nettime Jonathan Zittrain: Tyrants will find the key to the
Original to: - well, forget it! ;-) ( do yr own research on how to pilfer FT content in the age of paywalls - applies even if you actually hold a paper copy ;-) Tyrants will find the key to the internet?s back door Jonathan Zittrain Banning strong encryption is no solution to security, writes Jonathan Zittrain Sould the citizens of a democratic state be free to communicate over electronic networks hardened against any government surveillance? To some the answer will seem obvious: No. Ever since telephony was invented, solving or preventing violent crime has often involved tapping people?s phones. When digital networks replaced mechanical exchanges in the 1990s, governments demanded that they should still be able to listen in. David Cameron is among those who argue that the advent of the internet should not upset that apparent balance between security and privacy. Speaking in January, the British prime minister pointed out that it has always been ?possible to read someone?s letter, to listen to someone?s call?, and insisted that he was not ?going to allow a means of communication where it simply is not possible to do that?. Many understood him to be taking aim at internet communications services that use end-to-end encryption, a now-common technology that makes it impossible to read messages even if they are intercepted in transit. Many people will agree with Mr Cameron. True, they will say, the state must respect the rule of law. But they pose a reasonable question: so long as it does, why should new technology trump its demands for information? Here are three reasons why it should. First, while legitimate eavesdropping could be implemented without making telephones less useful, there is no way of guaranteeing the state unfettered access to online communications without making the internet vastly less useful even for lawful purposes. Traditional telephone systems were run by large companies or governments themselves. An entire industry was built, in effect, on a single application: letting people speak at a distance. The experience of using a phone in 1990 was little different from 1950. Regulating the unchanging service of a single company can be done without creating much friction. The internet has evolved in a wildly different way. It supports applications written by anyone. To restrict how a coder might build an internet application is to place an enormous weight on slender shoulders. Every software developer would have to be a professional operation with an army of compliance lawyers, or risk breaking the rules. In the worst case, software development would be relegated to a handful of government-friendly incumbents. The best case, so far as the advocates of surveillance are concerned, would be one where software developers avoid the lawyers but give up on encryption entirely. But this is a nightmare, from the public?s point of view and even the state?s: it exposes communications to anyone willing to do a bit of hacking. Telephone eavesdropping never ran such risks. For anyone other than the authorised agents of the state, it was comparatively difficult to listen in to someone?s call. More video Second, on the internet, enabling surveillance means requiring the people who build communications apps and services to make sure they are breakable. But this concession to lawful snoopers would also be a gift to states that do not embrace the rule of law. For the billions of people who live in such countries, western technology has offered a rare glimpse of the freedom to communicate. Authoritarian governments have had to invest enormous effort in trying to connect with the world while still permitting censorship and surveillance. If western governments succeed in shaping our software so that we cannot keep secrets from authorities bearing warrants, they will also stop people keeping secrets from regimes that do not bother with formalities. Third, a more practical point: it is very, very difficult to design a communications system that allows messages to be intercepted by the government but otherwise keeps them secure from prying eyes. The chance of error is high. Then, sensitive information risks falling into the wrong hands ? a worse outcome than if the communicating parties had not had access to encryption at all. I understand the imperative to provide security. It makes sense that the boundary between state and citizen should be drawn by a democratic process ? not determined by a cat-and-mouse contest between programmers. I sympathise with the alarm that law enforcers feel when communications threaten to ?go dark?. But banning strong encryption is no solution. The internet has been a force for modernity and openness ? exactly what those who believe in indiscriminate violence despise. We must not build them a more agreeable network in the name of a short-term imperative to uncover and prevent their worst. The writer is a professor of law and computer science at Harvard University Related
nettime Molly Scott Cato: I've seen the secrets of TTIP, and it is built for corporations not citizens
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/04/secrets-ttip-corporations-not-citizens-transatlantic-trade-deal I've seen the secrets of TTIP, and it is built for corporations not citizens Molly Scott Cato As an MEP I'm party to the transatlantic trade deal's inner workings. I'm sworn to secrecy, but this much I can say: TTIP is undemocratic US chief trade negotiator Dan Mullaney, left, and EU chief trade negotiator Ignacio Garcia Bercero US chief trade negotiator Dan Mullaney, left, and his EU couterpart Ignacio Garcia Bercero, prior to talks on the TTIP. Photograph: Virginia Mayo/AP Wednesday 4 February 2015 16.07 GMT * Share on Facebook * Share on Twitter * Share via Email * Share on LinkedIn * Share on Google+ * Share on WhatsApp It appears that, even though I am past 50, my opportunities to become a spy have not expired. This is because, as an MEP, I have now been granted privileged access to the European parliament restricted reading room to explore documents relating to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal. But before I had the right to see such top secret documents, which are restricted from the gaze of most EU citizens, I was required to sign a document of some 14 pages, reminding me that EU institutions are a valuable target and of the dangers of espionage. Crucially, I had to agree not to share any of the contents with those I represent. The delightful parliamentary staff required me to leave even the smallest of my personal items in a locked cupboard, as they informed me how tiny cameras can be these days. Like a scene from a James Bond film, they then took me through the security door into a room with secure cabinets from which the documents were retrieved. I was not at any point left alone. This week hundreds of protesters against TTIP have descended on the European parliament. They are quite rightly concerned about the threat that this treaty poses to the British government's ability to conduct its affairs in their interests. On a range of issues, from food safety standards and animal welfare to public services and financial regulation, there are deep concerns that the harmonisation of standards across the Atlantic really means a reduction of standards on both sides. But how are we to know for certain? All discussions about TTIP have been hypothetical, since the negotiations are taking place in secret. In order to read even brief notes of what has been discussed I have to be reminded of my duties not to undertake espionage for foreign powers. Repeated complaints about secrecy from my fellow Green members have resulted in our being admitted to the restricted reading room but we are still not able to share what we discover there with our constituents or with journalists. What we do know is that 92% of those involved in the consultations have been corporate lobbyists. Of the 560 lobby encounters that the commission had, 520 were with business lobbyists and only 26 (4.6%) were with public interest groups. This means that, for every encounter with a trade union or consumer group, there were 20 with companies and industry federations. Related: This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy | George Monbiot What I am able to reveal from my visit to the library is that I left without any sense of reassurance either that the process of negotiating this trade deal is democratic, or that the negotiators are operating on behalf of citizens. The whole process, from the implicit accusation of industrial espionage, to the recognition about who is actually engaged in the negotiations, makes it clear that this is a corporate discussion, not a democratic one. I picture a room full of bureaucrats trying to find ways to facilitate the business of the world's most powerful companies, many of which have a turnover larger than the economic activity of some EU member states. So why would anyone want a world that contains a giant trading area stretching from Alaska to the Black Sea? I think the vision arises from a sense of the need to order and control; the sense that uniformity is equivalent to security. But it is also clear that the decisions about what this uniform system of regulation and trade would look like are devised by corporations whose very DNA is the profit motive, and which are legally required to serve shareholders at the expense of all others. Culturally, as a Green, I would always be opposed to this vision and therefore this treaty. However, looking kindly on the impulse to create such standardisation, I try to imagine that the rules were ones I would be happy to see: high standards of animal welfare, bans on dangerous pesticides, financial regulation designed to achieve stability, to name
