Re: [OAUTH-WG] Redirection in authorization code flow: GET vs POST

[Jim Manico]

> Get is mostly OK with the correct headers to stop referrer leakage.

Those work in new-ish browsers only. Referrer is only one GET leakage vector.

>  Fragment should only be used with real JS clients in the browser and not 
> with servers.  

Fragment behavior is very different in modern browsers, which is one reason why 
many security folks recommend against the implicit grant type. (I'll double 
check on this one)

Respectfully,
--
Jim Manico
@Manicode

> On Aug 12, 2017, at 11:43 AM, John Bradley  wrote:
> 
> From a interoperability perspective accepting both is best.   
> 
> Get is mostly OK with the correct headers to stop referer leakage.   Fragment 
> should only be used with real JS clients in the browser and not with servers. 
>  
> 
> That is the general direction of the new security advice.  
> 
> People wanting to use POST should probably follow the connect spec for 
> response mode to be explicit about it.  
> 
> John B. 
> 
>> On Aug 12, 2017 10:55, "Jim Manico"  wrote:
>> > The safest thing for a client is to accept both.  
>> I politely (and strongly) disagree with this statement. The safest thing for 
>> a client is to only accept POST or other verbs where any kind of sensitive 
>> data is NOT kept in the URL. Sensitive data in URL's leak like a sieve, even 
>> over HTTPS.
>> 
>> Respectfully,
>> Jim
>> 
>> 
>>> On 8/11/17 3:18 PM, John Bradley wrote:
>>> OpenID Connect formally defined a POST response mode.
>>> 
>>> http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html
>>> 
>>> The OAuth 2 spec docent preclude it.  
>>> 
>>> The safest thing for a client is to accept both.  
>>> The main advantages of POST is that it docent leak in the referrer, and can 
>>> handle larger responses without the browser choking in some cases.
>>> 
>>> Size is more of an issue in Connect where a id_token may be returned in the 
>>> front channel and POST allows for the larger response without the client 
>>> needing to have JS extract the fragment.
>>> 
>>> That is why Connect defined it and OAuth largely assumes that for code get 
>>> is OK.
>>> For security GET responses should add headers to prevent referrer from 
>>> leaking the code.
>>> 
>>> We are adding advice on that to the Security document that is being updated 
>>> now.
>>> 
>>> John B.
>>> 
>>> 
 On Aug 11, 2017, at 4:08 PM, Josh Mandel  wrote:
 
 Fixing my "with this technique" url: it should have been 
 https://gist.github.com/jmandel/4704d1efed8578a67a6f9b600ffd0c63 .
 
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Josh Mandel  wrote:
> Hi All,
> 
> I've just encountered a server that performs a redirect (back to the 
> client's redirect_uri) via POST instead of GET. This was surprising 
> behavior to me and broke my client implementation — but citing chapter 
> and verse, the server developer pointed out that 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.7 says 
> 
>> While the examples in this specification show the use of the HTTP 302 
>> status code, any other method available via the user-agent to accomplish 
>> this redirection is allowed and is considered to be an implementation 
>> detail.
> 
> Is triggering a POST-based redirect (e.g. with this technique) to the 
> redirect_url (including url query parameters for state and code) indeed 
> considered a "method available via the user-agent to accomplish this 
> redirection"? In other words, should a well-behaved OAuth client be 
> prepared to receive GETs as well as POSTs to its redirect_uri? If so, 
> what would be the considerations for a server choosing between GET and 
> POST?
> 
> Best,
> 
>   Josh
 
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 OAuth@ietf.org
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>> 
>> -- 
>> Jim Manico
>> Manicode Security
>> https://www.manicode.com
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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Redirection in authorization code flow: GET vs POST

[John Bradley]

>From a interoperability perspective accepting both is best.

Get is mostly OK with the correct headers to stop referer leakage.
Fragment should only be used with real JS clients in the browser and not
with servers.

That is the general direction of the new security advice.

People wanting to use POST should probably follow the connect spec for
response mode to be explicit about it.

John B.

On Aug 12, 2017 10:55, "Jim Manico"  wrote:

> > The *safest* thing for a client is to accept both.
>
> I politely (and strongly) disagree with this statement. The safest thing
> for a client is to only accept POST or other verbs where any kind of
> sensitive data is NOT kept in the URL. Sensitive data in URL's leak like a
> sieve, even over HTTPS.
> Respectfully,
> Jim
>
>
>
> On 8/11/17 3:18 PM, John Bradley wrote:
>
> OpenID Connect formally defined a POST response mode.
>
> http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html
>
> The OAuth 2 spec docent preclude it.
>
> The safest thing for a client is to accept both.
> The main advantages of POST is that it docent leak in the referrer, and
> can handle larger responses without the browser choking in some cases.
>
> Size is more of an issue in Connect where a id_token may be returned in
> the front channel and POST allows for the larger response without the
> client needing to have JS extract the fragment.
>
> That is why Connect defined it and OAuth largely assumes that for code get
> is OK.
> For security GET responses should add headers to prevent referrer from
> leaking the code.
>
> We are adding advice on that to the Security document that is being
> updated now.
>
> John B.
>
>
> On Aug 11, 2017, at 4:08 PM, Josh Mandel  wrote:
>
> Fixing my "with this technique" url: it should have been
> https://gist.github.com/jmandel/4704d1efed8578a67a6f9b600ffd0c63 .
>
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Josh Mandel  wrote:
>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> I've just encountered a server that performs a redirect (back to the
>> client's redirect_uri) via POST instead of GET. This was surprising
>> behavior to me and broke my client implementation — but citing chapter and
>> verse, the server developer pointed out that https://tools.ietf.org/ht
>> ml/rfc6749#section-1.7 says
>>
>> While the examples in this specification show the use of the HTTP 302
>>> status code, any other method available via the user-agent to accomplish
>>> this redirection is allowed and is considered to be an implementation
>>> detail.
>>
>>
>> Is triggering a POST-based redirect (e.g. with this technique
>> )
>> to the redirect_url (including url query parameters for state and code)
>> indeed considered a "method available via the user-agent to accomplish this
>> redirection"? In other words, should a well-behaved OAuth client be
>> prepared to receive GETs as well as POSTs to its redirect_uri? If so, what
>> would be the considerations for a server choosing between GET and POST?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>   Josh
>>
>
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>
>
>
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>
>
> --
> Jim Manico
> Manicode Securityhttps://www.manicode.com
>
>


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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Redirection in authorization code flow: GET vs POST

[Jim Manico]

> The _*safest*_ thing for a client is to accept both. 

I politely (and strongly) disagree with this statement. The safest thing
for a client is to only accept POST or other verbs where any kind of
sensitive data is NOT kept in the URL. Sensitive data in URL's leak like
a sieve, even over HTTPS.

Respectfully,
Jim



On 8/11/17 3:18 PM, John Bradley wrote:
> OpenID Connect formally defined a POST response mode.
>
> http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html
>
> The OAuth 2 spec docent preclude it.  
>
> The safest thing for a client is to accept both.  
> The main advantages of POST is that it docent leak in the referrer,
> and can handle larger responses without the browser choking in some cases.
>
> Size is more of an issue in Connect where a id_token may be returned
> in the front channel and POST allows for the larger response without
> the client needing to have JS extract the fragment.
>
> That is why Connect defined it and OAuth largely assumes that for code
> get is OK.
> For security GET responses should add headers to prevent referrer from
> leaking the code.
>
> We are adding advice on that to the Security document that is being
> updated now.
>
> John B.
>
>
>> On Aug 11, 2017, at 4:08 PM, Josh Mandel > > wrote:
>>
>> Fixing my "with this technique" url: it should have been
>> https://gist.github.com/jmandel/4704d1efed8578a67a6f9b600ffd0c63 .
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Josh Mandel > > wrote:
>>
>> Hi All,
>>
>> I've just encountered a server that performs a redirect (back to
>> the client's redirect_uri) via POST instead of GET. This was
>> surprising behavior to me and broke my client implementation —
>> but citing chapter and verse, the server developer pointed out
>> that https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.7
>>  says 
>>
>> While the examples in this specification show the use of the
>> HTTP 302 status code, any other method available via the
>> user-agent to accomplish this redirection is allowed and is
>> considered to be an implementation detail.
>>
>>
>> Is triggering a POST-based redirect (e.g. with this technique
>> )
>> to the redirect_url (including url query parameters for state and
>> code) indeed considered a "method available via the user-agent to
>> accomplish this redirection"? In other words, should a
>> well-behaved OAuth client be prepared to receive GETs as well as
>> POSTs to its redirect_uri? If so, what would be the
>> considerations for a server choosing between GET and POST?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>   Josh
>>
>>
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
>
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-- 
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com

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