Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-10-01 Thread Mark Tinka




On 10/1/21 19:28, Randy Bush wrote:


in fact, this seems to be the modern conservative style for some years.
i sometimes wonder if it is worth the config pain.


If having routers dedicated to peering, transit or edge functions is 
worth the extra pain, in lieu of doing it all on one box?


Mark.


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-10-01 Thread Mark Tinka



On 10/1/21 20:17, Adam Thompson wrote:

Do people in other parts of the world have access (both physical and 
logical) to enough bilateral peering (and budgets...) that it makes 
sense to deploy a router per peer?


Certainly not a router per peer, but a peering router per city, where it 
may connect to one or more exchange points. This is what we do.


Granted, it does increase your budgeting complexity, but in our case, 
over time, the delineation has actually simplified operations that the 
architecture has paid itself back many times over.


In the real world, this is not always possible, and I understand that a 
peering router for some networks may also be providing transit as well 
as edge functions. This is quite normal, even though it can create other 
complexities depending on whom the eBGP session is with - which then 
lends itself to running parts or all of the Internet in VRF's and all 
that hocus pocus. When we tried this sort of thing at a previous job 
some 14 years ago, it was just simpler to have separate routers each 
handling transit, peering and customer edge.


Mark.

Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-10-01 Thread Saku Ytti
Hey Adam,

Peer is homonym, in this context peer refers to a BGP session with
whom you exchange your customer routes with, and it implies absence of
customers and transit in the same router. Whereas you interpreted peer
in its wider meaning of any BGP session.

On Fri, 1 Oct 2021 at 21:21, Adam Thompson  wrote:
>
> IMHO, no, it's not worth it... at least, not unless you have a larger budget 
> than mine, a larger department than mine, and possibly more skilled operators 
> than I am.
>
> I don't even grok how this is supposed to work - the only place I "peer" in 
> the classical sense is my local IX; all my other "peers" are ALSO either 
> downstream or upstream networks for me.  (e.g. my NREN regional affiliate, 
> who is a lateral peer for many prefixes, but also an upstream access network 
> to reach the national, and then global, REN[s])
> If a router doesn't have a default route, and also doesn't have full tables, 
> I can't use it for downstream customers even if they're BGP peers; they're 
> expecting me to either provide full tables, or act as a default gateway.
>
> Do people in other parts of the world have access (both physical and logical) 
> to enough bilateral peering (and budgets...) that it makes sense to deploy a 
> router per peer?
>
> For the NREN case, it's not full tables, and it's not default routes, but 
> it's still a pretty big table.   And they're the location of the "triangle" 
> routing where I have several downstream clients who also peer directly with 
> them.  I'm both a lateral "peer" AND a downstream customer to them... so they 
> tried to turn on uRPF on the L3 interfaces towards me and, well, bad things 
> happened to our mutual customers' traffic.  Admittedly this was triggered by 
> the downstream customer doing questionable things with different-length 
> prefixes, but the fact remains uRPF causes (sometimes partial) outages 
> anywhere you have multi-path "downstream" clients.
> And based on the topology, I cannot conceive of any set of ACLs that I could 
> feasibly apply to inbound traffic on the peering link with my NREN affiliate, 
> which makes it... more difficult to be BCP/MARNS-compliant.  Commercial 
> traffic regularly transits R unexpectedly, and vice-versa: path asymmetry 
> is common here.
>
> -Adam
>
>
> P.S. the topology in question was as simple as this.  Cust. advertised /N to 
> me, but /N+1 to the R side, so traffic started taking an unanticipated 
> detour via the R side.  IRR/RPKI does not solve this: it was a legitimate 
> advertisement.
>  ┌─┐ ┌───┐
>┌►│MRnet├►│R│
>│ └─┘ └───┘
>│▲
>││
>  ┌─┴───┐ ┌──┴───┐┌──┐
>  │Cust.├►│MERLIN├───►│Commercial│
>  └─┘ └──┘└──┘
>
>
> Adam Thompson
> Consultant, Infrastructure Services
>
> 100 - 135 Innovation Drive
> Winnipeg, MB, R3T 6A8
> (204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only)
> athomp...@merlin.mb.ca
> www.merlin.mb.ca
> 
> From: NANOG  on behalf of 
> Randy Bush 
> Sent: October 1, 2021 12:28
> To: Mark Tinka 
> Cc: North American Network Operators' Group 
> Subject: Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more
>
> > A partial table with no default is perfectly fine for a peering router.
> >
> > As long as your peering router knows how to get to your prefixes and
> > those of your customers, as well as the prefixes of the networks you
> > peer with, you're good to go.
>
> in fact, this seems to be the modern conservative style for some years.
> i sometimes wonder if it is worth the config pain.
>
> randy



-- 
  ++ytti


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-10-01 Thread Adam Thompson
IMHO, no, it's not worth it... at least, not unless you have a larger budget 
than mine, a larger department than mine, and possibly more skilled operators 
than I am.

I don't even grok how this is supposed to work - the only place I "peer" in the 
classical sense is my local IX; all my other "peers" are ALSO either downstream 
or upstream networks for me.  (e.g. my NREN regional affiliate, who is a 
lateral peer for many prefixes, but also an upstream access network to reach 
the national, and then global, REN[s])
If a router doesn't have a default route, and also doesn't have full tables, I 
can't use it for downstream customers even if they're BGP peers; they're 
expecting me to either provide full tables, or act as a default gateway.

Do people in other parts of the world have access (both physical and logical) 
to enough bilateral peering (and budgets...) that it makes sense to deploy a 
router per peer?

For the NREN case, it's not full tables, and it's not default routes, but it's 
still a pretty big table.   And they're the location of the "triangle" routing 
where I have several downstream clients who also peer directly with them.  I'm 
both a lateral "peer" AND a downstream customer to them... so they tried to 
turn on uRPF on the L3 interfaces towards me and, well, bad things happened to 
our mutual customers' traffic.  Admittedly this was triggered by the downstream 
customer doing questionable things with different-length prefixes, but the fact 
remains uRPF causes (sometimes partial) outages anywhere you have multi-path 
"downstream" clients.
And based on the topology, I cannot conceive of any set of ACLs that I could 
feasibly apply to inbound traffic on the peering link with my NREN affiliate, 
which makes it... more difficult to be BCP/MARNS-compliant.  Commercial traffic 
regularly transits R unexpectedly, and vice-versa: path asymmetry is common 
here.

-Adam


P.S. the topology in question was as simple as this.  Cust. advertised /N to 
me, but /N+1 to the R side, so traffic started taking an unanticipated detour 
via the R side.  IRR/RPKI does not solve this: it was a legitimate 
advertisement.
​ ┌─┐ ┌───┐
   ┌►│MRnet├►│R│
   │ └─┘ └───┘
   │▲
   ││
 ┌─┴───┐ ┌──┴───┐┌──┐
 │Cust.├►│MERLIN├───►│Commercial│
 └─┘ └──┘└──┘


Adam Thompson
Consultant, Infrastructure Services
[1593169877849]
100 - 135 Innovation Drive
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 6A8
(204) 977-6824 or 1-800-430-6404 (MB only)
athomp...@merlin.mb.ca<mailto:athomp...@merlin.mb.ca>
www.merlin.mb.ca<http://www.merlin.mb.ca/>

From: NANOG  on behalf of Randy 
Bush 
Sent: October 1, 2021 12:28
To: Mark Tinka 
Cc: North American Network Operators' Group 
Subject: Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

> A partial table with no default is perfectly fine for a peering router.
>
> As long as your peering router knows how to get to your prefixes and
> those of your customers, as well as the prefixes of the networks you
> peer with, you're good to go.

in fact, this seems to be the modern conservative style for some years.
i sometimes wonder if it is worth the config pain.

randy


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-10-01 Thread Randy Bush
> A partial table with no default is perfectly fine for a peering router.
> 
> As long as your peering router knows how to get to your prefixes and
> those of your customers, as well as the prefixes of the networks you
> peer with, you're good to go.

in fact, this seems to be the modern conservative style for some years.
i sometimes wonder if it is worth the config pain.

randy


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Mark Tinka




On 10/1/21 01:51, Valdis Klētnieks wrote:


Am I insufficently caffienated, or is uRPF the least of your problems
if you don't have a full table *and* don't have a default route?


A partial table with no default is perfectly fine for a peering router.

As long as your peering router knows how to get to your prefixes and 
those of your customers, as well as the prefixes of the networks you 
peer with, you're good to go.


Mark.


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Valdis Klētnieks
On Thu, 30 Sep 2021 18:12:51 +0200, Mark Tinka said:

> I should have said "If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a
> device without a default a route as well,

Am I insufficently caffienated, or is uRPF the least of your problems
if you don't have a full table *and* don't have a default route?


pgp5WFYI4WSQ6.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Sabri Berisha
- On Sep 30, 2021, at 9:13 AM, Andrew Smith andrew.william.sm...@gmail.com 
wrote:

Hi,

> In Ciscoland, you do have to explicitly state that the default route is 
> eligible
> for URPF verification, otherwise you'll get unexpected traffic drops.

> ip verify unicast source reachable-via any allow-default

Customer: We need a way to prevent spoofing.
Dev: Sure, I created a new feature: "ip verify unicast"
Customer: We're dropping legitimate traffic!
Dev: Oops, sorry about that. Here, a new feature: "ip verify unicast source 
reachable-via any"
Customer: But but but, we don't have a full BGP table!
Dev: Oh well...  "ip very unicast source reachable via any 
allow-default"

Thanks,

Sabri



RE: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Brian Turnbow via NANOG
Hi 

> 
> > What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
> > null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
> > as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.
> 
> I don't think it is implied here, but just for clarification this is 
> implementation
> detail. Loose and blackhole route does not imply this behaviour, It might, it
> might not, depending on vendor/implementation.
> JunOS by default considers null route as loose path satisfied, and you need
> 'set forwarding-options rpf-loose-mode-discard family X' to behave like you
> explain.

Yes even in cisco land for Ios XR SBRTBH you need set next-hop discard in route 
policy.
You cannot use recursive lookup to null in urpf

Brian


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Saku Ytti
On Thu, 30 Sept 2021 at 19:00, Hunter Fuller via NANOG  wrote:

> What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
> null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
> as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.

I don't think it is implied here, but just for clarification this is
implementation detail. Loose and blackhole route does not imply this
behaviour, It might, it might not, depending on vendor/implementation.
JunOS by default considers null route as loose path satisfied, and you
need 'set forwarding-options rpf-loose-mode-discard family X' to
behave like you explain.

-- 
  ++ytti


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Andrew Smith
In Ciscoland, you do have to explicitly state that the default route is
eligible for URPF verification, otherwise you'll get unexpected traffic
drops.

ip verify unicast source reachable-via any allow-default


And yes, it's main purpose is for implementing source-based
remotely-triggered blackhole (SRTBH).

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 10:58 AM Hunter Fuller via NANOG 
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 12:08 AM Mark Tinka  wrote:
> > If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a device, don't enable
> uRPF, even loose-mode.
>
> At least in Ciscoland, loose URPF checks will pass if you have a
> default route. So I do not think it could result in inadvertent
> blackholing of traffic.
>
> What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
> null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
> as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.
>
>
> --
> Hunter Fuller (they)
> Router Jockey
> VBH M-1A
> +1 256 824 5331
>
> Office of Information Technology
> The University of Alabama in Huntsville
> Network Engineering
>


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Mark Tinka




On 9/30/21 17:56, Hunter Fuller wrote:

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 12:08 AM Mark Tinka  wrote:

If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a device, don't enable uRPF, even 
loose-mode.

At least in Ciscoland, loose URPF checks will pass if you have a
default route. So I do not think it could result in inadvertent
blackholing of traffic.

What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.


Agreed.

I should have said "If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a 
device without a default a route as well, don't enable uRPF, even 
loose-mode".


Principally, we don't run default on any of our service routers. 
Technically, we point default to the bin on all our service routers, as 
that's the fastest way for the router to handle illegal traffic it 
"could" receive.


Mark.


Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more

2021-09-30 Thread Hunter Fuller via NANOG
On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 12:08 AM Mark Tinka  wrote:
> If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a device, don't enable uRPF, 
> even loose-mode.

At least in Ciscoland, loose URPF checks will pass if you have a
default route. So I do not think it could result in inadvertent
blackholing of traffic.

What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.


--
Hunter Fuller (they)
Router Jockey
VBH M-1A
+1 256 824 5331

Office of Information Technology
The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Network Engineering