RE: jon postel

2022-10-20 Thread Adam Thompson
The book, being written by an actual credentialed historian, contains their 
complete sources as footnotes/endnotes.  That section was overwhelming, I 
mostly skipped it...

Adam Thompson
Consultant, Infrastructure Services
MERLIN
100 - 135 Innovation Drive
Winnipeg, MB R3T 6A8
(204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only)
https://www.merlin.mb.ca
Chat with me on Teams: athomp...@merlin.mb.ca

> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG  On Behalf Of
> Carsten Bormann
> Sent: October 17, 2022 11:54 AM
> To: Grant Taylor 
> Cc: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Re: jon postel
> 
> On 2022-10-17, at 16:57, Grant Taylor via NANOG  wrote:
> >
> > In my not so humble opinion, Where Wizards Stay Up Late should be required
> reading for anyone wanting to learn about the history / development of the
> ARPAnet and the Internet.
> 
> That said, it would be a worthwhile project to collect the places in which
> this source can be supplemented with additional information (a.k.a. grains
> of salt).
> 
> Grüße, Carsten



RE: any dangers of filtering every /24 on full internet table to preserve FIB space ?

2022-10-20 Thread Adam Thompson
I can't find the original message, so replying to the wrong spot in the thread, 
but... no, filtering /24s is a bad idea if you want (more or less) all your 
packets to get to their destinations.

If you filter all /24s you will lose reachability to 4x /24s I publish that 
have no covering route because they are not contiguous and not part of any 
larger logical aggregate.  Then there's the 10-20 legacy /24s I *don't* 
currently publish - if I start advertising them, you won't be able to reach 
them, either, because they're in the same boat: discontiguous singletons.  
There are a LOT of legacy discontiguous IPv4 singletons assigned out of the old 
Class-C space to small/medium businesses, schools, etc. in the pre-ARIN days, 
and I would guess that the vast majority of them do not have a correct covering 
/23 or larger - certainly none of the ones I'm currently working with/aware of 
do.

I believe there's at least a couple of DNS servers running in my /24s, so you 
could potentially lose access to much more than those /24s.

Your packet will *probably* hit a next-hop carrier who happens to have the 
more-specific /24, and it will *probably* eventually reach me, but I thought 
everyone more-or-less agreed that internet router was already nondeterministic 
enough as it is?
IMHO, if you don't want all the /24s in your FIB (or even RIB!), just pick a 
carrier, set a default route, and stop worrying about all the headaches BGP 
provides.
Alternately, a valid technique is to have a default route AND a partial BGP 
feed (a filtered full feed is by definition a partial feed).  That helps 
optimize outbound routing a little bit, you still get the advantage - mostly - 
of multiple inbound carriers; but you still have to pick one carrier to do the 
heavy lifting for you.  And you are paying them to route for you, so that's not 
an unfair shifting of the routing burden, unlike relying on covering routes.  
Note that this approach does NOT provide any redundancy, unlike having full BGP 
feeds.

Separately, I don't know if Geoff has produced such a survey/article, but if 
not he can probably type it from memory by now :-).

Adam Thompson
Consultant, Infrastructure Services
MERLIN
100 - 135 Innovation Drive
Winnipeg, MB R3T 6A8
(204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only)
https://www.merlin.mb.ca
Chat with me on Teams: athomp...@merlin.mb.ca

> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG  On Behalf Of
> Stephane Bortzmeyer
> Sent: October 10, 2022 10:21 AM
> To: Edvinas Kairys 
> Cc: NANOG Operators' Group 
> Subject: Re: any dangers of filtering every /24 on full internet table to
> preserve FIB space ?
> 
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2022 at 05:58:45PM +0300,
>  Edvinas Kairys  wrote
>  a message of 35 lines which said:
> 
> > But theoretically every filtered /24 could be routed via smaller
> > prefix /23 /22 /21 or etc.
> 
> I don't think this is true, even in theory, specially for legacy
> prefixes. There is probably somewhere a Geoff Huston survey on /24
> without a covering route.



Re: Detecting, mitigating, and preventing distributed large-scale prefix de-aggregation attacks

2022-10-20 Thread Douglas Fischer
Your research is remarkably interesting.
I intend to study it more closely in the coming days.

I just like to share a methodology that I came across to mitigate this type
of problem, and that I found very elegant.

It's not ideal, but it has very small implementation requirements.

Using basically SNMP and Ansible, the company in question historically kept
the numbers of received/accepted/rejected routes.
Having that information, we could create curves and forecasts from those
numbers.
And with ansible, cyclically adjusting the session prefix limiters at
shorter intervals is quite simple.
This way, the practice of ", even if this client is only advertising 3
routes, I'm going to put a limit of 500 routes here so I don't have to keep
coming back here to adjust this limit is avoided."

Em qui., 20 de out. de 2022 às 16:25, Lars Prehn 
escreveu:

> Dear NANOG,
>
> Our apologies to those who received this message via multiple channels.
>
> My colleagues and I recently revisited the topic of prefix de-aggregation
> attacks. We believe that the current IPv6 allocation policies combined with
> the ever-growing number of interconnection opportunities may facilitate
> those attacks to the point where they may circumvent traditional prevention
> mechanisms. Hence, we'd like to raise awareness on how to detect, mitigate,
> and prevent these kinds of attacks.
>
>
> # Prefix De-aggregation Attacks
>
> While allocation policies in IPv4 are very tight, even a new LIR can
> obtain, e.g., a /29 IPv6 address block from RIPE without justification [1].
> This /29 may source more than a million unique IPv6 prefixes when using all
> CIDR sizes between /29 and /48 (the largest CIDR size that is not
> filtered). To prevent this many prefixes from flooding the DFZ, many ASes
> set a maximum prefix limit on their eBGP sessions.
>
> When initially introduced, these max-prefix limits prevented prefix
> de-aggregation attacks. In today's hyper-connected world, prefix limits
> transform these attacks into session-hunting challenges. To better
> illustrate this relationship, consider the following example: If an
> adversary combines two remote-peering offerings of BSO's IXReach [2] and
> Epsilon's Infinity Platform [3], they can establish ports at more than a
> hundred peering LANs. If this adversary uses Hurricane Electric as their
> IPv6 transit provider and establish a BGP session at every in-common
> peering LAN [4], this will lead to 100+ sessions. With a per-session limit
> of e.g. 500 prefixes, the adversary could redistribute 50K unique prefixes
> via this setup alone.
>
> If an adversary further increases the number of remote peering providers,
> adds announcements from BGP-enabled VPS services (e.g., Vultr [5] among
> many others [6]), and contracts additional IPv6 transit providers, they may
> globally increase the current IPv6 routing table size manifold. Notably,
> each of these new routes would have a valid ROV status once the adversary
> adds a single ROA entry for a /29 with a max CIDR size of /48; hence, they
> would pass the redistribution requirements for various transit providers.
>
> While many current router models support multiple million IPv6 routes,
> especially older models may crash, drop sessions, or behave in other
> unintended ways when either their FIB or RIB runs out of memory. When the
> adversary also withdraws all routes simultaneously, the number of updates
> generated from BGP's path-hunting may further lead to very high load for
> extended periods of time.
>
> To put this into perspective: Some of you might have noticed increased CPU
> load alongside other effects when Vultr was de-aggregating 12k IPv6
> prefixes on October 5th [7]. Using the different methods described above,
> an highly-motivated adversary might be able to produce 1-2 orders of
> magnitude more updates.
>
> Please note that we performed various smaller (<600 prefixes)
> de-aggregation tests as part of our research---see sections 6 and 8 in the
> document referenced at the end of this notification for detailed
> explanations. While our experimental setup was very similar to the October
> 5th incident (we also announced address space obtained from SecureBit via
> VMs within Vultr), we are in no way related to that incident neither did we
> share any information about our research or findings with individuals
> outside our research group prior to the start of our private disclosure
> phase on October 11th.
>
>
> # Detection, Mitigation, and Prevention Mechanisms.
>
> Luckily, prefix de-aggregation attacks are easily detectable (e.g., based
> on prefix-limit notification thresholds or direct routing table size
> monitoring) and can be mitigated quickly by filtering either the more
> specifics of the covering prefix or all prefixes announced by the
> adversary's ASN(s). Effectively, damage can only be done within the human
> reaction time---which we hope to shorten with this notification.
>
> To protect yourself from prefix de-agg

Detecting, mitigating, and preventing distributed large-scale prefix de-aggregation attacks

2022-10-20 Thread Lars Prehn

Dear NANOG,

Our apologies to those who received this message via multiple channels.

My colleagues and I recently revisited the topic of prefix 
de-aggregation attacks. We believe that the current IPv6 allocation 
policies combined with the ever-growing number of interconnection 
opportunities may facilitate those attacks to the point where they may 
circumvent traditional prevention mechanisms. Hence, we'd like to raise 
awareness on how to detect, mitigate, and prevent these kinds of attacks.



# Prefix De-aggregation Attacks

While allocation policies in IPv4 are very tight, even a new LIR can 
obtain, e.g., a /29 IPv6 address block from RIPE without justification 
[1]. This /29 may source more than a million unique IPv6 prefixes when 
using all CIDR sizes between /29 and /48 (the largest CIDR size that is 
not filtered). To prevent this many prefixes from flooding the DFZ, many 
ASes set a maximum prefix limit on their eBGP sessions.


When initially introduced, these max-prefix limits prevented prefix 
de-aggregation attacks. In today's hyper-connected world, prefix limits 
transform these attacks into session-hunting challenges. To better 
illustrate this relationship, consider the following example: If an 
adversary combines two remote-peering offerings of BSO's IXReach [2] and 
Epsilon's Infinity Platform [3], they can establish ports at more than a 
hundred peering LANs. If this adversary uses Hurricane Electric as their 
IPv6 transit provider and establish a BGP session at every in-common 
peering LAN [4], this will lead to 100+ sessions. With a per-session 
limit of e.g. 500 prefixes, the adversary could redistribute 50K unique 
prefixes via this setup alone.


If an adversary further increases the number of remote peering 
providers, adds announcements from BGP-enabled VPS services (e.g., Vultr 
[5] among many others [6]), and contracts additional IPv6 transit 
providers, they may globally increase the current IPv6 routing table 
size manifold. Notably, each of these new routes would have a valid ROV 
status once the adversary adds a single ROA entry for a /29 with a max 
CIDR size of /48; hence, they would pass the redistribution requirements 
for various transit providers.


While many current router models support multiple million IPv6 routes, 
especially older models may crash, drop sessions, or behave in other 
unintended ways when either their FIB or RIB runs out of memory. When 
the adversary also withdraws all routes simultaneously, the number of 
updates generated from BGP's path-hunting may further lead to very high 
load for extended periods of time.


To put this into perspective: Some of you might have noticed increased 
CPU load alongside other effects when Vultr was de-aggregating 12k IPv6 
prefixes on October 5th [7]. Using the different methods described 
above, an highly-motivated adversary might be able to produce 1-2 orders 
of magnitude more updates.


Please note that we performed various smaller (<600 prefixes) 
de-aggregation tests as part of our research---see sections 6 and 8 in 
the document referenced at the end of this notification for detailed 
explanations. While our experimental setup was very similar to the 
October 5th incident (we also announced address space obtained from 
SecureBit via VMs within Vultr), we are in no way related to that 
incident neither did we share any information about our research or 
findings with individuals outside our research group prior to the start 
of our private disclosure phase on October 11th.



# Detection, Mitigation, and Prevention Mechanisms.

Luckily, prefix de-aggregation attacks are easily detectable (e.g., 
based on prefix-limit notification thresholds or direct routing table 
size monitoring) and can be mitigated quickly by filtering either the 
more specifics of the covering prefix or all prefixes announced by the 
adversary's ASN(s). Effectively, damage can only be done within the 
human reaction time---which we hope to shorten with this notification.


To protect yourself from prefix de-aggregation attacks, you may 
establish dynamic yet tight per-session limits on all eBGP sessions. As 
an adversary could enter unreasonably large values into databases such 
as PeeringDB, we'd recommend to not solely rely on them but also accept 
at most 1.5-2x the number of yesterday's prefixes for peers and 
customers and 1.2x yesterday's routing table size for transit providers 
(which would currently reflect a headroom of ~32k prefixes with a yearly 
growth rate of <50k prefixes [8]). We'd also recommend ensuring that the 
summed prefix limits across all sessions do not drastically exceed the 
router's maximal FIB size.


To protect others, you may:

(i) ensure that you only redistribute a certain number of routes per 
origin; currently, AS 9808 announces the most (~4K) IPv6 prefixes.


(ii) ensure that you only redistribute a certain number of more-specific 
routes for each assigned address block; currently, 2409:8000::/20

abha

2022-10-20 Thread Randy Bush
abha ahuja died 21 years ago today; a force in routing, ops, and trying
to liberate the culture.

fort hose who want to pull threads,
http://www.neebu.net/~khuon/abha/
https://archive.nanog.org/resources/scholarships/abha_ahuja

there are others here who will have much better cites (hint hint).

randy


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Matthew Petach
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 6:23 AM Jon Lewis  wrote:

> [...]
> While writing this though, two things occurred to me.
>
> 1) Are there any networks with routing policy that looks at prepends and
> says "if we see a peering path with >X number of prepends (or maybe
> just path length >X), demote the localpref to transit or lower"?  "i.e.
> They obviously don't want us using this path, turn it into a backup
> path."
>
> 2) Particularly back when it was found some BGP implementations broke when
> encountering unusually long as-paths, I think it became somewhat common
> to reject routes with "crazy long" as-paths.  If such policy is still
> in place in many networks, excessive prepending would actually have the
> desired effect for those networks.  i.e. The excessive prepends would
> get that path rejected, keeping it from being used.
>

At a previous job, I explicitly crafted policies that were structured such
that:

if PREFIXLENGTH > MAXPREFIXLENGTH then reject
if ASPATH > MAXASPATH then reject
strip_internal_communities
if ASPATH > MAX_VALID_PATH then
   set localpref = TRANSIT_DEPREF_LOCALPREF
   set communities DEPREF_TRANSIT
   blah blah blah
if match external_signal_communities then
  set localpref
  set internal propagation communities
  set external propagation communities
  blah blah blah
then accept

that way, if the prefix size is too small, or the aspath is too long
(>100),
it gets dropped before even bothering to evaluate communities; save
every bit of CPU and memory you can.
Then, strip your internal communities off everything else that's a
reasonable
path length;
set a lower threshold for what you consider a "reasonable" internet
diameter
to be, including a reasonable 3x prepend at one or two levels; if it's
longer than
that, it's a backup path at best, treat it that way (below standard transit
level)
finally, on all the remaining routes, evaluate your external signalling
communities,
and apply internal signalling communities as appropriate, and process
normally.

There's a clear tradeoff between trying to ensure maximum reachability
to the rest of the internet versus protecting your CPU and memory from
unnecessary work and state-keeping.  As mentioned in another thread,
what each network decides the MAXPREFIXLENGTH is will depend on
their relationships and the capabilities of their hardware.  It doesn't
necessarily
have to be /24 and /48, but it should be set at the longest value your
network
can happily support, unless you want to chase down odd connectivity issues
in other people's networks.  ^_^;

Thanks!

Matt


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Tom Beecher
>
> 1) Are there any networks with routing policy that looks at prepends and
> says "if we see a peering path with >X number of prepends (or maybe
> just path length >X), demote the localpref to transit or lower"?  "i.e.
> They obviously don't want us using this path, turn it into a backup
> path."
>

Yes. At a previous job, this is exactly what I did. If the path length was
X or longer, set localpref to our last resort value. If path length was Y
or longer, then I dropped completely, and at that point following defaults
was just as good. Maybe once I hit something that caused a performance
problem , but an email to that AS was all it took to fix ; they didn't
realize they were prepending that much and corrected it.

I have firsthand knowledge of some other networks that do similar things.


On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 9:21 AM Jon Lewis  wrote:

> On Thu, 20 Oct 2022, Tom Beecher wrote:
>
> > 1. Prepending by itself isn’t bad. Prepending past the point that it is
> effective in accomplishing anything is what you generally want to avoid.
> Even then, it’s not nearly
> > as big a deal as some make it out to be in most cases.
>
> To me, it's somewhat comical to see routes prepended 10-20 or more times.
> If one or two prepends doesn't do it, 10-20 isn't likely to either.
>
> AFAIK, it's pretty common to use localpref to prefer peering (free) routes
> over transit (paid paths), and in cases where remote networks see your
> prepended path via peering, "no amount" of prepends is going change the
> fact that they prefer the free path.
>
> While writing this though, two things occurred to me.
>
> 1) Are there any networks with routing policy that looks at prepends and
> says "if we see a peering path with >X number of prepends (or maybe
> just path length >X), demote the localpref to transit or lower"?  "i.e.
> They obviously don't want us using this path, turn it into a backup
> path."
>
> 2) Particularly back when it was found some BGP implementations broke when
> encountering unusually long as-paths, I think it became somewhat common
> to reject routes with "crazy long" as-paths.  If such policy is still
> in place in many networks, excessive prepending would actually have the
> desired effect for those networks.  i.e. The excessive prepends would
> get that path rejected, keeping it from being used.
>
> --
>   Jon Lewis, MCP :)   |  I route
>   StackPath, Sr. Neteng   |  therefore you are
> _ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_
>


RE: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Kevin Burke
Reading between the lines this network’s current lack of diverse providers is 
consistent with a geographic/monopoly disadvantage.  I do agree that your 
transit provider is in bad form to pad your routes, but it does happen.  A 
phone call or email to understand their limitations may be helpful.  Trying to 
fit all of your traffic into an upstream’s own uplink that is far to small does 
not provide the best user experience.  It could be an bug in the route-map.  
Speaking of bugs, trying to use communities can cause you to observe bugs in 
other network’s route-maps (with great power comes great…).

Padding much past three usually has little affect.  Splitting your 
advertisement into say four smaller announcements and starting to advertise 
them one at a time through your preferred provider is a good place to start.  
Traffic will prefer the more specific route.  With luck that was done last 
night 😊

Once you have balanced this out somewhat, you have bought yourself time.  Next 
fun thing is to understand how this works when one provider fails or similar.  
Traffic can prefer the oldest route, so a small bump down the road can cause 
unanticipated traffic changes the next nightly peak.  Or to put it another way, 
this is how the sausage is made.

P.S. Both of us top posting is also bad form.

Kevin Burke
802-540-0979
Burlington Telecom
200 Church St, Burlington, VT

From: NANOG  On Behalf Of 
Douglas Fischer
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2022 8:51 AM
To: Pirawat WATANAPONGSE 
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation 
to do BGP Load-sharing?

WARNING!! This message originated from an External Source. Please use proper 
judgment and caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to 
this email.
If your Upstream(Transit provider) prepends your routes without you asking or 
authorizing it to do so, you should SERIOUSLY consider switching providers!

In the other email I talked about traffic engineering BGP communities.
If those prepends were made from some community you were applying... OK, that's 
great!
Even better if you could apply a community that did something like "apply 2 
prepends for south america only".

But a Transit Provider changing the AS-PATH (in addition to the mandatory hop) 
arbitrarily without your consent is not for good people.


P.S. Your email replies are breaking threads in email readers. I suggest you 
review the email client tool.

Em qui., 20 de out. de 2022 às 09:16, Pirawat WATANAPONGSE via NANOG 
mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> escreveu:
Dear all,


Before all else:
thank you all for the lightning-fast responses (even taking the time zone 
advantage into account).
I really, really, really appreciate all your recommendations.

Virtually all of you recommend prepending as the first choice.
I also get the feeling that you guys consider de-aggregation “distasteful” (at 
the least) but sometimes unavoidable.

I have considered the prepending myself, but dare not implement it yet
for the fear that BGP (Human) Community will burn me alive, witch-hunt style,
because of the following reasons:
1. I can see from looking glass(es) that my upstreams already practice 
prepending (some paths) at their level (at least 3 more hops [x4]), supposedly 
to “balance” their bandwidth.
2. Should I start prepending mine, I might upset their balance, causing them to 
prepend more, thus starting a “prepend war”. [I imagine that x20+ prepending 
starts out this way]

The way I see it, prepending (or maybe even the whole BGP-Path thing) is a 
local-optimization problem: it’s only best for someone, not globally.
And the Higher-Tiers (Lower Tier-Numbers) will always “engineer” me in the end.

Worse yet, I might be out-voted by de-aggregation insider “cultists” anyway.

Which forces me to proactively ask you guys questions about ROV-Overlapping and 
ROV “Hijack Gap” soon, in another posting with separate “Subject:”.

Again, Thank you.


Cheers,

Pirawat.


P.S.  [Off-Topic] Any comment on the “SCION” System?
Any good (I will even take "academically")?
[Reference: https://scion-architecture.net/]



--
Douglas Fernando Fischer
Engº de Controle e Automação


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread William Herrin
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 5:13 AM Pirawat WATANAPONGSE via NANOG
 wrote:
> I have considered the prepending myself, but dare not implement it yet
> for the fear that BGP (Human) Community will burn me alive, witch-hunt style,
> because of the following reasons:
> 1. I can see from looking glass(es) that my upstreams already practice 
> prepending (some paths) at their level (at least 3 more hops [x4]), 
> supposedly to “balance” their bandwidth.
> 2. Should I start prepending mine, I might upset their balance, causing them 
> to prepend more, thus starting a “prepend war”. [I imagine that x20+ 
> prepending starts out this way]
>
> The way I see it, prepending (or maybe even the whole BGP-Path thing) is a 
> local-optimization problem: it’s only best for someone, not globally.
> And the Higher-Tiers (Lower Tier-Numbers) will always “engineer” me in the 
> end.
>
> Worse yet, I might be out-voted by de-aggregation insider “cultists” anyway.

Hi Pirawat,

You asked the experts how it's done. It's done with prepends. Do you
really want to argue with the answer?

De-aggregation is a last resort, the bluntest tool in the toolchest.
And it costs other people money so they don't appreciate you doing it
unless you absolutely have to.
https://bill.herrin.us/network/bgpcost.html

As others have said, no one is going to yell at you because you
prepended your AS two or three or even five times. If you don't get
the desired effect after 5, you're running up against a problem
prepends won't solve. The typical problem is that your upstream has
used "localprefs" to prefer a particular path to you, overriding AS
path length as the deciding factor. Competent upstreams that employ
this technique also allow you to set a "BGP community" on your
advertisement that overrides this behavior. A "BGP Community" is a
32-bit number often expressed as two 16-bit numbers the first of which
is the ISP's AS number. When detected by the router, the number causes
it to apply some locally-chosen rule to the route. If you ask them,
the ISP will provide you with a list of "BGP Communities" (numbers)
they allow you to set on your route advertisement along with what
action they will take if they see that number.

Regards,
Bill Herrin




-- 
For hire. https://bill.herrin.us/resume/


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Jon Lewis

On Thu, 20 Oct 2022, Tom Beecher wrote:


1. Prepending by itself isn’t bad. Prepending past the point that it is 
effective in accomplishing anything is what you generally want to avoid. Even 
then, it’s not nearly
as big a deal as some make it out to be in most cases. 


To me, it's somewhat comical to see routes prepended 10-20 or more times. 
If one or two prepends doesn't do it, 10-20 isn't likely to either.


AFAIK, it's pretty common to use localpref to prefer peering (free) routes 
over transit (paid paths), and in cases where remote networks see your 
prepended path via peering, "no amount" of prepends is going change the 
fact that they prefer the free path.


While writing this though, two things occurred to me.

1) Are there any networks with routing policy that looks at prepends and
   says "if we see a peering path with >X number of prepends (or maybe
   just path length >X), demote the localpref to transit or lower"?  "i.e.
   They obviously don't want us using this path, turn it into a backup
   path."

2) Particularly back when it was found some BGP implementations broke when
   encountering unusually long as-paths, I think it became somewhat common
   to reject routes with "crazy long" as-paths.  If such policy is still
   in place in many networks, excessive prepending would actually have the
   desired effect for those networks.  i.e. The excessive prepends would
   get that path rejected, keeping it from being used.

--
 Jon Lewis, MCP :)   |  I route
 StackPath, Sr. Neteng   |  therefore you are
_ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Tom Beecher
1. Prepending by itself isn’t bad. Prepending past the point that it is
effective in accomplishing anything is what you generally want to avoid.
Even then, it’s not nearly as big a deal as some make it out to be in most
cases.

2. De-aggregation has it’s uses and it’s place. Have a /20 , but announcing
all the component /24s, even though you aren’t doing anything different
with any of those? Bad practice. You’re just polluting the global table
size for no good reason.  However, perhaps you have a set of hosts in a
single /24 that you want to try and protect from a prefix hijack. Announce
the /20 and that singe /24. Not perfect protection , but provides some
cover, and isn’t that big a deal.

The answers to all of these questions are really : “It depends on what you
are trying to do.” There are generally accepted solutions to certain
problems, and there are plenty of dumb solutions that are the only thing
possible due to circumstances, so sometimes that’s what you have to do too.

Don’t worry about the pitchforks so much. :)

On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 08:15 Pirawat WATANAPONGSE via NANOG <
nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

> Dear all,
>
>
> Before all else:
> thank you all for the lightning-fast responses (even taking the time zone
> advantage into account).
> I really, really, really appreciate all your recommendations.
>
> Virtually all of you recommend prepending as the first choice.
> I also get the feeling that you guys consider de-aggregation “distasteful”
> (at the least) but sometimes unavoidable.
>
> I have considered the prepending myself, but dare not implement it yet
> for the fear that BGP (Human) Community will burn me alive, witch-hunt
> style,
> because of the following reasons:
> 1. I can see from looking glass(es) that my upstreams already practice
> prepending (some paths) at their level (at least 3 more hops [x4]),
> supposedly to “balance” their bandwidth.
> 2. Should I start prepending mine, I might upset their balance, causing
> them to prepend more, thus starting a “prepend war”. [I imagine that x20+
> prepending starts out this way]
>
> The way I see it, prepending (or maybe even the whole BGP-Path thing) is a
> local-optimization problem: it’s only best for someone, not globally.
> And the Higher-Tiers (Lower Tier-Numbers) will always “engineer” me in the
> end.
>
> Worse yet, I might be out-voted by de-aggregation insider “cultists”
> anyway.
>
> Which forces me to proactively ask you guys questions about
> ROV-Overlapping and ROV “Hijack Gap” soon, in another posting with separate
> “Subject:”.
>
> Again, Thank you.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Pirawat.
>
>
> P.S.  [Off-Topic] Any comment on the “SCION” System?
> Any good (I will even take "academically")?
> [Reference: https://scion-architecture.net/]
>
>


Re: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Douglas Fischer
If your Upstream(Transit provider) prepends your routes without you asking
or authorizing it to do so, you should SERIOUSLY consider switching
providers!

In the other email I talked about traffic engineering BGP communities.
If those prepends were made from some community you were applying... OK,
that's great!
Even better if you could apply a community that did something like "apply 2
prepends for south america only".

But a Transit Provider changing the AS-PATH (in addition to the mandatory
hop) arbitrarily without your consent is not for good people.


P.S. Your email replies are breaking threads in email readers. I suggest
you review the email client tool.


Em qui., 20 de out. de 2022 às 09:16, Pirawat WATANAPONGSE via NANOG <
nanog@nanog.org> escreveu:

> Dear all,
>
>
> Before all else:
> thank you all for the lightning-fast responses (even taking the time zone
> advantage into account).
> I really, really, really appreciate all your recommendations.
>
> Virtually all of you recommend prepending as the first choice.
> I also get the feeling that you guys consider de-aggregation “distasteful”
> (at the least) but sometimes unavoidable.
>
> I have considered the prepending myself, but dare not implement it yet
> for the fear that BGP (Human) Community will burn me alive, witch-hunt
> style,
> because of the following reasons:
> 1. I can see from looking glass(es) that my upstreams already practice
> prepending (some paths) at their level (at least 3 more hops [x4]),
> supposedly to “balance” their bandwidth.
> 2. Should I start prepending mine, I might upset their balance, causing
> them to prepend more, thus starting a “prepend war”. [I imagine that x20+
> prepending starts out this way]
>
> The way I see it, prepending (or maybe even the whole BGP-Path thing) is a
> local-optimization problem: it’s only best for someone, not globally.
> And the Higher-Tiers (Lower Tier-Numbers) will always “engineer” me in the
> end.
>
> Worse yet, I might be out-voted by de-aggregation insider “cultists”
> anyway.
>
> Which forces me to proactively ask you guys questions about
> ROV-Overlapping and ROV “Hijack Gap” soon, in another posting with separate
> “Subject:”.
>
> Again, Thank you.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Pirawat.
>
>
> P.S.  [Off-Topic] Any comment on the “SCION” System?
> Any good (I will even take "academically")?
> [Reference: https://scion-architecture.net/]
>
>

-- 
Douglas Fernando Fischer
Engº de Controle e Automação


Re: Prepending

2022-10-20 Thread Tom Beecher
Always a bunch of them out there. Sometimes accidental, sometimes from
folks who are trying to do something , just using ineffective methods to do
it.


On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 10:21 Sandoiu Mihai  wrote:

> Hi
>
>
>
> We have witnessed a lot of prepending in the last days, we got a few
> internet routes that have 30…200 prepends, did you face the same issue?
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Mihai
>


RE: Newbies Question: Do I really need to sacrifice Prefix-aggregation to do BGP Load-sharing?

2022-10-20 Thread Pirawat WATANAPONGSE via NANOG
Dear all,


Before all else:
thank you all for the lightning-fast responses (even taking the time zone
advantage into account).
I really, really, really appreciate all your recommendations.

Virtually all of you recommend prepending as the first choice.
I also get the feeling that you guys consider de-aggregation “distasteful”
(at the least) but sometimes unavoidable.

I have considered the prepending myself, but dare not implement it yet
for the fear that BGP (Human) Community will burn me alive, witch-hunt
style,
because of the following reasons:
1. I can see from looking glass(es) that my upstreams already practice
prepending (some paths) at their level (at least 3 more hops [x4]),
supposedly to “balance” their bandwidth.
2. Should I start prepending mine, I might upset their balance, causing
them to prepend more, thus starting a “prepend war”. [I imagine that x20+
prepending starts out this way]

The way I see it, prepending (or maybe even the whole BGP-Path thing) is a
local-optimization problem: it’s only best for someone, not globally.
And the Higher-Tiers (Lower Tier-Numbers) will always “engineer” me in the
end.

Worse yet, I might be out-voted by de-aggregation insider “cultists” anyway.

Which forces me to proactively ask you guys questions about ROV-Overlapping
and ROV “Hijack Gap” soon, in another posting with separate “Subject:”.

Again, Thank you.


Cheers,

Pirawat.


P.S.  [Off-Topic] Any comment on the “SCION” System?
Any good (I will even take "academically")?
[Reference: https://scion-architecture.net/]