Re: obvious intent (Re: the Intercage mess)

2008-09-25 Thread Paul Bennett
On 9/25/08, Paul Vixie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  so, now begins the search for the line that mustn't be crossed.  if they
  have N spamming customer or M captured machines running CC and they
  disconnect such customers after P warnings or Q days, then will the
  community still rise up in arms and if so will that still be enough
  negativity to cause their (new?) provider to lose connectivity?  if not,
  then what about P-1 or Q+1 or M*2 or N/2?

  discovering the process by which N, M, P, and Q are discovered, will be
  even uglier than everything we've seen on this topic to date.

I work the at the abuse department of one of the big ISPs, and I have
to note that finding effective values for those four varables is
sticky business from the abuse preventers' side too.

We get tens of thousands of abuse complaints every single day. Even
filtering out the frequent-flyer abuse miscomplainers (certain ISPs
seem to have no outbound filtering -- to cope with the very large
number of times when their customers seem to confuse Report Spam
with Move to Trash, for instance), there's still a butt-load of data
to be analysed and acted on, and only a finite number of monkeys with
typewriters to churn through it.

At best, it's a trans-global game of whack-a-mole, suspending orgs and
consumers who have never heard the word firewall, or at least have
never learned router ACL config. Add to this the potential legal
and/or press minefield of being accused of wiretapping,
traffic-shaping, and other nefarious deeds, and we have to tread very
gently indeed around certain abuse detection and prevention issues.

In short, it's a big hairy beast, and it's even scarier if you take a
closer-than-normal look.



Paul
(not an official spokesperson, nor a policy-maker, of any ISP or
similar company)



obvious intent (Re: the Intercage mess)

2008-09-24 Thread Paul Vixie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (William Pitcock) writes:

 ... forcing them offline now that they are taking a new approach to
 handling abuse is ridiculous. ...

renaming, renumbering, and rehoming the darkest parts of their empire is
not a new approach to handling abuse, it's the most common thing that gray
networks do when faced with disconnection, because it's the thing that
looks most like protective colouration for them and it's the thing that
looks most like plausible deniability for their (new?) providers.

so, now begins the search for the line that mustn't be crossed.  if they
have N spamming customer or M captured machines running CC and they
disconnect such customers after P warnings or Q days, then will the
community still rise up in arms and if so will that still be enough
negativity to cause their (new?) provider to lose connectivity?  if not,
then what about P-1 or Q+1 or M*2 or N/2?

discovering the process by which N, M, P, and Q are discovered, will be
even uglier than everything we've seen on this topic to date.  i advise
those interested in the truth about a network's long term reputation to get
their information from friends and professionals in the security business,
or even google, but not nanog.

or just refuse to suspend disbelief, and ask why someone's apparently new
approach to handling abuse, the turning over a new leaf, happened so many
years into the game.  what was their obvious intent, if not monetizing the
uncertainty and inertia of the networks whose connectivity they depend on?
-- 
Paul Vixie