Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread Stephen Stuart
  Forgetting all of the theoretical constructs for a moment, has anyone
  here personally encountered an operational scenario in which ICMP
  redirects solved a problem for you that you would otherwise have found
  difficult or intransigent? Without naming names, would you describe
  the scenario's details, explain the problem that would have existed
  absent redirects and explain how redirects solved it for you?
 
 I've never had redirects solve a problem for me.

Once upon a time, gatekeeper.dec.com was a MIPS Ultrix box connected
to a LAN segment (the IP prefix for that LAN segment was 16.1.0.0/24,
and gatekeeper used to be 16.1.0.2). Also connected to the LAN segment
were routers belonging to AlterNet (or maybe it was UUnet by then) and
BARRnet.

gatekeeper's static default route was pointed at the BARRnet
router. The BARRnet and AlterNet routers exchanged routes out of sight
of the LAN segment in question. When BARRnet knew that the destination
of a packet would be the AlterNet router, it would issue an ICMP
redirect to gatekeeper (or any of the other hosts that pointed default
at the BARRnet router). The redirects let us make pretty efficient use
of the interfaces toward both from the collection of gatekeeper and
uucp-gw{1,2} and the NNTP relays and such. Had we shovelled all the
traffic at BARRnet, all the time, we wouldn't have stretched our
DELNIs as far as we did.

That was 1994 - and in fairly short order (within two years) we went
from DELNIs to DECswitch 900s, MIPS Ultrix to Digital UNIX (or
whatever it was called) on AlphaStations (so many AlphaStations), and
ICMP redirects to the private IX that became PAIX. 

Stephen



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson

On Wed, 25 Aug 2010, Stephen Stuart wrote:


Once upon a time


I think the question is what sensible defaults should be. In my 
environment we turn off proxy-arp and redirects, and it is my firm belief 
that this is actually what should be the default.


In my opinion:

A host SHOULD support listening to redirects and MUST have a knob to turn 
off this listening if implemented. A router MUST have redirects off as 
default but MUST support a knob turning them on and when sending a 
redirect it MUST forward the packet that generated the redirect.


I know most of the above is completely against current standards, but for 
me these are more in tune with todays reality in networking as I see them.


--
Mikael Abrahamssonemail: swm...@swm.pp.se



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread Randy Bush
 A host SHOULD support listening to redirects and MUST have a knob to
 turn off this listening if implemented. A router MUST have redirects
 off as default but MUST support a knob turning them on and when
 sending a redirect it MUST forward the packet that generated the
 redirect.

wfm

randy




Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread Warren Kumari


On Aug 24, 2010, at 4:32 PM, William Herrin wrote:


On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 1:20 PM, Christopher Morrow
christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:

Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
 o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
 o be sending these by default


Hi Chris,

If you don't mind, I'd like to ask a similar question whose answers
might be instructive for the question you asked:


Forgetting all of the theoretical constructs for a moment, has anyone
here personally encountered an operational scenario in which ICMP
redirects solved a problem for you that you would otherwise have found
difficult or intransigent? Without naming names, would you describe
the scenario's details, explain the problem that would have existed
absent redirects and explain how redirects solved it for you?



I have, but it was a long long time ago (~1997), and it was a stupid  
problem


We had a bunch of hosts on a LAN - their default GW was an AGS+  
connected to provider X. Also on the same network was a Bay Networks  
BCN (AFAIR) connected to provider Y.


In general most flows were relatively long lived (some NNTP, some  
FTP.. oh, and Quake!). There was no reasonable way to inform the hosts  
if provider X went away. The AGS+ would also run a bit too hot if it  
had to accept all of the traffic and then punt the relevant parts over  
to the BCN


Unrelated, but this network also did static IPs for dial customers  
(who could dial into one of ~lots of RAS boxes) -- this meant that the  
RAS boxen has to inject /32s into OSPF for each customer -- this meant  
that if certain routers (like the AGS+) bounced there was enough churn  
that other routers would fall over (the BCN would hit some watchdog  
and fall over, and if you tried to bring it up into a network that was  
already converged it would run out of RAM and happily drop into some  
debugger console).


Fun times...

W





Thanks,
Bill Herrin






--
William D. Herrin  her...@dirtside.com  b...@herrin.us
3005 Crane Dr. .. Web: http://bill.herrin.us/
Falls Church, VA 22042-3004



--
She'd even given herself a middle initial - X - which stood for  
someone who has a cool and exciting middle name.


-- (Terry Pratchett, Maskerade)





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread Mark Smith
On Wed, 25 Aug 2010 01:18:15 -0400
Christopher Morrow christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 4:32 PM, William Herrin b...@herrin.us wrote:
  On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 1:20 PM, Christopher Morrow
  christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
  Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
  6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
   o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
   o be sending these by default
 
  Hi Chris,
 
  If you don't mind, I'd like to ask a similar question whose answers
  might be instructive for the question you asked:
 
 sure :) (other folks should also chime in, or I thought that was the
 spirit of your question...)
 
 
  Forgetting all of the theoretical constructs for a moment, has anyone
  here personally encountered an operational scenario in which ICMP
  redirects solved a problem for you that you would otherwise have found
  difficult or intransigent? Without naming names, would you describe
  the scenario's details, explain the problem that would have existed
  absent redirects and explain how redirects solved it for you?
 
 I've never had redirects solve a problem for me.
 

So how do you know?

If redirects are enabled by default, then they may have fixed a problem
for you that you didn't know existed and never realised existed. When
your packets get there successfully you don't go and investigate why.
You only troubleshoot failure, not success.

I think the only way to know an absolute answer would be to
have witnessed this sequence of events 

- have an environment where redirects are switched off

- suffer from a problem that redirects are designed to solve

- switch redirects on and have the problem not disappear

Of course, the problem not disappearing when redirects are enabled might
also mean a misdiagnosis of what the problem really is.

Regards,
Mark.



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-25 Thread James Hess
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 4:08 PM, Butch Evans but...@butchevans.com wrote:
I would suggest the recommendation be that ICMP Redirects, proxy ARP,
directed broadcast, source routing,   and  acceptance/usage
of all fancy/surprising features should be off by default.   Where
surprising  is defined as the sort of thing that  is nonessential,
has questionable benefits,
can cause problems,  and that people will forget to turn off.

Redirects seem to fall into the non-essential  with questionable
benefits  (in most cases) category.


 For most of the networks that I manage (or help to manage), I can see no  
 reason why this would be an issue.

If none of your hosts accept redirects,  then it is not really
apparent that redirects are harmful. If some of your hosts accept
redirects,  then redirects may be
capable of causing headaches.   You might have a gateway using a
protocol such as VRRP,  with redundancy for the default gateway
address of subnet $X.

And you have other routers for other subnets which just happen to have
an  extra ip on subnet $X.

But the other subnets' routers'  IPs on subnet $X are not redundant,
and the packets are supposed take a secondary route if that second
hop  router goes down,
since the   $X  default gateway will dynamically figure this out in a
couple of seconds.

Then  the ICMP redirect  becomes a redirect to /dev/null.
And almost random sets of hosts will lose communications with each
other for the redirect timeout duration, if they are not smart enough
to implement methods of detecting the redirect is now bad.


Sending ICMP redirects is not a huge security risk.  ACCEPTING
redirects is a larger risk. The redirects can be used by an adversary
that acts as a router,
to extend the lifetime of   or increase the effectiveness of an ARP
hijacking  or switch CAM flooding tactic,  to continue to steal
traffic from a host,
and ensure they get every packet.  The adversary with an IP on the
same subnet as target hosts can use forged ICMP redirects,  in order
to cause hosts
to misdirect packets sent to certain IPs,  so that  the  attacker's
local subnet IP address is  the first hop in the path,   instead of
the hosts' default gateway.


--
-J



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 07:49:43PM -0400, Ricky Beam wrote:
 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4 
 purely for security (traffic interception.)  In a perfectly run network, 
 redirects should never be necessary, so I'd think IPv6 should avoid going 
 down that road again. (support OPTIONAL, never enabled by default.) [It's 
 another insecure mistake IPv6 doesn't need to repeat.]

I am not sure that is so much of an issue in IPv6.  I know that in
IPv4 3rd party ICMP redirects were quite common among the kiddies to
knock each other off IRC, but ICMPv6 redirect reception in hosts has
a number of saves and limitations that mean it should be far less,
perhaps not an issue, provided your local network is secure and BCP
38 is in use.

For example, an ICMPv6 implementation will not process a redirect from
a router that is not the host's current next-hop for the target
destination.  Because this is a Link-Local Address, an off-link
attacker has quite a problem guessing (and on-link attackers are a
problem anyway).


But I have a different memory of why we first started disabling
redirects, back in the day.

My memory is that hosts typically implement redirects with /32 routes,
with no aggregation, installed upon receiving a redirect message.

The ICMP message does not contain any TTL, and none was specified in
RFC, so consequently over the lifetime of a device receiving redirects
the routing table grows until every redirected destination is
enumerated, or the system restarts.

The ultimate size of the table reached can be quite large, beyond the
scale typically engineered for in a host.

Of course, that was back in the day when hosts were typically slower
than the LANs they were connected to.  So every additional host route
installed increased per-packet forwarding overhead and decreased
throughput considerably.


Although ICMPv6 Redirect messages also lack a (router-advertised) TTL,
an examination of [1] leads me to believe they will time out because
they are implemented as part of the ND llinfo cache.  A stale cache
entry (the equivalent of a /128 route with link layer information)
will ultimately be cleaned.  If the destination is reused later,

So it may be that the same conclusion does not hold, except in the
unusual condition where a large number of redirects are required over
a relatively short period of time (such as devices that have a large
number of active sessions with hosts that its routers redirect; web
servers, smtp systems...).


[1] Li, Q., Jinmei, T., Shima, K., IPv6 Core Protocols
Implementation, October 2006.
ISBN 13: 978-0-12-447751-3
ISBN 10: 0-12-447751-8

-- 
David W. HankinsBIND 10 needs more DHCP voices.
Software Engineer   There just aren't enough in our heads.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   http://bind10.isc.org/


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Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread David W. Hankins
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 10:12:01AM +0930, Mark Smith wrote:
 o  allow an IPv6 router to indicate to an end-node that the destination
 it is attempting to send to is onlink. This situation occurs when the
 router is more informed than the origin end-node about what prefixes
 are onlink.
 
 This shouldn't happen very often either, as multiple onlink IPv6 routers
 should be announcing the same Prefix Information Options in their RAs,
 and therefore end-nodes should be fully informed as to all the onlink
 prefixes. ICMPv6 redirects in this scenario would only occur during the
 introduction of that new prefix information i.e. the time gap between
 when the first and second onlink routers are configured with new prefix
 information.

It may be true the situations where redirects are required for this
are few in number, but I think it is not true that the use of
redirects is limited solely to the configuration gap between
introducing a new prefix.

In NBMA networks, it is said that the nodes will have IPv6 addresses
with no covering advertised prefixes (IPv6 Core Protocols
Implementation, page 393, just spotted while reading today).

Additionally, the typical use of /128 role addresses for services
aliased onto lo0 mean the router has a /128 route for the role address
to an on-link device, but a covering prefix advertisement would be
both futile and inappropriate.

I don't necessarily want to say that your conclusion is false, but
rather that it seems to me there are more enumerations in the set.

-- 
David W. HankinsBIND 10 needs more DHCP voices.
Software Engineer   There just aren't enough in our heads.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   http://bind10.isc.org/


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Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread David W. Hankins
On Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 01:02:49PM -0700, David W. Hankins wrote:
 will ultimately be cleaned.  If the destination is reused later,
 

Ah, I forgot to complete this thought in editing.

If packets are sent to the destination later (after a cache entry is
expired) the host obviously starts over as if there was no redirection.
In this way, changes in topology are ultimately discovered, whether
the redirection changes or is no longer needed.

-- 
David W. HankinsBIND 10 needs more DHCP voices.
Software Engineer   There just aren't enough in our heads.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   http://bind10.isc.org/


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Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread William Herrin
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 1:20 PM, Christopher Morrow
christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

Hi Chris,

If you don't mind, I'd like to ask a similar question whose answers
might be instructive for the question you asked:


Forgetting all of the theoretical constructs for a moment, has anyone
here personally encountered an operational scenario in which ICMP
redirects solved a problem for you that you would otherwise have found
difficult or intransigent? Without naming names, would you describe
the scenario's details, explain the problem that would have existed
absent redirects and explain how redirects solved it for you?

Thanks,
Bill Herrin






-- 
William D. Herrin  her...@dirtside.com  b...@herrin.us
3005 Crane Dr. .. Web: http://bill.herrin.us/
Falls Church, VA 22042-3004



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread Mark Smith
On Tue, 24 Aug 2010 13:25:01 -0700
David W. Hankins david_hank...@isc.org wrote:

 On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 10:12:01AM +0930, Mark Smith wrote:
  o  allow an IPv6 router to indicate to an end-node that the destination
  it is attempting to send to is onlink. This situation occurs when the
  router is more informed than the origin end-node about what prefixes
  are onlink.
  
  This shouldn't happen very often either, as multiple onlink IPv6 routers
  should be announcing the same Prefix Information Options in their RAs,
  and therefore end-nodes should be fully informed as to all the onlink
  prefixes. ICMPv6 redirects in this scenario would only occur during the
  introduction of that new prefix information i.e. the time gap between
  when the first and second onlink routers are configured with new prefix
  information.
 
 It may be true the situations where redirects are required for this
 are few in number, but I think it is not true that the use of
 redirects is limited solely to the configuration gap between
 introducing a new prefix.
 
 In NBMA networks, it is said that the nodes will have IPv6 addresses
 with no covering advertised prefixes (IPv6 Core Protocols
 Implementation, page 393, just spotted while reading today).
 
 Additionally, the typical use of /128 role addresses for services
 aliased onto lo0 mean the router has a /128 route for the role address
 to an on-link device, but a covering prefix advertisement would be
 both futile and inappropriate.
 
 I don't necessarily want to say that your conclusion is false, but
 rather that it seems to me there are more enumerations in the set.
 

Before coming to any conclusions, we'd need to more strictly define
what the NBMA topology is. Is it fully transitive i.e. all nodes can
see all other nodes, and that the only property that makes it different
from a conventional LAN is the absence of a broadcast/multicast
capability? Or is there only partial visibility, such that end-nodes
only have permanent visibility to a router i.e hub-and-spoke? In the
latter case, another property is whether or not direct communcations
paths can be set up between the spoke nodes on demand, such as in the
case of Dynamic Multi-point VPNs.

Whether ICMPv6 redirects are necessary or useful, or whether other
somewhat similar mechanisms, such as Next Hop Resolution Protocol, are
used in an NBMA subnet very much depends on the sort of connectivity
it provides or can provide between the nodes on the subnet.

Regards,
Mark.



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread Butch Evans
On Fri, 2010-08-20 at 21:34 -0400, Brandon Ross wrote: 
 So far I have not heard a single compelling argument for how the 
 _transmittal_ of ICMP redirects can cause any signficicant harm to a 
 network other than what the other typical protocols that are enabled by 
 defualt (ping, can't fragement, etc) cause.  I will make the statement:

I agree with you here, Brandon.  I asked the question: What is the real
security hole? because I cannot see any real risk here for MOST of the
networks that I am involved in.  I can see the possibility of MITM
attacks with ICMP redirects, but that is not the case for (as you point
out) a router that issues an ICMP redirect.  Also, it is not my
experience that most host OS have this disabled either.  That being the
case, it seems to me that eliminating the behavior of transmitting these
redirects in a router are of little value in protecting against MITM
attacks.  

 The transmittal of ICMP redirects by a router _cannot_ be exploited to 
 create a man in the middle attack.

I'd have to agree with this.  More because my limited research (which
includes responses I've seen on this thread) seems to indicate that this
is the case.  

 Before anyone responds to that statement, please read it very carefully. 
 This statement does not comment on whether a host or router should be 
 configured to _receive_ an ICMP redirect and act on it, that clearly can 
 be used to create a MITM attack.

If a network has a single router, then wouldn't this also create a DOS
situation under the right circumstances?  I mean, if it can create MITM,
it would HAVE to also create DOS possibilities.  What is the distance of
a route learned from an ICMP redirect?  If it is greater than 0
(connected route) or 1 (static route) but less than the cost of other
dynamically learned routes, then I can see the why this may be a problem
for a router to respond to an ICMP redirect packet.


-- 

* Butch Evans   * Professional Network Consultation*
* http://www.butchevans.com/* Network Engineering  *
* http://store.wispgear.net/* Wired or Wireless Networks   *
* http://blog.butchevans.com/   * ImageStream, Mikrotik and MORE!  *





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-24 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 4:32 PM, William Herrin b...@herrin.us wrote:
 On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 1:20 PM, Christopher Morrow
 christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

 Hi Chris,

 If you don't mind, I'd like to ask a similar question whose answers
 might be instructive for the question you asked:

sure :) (other folks should also chime in, or I thought that was the
spirit of your question...)


 Forgetting all of the theoretical constructs for a moment, has anyone
 here personally encountered an operational scenario in which ICMP
 redirects solved a problem for you that you would otherwise have found
 difficult or intransigent? Without naming names, would you describe
 the scenario's details, explain the problem that would have existed
 absent redirects and explain how redirects solved it for you?

I've never had redirects solve a problem for me.



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-23 Thread Ricky Beam
On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 20:42:01 -0400, Mark Smith  
na...@85d5b20a518b8f6864949bd940457dc124746ddc.nosense.org wrote:

In IPv6, redirects serve two purposes, where as in IPv4 they only
served one -


IPv4 redirects serve exactly the same two situations... both are  
situations where a router would be required to hairpin a packet -- either  
the destination is on-wire or the path to it is elsewhere on-wire.


Let's say host 1.100 has a default gw of 1.1 and no other routes.  A  
packet destined for 2.1 would go to 1.1, even if 2.1 is on the same wire.   
Following old rules, 1.1 sends a redirect and drops the packet.  Most  
hosts would ignore that redirect as it makes no sense (redirects are not  
a substitute for device routes.  I've seen this happen too many times.)


Now, if 2.1 was behind 1.2, the redirect would tell 1.100 to go there  
instead.


(This isn't as much of a problem these days since routers don't to the  
drop packet part -- which used to be mandated by RFC.  And secondary  
networks have given way to inter-VLAN routing.)


--Ricky



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Yann GAUTERON
2010/8/20 Jared Mauch ja...@puck.nether.net


 Personally (and as the instigator in the ipv6/6man discussion) if the
 vendors could be trusted to expose their default settings in their
 configs, i would find a default of ON to be more acceptable.  As their
 track-record is poor, and the harm has been realized in the network we
 operate (at least), I am advocating that as a matter of policy enabling
 redirects not be a default-on policy.  If people want to hang themselves
 that's their problem, but at least they won't come with a hidden noose
 around their neck.


On Cisco routers (at least some of them), have you tried the command
show running-config all

This command displays all configuration, including hidden default values.

This may help when this command is present.

Don't know about other vendors.


Yann


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Jack Bates

Eric J. Katanich wrote:


You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well 
disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which 
is obviously slower.


Most redirects are limited in their rate, so it generally is unnoticed 
on the router, but yes, to be fully optimized, turning it off isn't a 
bad idea. Here's a better one. Put the router's choice in the RA on a 
per prefix basis (and of course DHCPv6 for non-RA setups).


Any router/host communication agreements really should have a profile 
setup. If the router is acting in a certain way, it should be able to 
notify the host. If RA is disabled and a pure DHCPv6 setup was deployed, 
obviously the DHCPv6 server would need to provide the necessary router 
information (mtu, icmp unreachable support, etc).


It bugs me that we setup automation support such as between routers and 
hosts and don't include all the different details that both really 
should agree on (such as icmp redirects, or even the ability to push 
routes to hosts, ie modify redirects to support prefix or host based 
redirects since we are starting over here).



Jack



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Jared Mauch

On Aug 21, 2010, at 2:11 AM, Yann GAUTERON wrote:

 
 
 2010/8/20 Jared Mauch ja...@puck.nether.net
 
 Personally (and as the instigator in the ipv6/6man discussion) if the
 vendors could be trusted to expose their default settings in their
 configs, i would find a default of ON to be more acceptable.  As their
 track-record is poor, and the harm has been realized in the network we
 operate (at least), I am advocating that as a matter of policy enabling
 redirects not be a default-on policy.  If people want to hang themselves
 that's their problem, but at least they won't come with a hidden noose
 around their neck.
 
 On Cisco routers (at least some of them), have you tried the command
 show running-config all
 
 This command displays all configuration, including hidden default values.
 
 This may help when this command is present.
 
 Don't know about other vendors.

This varies by IOS (software revision), and because not all devices 
actually have the access to this mainline featureset due to when they
branched for their localized hardware support.

I certainly wish they could get there now, and it's better in the newer
access (CPE) hardware.  While related, the larger problem IMHO is them
removing stuff like show parser dump exec and show parser dump config.

I have been a supporter of exposed defaults for years, including more secure
and more robust defaults.  The folks on the IETF list seem to think
that the existing rate-limit mechanics will protect the routers.  We did not
arrive at these settings as a result of those rate-limits working properly
sadly.

- Jared


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Jared Mauch

On Aug 21, 2010, at 10:12 AM, Jack Bates wrote:

 Eric J. Katanich wrote:
 You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well 
 disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
 some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which is 
 obviously slower.
 
 Most redirects are limited in their rate, so it generally is unnoticed on the 
 router, but yes, to be fully optimized, turning it off isn't a bad idea. 
 Here's a better one. Put the router's choice in the RA on a per prefix basis 
 (and of course DHCPv6 for non-RA setups).
 
 Any router/host communication agreements really should have a profile setup. 
 If the router is acting in a certain way, it should be able to notify the 
 host. If RA is disabled and a pure DHCPv6 setup was deployed, obviously the 
 DHCPv6 server would need to provide the necessary router information (mtu, 
 icmp unreachable support, etc).
 
 It bugs me that we setup automation support such as between routers and hosts 
 and don't include all the different details that both really should agree on 
 (such as icmp redirects, or even the ability to push routes to hosts, ie 
 modify redirects to support prefix or host based redirects since we are 
 starting over here).

One of the use cases for the redirects listed is that someone may DHCPv6 a 
prefix, but (!!!) not know the netmask of the prefix, so may not know what is 
on-net.  ie: here's your host address, good luck!

This surely isn't something I had expected as an output of the IETF, as i 
figured that even the most basic folks advocating for internet engineering 
would tell a host the netmask so it would know what is on-net vs off-net.

This tells me that the use of redirects isn't quite as straightforward as 
helping but more as crutch for not wanting to consume an extra byte for 
mask and few bytes for a default-router.

It also means they are unlikely to be as limited in their rate as you suggest, 
it will make the IPv6 router look more like a flow-swithced device (having to 
send a redirect for each subnet/mask that is different) and effectively make 
the host participate (via redirects) in this routing protocol.

- Jared


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
I appreciate the discussion.. Eric, are you reflecting messages back
to the list without additional content for a reason?

list-admin folks, could we ping eric and see what's busted?

On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 9:08 PM, Eric J. Katanich e...@onyxlight.net wrote:
 On 08/21/2010 02:08 AM, Brandon Ross wrote:
 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:

 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in
 IPv4 purely for security (traffic interception.)

 Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my
 router prevent traffic from being intercepted?

 As was mentioned in an other part of the thread.

 You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well
 disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
 some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which
 is obviously slower.

 It might also help you notice you have a roque host when you are looking
 at your network-traffic and if you know your
 network doesn't have any ICMP-redirects normally.

 disabling on the host:
 OpenBSD:
 echo net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 sysctl net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0
 sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

 FreeBSD:
 echo net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 sysctl net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0
 sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

 Linux:
 echo net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 echo net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
 sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.conf







Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-21 Thread Mark Smith
On Sat, 21 Aug 2010 09:12:47 -0500
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:

 Eric J. Katanich wrote:
  
  You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well 
  disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
  some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which 
  is obviously slower.
 
 Most redirects are limited in their rate, so it generally is unnoticed 
 on the router, but yes, to be fully optimized, turning it off isn't a 
 bad idea. Here's a better one. Put the router's choice in the RA on a 
 per prefix basis (and of course DHCPv6 for non-RA setups).
 

I'm don't think that would work.

In IPv6, redirects serve two purposes, where as in IPv4 they only
served one -

o  allow an IPv6 router to indicate to an end-node that another onlink
IPv6 router is a better path towards the destination (i.e. the IPv4
purpose).

This situation doesn't seem to occur very often - when there are two
routers on a link they're usually there for availability, rather than
presenting a significantly different set of paths to potential offlink
destinations. Usually they'll be hidden behind a single virtual router
via HSRP or VRRP.

o  allow an IPv6 router to indicate to an end-node that the destination
it is attempting to send to is onlink. This situation occurs when the
router is more informed than the origin end-node about what prefixes
are onlink.

This shouldn't happen very often either, as multiple onlink IPv6 routers
should be announcing the same Prefix Information Options in their RAs,
and therefore end-nodes should be fully informed as to all the onlink
prefixes. ICMPv6 redirects in this scenario would only occur during the
introduction of that new prefix information i.e. the time gap between
when the first and second onlink routers are configured with new prefix
information.

So a redirect status parameter isn't prefix specific. 




 Any router/host communication agreements really should have a profile 
 setup. If the router is acting in a certain way, it should be able to 
 notify the host. If RA is disabled and a pure DHCPv6 setup was deployed, 
 obviously the DHCPv6 server would need to provide the necessary router 
 information (mtu, icmp unreachable support, etc).
 
 It bugs me that we setup automation support such as between routers and 
 hosts and don't include all the different details that both really 
 should agree on (such as icmp redirects, or even the ability to push 
 routes to hosts, ie modify redirects to support prefix or host based 
 redirects since we are starting over here).
 
 
 Jack
 



Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Christopher Morrow
Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

Essentially 12+ years ago in RFC2461
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2461.txt) and later in RFC4861
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861) there are a set of message types
defined and use cases discussed which seem to lead to the idea that:
  routers should be reqiured to implement redirect logic/functionality
  routers should by default be enabled to send these redirect messages.

In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
redirects. secure router and secure host templates disable this
functionality, and have for quite some time. There are a host of
reasons for this I don't really want to debate them though :) It would
be instructive to get a sense of how many folks do NOT disable this
sort of thing, or how many folks RELY on these functions working in
their network build today.

For the 6man discussion though, I presume that in ipv4 we take a set
of configs/actions because of somewhat sane reasons, I suspect we
would want to have the same config/end-state in v6? One proposal is to
do this with:
  o routers are required to be able to send redirect messages
  o routers should NOT do this by default

With the proviso that some consenting adults may choose to enable by
default on certain platforms (cabl/dsl CPE, enterprise-LAN)... if that
muddies the waters it'd be nice to just hear about the proposal there
and leave the hinkiness of the rest out of the picture :) I hope that
folks who currently run v6 network(s) might respond, there are quite a
few v6 operators here... I'm looking at you owen/jjb/au-dsl-folk... :)

thanks for your time, of couse if you want to chat more directly about
this the 6man list is open and at:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6/current/maillist.html

-Chris



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jack Bates
Why should the ietf dictate a default on this? Requiring implementation 
I could understand, but setting the default? Should the ietf also 
specify requirement of allowing configuration change of a default?


Honestly, redirects are not near the problem as icmp unreachables.


Jack

Christopher Morrow wrote:

Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

Essentially 12+ years ago in RFC2461
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2461.txt) and later in RFC4861
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861) there are a set of message types
defined and use cases discussed which seem to lead to the idea that:
  routers should be reqiured to implement redirect logic/functionality
  routers should by default be enabled to send these redirect messages.

In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
redirects. secure router and secure host templates disable this
functionality, and have for quite some time. There are a host of
reasons for this I don't really want to debate them though :) It would
be instructive to get a sense of how many folks do NOT disable this
sort of thing, or how many folks RELY on these functions working in
their network build today.

For the 6man discussion though, I presume that in ipv4 we take a set
of configs/actions because of somewhat sane reasons, I suspect we
would want to have the same config/end-state in v6? One proposal is to
do this with:
  o routers are required to be able to send redirect messages
  o routers should NOT do this by default

With the proviso that some consenting adults may choose to enable by
default on certain platforms (cabl/dsl CPE, enterprise-LAN)... if that
muddies the waters it'd be nice to just hear about the proposal there
and leave the hinkiness of the rest out of the picture :) I hope that
folks who currently run v6 network(s) might respond, there are quite a
few v6 operators here... I'm looking at you owen/jjb/au-dsl-folk... :)

thanks for your time, of couse if you want to chat more directly about
this the 6man list is open and at:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6/current/maillist.html

-Chris




Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Jack Bates wrote:


Why should the ietf dictate a default on this?


Because that's what the IETF does, sets a SHOULD on best common 
practice after discussion in the community.


Requiring implementation I could understand, but setting the default? 
Should the ietf also specify requirement of allowing configuration 
change of a default?


I'd say by definition it's meaningless of talking about a default that 
can't be changed.


As I stated in the 6man discussion, I prefer routers to by default not 
send redirects. We do that in our configuration template.


--
Mikael Abrahamssonemail: swm...@swm.pp.se



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jack Bates

Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
As I stated in the 6man discussion, I prefer routers to by default not 
send redirects. We do that in our configuration template.




I often turn them off, but I'm not sure why. If they aren't needed, 
generally they won't be issued anyways (p2p links, router only segments, 
etc). About the only case where they might be issued and I don't want 
them is in policy routing situations. In host based broadcast domains, I 
usually want them to limit the amount of traffic redirection I need to do.


Jack



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Dobbins, Roland

On Aug 21, 2010, at 12:20 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

  o routers are required to be able to send redirect messages
  o routers should NOT do this by default

I concur with this position from an opsec standpoint; at the same time, I don't 
know that *mandating* a default configuration setting for a legal (if largely 
iatrogenic) mode of operation is something that the IETF should be doing.

Here's an alternate formulation which gets the point across, but doesn't stray 
into the area of :

1.  Routers are required to be able to send redirect messages.

2.  It is recommended that routers should NOT do this by default.

As was mentioned somewhere in the 6man thread, the root of the problem has to 
do with the ugliness of IPv6 in general, and the whole v6 ICMP/ND mess in 
particular.  Unfortunately, those ships have long since sailed; while it's 
tempting to try and retrofit fixes for poor design decisions in the fundamental 
protocol specifications by mandating sane implementation defaults in 
conformance documents, a recommendation rather than a mandate seems more 
situationally-appropriate in this context.  

The 'right way', impractical though it may be, is in fact to fix this problem 
is to go back and fix the protocol specifications; since that isn't going to 
happen, making recommendations gets the point across without being overbearing.

YMMV, of course.

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net // http://www.arbornetworks.com

Injustice is relatively easy to bear; what stings is justice.

-- H.L. Mencken






Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Butch Evans
On Fri, 2010-08-20 at 13:20 -0400, Christopher Morrow wrote: 
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
   o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
   o be sending these by default

I do not currently have an IPv6 deployment, so my input may be lacking
in real usefulness here.  With IPv4, however, I have been a little
irritated at a few situations where I NEEDED this to work and it did not
(certain PIX routers come to mind here).  There are risks involved with
ANY automated type traffic to be sure, but for my money, it SHOULD be
possible to configure every router to support the network needs.  So for
my money, I'd suggest:

* routers MUST support ip redirect
* default configurations irrelevant to me

I do agree with one or two of the other posters that it should not be
within the purview of the IETF to mandate these defaults.  Each of us
will learn the defaults of the particular gear we use and can adjust
config templates to match, given the needs of the network we are
deploying.  Just my $0.02 (may be worth less than that)  :-)

-- 

* Butch Evans   * Professional Network Consultation*
* http://www.butchevans.com/* Network Engineering  *
* http://store.wispgear.net/* Wired or Wireless Networks   *
* http://blog.butchevans.com/   * ImageStream, Mikrotik and MORE!  *





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jared Mauch

On Aug 20, 2010, at 3:56 PM, Butch Evans wrote:

 On Fri, 2010-08-20 at 13:20 -0400, Christopher Morrow wrote: 
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default
 
 I do not currently have an IPv6 deployment, so my input may be lacking
 in real usefulness here.  With IPv4, however, I have been a little
 irritated at a few situations where I NEEDED this to work and it did not
 (certain PIX routers come to mind here).  There are risks involved with
 ANY automated type traffic to be sure, but for my money, it SHOULD be
 possible to configure every router to support the network needs.  So for
 my money, I'd suggest:
 
 * routers MUST support ip redirect
 * default configurations irrelevant to me
 
 I do agree with one or two of the other posters that it should not be
 within the purview of the IETF to mandate these defaults.  Each of us
 will learn the defaults of the particular gear we use and can adjust
 config templates to match, given the needs of the network we are
 deploying.  Just my $0.02 (may be worth less than that)  :-)

One of the challenges is that some vendors have a poor track-record of
documenting these defaults.  this means unless you frequently sample
your network traffic, you may not see your device sending decnet mop
messages, or ipv6 redirects :)

Personally (and as the instigator in the ipv6/6man discussion) if the
vendors could be trusted to expose their default settings in their
configs, i would find a default of ON to be more acceptable.  As their
track-record is poor, and the harm has been realized in the network we
operate (at least), I am advocating that as a matter of policy enabling
redirects not be a default-on policy.  If people want to hang themselves
that's their problem, but at least they won't come with a hidden noose 
around their neck.

- Jared



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Owen DeLong
Redirects in IPv6 are no worse nor better an idea than unauthenticated RAs for 
default routers with nearly identical security implications.

Owen


Sent from my iPad

On Aug 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Christopher Morrow christopher.mor...@gmail.com 
wrote:

 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default
 
 Essentially 12+ years ago in RFC2461
 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2461.txt) and later in RFC4861
 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861) there are a set of message types
 defined and use cases discussed which seem to lead to the idea that:
  routers should be reqiured to implement redirect logic/functionality
  routers should by default be enabled to send these redirect messages.
 
 In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
 redirects. secure router and secure host templates disable this
 functionality, and have for quite some time. There are a host of
 reasons for this I don't really want to debate them though :) It would
 be instructive to get a sense of how many folks do NOT disable this
 sort of thing, or how many folks RELY on these functions working in
 their network build today.
 
 For the 6man discussion though, I presume that in ipv4 we take a set
 of configs/actions because of somewhat sane reasons, I suspect we
 would want to have the same config/end-state in v6? One proposal is to
 do this with:
  o routers are required to be able to send redirect messages
  o routers should NOT do this by default
 
 With the proviso that some consenting adults may choose to enable by
 default on certain platforms (cabl/dsl CPE, enterprise-LAN)... if that
 muddies the waters it'd be nice to just hear about the proposal there
 and leave the hinkiness of the rest out of the picture :) I hope that
 folks who currently run v6 network(s) might respond, there are quite a
 few v6 operators here... I'm looking at you owen/jjb/au-dsl-folk... :)
 
 thanks for your time, of couse if you want to chat more directly about
 this the 6man list is open and at:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6/current/maillist.html
 
 -Chris



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 4:10 PM, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:
 Redirects in IPv6 are no worse nor better an idea than unauthenticated RAs 
 for default routers with nearly identical security implications.

this answered a different question... wanna try answering the question
I posed originally? :)
-chris


 Owen


 Sent from my iPad

 On Aug 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Christopher Morrow 
 christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:

 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

 Essentially 12+ years ago in RFC2461
 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2461.txt) and later in RFC4861
 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4861) there are a set of message types
 defined and use cases discussed which seem to lead to the idea that:
  routers should be reqiured to implement redirect logic/functionality
  routers should by default be enabled to send these redirect messages.

 In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
 redirects. secure router and secure host templates disable this
 functionality, and have for quite some time. There are a host of
 reasons for this I don't really want to debate them though :) It would
 be instructive to get a sense of how many folks do NOT disable this
 sort of thing, or how many folks RELY on these functions working in
 their network build today.

 For the 6man discussion though, I presume that in ipv4 we take a set
 of configs/actions because of somewhat sane reasons, I suspect we
 would want to have the same config/end-state in v6? One proposal is to
 do this with:
  o routers are required to be able to send redirect messages
  o routers should NOT do this by default

 With the proviso that some consenting adults may choose to enable by
 default on certain platforms (cabl/dsl CPE, enterprise-LAN)... if that
 muddies the waters it'd be nice to just hear about the proposal there
 and leave the hinkiness of the rest out of the picture :) I hope that
 folks who currently run v6 network(s) might respond, there are quite a
 few v6 operators here... I'm looking at you owen/jjb/au-dsl-folk... :)

 thanks for your time, of couse if you want to chat more directly about
 this the 6man list is open and at:
  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6/current/maillist.html

 -Chris




Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Butch Evans
On Fri, 2010-08-20 at 16:03 -0400, Jared Mauch wrote: 
 One of the challenges is that some vendors have a poor track-record of
 documenting these defaults.  this means unless you frequently sample
 your network traffic, you may not see your device sending decnet mop
 messages, or ipv6 redirects :)

I agree.  

 Personally (and as the instigator in the ipv6/6man discussion) if the
 vendors could be trusted to expose their default settings in their
 configs, i would find a default of ON to be more acceptable.

The reason it doesn't matter to me WHICH one it is (on OR off) is
because if/when a need arises to have ICMP redirect to be working (this
is the exception and NOT the norm), it is easy to see why things do not
work as expected.  If my preferred gear is a Linux box (and it is,
usually), and for some reason I need this to work, I simply run a
tcpdump to capture the packets and I see that the redirect (which would
be expected) is missing, then I can easily fix the problem by enabling
that feature.  Same is true for the reverse.

 If people want to hang themselves
 that's their problem, but at least they won't come with a hidden noose 
 around their neck.

Maybe I'm missing something.  Can you point me to something that will
help my understand WHY an ICMP redirect is such a huge security concern?
For most of the networks that I manage (or help to manage), I can see no
reason why this would be an issue.

-- 

* Butch Evans   * Professional Network Consultation*
* http://www.butchevans.com/* Network Engineering  *
* http://store.wispgear.net/* Wired or Wireless Networks   *
* http://blog.butchevans.com/   * ImageStream, Mikrotik and MORE!  *





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 4:03 PM, Jared Mauch ja...@puck.nether.net wrote:

 On Aug 20, 2010, at 3:56 PM, Butch Evans wrote:

 On Fri, 2010-08-20 at 13:20 -0400, Christopher Morrow wrote:
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

 I do not currently have an IPv6 deployment, so my input may be lacking
 in real usefulness here.  With IPv4, however, I have been a little
 irritated at a few situations where I NEEDED this to work and it did not
 (certain PIX routers come to mind here).  There are risks involved with
 ANY automated type traffic to be sure, but for my money, it SHOULD be
 possible to configure every router to support the network needs.  So for
 my money, I'd suggest:

 * routers MUST support ip redirect
 * default configurations irrelevant to me

 I do agree with one or two of the other posters that it should not be
 within the purview of the IETF to mandate these defaults.  Each of us
 will learn the defaults of the particular gear we use and can adjust
 config templates to match, given the needs of the network we are
 deploying.  Just my $0.02 (may be worth less than that)  :-)

 One of the challenges is that some vendors have a poor track-record of
 documenting these defaults.  this means unless you frequently sample

and changing them... so, picking a good default I think is important.
You'd prefer less config headaches I bet vs having to constantly hack
templates?

 your network traffic, you may not see your device sending decnet mop
 messages, or ipv6 redirects :)

 Personally (and as the instigator in the ipv6/6man discussion) if the

yes thanks! :) (just following a path as requested by another 6man person)

 vendors could be trusted to expose their default settings in their
 configs, i would find a default of ON to be more acceptable.  As their
 track-record is poor, and the harm has been realized in the network we
 operate (at least), I am advocating that as a matter of policy enabling
 redirects not be a default-on policy.  If people want to hang themselves
 that's their problem, but at least they won't come with a hidden noose
 around their neck.

yes, that was my point as well.
-chris

 - Jared




Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Fri, Aug 20, 2010 at 1:40 PM, Mikael Abrahamsson swm...@swm.pp.se wrote:
 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Jack Bates wrote:

 Why should the ietf dictate a default on this?

 Because that's what the IETF does, sets a SHOULD on best common practice
 after discussion in the community.

 Requiring implementation I could understand, but setting the default?
 Should the ietf also specify requirement of allowing configuration change of
 a default?

 I'd say by definition it's meaningless of talking about a default that can't
 be changed.

 As I stated in the 6man discussion, I prefer routers to by default not send
 redirects. We do that in our configuration template.

as always, thanks! :) I am hoping we all don't have to continue to
hack templates, if the option is sane to begin with and is documented
in the code/config/docs by the vendor(s).

-Chris



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 16:08:19 CDT, Butch Evans said:

 Maybe I'm missing something.  Can you point me to something that will
 help my understand WHY an ICMP redirect is such a huge security concern?
 For most of the networks that I manage (or help to manage), I can see no
 reason why this would be an issue.

In general, it's not a big deal, except that unlike a proper routing protocol
where you can redirect a /16 or a /default at a time and withdraw it when
needed, ICMP redirects tend to form host routes that have to individually be
redirected back if the routing flips back to its original status.

Until a PC or something on the network gets pwned, and issues selective forged
ICMP redirects to declare itself a router and the appropriate destination for
some traffic, which it can then MITM to its heart's content. *Then* you truly
have a manure-on-fan situation.


pgpgA2dBziDVX.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Brandon Ross

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:


Until a PC or something on the network gets pwned, and issues selective forged
ICMP redirects to declare itself a router and the appropriate destination for
some traffic, which it can then MITM to its heart's content. *Then* you truly
have a manure-on-fan situation.


I believe the question was along the lines of, why do I turn this off on 
my router?


How does turning off ICMP redirects on the router prevent a rouge PC from 
sending ICMP redirects to it's neighbors?


I'm in the same boat here.  I know there's a lot of conventional wisdom 
that says to turn it off, but I'm yet to hear a convincing argument as to 
why I should bother.  Now configuring your hosts to ignore them, that I 
could understand.


--
Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jared Mauch
See below

Jared Mauch

On Aug 20, 2010, at 6:16 PM, Brandon Ross br...@pobox.com wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
 
 Until a PC or something on the network gets pwned, and issues selective 
 forged
 ICMP redirects to declare itself a router and the appropriate destination for
 some traffic, which it can then MITM to its heart's content. *Then* you truly
 have a manure-on-fan situation.
 
 I believe the question was along the lines of, why do I turn this off on my 
 router?
 
 How does turning off ICMP redirects on the router prevent a rouge PC from 
 sending ICMP redirects to it's neighbors?
 
 I'm in the same boat here.  I know there's a lot of conventional wisdom that 
 says to turn it off, but I'm yet to hear a convincing argument as to why I 
 should bother.  Now configuring your hosts to ignore them, that I could 
 understand.


The issue is routers typically do this in software requiring a punt and CPU 
theft from bgp, ospf etc. 
 
 -- 
 Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Owen DeLong

On Aug 20, 2010, at 2:54 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 16:08:19 CDT, Butch Evans said:
 
 Maybe I'm missing something.  Can you point me to something that will
 help my understand WHY an ICMP redirect is such a huge security concern?
 For most of the networks that I manage (or help to manage), I can see no
 reason why this would be an issue.
 
 In general, it's not a big deal, except that unlike a proper routing protocol
 where you can redirect a /16 or a /default at a time and withdraw it when
 needed, ICMP redirects tend to form host routes that have to individually be
 redirected back if the routing flips back to its original status.
 
 Until a PC or something on the network gets pwned, and issues selective forged
 ICMP redirects to declare itself a router and the appropriate destination for
 some traffic, which it can then MITM to its heart's content. *Then* you truly
 have a manure-on-fan situation.

This is worse than said PC issuing rogue RAs exactly how?

Perhaps we should pressure switch vendors to add ICMP Redirect
protection to the RA Guard feature they haven't implemented yet?

Owen




Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Brandon Ross

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Jared Mauch wrote:

The issue is routers typically do this in software requiring a punt and 
CPU theft from bgp, ospf etc.


You mean like ICMP echo, ICMP can't fragment, ICMP unreachable...?

--
Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jared Mauch
Yea the stuff that sometimes is done in hw and sometimes in sw and causes 
varying pain. You may find the discussion interesting to read if you feel 
redirects are ok or tolerable. 

If vendors can't expose their defaults they really should not be enabling these 
things as it causes trouble. 

I've had problems with both v4 and v6 redirects. Perhaps you have not. 

Jared Mauch

On Aug 20, 2010, at 6:36 PM, Brandon Ross br...@pobox.com wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Jared Mauch wrote:
 
 The issue is routers typically do this in software requiring a punt and CPU 
 theft from bgp, ospf etc.
 
 You mean like ICMP echo, ICMP can't fragment, ICMP unreachable...?
 
 -- 
 Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Jared Mauch
See below

Jared Mauch

On Aug 20, 2010, at 6:34 PM, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:

 
 On Aug 20, 2010, at 2:54 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
 
 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 16:08:19 CDT, Butch Evans said:
 
 Maybe I'm missing something.  Can you point me to something that will
 help my understand WHY an ICMP redirect is such a huge security concern?
 For most of the networks that I manage (or help to manage), I can see no
 reason why this would be an issue.
 
 In general, it's not a big deal, except that unlike a proper routing protocol
 where you can redirect a /16 or a /default at a time and withdraw it when
 needed, ICMP redirects tend to form host routes that have to individually be
 redirected back if the routing flips back to its original status.
 
 Until a PC or something on the network gets pwned, and issues selective 
 forged
 ICMP redirects to declare itself a router and the appropriate destination for
 some traffic, which it can then MITM to its heart's content. *Then* you truly
 have a manure-on-fan situation.
 
 This is worse than said PC issuing rogue RAs exactly how?
 
 Perhaps we should pressure switch vendors to add ICMP Redirect
 protection to the RA Guard feature they haven't implemented yet?


One of my points is that redirects are routing updates of a dynamic nature. If 
the hosts are intended to participate in the routing process perhaps they 
should speak a protocol that can be secured further vs something that can't. 

Please join the discussion on ipv6 at ietf. It's part of a router and host 
requirements document. 


 
 Owen
 
 



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 18:16:35 EDT, Brandon Ross said:

 How does turning off ICMP redirects on the router prevent a rouge PC from 
 sending ICMP redirects to it's neighbors?

If I know for a fact that the network is designed such that I will never ever
receive a valid ICMP redirect because there is exactly one route off the
network, I can safely turn off accept ICMP redirects and be done with it.

If I have to allow ICMP in, it becomes a much more interesting iptables/whatever
issue.

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 15:34:17 PDT, Owen DeLong said:

 This is worse than said PC issuing rogue RAs exactly how?

It's the exact same problem, actually.

 Perhaps we should pressure switch vendors to add ICMP Redirect
 protection to the RA Guard feature they haven't implemented yet?

You mean you aren't already? ;)


pgpI5DNr6rilG.pgp
Description: PGP signature


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Ricky Beam
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 13:20:58 -0400, Christopher Morrow  
christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:

Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
  o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
  o be sending these by default

...

In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
redirects.


I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4  
purely for security (traffic interception.)  In a perfectly run network,  
redirects should never be necessary, so I'd think IPv6 should avoid going  
down that road again. (support OPTIONAL, never enabled by default.) [It's  
another insecure mistake IPv6 doesn't need to repeat.]


As I recall from long long ago, Cisco IOS would deal with traffic  
differently depending on redirects... with redirects enabled, a redirect  
was sent and the packet dropped; with redirects disabled, the router  
hairpined the packets.  I honestly don't know what today's versions do  
because I've never checked -- A can ping B, I move on.  I turn redirects  
off on *outside* interfaces.  Inside (trustable) interfaces vary -- I  
don't go out of my way to disable them.


--Ricky



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Brandon Ross

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:

I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4 
purely for security (traffic interception.)


Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my 
router prevent traffic from being intercepted?


--
Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Mark Smith
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 19:49:43 -0400
Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 13:20:58 -0400, Christopher Morrow  
 christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
  Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
  6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
o be sending these by default
 ...
  In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
  redirects.
 
 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4  
 purely for security (traffic interception.)  In a perfectly run network,  
 redirects should never be necessary, so I'd think IPv6 should avoid going  
 down that road again. (support OPTIONAL, never enabled by default.) [It's  
 another insecure mistake IPv6 doesn't need to repeat.]
 

You're assuming the cost of always hair pinning traffic on an interface
is cheaper than issuing a redirect. Sometimes it won't be. 1 ICMP
redirect could result in potentially congestion inducing load being
shifted off of a single router's interface.

It seems that there might be a common and unstated assumption here that 
ever router uses hardware forwarding and has high speed 1Gbps+
interfaces that have 50% utilisation. The majority of routers - CPE -
don't meet that assumption.

 As I recall from long long ago, Cisco IOS would deal with traffic  
 differently depending on redirects... with redirects enabled, a redirect  
 was sent and the packet dropped; with redirects disabled, the router  
 hairpined the packets.  I honestly don't know what today's versions do  
 because I've never checked -- A can ping B, I move on.  I turn redirects  
 off on *outside* interfaces.  Inside (trustable) interfaces vary -- I  
 don't go out of my way to disable them.
 
 --Ricky
 



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Leen Besselink

On 08/21/2010 02:08 AM, Brandon Ross wrote:

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:

I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in 
IPv4 purely for security (traffic interception.)


Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my 
router prevent traffic from being intercepted?



As was mentioned in an other part of the thread.

You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well 
disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which 
is obviously slower.


It might also help you notice you have a roque host when you are looking 
at your network-traffic and if you know your

network doesn't have any ICMP-redirects normally.

disabling on the host:
OpenBSD:
echo net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0
sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

FreeBSD:
echo net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0
sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

Linux:
echo net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.conf





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Eric J. Katanich
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 19:49:43 -0400
Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 13:20:58 -0400, Christopher Morrow  
 christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
  Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
  6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
o be sending these by default
 ...
  In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
  redirects.
 
 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4  
 purely for security (traffic interception.)  In a perfectly run network,  
 redirects should never be necessary, so I'd think IPv6 should avoid going  
 down that road again. (support OPTIONAL, never enabled by default.) [It's  
 another insecure mistake IPv6 doesn't need to repeat.]
 

You're assuming the cost of always hair pinning traffic on an interface
is cheaper than issuing a redirect. Sometimes it won't be. 1 ICMP
redirect could result in potentially congestion inducing load being
shifted off of a single router's interface.

It seems that there might be a common and unstated assumption here that 
ever router uses hardware forwarding and has high speed 1Gbps+
interfaces that have 50% utilisation. The majority of routers - CPE -
don't meet that assumption.

 As I recall from long long ago, Cisco IOS would deal with traffic  
 differently depending on redirects... with redirects enabled, a redirect  
 was sent and the packet dropped; with redirects disabled, the router  
 hairpined the packets.  I honestly don't know what today's versions do  
 because I've never checked -- A can ping B, I move on.  I turn redirects  
 off on *outside* interfaces.  Inside (trustable) interfaces vary -- I  
 don't go out of my way to disable them.
 
 --Ricky
 



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Eric J. Katanich
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 18:16:35 EDT, Brandon Ross said:

 How does turning off ICMP redirects on the router prevent a rouge PC from 
 sending ICMP redirects to it's neighbors?

If I know for a fact that the network is designed such that I will never ever
receive a valid ICMP redirect because there is exactly one route off the
network, I can safely turn off accept ICMP redirects and be done with it.

If I have to allow ICMP in, it becomes a much more interesting iptables/whatever
issue.

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 15:34:17 PDT, Owen DeLong said:

 This is worse than said PC issuing rogue RAs exactly how?

It's the exact same problem, actually.

 Perhaps we should pressure switch vendors to add ICMP Redirect
 protection to the RA Guard feature they haven't implemented yet?

You mean you aren't already? ;)


Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Eric J. Katanich
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:

 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4 
 purely for security (traffic interception.)

Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my 
router prevent traffic from being intercepted?

-- 
Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
ICQ:  2269442
Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Eric J. Katanich
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 13:20:58 -0400, Christopher Morrow  
christopher.mor...@gmail.com wrote:
 Polling a little bit here, there's an active discussion going on
 6...@ietf about whether or not v6 routers should:
   o be required to implement ip redirect functions (icmpv6 redirect)
   o be sending these by default
...
 In ipv4 there's a relatively widely used practice of disabling ip
 redirects.

I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in IPv4  
purely for security (traffic interception.)  In a perfectly run network,  
redirects should never be necessary, so I'd think IPv6 should avoid going  
down that road again. (support OPTIONAL, never enabled by default.) [It's  
another insecure mistake IPv6 doesn't need to repeat.]

As I recall from long long ago, Cisco IOS would deal with traffic  
differently depending on redirects... with redirects enabled, a redirect  
was sent and the packet dropped; with redirects disabled, the router  
hairpined the packets.  I honestly don't know what today's versions do  
because I've never checked -- A can ping B, I move on.  I turn redirects  
off on *outside* interfaces.  Inside (trustable) interfaces vary -- I  
don't go out of my way to disable them.

--Ricky



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Eric J. Katanich
On 08/21/2010 02:08 AM, Brandon Ross wrote:
 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:

 I think it's almost universally disabled (by default) everywhere in 
 IPv4 purely for security (traffic interception.)

 Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my 
 router prevent traffic from being intercepted?

As was mentioned in an other part of the thread.

You disable it on the host and if no host is using it, you might as well 
disable it on the router as wel. Others mentioned
some routers need to handle this in software instead of hardware, which 
is obviously slower.

It might also help you notice you have a roque host when you are looking 
at your network-traffic and if you know your
network doesn't have any ICMP-redirects normally.

disabling on the host:
OpenBSD:
echo net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl net.inet.icmp.rediraccept=0
sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

FreeBSD:
echo net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl net.inet.icmp.drop_redirect=0
sysctl net.inet6.icmp6.rediraccept=0

Linux:
echo net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
echo net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0  /etc/sysctl.conf
sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.conf





Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Ricky Beam

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 20:08:34 -0400, Brandon Ross br...@pobox.com wrote:
Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my  
router prevent traffic from being intercepted?


It stops *one vector* of MITM attack.  If a router honors redirects (and  
it never should), an evil host can intercept traffic of hosts that aren't  
on the local network.


This is 5000% beyond the scope of the original question, btw.

--Ricky



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Ricky Beam
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 20:43:39 -0400, Mark Smith  
na...@85d5b20a518b8f6864949bd940457dc124746ddc.nosense.org wrote:

You're assuming the cost of always hair pinning traffic on an interface
is cheaper than issuing a redirect.


I am saying no such thing. (a single redirect packet is always more  
efficient.)  I *am* saying ICMP redirects are a mistake that should not be  
replicated in IPv6.  They are too easy to abuse, which is why they are  
almost universally ignored by IPv4 hosts.


In a *properly* configured network, redirects should not be necessary.  
(everything on the local LAN should know what's on the local LAN.) [For  
the record, my own networks don't follow that rule. :-) Coworkers throwing  
random crap on the wire doesn't help. *sigh* Don't go there.]


IPv6 has more than enough mistakes glued into it.  Redirects are a mess  
that does not need to be there.  For the purests who insist on making ugly  
networks that are trival to subvert, make ICMPv6 redirects *OPTIONAL*,  
*REQUIRING* explicit configuration to enable.  Without strong  
authentication/authorization mechanisms, it'll be the same mess that it is  
in IPv4.


--Ricky



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Brandon Ross

On Fri, 20 Aug 2010, Ricky Beam wrote:


On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 20:08:34 -0400, Brandon Ross br...@pobox.com wrote:
Okay, I'll ask again.  Exactly how does disabling ICMP redirects on my 
router prevent traffic from being intercepted?


It stops *one vector* of MITM attack.  If a router honors redirects (and it 
never should), an evil host can intercept traffic of hosts that aren't on the 
local network.


Are you saying that turning off the transmittal of ICMP redirects on most 
routers will simultaniously disable the honoring of ICMP redirects that 
that router receives?


If that's not what you are saying then you are wrong.


This is 5000% beyond the scope of the original question, btw.


I disagree.  The decision about whether or not a feature should be on by 
default or not should be clear evidence that said feature is/could be 
harmful.


So far I have not heard a single compelling argument for how the 
_transmittal_ of ICMP redirects can cause any signficicant harm to a 
network other than what the other typical protocols that are enabled by 
defualt (ping, can't fragement, etc) cause.  I will make the statement:


The transmittal of ICMP redirects by a router _cannot_ be exploited to 
create a man in the middle attack.


Before anyone responds to that statement, please read it very carefully. 
This statement does not comment on whether a host or router should be 
configured to _receive_ an ICMP redirect and act on it, that clearly can 
be used to create a MITM attack.


How many of you that routinely disable ICMP redirect on your routers also 
routinely disable the reception of ICMP redirects on your hosts?  For 
those of you that do not, why not?


--
Brandon Ross  AIM:  BrandonNRoss
   ICQ:  2269442
   Skype:  brandonross  Yahoo:  BrandonNRoss



Re: Should routers send redirects by default?

2010-08-20 Thread Mark Smith
On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 21:24:43 -0400
Ricky Beam jfb...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Aug 2010 20:43:39 -0400, Mark Smith  
 na...@85d5b20a518b8f6864949bd940457dc124746ddc.nosense.org wrote:
  You're assuming the cost of always hair pinning traffic on an interface
  is cheaper than issuing a redirect.
 
 I am saying no such thing. (a single redirect packet is always more  
 efficient.)  I *am* saying ICMP redirects are a mistake that should not be  
 replicated in IPv6.  They are too easy to abuse, which is why they are  
 almost universally ignored by IPv4 hosts.
 

I thought we were talking about IPv6 redirects not IPv4 ones. How much
do you know about their operation and purposes?

 In a *properly* configured network, redirects should not be necessary.  
 (everything on the local LAN should know what's on the local LAN.) [For  
 the record, my own networks don't follow that rule. :-) Coworkers throwing  
 random crap on the wire doesn't help. *sigh* Don't go there.]
 
 IPv6 has more than enough mistakes glued into it.  Redirects are a mess  
 that does not need to be there.  For the purests who insist on making ugly  
 networks that are trival to subvert, make ICMPv6 redirects *OPTIONAL*,  
 *REQUIRING* explicit configuration to enable.  Without strong  
 authentication/authorization mechanisms, it'll be the same mess that it is  
 in IPv4.
 

Know anything about IPv6 SeND?

 --Ricky