Re: Network virtualization/isolation

2006-12-02 Thread Kari Hurtta
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric W. Biederman) writes in gmane.linux.network:

 Ok.  So on this point we agree.  Full isolation at the network device/L2 level
 is desirable and no one is opposed to that.
 
 There is however a strong feeling especially for the case of application
 containers that something more focused on what a non-privileged process can
 use and deal with would be nice.  The ``L3'' case.
 
 I agree that has potential but I worry about 2 things.
 - Premature optimization.
 - A poor choice of semantics.
 - Feature creep leading to insane semantics.
 
 I feel there is something in the L3 arguments as well and it sounds
 like it would be a good idea to flush out the semantics.
 
 For full network isolation we have the case that every process,
 every socket, and every network device belongs to a network namespace.
 This is enough to derive the network namespace for all other user
 visible data structures, and to a large extent to define their semantics.
 
 We still need a definition of the non-privileged case, that is compatible
 with the former definition.
 
 .
 
 What unprivileged user space gets to manipulate are sockets.  So perhaps
 we can break our model into a network socket namespace and network device
 namespace.  
 
 I would define it so that for each socket there is exactly one network
 socket namespace.  And for each network socket namespace there is exactly
 one network device namespace.
 
 The network socket namespace would be concerned with the rules for deciding
 which local addresses a socket can connect/accept/bind to.
 
 The network device namespace would be concerned with everything else.

There need decide one thing:  What is connection between  namespaces?

- Connection between the network device namespaces is bridge.

- What (socket) is connection between the network socket namespaces?

Connection inside on name namespace is clear I think.

 - Connection inside of network device namespaces is loopback device.

 - Connection inside of network socket namespaces is socket
   using loopback address(es)?

/ Kari Hurtta



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Re: Network virtualization/isolation

2006-12-02 Thread Kari Hurtta
Kari Hurtta [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes in gmane.linux.network:

 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric W. Biederman) writes in gmane.linux.network:
 
  Ok.  So on this point we agree.  Full isolation at the network device/L2 
  level
  is desirable and no one is opposed to that.
  
  There is however a strong feeling especially for the case of application
  containers that something more focused on what a non-privileged process can
  use and deal with would be nice.  The ``L3'' case.
  
  I agree that has potential but I worry about 2 things.
  - Premature optimization.
  - A poor choice of semantics.
  - Feature creep leading to insane semantics.
  
  I feel there is something in the L3 arguments as well and it sounds
  like it would be a good idea to flush out the semantics.
  
  For full network isolation we have the case that every process,
  every socket, and every network device belongs to a network namespace.
  This is enough to derive the network namespace for all other user
  visible data structures, and to a large extent to define their semantics.
  
  We still need a definition of the non-privileged case, that is compatible
  with the former definition.
  
  .
  
  What unprivileged user space gets to manipulate are sockets.  So perhaps
  we can break our model into a network socket namespace and network device
  namespace.  
  
  I would define it so that for each socket there is exactly one network
  socket namespace.  And for each network socket namespace there is exactly
  one network device namespace.
  
  The network socket namespace would be concerned with the rules for deciding
  which local addresses a socket can connect/accept/bind to.
  
  The network device namespace would be concerned with everything else.
 
 There need decide one thing:  What is connection between  namespaces?
 
 - Connection between the network device namespaces is bridge.
 
 - What (socket) is connection between the network socket namespaces?
 
 Connection inside on name namespace is clear I think.
 
  - Connection inside of network device namespaces is loopback device.
 
  - Connection inside of network socket namespaces is socket
using loopback address(es)?


On other hand bridge between the network device namespaces need to set
on parent namespace.

So it is logical that connecting socket between network socket namespaces
is set on parent namespace.So connecting socket is any socket created 
on parent namespace?   (socketpair() for example? )


( Currently socketpair()  allows only create AF_UNIX  sockects, which
  are not part of network socket namespace, I think) 

/ Kari Hurtta

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