaign represents a mass movement of 
average folks, the initial core of his support was largely comprised of rich 
denizens of Wall Street. Why would the super wealthy want a percieved black 
populist to become the nation's chief executive officer? The Obama bubble 
was nurtured by Wall Street in order to have a friend in the White House when 
the captains of capital are made to face the legal consequences for 
deliberately creating current and past economic bubbles. Wall Street 
desperately needs a president who will sweep all the corruption and losses, 
would-be indictments, perp walks and prosecutions under the rug and get on with 
an unprecedented taxpayer bailout of Wall Street. Who better to sell this 
agenda to the millions of duped mortgage holders and foreclosed homeowners in 
minority communities across America than our first, beloved, black president of 
hope and change? 

The Obama Bubble: Why Wall Street Needs a Presidential Brand 

by Pam Martens 

This article originally appeared in the print edition of Counterpunch.org. 

We are asked to believe that those white executives at all the biggest Wall 
Street firms now want a black populist president because they crave a level 
playing field for the American people.” 
  
 
  
The Obama phenomenon has been likened to that of cults, celebrity groupies and 
Messiah worshipers. But what we're actually witnessing is Obama mania (as in 
tulip mania), the third and final bubble orchestrated and financed by the 
wonderful Wall Street folks who brought us the first two: the Nasdaq/tech 
bubble and a subprime-mortgage-in-every-pot bubble. 
To understand why Wall Street desperately needs this final bubble, we need to 
first review how the first two bubbles were orchestrated and why. 

In March of 2000, the Nasdaq stock market, hyped with spurious claims for 
startup tech and dot.com companies, reached a peak of over 5,000. Eight years 
later, it's trading in the 2,300 range and most of those companies no longer 
exist. From peak to trough, Nasdaq transferred over $4 trillion from the 
pockets of small mania-gripped investors to the wealthy and elite market 
manipulators. 

The highest monetary authority during those bubble days, Alan Greenspan, 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, consistently told us that the market was 
efficient and stock prices were being set by the judgment of millions of 
highly knowledgeable investors. 

Mr. Greenspan was the wind beneath the wings of a carefully orchestrated wealth 
transfer system known as pump and dump on Wall Street. As hundreds of court 
cases, internal emails, and insider testimony now confirm, this bubble was no 
naturally occurring phenomenon any more than the Obama bubble is. 

Nasdaq transferred over $4 trillion from the pockets of small mania-gripped 
investors to the wealthy and elite market manipulators. 

First, Wall Street firms issued knowingly false research reports to trumpet the 
growth prospects for the company and stock price; second, they lined up big 
institutional clients who were instructed how and when to buy at escalating 
prices to make the stock price skyrocket (laddering); third, the firms 
instructed the hundreds of thousands of stockbrokers serving the mom-and-pop 
market to advise their clients to sit still as the stock price flew to the moon 
or else the broker would have his commissions taken away (penalty bid). While 
the little folks' money served as a prop under prices, the wealthy elite on 
Wall Street and corporate insiders were allowed to sell at the top of the 
market (pump-and-dump wealth transfer). 

Why did people buy into this mania for brand new, untested companies when there 
is a basic caveat that most people in this country know, i.e., the majority of 
all new businesses fail? Common sense failed and mania prevailed because of 
massive hype pumped by big media, big public relations, and shielded from 
regulation by big law firms, all eager to collect their share of Wall Street's 
rigged cash cow. 

 The current housing bubble bust is just a freshly minted version of Wall 
Street's real estate limited partnership frauds of the '80s, but on a grander 
scale. In the 1980s version, the firms packaged real estate into limited 
partnerships and peddled it as secure investments to moms and pops. The major 
underpinning of this wealth transfer mechanism was that regulators turned a 
blind eye to the fact that the investments were listed at the original face 
amount on the clients' brokerage statements long after they had lost most of 
their value. 

Today's real estate related securities (CDOs and SIVs) that are blowing up 
around the globe are simply the above scheme with more