[menog] Weekly Routing Table Report
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-st...@lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith . Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 09 May, 2020 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary BGP routing table entries examined: 807903 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 307689 Deaggregation factor: 2.63 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 396306 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 67970 Prefixes per ASN: 11.89 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 58375 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 24342 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:9595 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:312 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.4 Max AS path length visible: 50 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 22394) 38 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 1107 Number of instances of unregistered ASNs: 1109 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 31553 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 26053 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 120117 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:22 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:2 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 0 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2840843264 Equivalent to 169 /8s, 83 /16s and 212 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 99.5 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 600637 APNIC Region Analysis Summary - Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 211601 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 62375 APNIC Deaggregation factor:3.39 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 0 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:0 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 10552 APNIC Prefixes per ASN:0.00 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2951 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1575 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:4.5 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 27 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 5627 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 0 Equivalent to 0 /8s, 0 /16s and 0 /24s APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-141625 APNIC Address Blocks ARIN Region Analysis Summary Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes:237006 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 109034 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.17 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:0 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 0 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:18488 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 0.00 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:6744 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:1917 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.9 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 42 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table:3230 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 0 Equivalent to 0 /8s, 0 /16s and 0 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046,
[menog] Spoofer Report for MENOG for Apr 2020
In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Apr 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2020: ASNName First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE2016-09-23 2020-04-30 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2020-04-23 15802 DU-AS12018-09-22 2020-04-27 50597 ScopeSky 2018-10-09 2020-04-24 200697 Dijla-ISP 2020-04-08 2020-04-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org ___ Menog mailing list Menog@lists.menog.org http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
