Re: net/sctp: slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_sf_ootb
On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 02:23:48PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > Hi Marcelo, > > I can confirm that your patch fixes the issue for me. > > Tested-by: Andrey KonovalovGreat, thanks Andrey! I'll post the patch in a few. > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:44 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner > wrote: > > Hi Andrey, > > > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 05:30:04PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > >> The problem is that sctp_walk_errors walks the chunk before its length > >> is checked for overflow. > > > > Exactly. The check is done too late, for the 2nd and subsequent chunks > > only. > > Please try the following patch, thanks. Note: not even compile tested. > > > > ---8<--- > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > index 026e3bca4a94..8ec20a64a3f8 100644 > > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > > @@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, > > return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > > type, arg, > > commands); > > > > + /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ > > + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); > > + if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) > > + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > > type, arg, > > + commands); > > + > > /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header, > > * do things that are type appropriate. > > */ > > @@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, > > } > > } > > > > - /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ > > - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); > > - if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) > > - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > > type, arg, > > - commands); > > - > > ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; > > } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); > > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-sctp" in > the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >
Re: net/sctp: slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_sf_ootb
Hi Marcelo, I can confirm that your patch fixes the issue for me. Tested-by: Andrey KonovalovOn Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:44 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote: > Hi Andrey, > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 05:30:04PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote: >> The problem is that sctp_walk_errors walks the chunk before its length >> is checked for overflow. > > Exactly. The check is done too late, for the 2nd and subsequent chunks > only. > Please try the following patch, thanks. Note: not even compile tested. > > ---8<--- > > diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > index 026e3bca4a94..8ec20a64a3f8 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c > @@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, > return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > type, arg, > commands); > > + /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ > + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); > + if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) > + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > type, arg, > + commands); > + > /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header, > * do things that are type appropriate. > */ > @@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, > } > } > > - /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ > - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); > - if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) > - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, > type, arg, > - commands); > - > ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; > } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); >
Re: net/sctp: slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_sf_ootb
Hi Andrey, On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 05:30:04PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > The problem is that sctp_walk_errors walks the chunk before its length > is checked for overflow. Exactly. The check is done too late, for the 2nd and subsequent chunks only. Please try the following patch, thanks. Note: not even compile tested. ---8<--- diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 026e3bca4a94..8ec20a64a3f8 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ + ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); + if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header, * do things that are type appropriate. */ @@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, } } - /* Report violation if chunk len overflows */ - ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); - if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb)) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));
net/sctp: slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_sf_ootb
Hi, I've got the following error report while running the syzkaller fuzzer: == BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_sf_ootb+0x634/0x6c0 at addr 88006bc1f210 Read of size 2 by task syz-executor/13493 CPU: 3 PID: 13493 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc2+ #300 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 88003e256e40 81b47264 88003e80ccc0 88006bc1eed8 88006bc1f210 88006bc1eed0 88003e256e68 8150b34c 88003e256ef8 88003e80ccc0 8800ebc1f210 88003e256ee8 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10f lib/dump_stack.c:51 [] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194 [] kasan_report_error+0x1f7/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283 [< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303 [] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x3a/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:334 [] sctp_sf_ootb+0x634/0x6c0 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:3448 [] sctp_do_sm+0x104/0x4ed0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1108 [] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x32d/0x9c0 net/sctp/endpointola.c:452 [] sctp_inq_push+0x134/0x1a0 net/sctp/inqueue.c:95 [] sctp_rcv+0x1fa8/0x2d00 net/sctp/input.c:268 [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x332/0xad0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 [< inline >] NF_HOOK_THRESH include/linux/netfilter.h:232 [< inline >] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:255 [] ip_local_deliver+0x1c2/0x4b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 [< inline >] dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [] ip_rcv_finish+0x750/0x1c40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 [< inline >] NF_HOOK_THRESH include/linux/netfilter.h:232 [< inline >] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:255 [] ip_rcv+0x96f/0x12f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1897/0x2a50 net/core/dev.c:4212 [] __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4250 [] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1b3/0x390 net/core/dev.c:4278 [] netif_receive_skb+0x48/0x250 net/core/dev.c:4302 [] tun_get_user+0xbd5/0x28a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1308 [] tun_chr_write_iter+0xda/0x190 drivers/net/tun.c:1332 [< inline >] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499 [] __vfs_write+0x334/0x570 fs/read_write.c:512 [] vfs_write+0x17b/0x500 fs/read_write.c:560 [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607 [] SyS_write+0xd4/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:599 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Object at 88006bc1eed8, in cache kmalloc-512 size: 512 Allocated: PID = 9755 [ 182.804017] [] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57 [ 182.804017] [] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:495 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:507 [ 182.804017] [] kasan_kmalloc+0xab/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:598 [ 182.804017] [] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:537 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708 [ 182.804017] [] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x390 mm/slub.c:4270 [ 182.804017] [] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.35+0x41/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:138 [ 182.804017] [] __alloc_skb+0xf0/0x600 net/core/skbuff.c:231 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:921 [ 182.804017] [] sock_wmalloc+0xa3/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:1757 [ 182.804017] [] __ip_append_data.isra.46+0x1e38/0x28c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1010 [ 182.804017] [] ip_append_data.part.47+0xf1/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1201 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] ip_append_data net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1605 [ 182.804017] [] ip_send_unicast_reply+0x831/0xe20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1605 [ 182.804017] [] tcp_v4_send_reset+0xb0a/0x1700 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:696 [ 182.804017] [] tcp_v4_rcv+0x198b/0x2e50 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1719 [ 182.804017] [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x332/0xad0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] NF_HOOK_THRESH include/linux/netfilter.h:232 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:255 [ 182.804017] [] ip_local_deliver+0x1c2/0x4b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [ 182.804017] [] ip_rcv_finish+0x750/0x1c40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] NF_HOOK_THRESH include/linux/netfilter.h:232 [ 182.804017] [< inline >] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:255 [ 182.804017] [] ip_rcv+0x96f/0x12f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 [ 182.804017] [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1897/0x2a50 net/core/dev.c:4212 [ 182.804017] [] __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4250 [ 182.804017] [] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1b3/0x390 net/core/dev.c:4278 [ 182.804017] [] netif_receive_skb+0x48/0x250 net/core/dev.c:4302 [ 182.804017] [] tun_get_user+0xbd5/0x28a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1308 [ 182.804017] [] tun_chr_write_iter+0xda/0x190 drivers/net/tun.c:1332 [ 182.804017] [< inline >]