Re: private 5G networks?

[James Jun]

On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 12:23:46PM +0100, Baldur Norddahl wrote:

[ snip ]

> 
> And yes these are low bandwidth but on the other hand often stretch wifi to
> the very limits on the distance between bases. I am not claiming this is
> the same use case as a warehouse. I am pointing out that the argument that
> a system critical implementation _must_ be based on licensed frequencies
> does not hold as nothing could be more critical than a system that prevents
> trains from colliding.


The public transit market of rail industry has been in discussions for a while 
re:
mitigation measures (such as licensed band) against possible interference on 
CBTC
signalling data links.  It is however a standardization issue (much like we here
in internet infrastructure continue to discuss improvements to BGP and its 
lingering
security issues, nothing is perfect in every industry I suppose..).

> 
> I do claim that the reason these metro train systems can boast of a very
> high uptime is not that it would be especially hard to jam their wifi based
> systems.

Moreover, the degree of disruption to loss of data on CBTC is further dependent 
upon
individual deployment cases.  One example is system falling back to ABS 
(non-moving
block) operation during loss of confirmations on movement authorities, with 
trains
continuing to run, albeit at reduced capacity.

Anyhow it has not been a serious enough issue from operational and security 
standpoints
to date to warrant immediate concern.  It's a standardization matter.

James

Re: private 5G networks?

[Tom Beecher]

>
> This should give a good overview:
>
> https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/128950142/COMST2661384.pdf
>
> It is in fact quite interesting.
>

Thanks for sharing that. Excellent read, really interesting stuff.

Couple quick takeaways:

- The design is clearly well thought out to account for the environment of
tunnels and moving trains.
- They have designed redundancy and diversity into the systems that would
really make it difficult to execute a prolonged attack.
- Certain aspects of the underground environment actually make some things
easier than a wide open area.

On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 6:25 AM Baldur Norddahl 
wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, 30 Nov 2021 at 23:48, Shane Ronan  wrote:
>
>> Please provide details on public transit systems that are controlled via
>> Wifi, I find that very interesting.
>>
>
> This should give a good overview:
>
> https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/128950142/COMST2661384.pdf
>
> It is in fact quite interesting.
>
> And yes these are low bandwidth but on the other hand often stretch wifi
> to the very limits on the distance between bases. I am not claiming this is
> the same use case as a warehouse. I am pointing out that the argument that
> a system critical implementation _must_ be based on licensed frequencies
> does not hold as nothing could be more critical than a system that prevents
> trains from colliding.
>
> I do claim that the reason these metro train systems can boast of a very
> high uptime is not that it would be especially hard to jam their wifi based
> systems. No it is in fact probably quite easy to do so. It is just that
> nobody does it. Because that way lies jail and there are also so many other
> ways to stop the trains (rocks on the tracks etc). The same holds true for
> the warehouse as someone trying to cause trouble could just as easily do
> something to the power, cut a fiber cable, start a fire, call in a bomb
> threat, etc.
>
> Also having a licensed frequency only stops those that are law abiding and
> it is never legal to cause harmful interference to sabotage the operations
> of a warehouse.
>
> That leaves the risk that the wifi frequencies are blocked by other legal
> users of the frequencies. This risk is especially low on the new 6 GHz
> frequencies because the range is not great and you do have full control of
> what equipment enters your warehouse. The risk is essentially that the
> neighbor is also a warehouse with a wifi based system. The physical
> separation would in most cases be enough that this is not a problem and
> otherwise it would not be too much trouble to talk to the neighbor to agree
> on some frequency split on the bases at the border between the two systems.
> No need to pay a third party or the government for that.
>
> I did read about a use case for a private 5G network however. A system
> covering the harbor. Wifi would be at a disadvantage here because it is a
> large outside area with a lot of third parties entering, both ships and
> trucks. I imagine there also exists similar such a large mining operation
> etc.
>
> Regards,
>
> Baldur
>
>
>
>
>

Re: private 5G networks?

[Tom Beecher]

>
> If we are talking about wifi 6E on 6 GHz sitting in a parking lot trying
> to cause harmful interference within legal limits will not successfully
> harm the operation within a building, especially not if the owner has a
> security perimeter. Harmful interference on purpose is not legal in any
> case.
>

Even with a security perimeter, a cantenna or yagi can easily bridge the
gap.

While you are correct that it's just as illegal to intentionally interfere
with the unlicensed wifi bands as it is with CBRS, the difference is that
the FCC and regulatory bodies are much more likely to investigate and take
action against intentional interference in these frequency ranges than they
would be in the unlicensed wifi bands.

On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 5:44 PM Baldur Norddahl 
wrote:

>
>
> tir. 30. nov. 2021 23.19 skrev Tom Beecher :
>
>> In my view there is no practical difference. The owner has full control
>>> of his warehouse and it would be very illegal for any outside party to
>>> install any device at all including unauthorised wifi devices.
>>>
>>
>>  Nothing illegal about someone sitting in a parking lot next door with a
>> pineapple turned up to 11 that's washing out all the normal wifi spectrum.
>>
>
> If we are talking about wifi 6E on 6 GHz sitting in a parking lot trying
> to cause harmful interference within legal limits will not successfully
> harm the operation within a building, especially not if the owner has a
> security perimeter. Harmful interference on purpose is not legal in any
> case.
>
>
>> It would be illegal to do that with CBRS.
>>
>
> On the other hand, saboteurs rarely care about legal and can easily jam
> either system.
>
> And yet, this is simply not a real problem. Did you know that a larger
> number of train transit systems are controlled by WiFi? Block that WiFi
> signal and the trains stop city wide. But has this ever happened?
>
> Regards
>
> Baldur
>
>>

IMPORTANT - Fwd: [arin-announce] Retirement of ARIN Non-Authenticated IRR on 31 March 2022

[John Curran]

Network Operators -

Please read and take note that ARIN’s Non-Authenticated IRR service will be 
retired on 31 March 2022.

FYI,
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

Begin forwarded message:

From: ARIN mailto:i...@arin.net>>
Subject: [arin-announce] Retirement of ARIN Non-Authenticated IRR on 31 March 
2022
Date: 1 December 2021 at 8:32:30 AM EST
To: arin-announce mailto:arin-annou...@arin.net>>

ARIN has been engaged in a multi-year project to create and deploy a new and 
improved Internet Routing Registry (IRR). As a result of these efforts, ARIN 
now provides users with the ability to create, update, and delete objects in 
ARIN’s authenticated IRR database using ARIN Online or ARIN’s RESTful API. 
Unfortunately, use of ARIN’s previous non-authenticated email-based IRR service 
actually increased after ARIN released its authenticated IRR, in opposition to 
the outcome ARIN anticipated when improving its IRR.

On 8 February 2021, ARIN held a consultation to solicit input on the retirement 
of ARIN’s non-authenticated email-based IRR service. This retirement was 
originally scheduled for 30 September 2021. Based on community input, the 
proposed date for the ARIN-NONAUTH retirement was delayed to 31 March 2022 to 
allow more transition time for users. We also notified by email Points of 
Contact (POCs) of organizations who have objects in the ARIN-NONAUTH database 
of the retirement date and offered them our assistance with the transition.

This announcement serves as a reminder that ARIN will retire its ARIN-NONAUTH 
IRR database on 31 March 2022. After this date, users will no longer be able to 
create, update, or delete records in the ARIN-NONAUTH database, and the 
ARIN-NONAUTH data stream will no longer be available in Near Real Time 
Mirroring (NRTM) or via FTP or Whois Port 43.

If you have questions about this transition or need assistance, you can contact 
us by:

- submitting an Ask ARIN ticket or chat with us using your ARIN Online account
- emailing the Routing Security Team at mailto:routing.secur...@arin.net
- contacting the Registration Services Help Desk by phone Monday through 
Friday, 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM ET at +1.703.227.0660

Regards,

Brad Gorman
Senior Product Owner, Routing Security
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)





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Re: private 5G networks?

[Baldur Norddahl]

On Tue, 30 Nov 2021 at 23:48, Shane Ronan  wrote:

> Please provide details on public transit systems that are controlled via
> Wifi, I find that very interesting.
>

This should give a good overview:

https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/128950142/COMST2661384.pdf

It is in fact quite interesting.

And yes these are low bandwidth but on the other hand often stretch wifi to
the very limits on the distance between bases. I am not claiming this is
the same use case as a warehouse. I am pointing out that the argument that
a system critical implementation _must_ be based on licensed frequencies
does not hold as nothing could be more critical than a system that prevents
trains from colliding.

I do claim that the reason these metro train systems can boast of a very
high uptime is not that it would be especially hard to jam their wifi based
systems. No it is in fact probably quite easy to do so. It is just that
nobody does it. Because that way lies jail and there are also so many other
ways to stop the trains (rocks on the tracks etc). The same holds true for
the warehouse as someone trying to cause trouble could just as easily do
something to the power, cut a fiber cable, start a fire, call in a bomb
threat, etc.

Also having a licensed frequency only stops those that are law abiding and
it is never legal to cause harmful interference to sabotage the operations
of a warehouse.

That leaves the risk that the wifi frequencies are blocked by other legal
users of the frequencies. This risk is especially low on the new 6 GHz
frequencies because the range is not great and you do have full control of
what equipment enters your warehouse. The risk is essentially that the
neighbor is also a warehouse with a wifi based system. The physical
separation would in most cases be enough that this is not a problem and
otherwise it would not be too much trouble to talk to the neighbor to agree
on some frequency split on the bases at the border between the two systems.
No need to pay a third party or the government for that.

I did read about a use case for a private 5G network however. A system
covering the harbor. Wifi would be at a disadvantage here because it is a
large outside area with a lot of third parties entering, both ships and
trucks. I imagine there also exists similar such a large mining operation
etc.

Regards,

Baldur