Re: [OE-core] [PATCH] procps:Fix CVE-2018-1122-1123
On 06/26/2018 12:35 AM, Hong Liu wrote:
> 1.0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch fixed CVE-2018-1122
>
> 2.0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch fixed
> CVE-2018-1123
> ---
> ...put.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch | 84 +
> ...Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch | 101
> +
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.14.bb | 2 +
> 3 files changed, 187 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> create mode 100644
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000..ab4fc23
> --- /dev/null
> +++
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
> +From 136e3724952827bbae8887a42d9d2b6f658a48ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Qualys Security Advisory
> +Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +
> +Subject: [PATCH] ps/output.c: Fix outbuf overflows in pr_args() etc.
> +
> +Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
Patch missing signed-off-by
> +---
> + ps/output.c | 23 ++-
> + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/ps/output.c b/ps/output.c
> +index 0c63bb6..4456f28 100644
> +--- a/ps/output.c
> b/ps/output.c
> +@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ Modifications to the arguments are not shown.
> +
> + // FIXME: some of these may hit the guard page in forest mode
> +
> ++#define OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp) \
> ++ (((endp) >= outbuf && (endp) < outbuf + OUTBUF_SIZE) ? (outbuf +
> OUTBUF_SIZE) - (endp) : 0)
> ++
> + /*
> + * "args", "cmd", "command" are all the same: long unless c
> + * "comm", "ucmd", "ucomm" are all the same: short unless -f
> +@@ -402,15 +405,15 @@ static int pr_args(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp)
> + rightward -= fh;
> +
> + if(pp->cmdline && !bsd_c_option)
> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + else
> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
> ESC_DEFUNCT);
> +
> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
> + *endp++ = ' ';
> + rightward--;
> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + }
> + }
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> +@@ -429,15 +432,15 @@ static int pr_comm(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp)
> + rightward -= fh;
> +
> + if(pp->cmdline && unix_f_option)
> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + else
> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
> ESC_DEFUNCT);
> +
> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
> + *endp++ = ' ';
> + rightward--;
> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + }
> + }
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> +@@ -469,11 +472,13 @@ static int pr_fname(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp
> + if (rightward>8) /* 8=default, but forest maybe feeds more */
> + rightward = 8;
> +
> +- endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), );
> + //return endp - outbuf;
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> + }
> +
> ++#undef OUTBUF_SIZE_AT
> ++
> + /* elapsed wall clock time, [[dd-]hh:]mm:ss format (not same as "time") */
> + static int pr_etime(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict
> const pp){
> + unsigned long t;
> +--
> +2.14.3
> +
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000..8b1b904
> --- /dev/null
> +++
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
> +From
Re: [OE-core] [PATCH] procps:Fix CVE-2018-1122-1123
On 06/26/2018 04:27 AM, Burton, Ross wrote:
> It appears that these are fixed in 3.3.15, so let's just upgrade to
> that and get all the other security fixes too.
But I can take this for Sumo if I don't update too.
- armin
> Ross
>
> On 26 June 2018 at 08:35, Hong Liu wrote:
>> 1.0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch fixed
>> CVE-2018-1122
>>
>> 2.0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch fixed
>> CVE-2018-1123
>> ---
>> ...put.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch | 84 +
>> ...Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch | 101
>> +
>> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.14.bb | 2 +
>> 3 files changed, 187 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644
>> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>> create mode 100644
>> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>>
>> diff --git
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>>
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000..ab4fc23
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
>> +From 136e3724952827bbae8887a42d9d2b6f658a48ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Qualys Security Advisory
>> +Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +
>> +Subject: [PATCH] ps/output.c: Fix outbuf overflows in pr_args() etc.
>> +
>> +Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +---
>> + ps/output.c | 23 ++-
>> + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/ps/output.c b/ps/output.c
>> +index 0c63bb6..4456f28 100644
>> +--- a/ps/output.c
>> b/ps/output.c
>> +@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ Modifications to the arguments are not shown.
>> +
>> + // FIXME: some of these may hit the guard page in forest mode
>> +
>> ++#define OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp) \
>> ++ (((endp) >= outbuf && (endp) < outbuf + OUTBUF_SIZE) ? (outbuf +
>> OUTBUF_SIZE) - (endp) : 0)
>> ++
>> + /*
>> + * "args", "cmd", "command" are all the same: long unless c
>> + * "comm", "ucmd", "ucomm" are all the same: short unless -f
>> +@@ -402,15 +405,15 @@ static int pr_args(char *restrict const outbuf, const
>> proc_t *restrict const pp)
>> + rightward -= fh;
>> +
>> + if(pp->cmdline && !bsd_c_option)
>> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
>> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
>> );
>> + else
>> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
>> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
>> ESC_DEFUNCT);
>> +
>> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
>> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
>> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
>> + *endp++ = ' ';
>> + rightward--;
>> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
>> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
>> );
>> + }
>> + }
>> + return max_rightward-rightward;
>> +@@ -429,15 +432,15 @@ static int pr_comm(char *restrict const outbuf, const
>> proc_t *restrict const pp)
>> + rightward -= fh;
>> +
>> + if(pp->cmdline && unix_f_option)
>> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
>> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
>> );
>> + else
>> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
>> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
>> ESC_DEFUNCT);
>> +
>> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
>> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
>> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
>> + *endp++ = ' ';
>> + rightward--;
>> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
>> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
>> );
>> + }
>> + }
>> + return max_rightward-rightward;
>> +@@ -469,11 +472,13 @@ static int pr_fname(char *restrict const outbuf,
>> const proc_t *restrict const pp
>> + if (rightward>8) /* 8=default, but forest maybe feeds more */
>> + rightward = 8;
>> +
>> +- endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
>> ++ endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), );
>> + //return endp - outbuf;
>> + return max_rightward-rightward;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++#undef OUTBUF_SIZE_AT
>> ++
>> + /* elapsed wall clock time, [[dd-]hh:]mm:ss format (not same as "time") */
>> + static int pr_etime(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict
>> const pp){
>> + unsigned long t;
>> +--
>> +2.14.3
>> +
>> diff --git
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>>
Re: [OE-core] [PATCH] procps:Fix CVE-2018-1122-1123
It appears that these are fixed in 3.3.15, so let's just upgrade to
that and get all the other security fixes too.
Ross
On 26 June 2018 at 08:35, Hong Liu wrote:
> 1.0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch fixed CVE-2018-1122
>
> 2.0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch fixed
> CVE-2018-1123
> ---
> ...put.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch | 84 +
> ...Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch | 101
> +
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.14.bb | 2 +
> 3 files changed, 187 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> create mode 100644
> meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
>
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000..ab4fc23
> --- /dev/null
> +++
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
> +From 136e3724952827bbae8887a42d9d2b6f658a48ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Qualys Security Advisory
> +Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +
> +Subject: [PATCH] ps/output.c: Fix outbuf overflows in pr_args() etc.
> +
> +Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +---
> + ps/output.c | 23 ++-
> + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/ps/output.c b/ps/output.c
> +index 0c63bb6..4456f28 100644
> +--- a/ps/output.c
> b/ps/output.c
> +@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ Modifications to the arguments are not shown.
> +
> + // FIXME: some of these may hit the guard page in forest mode
> +
> ++#define OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp) \
> ++ (((endp) >= outbuf && (endp) < outbuf + OUTBUF_SIZE) ? (outbuf +
> OUTBUF_SIZE) - (endp) : 0)
> ++
> + /*
> + * "args", "cmd", "command" are all the same: long unless c
> + * "comm", "ucmd", "ucomm" are all the same: short unless -f
> +@@ -402,15 +405,15 @@ static int pr_args(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp)
> + rightward -= fh;
> +
> + if(pp->cmdline && !bsd_c_option)
> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + else
> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
> ESC_DEFUNCT);
> +
> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
> + *endp++ = ' ';
> + rightward--;
> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + }
> + }
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> +@@ -429,15 +432,15 @@ static int pr_comm(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp)
> + rightward -= fh;
> +
> + if(pp->cmdline && unix_f_option)
> +-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + else
> +-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
> ++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
> ESC_DEFUNCT);
> +
> +- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
> ++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
> + if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
> + *endp++ = ' ';
> + rightward--;
> +- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
> );
> + }
> + }
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> +@@ -469,11 +472,13 @@ static int pr_fname(char *restrict const outbuf, const
> proc_t *restrict const pp
> + if (rightward>8) /* 8=default, but forest maybe feeds more */
> + rightward = 8;
> +
> +- endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
> ++ endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), );
> + //return endp - outbuf;
> + return max_rightward-rightward;
> + }
> +
> ++#undef OUTBUF_SIZE_AT
> ++
> + /* elapsed wall clock time, [[dd-]hh:]mm:ss format (not same as "time") */
> + static int pr_etime(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict
> const pp){
> + unsigned long t;
> +--
> +2.14.3
> +
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
>
> b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000..8b1b904
> --- /dev/null
> +++
>
[OE-core] [PATCH] procps:Fix CVE-2018-1122-1123
1.0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch fixed CVE-2018-1122
2.0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch fixed CVE-2018-1123
---
...put.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch | 84 +
...Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch | 101 +
meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps_3.3.14.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 187 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000..ab4fc23
--- /dev/null
+++
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-ps-output.c-Fix-outbuf-overflows-in-pr_args-etc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 136e3724952827bbae8887a42d9d2b6f658a48ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +
+Subject: [PATCH] ps/output.c: Fix outbuf overflows in pr_args() etc.
+
+Because there is usually less than OUTBUF_SIZE available at endp.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+---
+ ps/output.c | 23 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ps/output.c b/ps/output.c
+index 0c63bb6..4456f28 100644
+--- a/ps/output.c
b/ps/output.c
+@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ Modifications to the arguments are not shown.
+
+ // FIXME: some of these may hit the guard page in forest mode
+
++#define OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp) \
++ (((endp) >= outbuf && (endp) < outbuf + OUTBUF_SIZE) ? (outbuf +
OUTBUF_SIZE) - (endp) : 0)
++
+ /*
+ * "args", "cmd", "command" are all the same: long unless c
+ * "comm", "ucmd", "ucomm" are all the same: short unless -f
+@@ -402,15 +405,15 @@ static int pr_args(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp)
+ rightward -= fh;
+
+ if(pp->cmdline && !bsd_c_option)
+-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
);
+ else
+-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
ESC_DEFUNCT);
+
+- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
+ if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
+ *endp++ = ' ';
+ rightward--;
+- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
);
+ }
+ }
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+@@ -429,15 +432,15 @@ static int pr_comm(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp)
+ rightward -= fh;
+
+ if(pp->cmdline && unix_f_option)
+-endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
++endp += escaped_copy(endp, *pp->cmdline, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
);
+ else
+-endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE, , ESC_DEFUNCT);
++endp += escape_command(endp, pp, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), ,
ESC_DEFUNCT);
+
+- if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1) {
++ if(bsd_e_option && rightward>1 && OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp)>1) {
+ if(pp->environ && *pp->environ) {
+ *endp++ = ' ';
+ rightward--;
+- endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
++ endp += escape_strlist(endp, pp->environ, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp),
);
+ }
+ }
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+@@ -469,11 +472,13 @@ static int pr_fname(char *restrict const outbuf, const
proc_t *restrict const pp
+ if (rightward>8) /* 8=default, but forest maybe feeds more */
+ rightward = 8;
+
+- endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE, );
++ endp += escape_str(endp, pp->cmd, OUTBUF_SIZE_AT(endp), );
+ //return endp - outbuf;
+ return max_rightward-rightward;
+ }
+
++#undef OUTBUF_SIZE_AT
++
+ /* elapsed wall clock time, [[dd-]hh:]mm:ss format (not same as "time") */
+ static int pr_etime(char *restrict const outbuf, const proc_t *restrict const
pp){
+ unsigned long t;
+--
+2.14.3
+
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000..8b1b904
--- /dev/null
+++
b/meta/recipes-extended/procps/procps/0001-top-Do-not-default-to-the-cwd-in-configs_read.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From b45c4803dd176f4e3f9d3d47421ddec9bbbe66cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qualys Security Advisory
+Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 +
+Subject: [PATCH] top: Do not default to the cwd in configs_read().
+
+If the HOME environment variable is not set, or not absolute, use the
+home directory returned by getpwuid(getuid()), if set and absolute
+(instead of the cwd
