Re: [ob] IMF Jual 400+ Ton Emas,China Yang Mau Beli. ( Interview with IMF Head )

2009-09-22 Terurut Topik CUMI.JK (Buy, TP 5000)
orang amerika mulai nabung dan stop ngutang konsumtif, tapi orang
brazil, india dan china gak bisa disuruh konsumtif. lah mereka
butuhnya kebutuhan dasar, pendidikan dan infrastruktur kok. so buy


inflasi akan dibiarkan, toh itu artinya ngurangin utang. likuiditas
bakal disedot dengan naikin bunga.

inflasi bakal tinggi. belilah EMAS! Mulai dari sekarang, cuan dari
trading buat beli emas aja :-)

On 9/22/09, Hubert Nice  wrote:
>
> http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,648833,00.html
>
> Interview with IMF Head Dominique Strauss-Kahn
> 'It Is Dangerous to Think the Financial Crisis Is Already Behind Us'
>
> The managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique
> Strauss-Kahn, 60, talks to SPIEGEL about Wall Street's unwillingness to
> learn lessons from the financial crisis, the future of the global economy
> and his ideas for a new role for the IMF as a global financial safety net.
> SPIEGEL: On the day after the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman
> Brothers, the American real estate crisis became an earthquake which was
> felt throughout the world economy. Have the people who caused the crisis
> learned from the events of last September?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Dominique Strauss-Kahn: A few months prior to the Lehman Brothers
> bankruptcy, the secretary of the Treasury at that time, Hank Paulson,
> organized a dinner for government officials and a handful of CEOs from big
> American investment banks. Hardly anyone knew about Lehman's problems then,
> but Bear Stearns had already collapsed. So the problems in the financial
> sector were evident. Over dinner, one of the high-profile bankers told us:
> "Look, we were actually too greedy. This is why we need to restrain our
> greed with better regulation."
>
>
>
>
>
>
> SPIEGEL: Sounds good. But are you sure …?
> Strauss-Kahn: I know what you are about to ask: No, I am not sure. I do not
> know if he would say the same thing today.
> SPIEGEL: Most Wall Street bankers seem to feel bullish again. Once again,
> millions are being handed out in bonuses, as rewards for highly risky
> business deals. The banking community would much prefer to be left alone by
> politicians once again.
> Strauss-Kahn: Well, human weakness is stronger than reason.
> SPIEGEL: The CEO of Goldman Sachs said after the crisis that it was a
> "perfect storm" and that you cannot do anything to protect yourself against
> a perfect storm.
> Strauss-Kahn: That is a flawed metaphor. Human society is not a force of
> nature. The financial crisis was a catastrophic event, but one created by
> human hand. The lesson we all need to learn is that even a free market
> economy needs some regulation, otherwise it cannot function. All these ideas
> about deregulation -- that more deregulation is always better and that the
> market can solve every problem -- are fine on paper but they do not work in
> reality.
> SPIEGEL: Ludwig Erhard, the mastermind behind the German Wirtschaftswunder,
> the post-war "economic miracle," had this insight 60 years ago. He coined
> his own term for it, calling it the "social market economy."
> Strauss-Kahn: Erhard is a German legend, but his ideas are attracting more
> and more followers worldwide. There are very few people today who say you
> should not have a market at all. And there are also very few who want
> absolutely no regulation. I think it is very interesting that during this
> crisis all governments -- whether liberal or conservative -- took similar
> measures, ranging from fiscal stimulus to the restructuring of the banking
> sector.
> SPIEGEL: Then again, in reality not much has changed. In American political
> circles, the motivation for reform seems to be waning.
> Strauss-Kahn: In general, I share part of your skepticism. I remember only
> too well the first report on lessons from the crisis. That was at the G-7
> meeting in spring 2008 when problems in the financial sector were already
> evident. All of us agreed with most of the reform proposals, but 17 months
> later, only a part of it has been implemented. Of course, it is not an easy
> task to do, but that worries me, particularly when I think of the traders on
> Wall Street.
> SPIEGEL: Are you suggesting that there are no incentives for them to change
> their risky behavior?
> Strauss-Kahn: There is not much point in politicians, academics and authors
> drawing lessons from the events if these do not reach the young trader at
> the bank. Without rules, the trader is likely to resort to his old behavior.
> He will attempt to take greater risks to earn higher rewards, because
> someone else will cover the risk. That is precisely what happened a year
> ago.
> SPIEGEL: But isn't the current response to the crisis creating new risks?
> Bankers now know that the government will ultimately come to the rescue when
> all goes terribly wrong. Economists call this "moral hazard," where
> individuals have an incentive to behave recklessly because they know they
> will not be punished f

[ob] IMF Jual 400+ Ton Emas,China Yang Mau Beli. ( Interview with IMF Head )

2009-09-21 Terurut Topik Hubert Nice
 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,648833,00.html
 
Interview with IMF Head Dominique Strauss-Kahn
'It Is Dangerous to Think the Financial Crisis Is Already Behind Us'

The managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, 60, talks to SPIEGEL about Wall Street's unwillingness to learn 
lessons from the financial crisis, the future of the global economy and his 
ideas for a new role for the IMF as a global financial safety net.
SPIEGEL: On the day after the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers, the American real estate crisis became an earthquake which was felt 
throughout the world economy. Have the people who caused the crisis learned 
from the events of last September?





 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn: A few months prior to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
the secretary of the Treasury at that time, Hank Paulson, organized a dinner 
for government officials and a handful of CEOs from big American investment 
banks. Hardly anyone knew about Lehman's problems then, but Bear Stearns had 
already collapsed. So the problems in the financial sector were evident. Over 
dinner, one of the high-profile bankers told us: "Look, we were actually too 
greedy. This is why we need to restrain our greed with better regulation." 


 

 

SPIEGEL: Sounds good. But are you sure …?
Strauss-Kahn: I know what you are about to ask: No, I am not sure. I do not 
know if he would say the same thing today.
SPIEGEL: Most Wall Street bankers seem to feel bullish again. Once again, 
millions are being handed out in bonuses, as rewards for highly risky business 
deals. The banking community would much prefer to be left alone by politicians 
once again.
Strauss-Kahn: Well, human weakness is stronger than reason.
SPIEGEL: The CEO of Goldman Sachs said after the crisis that it was a "perfect 
storm" and that you cannot do anything to protect yourself against a perfect 
storm.
Strauss-Kahn: That is a flawed metaphor. Human society is not a force of 
nature. The financial crisis was a catastrophic event, but one created by human 
hand. The lesson we all need to learn is that even a free market economy needs 
some regulation, otherwise it cannot function. All these ideas about 
deregulation -- that more deregulation is always better and that the market can 
solve every problem -- are fine on paper but they do not work in reality.
SPIEGEL: Ludwig Erhard, the mastermind behind the German Wirtschaftswunder, the 
post-war "economic miracle," had this insight 60 years ago. He coined his own 
term for it, calling it the "social market economy."
Strauss-Kahn: Erhard is a German legend, but his ideas are attracting more and 
more followers worldwide. There are very few people today who say you should 
not have a market at all. And there are also very few who want absolutely no 
regulation. I think it is very interesting that during this crisis all 
governments -- whether liberal or conservative -- took similar measures, 
ranging from fiscal stimulus to the restructuring of the banking sector.
SPIEGEL: Then again, in reality not much has changed. In American political 
circles, the motivation for reform seems to be waning. 
Strauss-Kahn: In general, I share part of your skepticism. I remember only too 
well the first report on lessons from the crisis. That was at the G-7 meeting 
in spring 2008 when problems in the financial sector were already evident. All 
of us agreed with most of the reform proposals, but 17 months later, only a 
part of it has been implemented. Of course, it is not an easy task to do, but 
that worries me, particularly when I think of the traders on Wall Street.
SPIEGEL: Are you suggesting that there are no incentives for them to change 
their risky behavior?
Strauss-Kahn: There is not much point in politicians, academics and authors 
drawing lessons from the events if these do not reach the young trader at the 
bank. Without rules, the trader is likely to resort to his old behavior. He 
will attempt to take greater risks to earn higher rewards, because someone else 
will cover the risk. That is precisely what happened a year ago.
SPIEGEL: But isn't the current response to the crisis creating new risks? 
Bankers now know that the government will ultimately come to the rescue when 
all goes terribly wrong. Economists call this "moral hazard," where individuals 
have an incentive to behave recklessly because they know they will not be 
punished for their mistakes. Was the downfall of Lehman Brothers necessary as 
an educational measure?
Strauss-Kahn: From a moral hazard perspective, it may be the right decision to 
allow a bank to fail. But the systemic consequences have to be taken into 
account and in this case they have been severe. I think most people today would 
say that letting Lehman go down was not a good idea. But hindsight is always 
easier than foresight. At the time, many factors and scenarios needed to be 
considered under extreme time constraints. Policymaker