Unicolonial Ants Pose Challenge to Selfish Gene Theory
1) The first that must be stated unequivocally is that, for my part at least, I
do not believe there is much evidence to suggest that there is a selfish
gene--- other than basic physiological drives for survival (which may or may
not be acted upon).
2) Now, having said that, I think that you (CB) have basically attempted to
confront the now-dominant manner of scientific discourse by adopting the very
presuppositions of this hegemonic perspective. Following Whitehead and Husserl,
I would posit that the very ontological framework of the Newtonian and
positivistic natural sciences is wholly bankrupt.
Scientific materialism (a vulgar sort of materialism) reduces the human being to
a 'thing', to an 'object', to an 'animal' (determined by a subconscious play of
forces that the individual himself/herself cannot even come to appreciate).
This sort of Newtonian alienation is precisely what Husserlian phenomenology
(see The Crisis of the European Sciences) and the Whiteheadian philosophy of
science (see Modes of Thought) attempted to combat. Enzo Paci (an Italian
Marxist in the tradition of Antonion Gramsci) reconciles these fundamental
phenomenological and ontological insights provided by Husserlian thought with
the vitality and essential spirit of Marx's writings.
I feel, by speaking of genes, we automatically reduce the human to a biological
computer--- something whose behavior we could predict in a controlled setting,
as if it was already predetermined. This, naturally, leaves no room for
self-determination and human freedom. However, rather than confront the
metaphysical, ontolgoical, existential, and epistemological questions involved
here--- viz., questions about very ourselves--- your commentary takes the easy
route of using one set of 'scientific' facts against another. Yet, as Husserl
advised us, such a mode of inquiry will never answer the truly human questions
of life; rather, what we need, for such questions, is not more vulgar
(scientific) materialism, but deep, rigorous philosophical investigation.
3) Tjirdly, I'm astonished that, on a site about Marxist theory, we have
devolved into a scientific discourse about ants (and, even worse, have begun to
anthropomorphisize them by comparing 'their genes' and 'our genes', their
sociality and our sociality as coterminously related, et al., etc.). And, so,
you note among many other correlations that you draw, that
There is no worker aggression, and there is free movement among nests on a vast
scale. The energy that might have been put into fighting and territoriality
flows into the common good, more ants.
Presumably, again, you are drawing correlations between worker ants and
Marxist class analysis, which, is my opinion, may be well intentioned, but it
is far from being grounded in Marx's thought. After all, I hope you don't
advocate that we have multiple queens as well! Why abstract and draw some
correlations, but not others? I mean, you even go on to identify possible
political implications for HUMAN societies:
Such a concept, a form of genuine anarchism in the animal world, was
thought to be impossible given existing theory...each ant worker is
mostly surrounded by total strangers that share none of their genes.
Only one other species has ever been known to organize themselves in
such a fashion (and if you're reading these words right now you know
who you are).
Thus, while in my first point I agree with you (I believe there is no
deterministic gene which makes us selfish), in my second point I disagree with
the ontological and epistemological perspective which you employ to confront
such scientific determinism (and that method of yours, once again, is nothing
other than scientific determinism itself!). However, with respect to this third
point of mine, the problem, CB, with making these sorts of inferences is that
you have made a number of conclusions about ant-sociability which have been
applied (and without much rigour) to human-sociability. Moreover, whilst
reducing the call for anarcho-socialism to another mode of scientific
determinism, you seem to have, at the same time, forgetten Marx's own writings
about ants and their sociality.
4) Thus, my final point brings me to these writings. In the Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844-45, Marx penned that:
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is not distinct from
that activity; it is that activity. Man makes his life activity itself an
object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not
a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity directly
distinguishes man from animal life activity. Only because of that is he a
species-being. Or, rather, he is a conscious being i.e., his own life is an
object for him, only because he is a species-being. Only because of that is his
activity free activity. Estranged labour reverses the relationship so that man,
just because
