Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[Stephen Smalley]

On Tue, 2017-10-10 at 10:54 -0700, Chenbo Feng via Selinux wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 10, 2017 at 7:52 AM, Stephen Smalley 
> wrote:
> > On Tue, 2017-10-10 at 10:18 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2017-10-09 at 15:20 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
> > > > From: Chenbo Feng 
> > > > 
> > > > Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related
> > > > syscalls.
> > > > This
> > > > implementation use the security field inside bpf object to
> > > > store a
> > > > sid that
> > > > identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the
> > > > object,
> > > > selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The
> > > > creation
> > > > of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook
> > > > and
> > > > new
> > > > cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng 
> > > > Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
> > > > ---
> > > >  security/selinux/hooks.c| 111
> > > > 
> > > >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
> > > >  security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
> > > >  3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > index f5d304736852..41aba4e3d57c 100644
> > > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > > > @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
> > > >  #include 
> > > >  #include 
> > > >  #include 
> > > > +#include 
> > > > 
> > > >  #include "avc.h"
> > > >  #include "objsec.h"
> > > > @@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void
> > > > selinux_ib_free_security(void
> > > > *ib_sec)
> > > >  }
> > > >  #endif
> > > > 
> > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> > > > +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
> > > > +unsigned int size)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > > > +   int ret;
> > > > +
> > > > +   switch (cmd) {
> > > > +   case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
> > > > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> > > > BPF_MAP__CREATE,
> > > > +  NULL);
> > > > +   break;
> > > > +   case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
> > > > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> > > > BPF_PROG__LOAD,
> > > > +  NULL);
> > > > +   break;
> > > > +   default:
> > > > +   ret = 0;
> > > > +   break;
> > > > +   }
> > > > +
> > > > +   return ret;
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   u32 av = 0;
> > > > +
> > > > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
> > > > +   av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
> > > > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> > > > +   av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
> > > > +   return av;
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec = map->security;
> > > > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> > > > +   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
> > > > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> > > > +   BPF_PROG__USE, NULL);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> > > > +   if (!bpfsec)
> > > > +   return -ENOMEM;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> > > > +   map->security = bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   return 0;
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
> > > > +
> > > > +   map->security = NULL;
> > > > +   kfree(bpfsec);
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> > > > +   if (!bpfsec)
> > > > +   return -ENOMEM;
> > > > +
> > > > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> > > > +   aux->security = bpfsec;
> > > > +
> > > > +   return 0;
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> > > > +{
> > > > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
> > > > +
> > > > +   aux->security = NULL;
> > > > +   kfree(bpfsec);
> > > > +}
> > > > +#endif
> > > > +
> > > >  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[]
> > > > __lsm_ro_after_init
> > > > = {
> > > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr,
> > > 

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[kbuild test robot]

Hi Chenbo,

[auto build test WARNING on net-next/master]

url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Chenbo-Feng/bpf-security-New-file-mode-and-LSM-hooks-for-eBPF-object-permission-control/20171011-010349
config: x86_64-randconfig-u0-10110310 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-6 (Debian 6.2.0-3) 6.2.0 20160901
reproduce:
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make ARCH=x86_64 

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

   In file included from include/linux/init.h:4:0,
from security/selinux/hooks.c:27:
   security/selinux/hooks.c: In function 'bpf_map_fmode_to_av':
   security/selinux/hooks.c:6284:6: error: 'f_mode' undeclared (first use in 
this function)
 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 ^
   include/linux/compiler.h:156:30: note: in definition of macro '__trace_if'
 if (__builtin_constant_p(!!(cond)) ? !!(cond) :   \
 ^~~~
>> security/selinux/hooks.c:6284:2: note: in expansion of macro 'if'
 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 ^~
   security/selinux/hooks.c:6284:6: note: each undeclared identifier is 
reported only once for each function it appears in
 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 ^
   include/linux/compiler.h:156:30: note: in definition of macro '__trace_if'
 if (__builtin_constant_p(!!(cond)) ? !!(cond) :   \
 ^~~~
>> security/selinux/hooks.c:6284:2: note: in expansion of macro 'if'
 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 ^~

vim +/if +6284 security/selinux/hooks.c

  6279  
  6280  static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
  6281  {
  6282  u32 av = 0;
  6283  
> 6284  if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
  6285  av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
  6286  if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
  6287  av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
  6288  return av;
  6289  }
  6290  

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructureOpen Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all   Intel Corporation


.config.gz
Description: application/gzip

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[kbuild test robot]

Hi Chenbo,

[auto build test ERROR on net-next/master]

url:
https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Chenbo-Feng/bpf-security-New-file-mode-and-LSM-hooks-for-eBPF-object-permission-control/20171011-010349
config: xtensa-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: xtensa-linux-gcc (GCC) 4.9.0
reproduce:
wget 
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O 
~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make.cross ARCH=xtensa 

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   security//selinux/hooks.c: In function 'bpf_map_fmode_to_av':
>> security//selinux/hooks.c:6284:6: error: 'f_mode' undeclared (first use in 
>> this function)
 if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
 ^
   security//selinux/hooks.c:6284:6: note: each undeclared identifier is 
reported only once for each function it appears in

vim +/f_mode +6284 security//selinux/hooks.c

  6279  
  6280  static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
  6281  {
  6282  u32 av = 0;
  6283  
> 6284  if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
  6285  av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
  6286  if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
  6287  av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
  6288  return av;
  6289  }
  6290  

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructureOpen Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all   Intel Corporation


.config.gz
Description: application/gzip

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[Chenbo Feng]

On Tue, Oct 10, 2017 at 7:52 AM, Stephen Smalley  wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-10-10 at 10:18 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On Mon, 2017-10-09 at 15:20 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
>> > From: Chenbo Feng 
>> >
>> > Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls.
>> > This
>> > implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a
>> > sid that
>> > identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the
>> > object,
>> > selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The
>> > creation
>> > of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and
>> > new
>> > cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng 
>> > Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
>> > ---
>> >  security/selinux/hooks.c| 111
>> > 
>> >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
>> >  security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
>> >  3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > index f5d304736852..41aba4e3d57c 100644
>> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> > @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
>> >  #include 
>> >  #include 
>> >  #include 
>> > +#include 
>> >
>> >  #include "avc.h"
>> >  #include "objsec.h"
>> > @@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void
>> > *ib_sec)
>> >  }
>> >  #endif
>> >
>> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> > +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
>> > +unsigned int size)
>> > +{
>> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
>> > +   int ret;
>> > +
>> > +   switch (cmd) {
>> > +   case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
>> > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
>> > BPF_MAP__CREATE,
>> > +  NULL);
>> > +   break;
>> > +   case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
>> > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
>> > BPF_PROG__LOAD,
>> > +  NULL);
>> > +   break;
>> > +   default:
>> > +   ret = 0;
>> > +   break;
>> > +   }
>> > +
>> > +   return ret;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
>> > +{
>> > +   u32 av = 0;
>> > +
>> > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
>> > +   av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
>> > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
>> > +   av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
>> > +   return av;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
>> > +{
>> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec = map->security;
>> > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
>> > +   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
>> > +{
>> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
>> > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
>> > +   BPF_PROG__USE, NULL);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
>> > +{
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
>> > +   if (!bpfsec)
>> > +   return -ENOMEM;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
>> > +   map->security = bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
>> > +{
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
>> > +
>> > +   map->security = NULL;
>> > +   kfree(bpfsec);
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>> > +{
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
>> > +   if (!bpfsec)
>> > +   return -ENOMEM;
>> > +
>> > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
>> > +   aux->security = bpfsec;
>> > +
>> > +   return 0;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>> > +{
>> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
>> > +
>> > +   aux->security = NULL;
>> > +   kfree(bpfsec);
>> > +}
>> > +#endif
>> > +
>> >  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[]
>> > __lsm_ro_after_init
>> > = {
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr,
>> > selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction,
>> > selinux_binder_transaction),
>> > @@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list
>> > selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
>> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
>> >  #endif
>> > +
>> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
>> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
>> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
>> > +   

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[Stephen Smalley]

On Tue, 2017-10-10 at 10:18 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-10-09 at 15:20 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
> > From: Chenbo Feng 
> > 
> > Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls.
> > This
> > implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a
> > sid that
> > identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the
> > object,
> > selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The
> > creation
> > of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and
> > new
> > cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng 
> > Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c| 111
> > 
> >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
> >  security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
> >  3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index f5d304736852..41aba4e3d57c 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
> >  #include 
> >  #include 
> >  #include 
> > +#include 
> >  
> >  #include "avc.h"
> >  #include "objsec.h"
> > @@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void
> > *ib_sec)
> >  }
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> > +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
> > +    unsigned int size)
> > +{
> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > +   int ret;
> > +
> > +   switch (cmd) {
> > +   case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
> > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> > BPF_MAP__CREATE,
> > +      NULL);
> > +   break;
> > +   case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
> > +   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> > BPF_PROG__LOAD,
> > +      NULL);
> > +   break;
> > +   default:
> > +   ret = 0;
> > +   break;
> > +   }
> > +
> > +   return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> > +{
> > +   u32 av = 0;
> > +
> > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
> > +   av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
> > +   if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> > +   av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
> > +   return av;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> > +{
> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec = map->security;
> > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> > +   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > +{
> > +   u32 sid = current_sid();
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
> > +   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> > +   BPF_PROG__USE, NULL);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
> > +{
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +   if (!bpfsec)
> > +   return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> > +   map->security = bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> > +{
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
> > +
> > +   map->security = NULL;
> > +   kfree(bpfsec);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> > +{
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +   if (!bpfsec)
> > +   return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> > +   aux->security = bpfsec;
> > +
> > +   return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> > +{
> > +   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
> > +
> > +   aux->security = NULL;
> > +   kfree(bpfsec);
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> >  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[]
> > __lsm_ro_after_init
> > = {
> >     LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr,
> > selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
> >     LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction,
> > selinux_binder_transaction),
> > @@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list
> > selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> >     LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
> >     LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
> >  #endif
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security,
> > selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security,
> > selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
> > +   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security,
> > selinux_bpf_map_free),
> > +   

Re: [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[Stephen Smalley]

On Mon, 2017-10-09 at 15:20 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
> From: Chenbo Feng 
> 
> Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
> implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a
> sid that
> identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
> selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The
> creation
> of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
> cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng 
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c| 111
> 
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
>  3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f5d304736852..41aba4e3d57c 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
>  #include 
>  #include 
>  #include 
> +#include 
>  
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
> @@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void
> *ib_sec)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
> +  unsigned int size)
> +{
> + u32 sid = current_sid();
> + int ret;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> BPF_MAP__CREATE,
> +    NULL);
> + break;
> + case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> BPF_PROG__LOAD,
> +    NULL);
> + break;
> + default:
> + ret = 0;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> +{
> + u32 av = 0;
> +
> + if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
> + av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
> + if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> + av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
> + return av;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> +{
> + u32 sid = current_sid();
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> + bpfsec = map->security;
> + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
> + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> +{
> + u32 sid = current_sid();
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> + bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
> + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
> + BPF_PROG__USE, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!bpfsec)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> + map->security = bpfsec;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
> +
> + map->security = NULL;
> + kfree(bpfsec);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!bpfsec)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> + aux->security = bpfsec;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
> +
> + aux->security = NULL;
> + kfree(bpfsec);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init
> = {
>   LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr,
> selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>   LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction,
> selinux_binder_transaction),
> @@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list
> selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>   LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
>   LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security,
> selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security,
> selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security,
> selinux_bpf_prog_free),
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  static __init int selinux_init(void)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 35ffb29a69cb..7253c5eea59c 100644
> --- 

[PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations

[Chenbo Feng]

From: Chenbo Feng 

Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.

Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c| 111 
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f5d304736852..41aba4e3d57c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
+#include 
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+unsigned int size)
+{
+   u32 sid = current_sid();
+   int ret;
+
+   switch (cmd) {
+   case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP, BPF_MAP__CREATE,
+  NULL);
+   break;
+   case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+   ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG, BPF_PROG__LOAD,
+  NULL);
+   break;
+   default:
+   ret = 0;
+   break;
+   }
+
+   return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+   u32 av = 0;
+
+   if (f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+   av |= BPF_MAP__READ;
+   if (f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+   av |= BPF_MAP__WRITE;
+   return av;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+   u32 sid = current_sid();
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+   bpfsec = map->security;
+   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
+   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+   u32 sid = current_sid();
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+   bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+   return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
+   BPF_PROG__USE, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+   if (!bpfsec)
+   return -ENOMEM;
+
+   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+   map->security = bpfsec;
+
+   return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+
+   map->security = NULL;
+   kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+   bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+   if (!bpfsec)
+   return -ENOMEM;
+
+   bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+   aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+   return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+   struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+
+   aux->security = NULL;
+   kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+#endif
+
 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] 
__lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+   LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+#endif
 };
 
 static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h 
b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35ffb29a69cb..7253c5eea59c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
  { "access", NULL } },
{ "infiniband_endport",
  { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+   { "bpf_map", {"create",