Re: BGP Engines with support to "RTFilter address-family"

[netravnen+nanog]

On Mon, 27 Feb 2023 at 22:20, Jeff Tantsura  wrote:
> FRR hasn’t implemented RFC4364 (nor planning to my knowledge (unless someone 
> comes and codes it ;-))

$ grep -P -r -i 'IANA_SAFI_.* = 1\d{2,}' frr
frr/lib/iana_afi.h: IANA_SAFI_MPLS_VPN = 128,
frr/lib/iana_afi.h: IANA_SAFI_FLOWSPEC = 133

No SAFI 132 [Route Target constrains]

The mentions in the frr issue tracker for "rfc 4684" are now old entries.

:-|

Re: BGP Engines with support to "RTFilter address-family"

[netravnen+nanog]

On Mon, 27 Feb 2023 at 22:20, Jeff Tantsura  wrote:
> FRR hasn’t implemented RFC4364 (nor planning to my knowledge (unless someone 
> comes and codes it ;-))

$ grep -P -r -i 'IANA_SAFI_.* = 1\d{2,}' frr
frr/lib/iana_afi.h: IANA_SAFI_MPLS_VPN = 128,
frr/lib/iana_afi.h: IANA_SAFI_FLOWSPEC = 133

No SAFI 132 [Route Target constrains]
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/safi-namespace/safi-namespace.xhtml#safi-namespace-2,
https://www.iana.org/go/rfc4684)

The mentions in the issue tracker are old entries,
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/issues/5206 (Oct 2019)
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/101
https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/issues?q=%22rfc+4684%22

:-|

Re: BGP Engines with support to "RTFilter address-family"

[netravnen+nanog]

On Sun, 26 Feb 2023 at 21:48, Douglas Fischer  wrote:
> But I'm looking for an open-source engine that supports it.
>
> The official FRR documentation does not mention anything about RFC 4364, or 
> RTFilter address family.
> So, I think FRR does not support RTFilter Constrained Route Distribution.

Searching for "RFC 4364"

http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/search.html?q=%22RFC+4364%22_keywords=yes=default#

Yields the following search results in the user documentation portal

http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/bgp.html?highlight=%22RFC%204364%22
http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/vnc.html?highlight=%22RFC%204364%22
http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/ospfd.html?highlight=%22RFC%204364%22
http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/extlog.html?highlight=%22RFC%204364%22
http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/overview.html?highlight=%22RFC%204364%22

Re: AS9498 Bharti BGP hijacks

[netravnen+nanog]

I would (from a peering perspective) see this as a configuration error
where somebody/someone botched a configuration change in a specific
network router.

Partly because
a) seeing as the reports is sequentially numbered,
b) as - already pointed out - it is either /30 or /29.
c) thou I'm puzzled about the /27 leaked https://bgpstream.com/event/78122

Somebody noticed, somebody or another fixed the error in silence and
said nothing afterwards.

Sadly, No route-maps or the like were in place to prevent the prefix
leaks from happening. That in it-self should be stuff for the people
at Origin ASN 9498  (BHARTI Airtel Ltd.) to think a little "harder"
about in the future. "Routers mostly only fail because of the selected many
people managing them."

Kind regards,
Christoffer,
CH11404-RIPE

On 2 April 2017 at 00:09, Youssef Bengelloun-Zahr  wrote:
> Hi,
>
> What's more concerning here is that those prefixes were able to pass through 
> all filters on their way, via their transits and maybe probably via their 
> peers as well. Haven't we been here before !?!
>
> And here I thought 2017 internet would be a "safer" place. Silly me...
>
> Y.
>
>
>
>> Le 1 avr. 2017 à 23:33, Job Snijders  a écrit :
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Perhaps another explanation is that these are router2router linknets
>> between the involved parties, and all we are seeing is the effect of
>> "redistribute connected". If this is the case, the word "hijack" might be
>> somewhat strong worded.
>>
>> Kind regards,
>>
>> Job
>>
>> On Sat, 1 Apr 2017 at 23:25, Tyler Conrad  wrote:
>>
>> So not only are they hijacking prefixes, they're leaking the  /30s to their
>> peers. Failure through and through.
>>
>> On Saturday, April 1, 2017, George William Herbert > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Hey, Bharti, knock that off.
>>>
>>> http://bgpstream.com/event/78126
>>> http://bgpstream.com/event/78125
>>> http://bgpstream.com/event/78124
>>> http://bgpstream.com/event/78123
>>> http://bgpstream.com/event/78122
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>