Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Mark Andrews

DNS Cookies / SIT (DNS Cookies w/o the error code) will also deal
with forged traffic.  It allows you to identify traffic from a
client that you have replied to in the past and to which you can
safely send a large response.  It lets you sort the wheat from the
chaff.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies-00

SIT is available in BIND 9.10 (configure --enable-sit) and uses a
experiment EDNS OPT code.  BIND 9.11 will have DNS Cookies / SIT
will on by default with a allocated code point.

The only thing is the amount of non EDNS compliance with servers
will make this hard to deploy.  In theory unknown EDNS options are
supposed to be IGNORED (See RFC6891, 6.1.2 Wire Format).  This was
done to allow you to send a EDNS option without knowing if the other
end supported that option safely.

http://users.isc.org/~marka/ts/gov.optfail.html

Unfortunately there are firewalls that block such queries.  There
are nameserver implementations that return FORMERR when they see
such queries.  There are nameserver implementations that return
BADVER when they see such queries.  There are nameserver implemations
that echo back the option.  There are also implementations that
don't return a EDNS response unless DO=1 is set.

If your nameserver / firewall combination fails to properly handle
EDNS queries with unknown options can you please fix it.

You can test EDNS option handling with the following allocated code
points.

dig +nsid soa $zone @$server
dig +expire soa $zone @$server

Experimentatal code point (requires BIND 9.10).

dig +sit soa $zone @$server

Unallocated code point (requires pre BIND 9.11 code from sources.isc.org).

dig +ednsopt=100 soa $zone @$server

There are also issues with attempting to use a new EDNS version
(this should get BADVERS returned) or setting a new EDNS flag bit
(supposed to be ignored).  Firewalls also stupidly block these even
more so than unknown EDNS options.

http://users.isc.org/~marka/ts.html

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org


RE: How to track DNS resolution sources

2014-12-03 Thread teleric team


> Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 17:56:23 +0100
> From: bortzme...@nic.fr
> To: notify.s...@gmail.com
> Subject: Re: How to track DNS resolution sources
> CC: nanog@nanog.org
> 
> On Wed, Dec 03, 2014 at 05:22:58PM +0100,
>  Notify Me  wrote 
>  a message of 13 lines which said:
> 
> > I hope I'm wording this correctly.
> 
> Not really :-)
> 
> > I had a incident at a client site where a DNS record was being
> > spoofed.
> 
> How do you know? What steps did you use to assert this? Answers to
> these questions would help to understand your problem.
> 
> > How does one track down the IP address that's returning the false
> > records ?
> 
> If it's real DNS spoofing (which I doubt), the source IP address of
> the poisoner is forged, so it would not help.
> 
> The main tool to use is dig. Let's assume the name that bothers you is
> foobar.example.com. Query your local resolver:
> 
> dig A foobar.example.com
> 
> Query an external resolver, here Google Public DNS:
> 
> dig @8.8.4.4 A foobar.example.com
> 
> Query the authoritative name servers of example.com. First, to find them:
> 
> dig NS example.com
> 
> Second, query them (replace the server name by the real one):
> 
> dig @a.iana-servers.net. A foobar.example.com

I didn't understand how this will help him identify the poisoner.
What an IDS rule will do is check for responding authoritative query IDs for 
DNS queries never made to that responder, but made for the authoritative server 
identified as per above (direct NS inquiry).
If no IDS is present, BIND logging would allow for identification of 
authoritative responses and query ID identification. 
In summary whatever is answered authoritatively by a server other than the NS 
ones tracked by "dig +trace foobar.examplecom" is the potential poisoner. But 
if the poisoing is done from an spoofed IP address (spoofing the authoritative 
IP), well good luck w/ that if the spoofed domain is not DNSSEC aware.  
   

Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...

2014-12-03 Thread Owen DeLong

> On Dec 1, 2014, at 5:25 AM, Livingood, Jason 
>  wrote:
> 
> On 11/29/14, 3:17 PM, "John Levine"  wrote:
> 
>> PS: I know enough technical people at Comcast that I would be
>> extremely surprised if it were Comcast doing this.  There's plenty not to
>> like about the corporation, but the technical staff are quite competent.
> 
> Thanks, John! I can tell folks here unequivocally that (1) the recent
> press article on STARTTLS re-writing did *not* involve Comcast and (2)
> Comcast does not engage in the claimed practice. In fact, weąre supporters
> and early deployers of STARTTLS on our own mail service.
> 
> I do not know how to explain the issue reported on this list. Absent a
> packet capture it is impossible for me to analyze this further. If
> anything, I could only imagine it was a misconfiguration someplace, but I
> have no idea where or in what network element thatąd even be possible. Iąm
> happy to work with anyone that has more info to try to troubleshoot this.
> 
> - Jason Livingood
> Comcast

I have encountered similar issues on some hotel networks.

Usually, a well meaning, but severely misinformed hotel administrator decides 
that:

1.  People don’t know what they’re doing and configure they’re laptops to 
use their [corporate|home|usual]
mailserver even when they’re on the road, often without authentication.

2.  Debugging people’s laptops for them takes a lot of time and reduces 
customer satisfaction.

so

3.  Let’s just redirect all port 25/587 to our own local SMTP proxy which 
can’t possibly support TLS
because we don’t have all the right certificates (nor should we), so it 
won’t announce the STARTLES
capability.

I don’t know if that’s what happened in this case, because, as you say, without 
first-hand information and
packet-captures, it’s impossible to tell, but I will say that if you intend to 
use TLS, make sure your MUA
REQUIRES TLS, rather than preferring TLS when available (as is default on many 
MUAs, unfortunately).

Owen



Re: Comcast IPv6 issues..?

2014-12-03 Thread Steve Meuse
I will follow-up offline

-Steve

On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Stephen Frost  wrote:

> * Steve Meuse (sme...@mara.org) wrote:
> > It's likely a reverse DNS error. If you look at the latency, it's within
> > range of the previous hops.
>
> Still curious that the systems (IPv6 addresses) are changing too..  It's
> not like it's the same route but just different rDNS results.  It's also
> quite a bit of latency between he.net and Comcast.  Also seeing ~20%
> packet loss to systems in Comcast and ~15% packet loss end-to-end.
> Certainly seems like there's something unhappy there, but I'll just keep
> an eye on it.
>
> Thanks!
>
> Stephen
>


Re: Comcast IPv6 issues..?

2014-12-03 Thread Stephen Frost
* Steve Meuse (sme...@mara.org) wrote:
> It's likely a reverse DNS error. If you look at the latency, it's within
> range of the previous hops.

Still curious that the systems (IPv6 addresses) are changing too..  It's
not like it's the same route but just different rDNS results.  It's also
quite a bit of latency between he.net and Comcast.  Also seeing ~20%
packet loss to systems in Comcast and ~15% packet loss end-to-end.
Certainly seems like there's something unhappy there, but I'll just keep
an eye on it.

Thanks!

Stephen


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Re: Comcast IPv6 issues..?

2014-12-03 Thread Steve Meuse
It's likely a reverse DNS error. If you look at the latency, it's within
range of the previous hops.

-Steve

On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Stephen Frost  wrote:

> Hey all,
>
>   Getting delays and seeing some pretty funky routes inside Comcast.
>   All traces start from Ashburn, VA (2001:4830:167b::) and go to
>   Chicago, IL (2610:150:4b0f::).
>
>   Coming from Occaid/SIXXS (over a tunnel) through HE.net and have seen:
>
> Ashburn -> San Jose -> New York -> Chicago
> -
>  3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.955 ms
> 10.583 ms  10.17 ms
>  4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.726 ms  11.004 ms
> 9.956 ms
>  5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  10.069
> ms  10.674 ms  12.465 ms
>  6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  94.83 ms  95.593 ms  94.768 ms
>  7  pos-2-2-0-0-cr01.sanjose.ca.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f58d::1)
> 96.779 ms  99.591 ms  94.964 ms
>  8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)
> 89.969 ms  91.143 ms  92.507 ms
>  9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  97.411 ms  88.731 ms  87.457 ms
> 10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  87.444 ms  88.756 ms  87.505 ms
> 11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  89.812 ms  88.774 ms  87.558
> ms
> -
>
> Ashburn -> New York (but with lots of latency..) -> Chicago
> -
>  3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.549 ms
> 10.652 ms  10.107 ms
>  4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.975 ms  11.044 ms
> 10.009 ms
>  5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  17.423
> ms  11.05 ms  12.27 ms
>  6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  95.197 ms  95.968 ms  94.793 ms
>  7  he-2-6-0-0-cr01.ashburn.va.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f8d2::1)
> 105.158 ms  101.428 ms  94.993 ms
>  8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)
> 89.735 ms  90.266 ms  92.577 ms
>  9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  89.813 ms  92.963 ms  92.383 ms
> 10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  87.401 ms  88.15 ms  87.085 ms
> 11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  122.387 ms  124.288 ms
> 122.409 ms
> -
>
> Ashburn -> Chicago -> New York -> Chicago
> -
>  3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.926 ms
> 10.183 ms  9.978 ms
>  4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.961 ms  11.37 ms
> 9.973 ms
>  5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  9.95
> ms  18.258 ms  9.951 ms
>  6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  94.959 ms  96.413 ms  95.001 ms
>  7  he-1-10-0-0-cr01.chicago.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f552::1)
> 92.457 ms  92.964 ms  89.965 ms
>  8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)
> 89.789 ms  91.291 ms  97.333 ms
>  9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  87.518 ms  95.961 ms  87.506 ms
> 10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net
> (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  87.406 ms  86.414 ms  87.425 ms
> 11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  87.517 ms  86.589 ms  87.506
> ms
> -
>
>   Thoughts?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Stephen
>


Comcast IPv6 issues..?

2014-12-03 Thread Stephen Frost
Hey all,

  Getting delays and seeing some pretty funky routes inside Comcast.
  All traces start from Ashburn, VA (2001:4830:167b::) and go to
  Chicago, IL (2610:150:4b0f::).

  Coming from Occaid/SIXXS (over a tunnel) through HE.net and have seen:

Ashburn -> San Jose -> New York -> Chicago
-
 3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.955 ms  10.583 
ms  10.17 ms
 4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.726 ms  11.004 ms  9.956 ms
 5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  10.069 ms  
10.674 ms  12.465 ms
 6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  94.83 ms  95.593 ms  94.768 ms
 7  pos-2-2-0-0-cr01.sanjose.ca.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f58d::1)  96.779 
ms  99.591 ms  94.964 ms
 8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)  89.969 
ms  91.143 ms  92.507 ms
 9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  
97.411 ms  88.731 ms  87.457 ms
10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  
87.444 ms  88.756 ms  87.505 ms
11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  89.812 ms  88.774 ms  87.558 ms
-

Ashburn -> New York (but with lots of latency..) -> Chicago
-
 3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.549 ms  10.652 
ms  10.107 ms
 4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.975 ms  11.044 ms  10.009 ms
 5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  17.423 ms  
11.05 ms  12.27 ms
 6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  95.197 ms  95.968 ms  94.793 ms
 7  he-2-6-0-0-cr01.ashburn.va.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f8d2::1)  105.158 
ms  101.428 ms  94.993 ms
 8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)  89.735 
ms  90.266 ms  92.577 ms
 9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  
89.813 ms  92.963 ms  92.383 ms
10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  
87.401 ms  88.15 ms  87.085 ms
11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  122.387 ms  124.288 ms  122.409 ms
-

Ashburn -> Chicago -> New York -> Chicago
-
 3  sixxs-asbnva-gw.customer.occaid.net (2001:4830:e6:7::2)  9.926 ms  10.183 
ms  9.978 ms
 4  iad0-b0-ge2.hotnic.net (2001:4810:0:100::1)  9.961 ms  11.37 ms  9.973 ms
 5  10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net (2001:504:0:2::6939:1)  9.95 ms  
18.258 ms  9.951 ms
 6  2001:559::db5 (2001:559::db5)  94.959 ms  96.413 ms  95.001 ms
 7  he-1-10-0-0-cr01.chicago.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f552::1)  92.457 
ms  92.964 ms  89.965 ms
 8  he-0-7-0-0-cr01.newyork.ny.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5ba::2)  89.789 
ms  91.291 ms  97.333 ms
 9  he-0-11-0-0-cr01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f5b8::2)  
87.518 ms  95.961 ms  87.506 ms  
10  he-0-10-0-0-pe04.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (2001:558:0:f8cc::2)  
87.406 ms  86.414 ms  87.425 ms  
11  2001:550:2:2::32:2 (2001:550:2:2::32:2)  87.517 ms  86.589 ms  87.506 ms
-

  Thoughts?

Thanks,

Stephen


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Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Grant Ridder
Ah that makes sense.  I am not going to worry about the inconstancy then.

Thanks to everyone that replied!!

-Grant

On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 10:30 AM, Doug Barton  wrote:

> On 12/3/14 10:07 AM, Grant Ridder wrote:
>
>> Did more digging and found the RFC regarding ANY queries:
>>
>> 3.2.3 - * 255 A request for all records
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt
>>
>
> When listing URLs for RFCs it's better to use the tools site, as it gives
> a much better experience:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035
>
> Meanwhile, the text is correct, but what you're missing is the nuance of
> authoritative vs. recursive. If you send an ANY query to an authoritative
> server it is naturally going to send you all of the related records, since
> it has them all.
>
> A recursive (or iterative if you prefer) server only has what it has in
> the cache, but it will send you "all records" that it has. What this does
> not imply is that the recursive server will go out and do its own ANY query
> for the RR you're asking about, unless there is nothing in the cache to
> start with.
>
> There are any number of explanations for why some of the recursive servers
> you're querying have more records than others. None of them are bugs. :)
>
>  However Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types)
>> lists this as a request for "All cached records" instead of "A request for
>> all records" per the RFC.
>>
>
> Wikipedia is good for a lot of things, but standards work is not one of
> them. :)  The text above is a good example of why.
>
> Doug
>
>


IPligence contact?

2014-12-03 Thread George, Wes
if anyone has a live-person contact at geolocation provider IPligence
(http://www.ipligence.com/) and can hit me up off-list, I would appreciate
it.

Thanks,


Wesley George
Time Warner Cable


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Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Scott Helms
It's also entirely possible that the behavior observed will change because
of testing.  The more a test looks different from "normal" residential
traffic the more likely that it's going to be handled differently.


Scott Helms
Vice President of Technology
ZCorum
(678) 507-5000

http://twitter.com/kscotthelms


On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 1:37 PM, Christopher Morrow 
wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Grant Ridder 
> wrote:
> > Hi Everyone,
> >
> > Thanks for the replies!  After reading them, i am doing some digging into
> > DNS RFC's and haven't found much with respect to ANY queries.  Not
> > responding with full results to protect against being used in an attack
> > makes sense.  However, I find it odd that only 1 of the 4 anycast
> servers I
> > tried would institute this.
>
> it's possible (jason hinted at this) that the servers in question are
> not a homogeneous software set... and have different behaviour being
> displayed because of that.
>
> Also, just because you sent a packet to 4 different ip addresses
> doesn't mean that they didn't end up on one or some of the same hosts
> behind loadbalancers/ecmp/etc, right? (so it's not clear you are/can
> test this properly from your vantage point)
>
> -chris
>
> (what's a bit concerning is my comcast link's not able to talk to
> cdns02 at all... over ipv4 at least, v6 works, thankfully I suppose)
>


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Andrew Sullivan
On Wed, Dec 03, 2014 at 10:07:04AM -0800, Grant Ridder wrote:
> Did more digging and found the RFC regarding ANY queries:
> 
> 3.2.3 - * 255 A request for all records
> https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt
> 
> However Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types)
> lists this as a request for "All cached records" instead of "A request for
> all records" per the RFC.

Those two turn out to mean the same thing in the way the DNS community
has come to understand the semantics of the * query.

A resolver that has a cache is able to answer the query for * by
consulting its cache.  There is no signal in the DNS that there are
records for other RRTYPEs at the same owner name and class, so the
resolver is in a position to answer the question, and so it does.

Certainly, the authoritative resolver will always give you every
record at that owner name and class in the authoritative zone in the
event you asked that.

Also, you probably want to look at RFC 4592, which considerably
expands the treatment of wildcards in the DNS.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
Dyn, Inc.
asulli...@dyn.com
v: +1 603 663 0448


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Grant Ridder  wrote:
> Hi Everyone,
>
> Thanks for the replies!  After reading them, i am doing some digging into
> DNS RFC's and haven't found much with respect to ANY queries.  Not
> responding with full results to protect against being used in an attack
> makes sense.  However, I find it odd that only 1 of the 4 anycast servers I
> tried would institute this.

it's possible (jason hinted at this) that the servers in question are
not a homogeneous software set... and have different behaviour being
displayed because of that.

Also, just because you sent a packet to 4 different ip addresses
doesn't mean that they didn't end up on one or some of the same hosts
behind loadbalancers/ecmp/etc, right? (so it's not clear you are/can
test this properly from your vantage point)

-chris

(what's a bit concerning is my comcast link's not able to talk to
cdns02 at all... over ipv4 at least, v6 works, thankfully I suppose)


Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...

2014-12-03 Thread John R. Levine

There’s a big difference between illegal and civil liability for breech of 
contract.

If I am paying someone for access to the internet, then I expect them not to 
modify, alter, rewrite, or otherwise interfere with my packets.

If they do so, they may not have violated 47 USC 230, but they have certainly 
failed to provide the service that I am paying for.


Uh huh.  Please let us know the case number when you sue, so we can find 
out howthat pans out.


By the way, I see you're a customer of Black Lotus.  You might want to 
review sections 7 and 10 of the terms of service to which you've agreed:


https://www.blacklotus.net/terms-of-service/

Your v6 traffic appears to arrive via a tunnel at HE.  See sections 9 and 
10 here, which you've also agreed to:


http://www.he.net/tos.html

R's,
John


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Doug Barton

On 12/3/14 10:07 AM, Grant Ridder wrote:

Did more digging and found the RFC regarding ANY queries:

3.2.3 - * 255 A request for all records
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt


When listing URLs for RFCs it's better to use the tools site, as it 
gives a much better experience:


https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035

Meanwhile, the text is correct, but what you're missing is the nuance of 
authoritative vs. recursive. If you send an ANY query to an 
authoritative server it is naturally going to send you all of the 
related records, since it has them all.


A recursive (or iterative if you prefer) server only has what it has in 
the cache, but it will send you "all records" that it has. What this 
does not imply is that the recursive server will go out and do its own 
ANY query for the RR you're asking about, unless there is nothing in the 
cache to start with.


There are any number of explanations for why some of the recursive 
servers you're querying have more records than others. None of them are 
bugs. :)



However Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types)
lists this as a request for "All cached records" instead of "A request for
all records" per the RFC.


Wikipedia is good for a lot of things, but standards work is not one of 
them. :)  The text above is a good example of why.


Doug



Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Grant Ridder
Did more digging and found the RFC regarding ANY queries:

3.2.3 - * 255 A request for all records
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt

However Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_DNS_record_types)
lists this as a request for "All cached records" instead of "A request for
all records" per the RFC.

-Grant


On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 9:54 AM, Grant Ridder 
wrote:

> Hi Everyone,
>
> Thanks for the replies!  After reading them, i am doing some digging into
> DNS RFC's and haven't found much with respect to ANY queries.  Not
> responding with full results to protect against being used in an attack
> makes sense.  However, I find it odd that only 1 of the 4 anycast servers I
> tried would institute this.
>
> Also, as a side note, i hit all 4 anycast servers on both v4 and v6 with
> similar results already.
>
> -Grant
>
> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 7:46 AM, Brian Rak  wrote:
>
>> Shouldn't everyone be on IPv6 these days anyway ;)
>>
>>
>> On 12/3/2014 10:28 AM, Jared Mauch wrote:
>>
>>> So have A record queries. Do you filter those as well?
>>>
>>> Jared Mauch
>>>
>>>  On Dec 3, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:

  On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
>
>> Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
>> and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>>
>> If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
>>
> An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.
> So
> if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching
> resolver
> for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at
> the
> authoritative nameserver.
>
> This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
> you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
> hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do
> these
> queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.
>
 At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
 been used for DNS amplification attacks.

>>>
>>
>


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Jared Mauch

> On Dec 3, 2014, at 10:45 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:
> 
> No.  When I've been victim of DNS amplification attacks, the packet
> capture showed that the attacker used ANY queries.  Legit ANY queries on
> my recursive servers?  Damn few.  So I block.  Not so on my
> authoritative servers, where ANY queries on the domains I host zone
> files for have not caused any problems, for anyone.
> 
> Another thing I did was slow down the port for my recursive DNS servers
> to 10 megabits/s.  That means that my upstream link can't be saturated
> by DNS amplification.  Oh, and I rate-limit incoming queries to my DNS
> servers by IP address range -- an attack from one subnet won't affect
> queries from other parts of the net.  Queries from my IP address range
> have a high cap; J random IP addresses have a lower cap.

You should not filter the any queries, perhaps you want to TC=1 them.  I
created a patch for bind for this purpose.

http://puck.nether.net/~jared/bind-9.9.3rc2-tcp-any.patch

I’ve seen many of these attacks, they will use MX/TXT/A and other records.

You may want to look at some of the public resources for this, e.g.:

http://dnsamplificationattacks.blogspot.nl/

is a good one and for the git lovers:

https://github.com/smurfmonitor/dns-iptables-rules/blob/master/domain-blacklist.txt

or

https://github.com/smurfmonitor/dns-iptables-rules/blob/master/domain-blacklist-string.txt

- Jared

Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Grant Ridder
Hi Everyone,

Thanks for the replies!  After reading them, i am doing some digging into
DNS RFC's and haven't found much with respect to ANY queries.  Not
responding with full results to protect against being used in an attack
makes sense.  However, I find it odd that only 1 of the 4 anycast servers I
tried would institute this.

Also, as a side note, i hit all 4 anycast servers on both v4 and v6 with
similar results already.

-Grant

On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 7:46 AM, Brian Rak  wrote:

> Shouldn't everyone be on IPv6 these days anyway ;)
>
>
> On 12/3/2014 10:28 AM, Jared Mauch wrote:
>
>> So have A record queries. Do you filter those as well?
>>
>> Jared Mauch
>>
>>  On Dec 3, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
 * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:

> Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
> and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>
> If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
>
 An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
 if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
 for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
 authoritative nameserver.

 This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
 you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
 hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
 queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.

>>> At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
>>> been used for DNS amplification attacks.
>>>
>>
>


Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...

2014-12-03 Thread Owen DeLong
I suspect it isn’t comcast at all.

I suspect it is the wifi operator and they happen to use comcast as an 
upstream. The RDNS points to the public address in front of the wifi. The proxy 
doing the rewriting is likely behind that.

Owen

> On Nov 29, 2014, at 10:46 AM, Christopher Morrow  
> wrote:
> 
> backing up a bit in the conversation, perhaps this is just in some
> regions of comcastlandia? I don't see this in Northern Virginia...
> 
> $ openssl s_client -starttls smtp  -connect my-mailserver.net:587
> CONNECTED(0003)
> depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN =
> my-mailserver.net, emailAddress = my-emailaddrss.com
> verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
> verify return:1
> depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN = my-mailsever.net,
> emailAddress = my-emailaddress.com
> verify error:num=27:certificate not trusted
> verify return:1
> depth=0 description = kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q, C = US, CN =
> my-mailserver.net, emailAddress = my-emailaddress.com
> verify error:num=21:unable to verify the first certificate
> verify return:1
> 
> ...
> 
> Certificate chain
> 0 
> s:/description=kVjtrCL8rUdvd00q/C=US/CN=my-mailserver.net/emailAddress=y-emailaddress.com
>   i:/C=IL/O=StartCom Ltd./OU=Secure Digital Certificate
> Signing/CN=StartCom Class 1 Primary Intermediate Server CA
> 
> ...
> 
> New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
> Server public key is 2048 bit
> Secure Renegotiation IS supported
> Compression: NONE
> Expansion: NONE
> SSL-Session:
>Protocol  : TLSv1.2
>Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
>Session-ID: 
> FC3E47AF2A2A96BF6DE6E11F96B02A0C41A6542864271F2901F09594DE9A48FA
>Session-ID-ctx:
>Master-Key:
> BE7FB76EF5C0A9BA507B175026F73E67080D6442201FDF28F536FA38197A9B1353D644EEAF8D0D264328F94B2EF5742C
>Key-Arg   : None
>PSK identity: None
>PSK identity hint: None
>SRP username: None
>Start Time: 1417286582
>Timeout   : 300 (sec)
>Verify return code: 21 (unable to verify the first certificate)
> ---
> 250 DSN
> ehlo me
> 250-my-mailserver.net
> 250-PIPELINING
> 
> 
> On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 12:26 PM, Jean-Francois Mezei
>  wrote:
>> On 14-11-29 11:07, Sander Steffann wrote:
>> 
>>> I am so glad that our Dutch net neutrality laws state that "providers of 
>>> Internet access services may not hinder or delay any services or 
>>> applications on the Internet" (unless [...], but those exceptions make 
>>> sense)
>> 
>> 
>> However, in the case of SMTP, due to the amount of spam, most ISPs break
>> "network neutrality" by blocking outbound port 25 for instance, and
>> their SMTP servers will block much incoming emails (spam).  However,
>> SMTP is a layer or two above the network. But blocking port 25 is at the
>> network level.
>> 
>> I have seen wi-fi systems where you ask to connect to 20.21.22.23 port
>> 25, and you get connected to 50.51.52.53 port 25. (the ISPs own SMTP
>> server).  I would rather they just block it than redirect you without
>> warning to an SMTP server of their own where they can look and your
>> outbound email, pretend to acccept it, and never deliver it.
>> 
>> 
>> 



Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...

2014-12-03 Thread Owen DeLong
There’s a big difference between illegal and civil liability for breech of 
contract.

If I am paying someone for access to the internet, then I expect them not to 
modify, alter, rewrite, or otherwise interfere with my packets.

If they do so, they may not have violated 47 USC 230, but they have certainly 
failed to provide the service that I am paying for.

Owen

> On Nov 29, 2014, at 12:17 PM, John Levine  wrote:
> 
>> i think of it as an intentional traffic hijack.  i would be talking to a
>> lawyer.
> 
> If the lawyer says anything other than that 47 USC 230(c)(2)(A)
> provides broad immunity for ISP content filtering, even if the filters
> sometimes screw up, you need a new lawyer.
> 
> Filtering STARTTLS on port 587 is pretty stupid, but not everything
> that's stupid is illegal.
> 
> R's,
> John
> 
> PS: I know enough technical people at Comcast that I would be
> extremely surprised if it were Comcast doing this.  There's plenty not
> to like about the corporation, but the technical staff are quite
> competent.



Re: Google contact: apps vs IPv6 issue

2014-12-03 Thread Jeroen Massar
On 2014-12-03 17:57, Max Tulyev wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> Could someone advice a good contact inside Google?

n...@google.com is where this stuff has to go. They claim to read it (and
mostly they do in time).

> I'm operating a IPv6 tunnel broker http://tb.netassist.ua/
> 
> Now there are a number of complaints tunnel broker users can't access
> Google Apps with the reason "We're sorry, but this service is not
> available in your country".

That is likely as your address space has shown users with cookies from a
variety of locations not matching where you claim they are coming.

Note that Happy Eyeballs causes folks to use IPv4 + IPv6 and thus
mismatches are easily caught by sites that care to pay attention to that.

> IPv4 access to same pages from Ukraine is OK, and MaxMind GeoIP replies
> our IPv6 network we are using in our service is "NetAssist, Ukraine".

You might want to implement:
 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-02

See also for a bit more user-sided detail:
 https://www.sixxs.net/faq/misc/?faq=geolocation

Do note that you need to have a good trust factor there for Google to
accept the geofeed.

Greets,
 Jeroen



Re: How to track DNS resolution sources

2014-12-03 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Wed, Dec 03, 2014 at 11:32:08AM -0500,
 TR Shaw  wrote 
 a message of 20 lines which said:

> On the command line:
> 
> host spoofed.host.name.com

Excuse me but it is useless. It tests only the local resolver (which
may be unpoisoned). It provides no details that could help to debug
the problem (such as the TTL).




Google contact: apps vs IPv6 issue

2014-12-03 Thread Max Tulyev
Hello!

Could someone advice a good contact inside Google?

I'm operating a IPv6 tunnel broker http://tb.netassist.ua/

Now there are a number of complaints tunnel broker users can't access
Google Apps with the reason "We're sorry, but this service is not
available in your country".

IPv4 access to same pages from Ukraine is OK, and MaxMind GeoIP replies
our IPv6 network we are using in our service is "NetAssist, Ukraine".


Re: How to track DNS resolution sources

2014-12-03 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Wed, Dec 03, 2014 at 05:22:58PM +0100,
 Notify Me  wrote 
 a message of 13 lines which said:

> I hope I'm wording this correctly.

Not really :-)

> I had a incident at a client site where a DNS record was being
> spoofed.

How do you know? What steps did you use to assert this? Answers to
these questions would help to understand your problem.

> How does one track down the IP address that's returning the false
> records ?

If it's real DNS spoofing (which I doubt), the source IP address of
the poisoner is forged, so it would not help.

The main tool to use is dig. Let's assume the name that bothers you is
foobar.example.com. Query your local resolver:

dig A foobar.example.com

Query an external resolver, here Google Public DNS:

dig @8.8.4.4 A foobar.example.com

Query the authoritative name servers of example.com. First, to find them:

dig NS example.com

Second, query them (replace the server name by the real one):

dig @a.iana-servers.net. A foobar.example.com


Re: How to track DNS resolution sources

2014-12-03 Thread TR Shaw
On the command line:

host spoofed.host.name.com


On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:22 AM, Notify Me  wrote:

> Hi!
> 
> I hope I'm wording this correctly. I had a incident at a client site where
> a DNS record was being spoofed. How does one track down the IP address
> that's returning the false records ? What tool can one use?
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Sent from MetroMail



How to track DNS resolution sources

2014-12-03 Thread Notify Me
Hi!

I hope I'm wording this correctly. I had a incident at a client site where
a DNS record was being spoofed. How does one track down the IP address
that's returning the false records ? What tool can one use?

Thanks!




-- 
Sent from MetroMail


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Livingood, Jason
On 12/3/14, 6:53 AM, "Grant Ridder"  wrote:


>Both of Google¹s public DNS servers return complete results every time
>and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>
>If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?

Comparing different resolvers often compares how the different developers
of DNS software have chosen to implement the RFCs.

I¹m curious what the exact query is.

Jason Livingood
Comcast

PS - I emailed you off-list.



Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Brian Rak

Shouldn't everyone be on IPv6 these days anyway ;)

On 12/3/2014 10:28 AM, Jared Mauch wrote:

So have A record queries. Do you filter those as well?

Jared Mauch


On Dec 3, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:


On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
* shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:

Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
and one of the two comcast ones works fine.

If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?

An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
authoritative nameserver.

This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.

At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
been used for DNS amplification attacks.




Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Stephen Satchell
No.  When I've been victim of DNS amplification attacks, the packet
capture showed that the attacker used ANY queries.  Legit ANY queries on
my recursive servers?  Damn few.  So I block.  Not so on my
authoritative servers, where ANY queries on the domains I host zone
files for have not caused any problems, for anyone.

Another thing I did was slow down the port for my recursive DNS servers
to 10 megabits/s.  That means that my upstream link can't be saturated
by DNS amplification.  Oh, and I rate-limit incoming queries to my DNS
servers by IP address range -- an attack from one subnet won't affect
queries from other parts of the net.  Queries from my IP address range
have a high cap; J random IP addresses have a lower cap.

On 12/03/2014 07:28 AM, Jared Mauch wrote:
> So have A record queries. Do you filter those as well?
> 
> Jared Mauch
> 
>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
>>> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
 Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
 and one of the two comcast ones works fine.

 If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
>>>
>>> An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
>>> if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
>>> for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
>>> authoritative nameserver.
>>>
>>> This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
>>> you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
>>> hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
>>> queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.
>>
>> At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
>> been used for DNS amplification attacks.



Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Jared Mauch
So have A record queries. Do you filter those as well?

Jared Mauch

> On Dec 3, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:
> 
>> On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
>> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
>>> Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
>>> and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>>> 
>>> If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
>> 
>> An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
>> if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
>> for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
>> authoritative nameserver.
>> 
>> This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
>> you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
>> hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
>> queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.
> 
> At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
> been used for DNS amplification attacks.


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Pavel Odintsov
Hello!

But any other DNS type can be used for DNS amplification. RRL is right
solution for amplification issue. I recommend NSD DNS server because
it's reliable, has complete support of DNSSEC, IPv6 and RRL.

On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 5:08 PM, Stephen Satchell  wrote:
> On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
>> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
>>> Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
>>> and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>>>
>>> If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
>>
>> An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
>> if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
>> for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
>> authoritative nameserver.
>>
>> This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
>> you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
>> hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
>> queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.
>
> At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
> been used for DNS amplification attacks.
>



-- 
Sincerely yours, Pavel Odintsov


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Stephen Satchell
On 12/03/2014 04:04 AM, Niels Bakker wrote:
> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
>> Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time
>> and one of the two comcast ones works fine.
>>
>> If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?
> 
> An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  So
> if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching resolver
> for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be present at the
> authoritative nameserver.
> 
> This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and
> you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been
> hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do these
> queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.

At the ISP I consult to, I filter all ANY queries, because they have
been used for DNS amplification attacks.



Re: Phasing out of copper

2014-12-03 Thread Clayton Zekelman


In the same breath, Bell says they want the CRTC to deregulate 
copper, as it is no longer essential.


I know right now, that if ULLs were forborne, we would not have a 
suitable substitute for our co-locate served customers.


In 5 to 10 years, that might be a different story, but today it is not.

Bell wants the freedom to deploy fibre networks without mandated 
wholesale but also wants to de-regulate copper loops while still 
using them for their own purposes as long as is convenient simply 
because for 99% of the customers today, DSL speeds are what they 
choose, and copper loops for now are the most cost effective way to 
provide those speeds or just plain dialtone.


A bit of a have your cake & eat it too attitude, which is exactly 
what I expect from Bell.



At 09:51 PM 02/12/2014, Jean-Francois Mezei wrote:


One reason is that by pretending that copper is here to stay and is
competitive, they hope to convicne CRTC that mandating wholesale access
to FTTP is not necessary.




---

Clayton Zekelman
Managed Network Systems Inc. (MNSi)
3363 Tecumseh Rd. E
Windsor, Ontario
N8W 1H4

tel. 519-985-8410
fax. 519-985-8409



Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Niels Bakker

* shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 12:54 CET]:
Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every 
time and one of the two comcast ones works fine.


If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?


An ANY query will typically return only what's already in the cache.  
So if you ask for MX records first and then query the same caching 
resolver for ANY it won't return, say, any TXT records that may be 
present at the authoritative nameserver.


This could be implementation dependent, but Comcast's isn't wrong, and 
you should not rely on ANY queries returning full data.  This has been 
hashed out to tears in the past, for example when qm**l used to do 
these queries in an attempt to optimise DNS query volumes and RTT.



-- Niels.


Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Grant Ridder
Both of Google’s public DNS servers return complete results every time and one 
of the two comcast ones works fine.

If this is working by design, can you provide the RFC with that info?

-Grant

> On Dec 3, 2014, at 2:51 AM, Niels Bakker  wrote:
> 
> * shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 10:49 CET]:
>> Can someone from Comcast that works with the customer resolvers ( 
>> cdns01.comcast.net / cdns02.comcast.net) please contact me off list? The 01 
>> resolver is sometimes not returning complete results when the DNS query type 
>> is set to ANY for $dayjob's domain.
> 
> That's how DNS works, yes.
> 
> 
>   -- Niels.



Re: Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Niels Bakker

* shortdudey...@gmail.com (Grant Ridder) [Wed 03 Dec 2014, 10:49 CET]:
Can someone from Comcast that works with the customer resolvers ( 
cdns01.comcast.net / cdns02.comcast.net) please contact me off list? 
The 01 resolver is sometimes not returning complete results when the 
DNS query type is set to ANY for $dayjob's domain.


That's how DNS works, yes.


-- Niels.


Re: Hibernia/Atrato contacts

2014-12-03 Thread Alistair Mackenzie
Thanks for the information.

I've got a few contacts now and will be reaching out to them.
On 3 Dec 2014 02:13, "Alistair Mackenzie"  wrote:

> Hi,
>
> Does anyone have a contact for a sales/account manager at Hibernia/Atrato
> located in the UK timezone or even +1?
>
> Please contact me off list with the details.
>
> Thanks,
> Alistair
>


Comcast residential DNS contact

2014-12-03 Thread Grant Ridder
Can someone from Comcast that works with the customer resolvers (
cdns01.comcast.net / cdns02.comcast.net) please contact me off list?  The
01 resolver is sometimes not returning complete results when the DNS query
type is set to ANY for $dayjob's domain.

-Grant