Gmail contact please?
Is there a good contact at Gmail that can take care of a persistant issue for me? Thanks in advance, Dave Rand d...@kelkea.com or d...@bungi.com --
ATT/SBC Global to AS13285 routing issue
If someone from ATT or SBC global could contact me off list, please? 2.96.0.0/13 is pretty much unreachable from portions of the Bay Area from the sbcglobal network. I've opened a couple of tickets on this, but no joy yet. Thank you --
Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers
[In the message entitled Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers on Jun 8, 16:03, J. Oquendo writes:] All humor aside, I'm curious to know what can anyone truly do at the end of the day if say a botnet was used to instigate a situation. Surely someone would have to say something to the tune of better now than never to implement BCP filtering on a large scale. Knobs, Levers, Dials and Switches: Now and Then (please sir, may I have some more ?) is 7 years old yet I wonder in practice, how many networks have 38/84 filtering. I'm wondering why it hasn't been implemented off the shelf in some of the newer equipment. This is not to say huge backbones should have it, but think about it, if smaller networks implemented it from the rip, the overheard wouldn't hurt that many of the bigger guys. On the contrary, my theory is it would save them headaches in the long run... Guess that's a pragmatic approach. Better that than an immediate pessimistic one. It's really way, way past time for us to actually deal with compromised computers on our networks. Abuse desks need to have the power to filter customers immediately on notification of activity. We need to have tools to help us identify compromised customers. We need to have policies that actually work to help notify the customers when they are compromised. None of this needs to be done for free. There needs to be a security fee charged _all_ customers, which would fund the abuse desk. With more than 100,000,000 compromised computers out there, it's really time for us to step up to the plate, and make this happen. --
Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers
[In the message entitled Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers on Jun 8, 14:30, Brielle Bruns writes:] Legit customers get caught in the cross-fire, and they suffer - but at the same time, those legit customers are the only ones that will be able to force a change on said provider. They contact us, and act all innocent, and tell people we're being unreasonable, neglecting to tell people at the same time that the 'unreasonable' DNSbl maintainer only wants for them to do a simple task that thousands of other providers and administrators have done before. I'm somewhat familiar with the concept :-) But yes, this indeed is currently the only effective way to cause change at the ISP level. Ferg is very correct in that Change Is Coming at the goverment level. That is the wrong place for it to happen, but it will also be very effective. I'm hopeful that more networks will take it upon themselves to make it happen before it is forced on them. --
Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers
[In the message entitled Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers on Jun 8, 13:33, Owen DeLong writes:] I realize your fond of punishing all of us to subsidize the ignorant, = but I would rather see those with compromised machines pay the bill for = letting their machines get compromised than have to subsidize their = ignorant or worse behavior. I'm fond of getting the issues addressed by getting the ISPs to be involved with the problem. If that means users get charged clean up fees instead of a security fee, that's fine. ISPs remain in the unique position of being able to identify the customer, the machine, and to verify the traffic. It can be done. --
Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers
[In the message entitled Re: Nato warns of strike against cyber attackers on Jun 9, 0:26, Steven Bellovin writes:] A liability scheme, with penalties on users and vendors, is certainly = worth considering. Such a scheme would also have side-effects -- think = of the effect on open source software. It would also be a lovely source = of income for lawyers, and would inhibit new software development. The = tradeoff may be worth while -- or it may not, because I have yet to see = evidence that *anyone* can produce really secure software without = driving up costs at least five-fold. The vast majority of users that I interact with (and yes, I am first to admit that it has been only thousands, perhaps less than 10,000 over the years, so it is a small sample) are quite happy to be informed of a compromised system. It's not, for the most part, that they are malicious. Just unaware. The bad guys are very stealthy, and the but, I can't see anything wrong on my screen! is a huge obstacle to overcome. Once they are made aware of the problem, the vast majority work quickly to fix it. Yes, some are clueless. Some want someone else to fix it. But most are simply unaware that they have been owned, and want the infection gone. We've tried to educate users for tens of years of the dangers of unsafe computing. Doesn't work. The users have been trained to click and install whatever they are told, because that makes it work. But when they _are_ compromised, and _are_ informed, most users do seek out a fix. Some will do it themselves. Some will hire someone to do it for them. When abuse desks content-filter reports, and don't pass on notifications to the customer, or wait until there are more complaints, or... this ends up with networks that have massive levels of infection. Yes, I know - we're all busy, and abuse@ is kind of the last priority on most networks, but it really is bad out there, and we need the network operators to help. Please. For those network operators that would like a 5 year view on their network, please drop me an email with your ASN, and I'll be happy to send you a text file, xls, or ods (your pick) of a view of the historical spam traffic. No obligation, and no salesman will call. Really. --
Re: Repeated Blacklisting / IP reputation
[In the message entitled Re: Repeated Blacklisting / IP reputation on Sep 8, 14:34, Joe Greco writes:] there is a fundamental disconnect here. the IP space is neutral. it has no bias toward or against social behaviours. its a tool. the actual/real target here are the people who are using these tools to be antisocial. blacklisting IP space is always reactive and should only beused in emergency and as a -TEMPORARY- expedient. IMHO of course., YMMV. If people were given an option to block this IP for 30 minutes, 24 hours, 30 days, 12 months, 5 years, or forever - I wonder how many people would just shrug and click forever. This may lead to the discovery of another fundamental disconnect - or two. IP address space is neutral, but the operators of the space either permit, or deny, the social behaviour which comes from these spaces. For what it's worth, I just completed a study of about 5 years of data on spam. I looked at 100,000,000 IP addresses which had sent me spam. The median duration of sending was 300 days. There was a pronounced peak at 2-3 years of about 30%. The vast majority was more than 30 days. forever is pretty close to right, based on current behaviour. --
