Re: cope with inline PGP encrypted messages

2018-05-11 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Thu 2018-05-10 09:39:32 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor  writes:
>
>> Not sure how to best
>> represent that in nmbug -- but for now i've removed
>> notmuch::needs-review and added notmuch::wip.  bremner, let me know if
>> you think i should have done something different.
>
> I also marked the other two patches in the series as WIP; feel free to
> remind me they've already been reviewed if/when the whole series is
> resubmitted.

i think you marked two patches from a different series (the "notmuch
show --decrypt=stash" series) as WIP.  For the record, that series is
not the same as this inline PGP series!

I've gone ahead and pushed a v2 of the "notmuch show --decrypt=stash"
series, and removed the notmuch::wip tag from the v1 patches, so i think
there's nothing to clean up now.  just wanted to make it clear that i am
still pursuing "notmuch show --decrypt=stash" (i think it's ready for
merge actually!) even as i take "inline PGP encryption" back to the shop
for repairs.

--dkg
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Re: cope with inline PGP encrypted messages

2018-05-10 Thread David Bremner
Daniel Kahn Gillmor  writes:

> Not sure how to best
> represent that in nmbug -- but for now i've removed
> notmuch::needs-review and added notmuch::wip.  bremner, let me know if
> you think i should have done something different.

I also marked the other two patches in the series as WIP; feel free to
remind me they've already been reviewed if/when the whole series is
resubmitted.

d
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Re: cope with inline PGP encrypted messages

2018-05-09 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Tue 2017-12-12 01:15:48 -0500, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Inline PGP encrypted messages are clearly worse than PGP/MIME
> structured encrypted messages.  There are no standards for how they
> are formed, and they don't offer any structured metadata about how to
> interpret the bytestream produced by decrypting them.
>
> However, some other MUAs and end-user workflows may make creation of
> inline PGP encrypted messages the only available option for message
> encryption, and when Notmuch encounters such a message, it should make
> a reasonable best-effort to render the cleartext to the user.

Jamie Rollins points out that I need to think more about some of the
security implications of this patch series, so i'd prefer to withdraw it
from consideration for notmuch at the moment.  i'd say it's a WIP but
really not ready for general consumption.  Not sure how to best
represent that in nmbug -- but for now i've removed
notmuch::needs-review and added notmuch::wip.  bremner, let me know if
you think i should have done something different.

I do think that we need to come up with *some* way of letting people
read messages with inline PGP encrypted chunks in them safely.
Otherwise, notmuch users will resort to dirty tricks (because they want
to read the mail), and those dirty tricks will possibly be worse than
anything we come up with.

But higher-priority issues are drawing my attention right now, and i
don't want this series to distract from them.

  --dkg
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cope with inline PGP encrypted messages

2017-12-11 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Inline PGP encrypted messages are clearly worse than PGP/MIME
structured encrypted messages.  There are no standards for how they
are formed, and they don't offer any structured metadata about how to
interpret the bytestream produced by decrypting them.

However, some other MUAs and end-user workflows may make creation of
inline PGP encrypted messages the only available option for message
encryption, and when Notmuch encounters such a message, it should make
a reasonable best-effort to render the cleartext to the user.

Due to ambiguities in interpretation of signatures on inline messages
(e.g. which parts of the message were actually signed?  what character
encoding should the bytestream be interpreted as), we continue to
ignore inline-signed messages entirely, and we do not look at the
validity of any signatures that might be found when decrypting inline
PGP encrypted messages.

We make use here of GMime's optimization function for detecting the
presence of inline PGP encrypted content, which is only found in GMime
3.0 or later.

This series is currently based n top of the "notmuch show
--decrypt=stash" series, which it needs to be able to apply cleanly.
If that series proves controversial, i could rebase this patch
manually against some earlier commit.

If you have applied this series, and you know you have some inline PGP
messages already in your message store, you can try to retroactively
reindex them with something like:

notmuch reindex --decrypt=true BEGIN-PGP-MESSAGE and not tag:encrypted

I welcome review and feedback about this series.

  --dkg

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