[openssl-commits] Fixed: FdaSilvaYY/openssl#2028 (oss_add_cb_args - 050701d)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for FdaSilvaYY/openssl
-

Build: #2028
Status: Fixed

Duration: 14 minutes and 47 seconds
Commit: 050701d (oss_add_cb_args)
Author: FdaSilvaYY
Message: Move global 'ctx' pointers and BIO variables into callback context ...

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/compare/336947238c17...050701da2171

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/builds/162039501

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: FdaSilvaYY/openssl#2027 (fix-ca-buf-usage - e75d4d6)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for FdaSilvaYY/openssl
-

Build: #2027
Status: Fixed

Duration: 3 hours, 36 minutes, and 48 seconds
Commit: e75d4d6 (fix-ca-buf-usage)
Author: FdaSilvaYY
Message: Introduce PATH_MAX and NAME_MAX

 to define the certificate filename storage buffer.

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/compare/13aeb3d6cc4e...e75d4d6636cd

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/builds/162039263

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: FdaSilvaYY/openssl#2026 (check_bn_wexpand_retcode - f963d47)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for FdaSilvaYY/openssl
-

Build: #2026
Status: Fixed

Duration: 23 minutes and 23 seconds
Commit: f963d47 (check_bn_wexpand_retcode)
Author: FdaSilvaYY
Message: Add missing checks on some conditional BN_copy return value

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/compare/cad489529990...f963d474121a

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/builds/162039141

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: FdaSilvaYY/openssl#2025 (pack_argv_options - e629ea2)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for FdaSilvaYY/openssl
-

Build: #2025
Status: Fixed

Duration: 1 hour, 17 minutes, and 53 seconds
Commit: e629ea2 (pack_argv_options)
Author: FdaSilvaYY
Message: Use PATH_MAX and NAME_MAX

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/compare/a53bfb922c18...e629ea2ad5dc

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/builds/162037927

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: FdaSilvaYY/openssl#2024 (master - 3014dda)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for FdaSilvaYY/openssl
-

Build: #2024
Status: Fixed

Duration: 40 minutes and 25 seconds
Commit: 3014dda (master)
Author: FdaSilvaYY
Message: Clean whitespaces on line ending

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/compare/372025c54b65...3014ddae4d08

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/FdaSilvaYY/openssl/builds/162037610

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[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch master has been updated
   via  c536b6be1a72aefd632d5530106a67c516cb9f4b (commit)
   via  4b0fc9fc7a8767f3e6289b2b9f4527db186b3566 (commit)
  from  f3b3d7f0033080f86ede5a53e8af2fb313091b5a (commit)


- Log -
commit c536b6be1a72aefd632d5530106a67c516cb9f4b
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 11:26:47 2016 +0100

Convert HelloVerifyRequest construction to WPACKET

We actually construct a HelloVerifyRequest in two places with common code
pulled into a single function. This one commit handles both places.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit 4b0fc9fc7a8767f3e6289b2b9f4527db186b3566
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 11:20:18 2016 +0100

Add warning about a potential pitfall with WPACKET_allocate_bytes()

If the underlying BUF_MEM gets realloc'd then the pointer returned could
become invalid. Therefore we should always ensure that the allocated
memory is filled in prior to any more WPACKET_* calls.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

---

Summary of changes:
 ssl/d1_lib.c | 116 +++
 ssl/packet.c |   1 +
 ssl/packet_locl.h|   5 +-
 ssl/ssl_locl.h   |   5 +-
 ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c |  51 +++--
 5 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 043057f..f34818b 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -437,8 +437,8 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
 unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
 unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
 const unsigned char *data;
-unsigned char *p, *buf;
-unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
+unsigned char *buf;
+unsigned long fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
 unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
 BIO *rbio, *wbio;
 BUF_MEM *bufm;
@@ -680,6 +680,10 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
 }
 
 if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+WPACKET wpkt;
+unsigned int version;
+size_t wreclen;
+
 /*
  * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
  * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
@@ -703,60 +707,76 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
 return -1;
 }
 
-p = [DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
-msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
-   cookie, cookielen);
-
-*p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
-
-/* Message length */
-l2n3(msglen, p);
-
-/* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
-s2n(0, p);
-
-/*
- * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
- * and fragment length is message length
- */
-l2n3(0, p);
-l2n3(msglen, p);
-
-/* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
-reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-/* Add the record header */
-p = buf;
-
-*(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
 /*
  * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and 
we
  * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
  * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
  */
-if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
-*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
-*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
-} else {
-*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
-*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+version = (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ? DTLS1_VERSION
+   : s->version;
+
+/* Construct the record and message headers */
+if (!WPACKET_init(, s->init_buf)
+|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(, version)
+   /*
+* Record sequence number is always the same as in the
+* received ClientHello
+*/
+|| !WPACKET_memcpy(, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
+   /* End of record, start sub packet for message */
+|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16()
+   /* Message type */
+|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+   /*
+

[openssl-commits] [web] master update

[Richard Levitte]

The branch master has been updated
   via  50b169440002898052ea41e9a9393ed41a68e7b2 (commit)
  from  d6a33b3c69b5776beaba29c61823e2474a00d17d (commit)


- Log -
commit 50b169440002898052ea41e9a9393ed41a68e7b2
Author: Richard Levitte 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 20:48:34 2016 +0200

Make the links in the topmost sidebar.shtml rooted

The reason is quite simple.  If a URL doesn't lead to a page,
err404.html is loaded and this sidebar along with it.

Now, consider the URL https://www.openssl.org/files/.
Clicking on "Downloads: source code" will get you to
https://www.openssl.org/files/source rather than
https://www.openssl.org/source...

---

Summary of changes:
 sidebar.shtml | 16 
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sidebar.shtml b/sidebar.shtml
index 1b3d6b6..37b715e 100644
--- a/sidebar.shtml
+++ b/sidebar.shtml
@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
 
 
   
-Home
+Home
 
   
-Downloads: Source code
+Downloads: Source code
   
   
-Docs: FAQ, FIPS, manpages, ...
+Docs: FAQ, FIPS, manpages, ...
   
   
-News: Latest information
+News: Latest information
   
   
-Policies: How we operate
+Policies: How we operate
   
   
-Community: Blog, bugs, email, ...
+Community: Blog, bugs, email, ...
   
   
-Support: Commercial support and contracting
+Support: Commercial support and contracting
   
   
-Sponsor Acknowledgements
+Sponsor Acknowledgements
   
 
   
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[openssl-commits] Errored: openssl/openssl#6153 (OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable - f15a7e3)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6153
Status: Errored

Duration: 25 minutes and 33 seconds
Commit: f15a7e3 (OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable)
Author: Dirk Feytons
Message: Fix build with no-nextprotoneg

Add a missing ifdef. Same change is already present in master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/581215a519c6...f15a7e39a1f7

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161931598

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[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[Rich Salz]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
   via  f15a7e39a1f7d41716ca5f07faef74f55147d2cf (commit)
  from  581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52 (commit)


- Log -
commit f15a7e39a1f7d41716ca5f07faef74f55147d2cf
Author: Dirk Feytons 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 16:17:45 2016 +0200

Fix build with no-nextprotoneg

Add a missing ifdef. Same change is already present in master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100)

---

Summary of changes:
 ssl/t1_ext.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ssl/t1_ext.c b/ssl/t1_ext.c
index 724ddf7..79ed946 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_ext.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_ext.c
@@ -275,7 +275,9 @@ int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type)
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves:
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg:
+# endif
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate:
 case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name:
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[openssl-commits] [web] master update

[Steve Marquess]

The branch master has been updated
   via  d6a33b3c69b5776beaba29c61823e2474a00d17d (commit)
  from  fbd32b1a5c7f0d7bc90e8a716bdf44cbfbeeb7a6 (commit)


- Log -
commit d6a33b3c69b5776beaba29c61823e2474a00d17d
Author: Steve Marquess 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 10:42:26 2016 -0400

Add 2.0.13 Security Policy

---

Summary of changes:
 ...Policy-2.0.11.pdf => SecurityPolicy-2.0.13.pdf} | Bin 902341 -> 916608 bytes
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 copy docs/fips/{SecurityPolicy-2.0.11.pdf => SecurityPolicy-2.0.13.pdf} (87%)

diff --git a/docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.11.pdf 
b/docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.13.pdf
similarity index 87%
copy from docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.11.pdf
copy to docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.13.pdf
index e4354dd..e4ea6c6 100644
Binary files a/docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.11.pdf and 
b/docs/fips/SecurityPolicy-2.0.13.pdf differ
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[openssl-commits] Passed: openssl/openssl#6147 (OpenSSL_1_1_0a - ac2c44c)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6147
Status: Passed

Duration: 48 minutes and 1 second
Commit: ac2c44c (OpenSSL_1_1_0a)
Author: Matt Caswell
Message: Prepare for 1.1.0a release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

View the changeset: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/OpenSSL_1_1_0a

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161875987

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[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[Rich Salz]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
   via  581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52 (commit)
  from  9d264d11a93413d2724b7c8c873e56b2ddd8c53f (commit)


- Log -
commit 581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52
Author: Rich Salz 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 08:47:45 2016 -0400

Fix typo introduced by a03f81f4

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

---

Summary of changes:
 crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index 65a74df..2a2b95c 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const 
EVP_MD_CTX *from)
 if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
 if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) {
 dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
-if (dstate->ac_data == NULL) {
+if (dstate->mac_data == NULL) {
 printf("cryptodev_digest_init: malloc failed\n");
 return 0;
 }
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[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

[Rich Salz]

The branch master has been updated
   via  f3b3d7f0033080f86ede5a53e8af2fb313091b5a (commit)
  from  39c136cc53d7b6fafdd1a0b52c035fd24358e01c (commit)


- Log -
commit f3b3d7f0033080f86ede5a53e8af2fb313091b5a
Author: Rich Salz 
Date:   Tue Aug 30 13:31:18 2016 -0400

Add -Wswitch-enum

Change code so when switching on an enumeration, have case's for all
enumeration values.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov 

---

Summary of changes:
 Configure|  3 +-
 apps/apps.c  | 12 ++--
 apps/openssl.c   | 16 +++
 apps/ts.c| 15 --
 crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c   |  4 +--
 crypto/ct/ct_sct.c   | 13 +
 crypto/ec/ec_lib.c   | 22 +++
 crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c | 10 +++
 crypto/ui/ui_lib.c   | 51 ++
 crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c   |  9 --
 crypto/x509/x509_lu.c|  8 +++---
 ssl/statem/statem.c  | 14 +++---
 ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 72 +---
 ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 69 +-
 test/ct_test.c   |  5 +++-
 test/handshake_helper.c  | 13 +
 16 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index 0cfc3ea..bfb9dbf 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-DDEBUG_UNUSED"
 # it grew impossible to resolve this without sizeable additional
 # code, so we just tell compiler to be pedantic about everything
 # but 'long long' type.
+. " -Wswitch"
 . " -DPEDANTIC -pedantic -Wno-long-long"
 . " -Wall"
 . " -Wsign-compare"
@@ -127,7 +128,6 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-DDEBUG_UNUSED"
 # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
 # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
 # following warnings can also be enabled:
-#   -Wswitch-enum
 #   -Wcast-align
 #   -Wunreachable-code
 #   -Wlanguage-extension-token -- no, we use asm()
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-DDEBUG_UNUSED"
 my $clang_devteam_warn = ""
 . " -Qunused-arguments"
 . " -Wextra"
+. " -Wswitch -Wswitch-default"
 . " -Wno-unused-parameter"
 . " -Wno-missing-field-initializers"
 . " -Wno-language-extension-token"
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index aa564b8..b287748 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -188,7 +188,11 @@ static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
 return 1;
 }
 }
-default:
+break;
+case UIT_NONE:
+case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+case UIT_INFO:
+case UIT_ERROR:
 break;
 }
 }
@@ -208,7 +212,11 @@ static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
 if (password && password[0] != '\0')
 return 1;
 }
-default:
+break;
+case UIT_NONE:
+case UIT_BOOLEAN:
+case UIT_INFO:
+case UIT_ERROR:
 break;
 }
 }
diff --git a/apps/openssl.c b/apps/openssl.c
index 4f4175c..fceb458 100644
--- a/apps/openssl.c
+++ b/apps/openssl.c
@@ -393,26 +393,32 @@ int list_main(int argc, char **argv)
 return 0;
 }
 
+typedef enum HELP_CHOICE {
+OPT_hERR = -1, OPT_hEOF = 0, OPT_hHELP
+} HELP_CHOICE;
+
 OPTIONS help_options[] = {
-{"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
+{"help", OPT_hHELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
 {NULL}
 };
 
+
 int help_main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 FUNCTION *fp;
 int i, nl;
 FUNC_TYPE tp;
 char *prog;
-HELPLIST_CHOICE o;
+HELP_CHOICE o;
 
 prog = opt_init(argc, argv, help_options);
-while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
+while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_hEOF) {
 switch (o) {
-default:
+case OPT_hERR:
+case OPT_hEOF:
 BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
 return 1;
-case OPT_HELP:
+case OPT_hHELP:
 opt_help(help_options);
 return 0;
 }
diff --git a/apps/ts.c b/apps/ts.c
index eda5297..e785ea0 100644
--- a/apps/ts.c
+++ b/apps/ts.c
@@ -296,19 +296,14 @@ int ts_main(int argc, char **argv)
 goto end;
 
 /* Check parameter consistency and execute the appropriate function. */
-switch (mode) {
-default:
-case OPT_ERR:
-goto opthelp;
-case OPT_QUERY:
+if (mode == OPT_QUERY) {
 if (vpmtouched)
 goto opthelp;
 if ((data != NULL) && (digest != NULL))
 goto opthelp;
 ret = !query_command(data, digest, md, policy, no_nonce, cert,
  in, out, text);
-  

[openssl-commits] Passed: openssl/openssl#6146 (OpenSSL_1_0_2i - 32c1301)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6146
Status: Passed

Duration: 18 minutes and 44 seconds
Commit: 32c1301 (OpenSSL_1_0_2i)
Author: Matt Caswell
Message: Prepare for 1.0.2i release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

View the changeset: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/OpenSSL_1_0_2i

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161875963

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[openssl-commits] [web] master update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch master has been updated
   via  fbd32b1a5c7f0d7bc90e8a716bdf44cbfbeeb7a6 (commit)
  from  08e980caee8d6252b0838e9924498db12083203b (commit)


- Log -
commit fbd32b1a5c7f0d7bc90e8a716bdf44cbfbeeb7a6
Author: Matt Caswell <m...@openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:10:48 2016 +0100

Update website for new release

---

Summary of changes:
 news/newsflash.txt   |   4 +
 news/secadv/20160922.txt | 361 +
 news/vulnerabilities.xml | 590 ++-
 3 files changed, 954 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 news/secadv/20160922.txt

diff --git a/news/newsflash.txt b/news/newsflash.txt
index 0a90069..6eb393c 100644
--- a/news/newsflash.txt
+++ b/news/newsflash.txt
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 # Format is two fields, colon-separated; the first line is the column
 # headings.  URL paths must all be absolute.
 Date: Item
+22-Sep-2016: Security Advisory: 
several security fixes
+22-Sep-2016: OpenSSL 1.1.0a is now available, including bug and security fixes
+22-Sep-2016: OpenSSL 1.0.2i is now available, including bug and security fixes
+22-Sep-2016: OpenSSL 1.0.1u is now available, including bug and security fixes
 19-Sep-2016: OpenSSL 1.1.0a, 1.0.2i, 1.0.1u https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-announce/2016-September/76.html;>security
 releases due 22nd Sep 2016
 25-Aug-2016: OpenSSL 1.1.0 is now available
 04-Aug-2016: Beta 3 (pre-release 6) of OpenSSL 1.1.0 is now available: please 
download and test it
diff --git a/news/secadv/20160922.txt b/news/secadv/20160922.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000..c35d70a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/news/secadv/20160922.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+
+OpenSSL Security Advisory [22 Sep 2016]
+
+
+OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
+=
+
+Severity: High
+
+A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension.
+If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status
+Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the
+server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory
+exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do
+not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not 
affected.
+
+Servers using OpenSSL versions prior to 1.0.1g are not vulnerable in a default
+configuration, instead only if an application explicitly enables OCSP stapling
+support.
+
+OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a
+OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
+OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 29th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
+Qihoo 360 Inc.). The fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL
+development team.
+
+SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305)
+===
+
+Severity: Moderate
+
+OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends 
an
+empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of 
Service
+attack.
+
+OpenSSL 1.1.0 users should upgrade to 1.1.0a
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 10th September 2016 by Alex Gaynor. The
+fix was developed by Matt Caswell of the OpenSSL development team.
+
+SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183)
+==
+
+Severity: Low
+
+SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info) is an attack on older block cipher algorithms
+that use a block size of 64 bits. In mitigation for the SWEET32 attack DES 
based
+ciphersuites have been moved from the HIGH cipherstring group to MEDIUM in
+OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.2.  OpenSSL 1.1.0 since release has had these
+ciphersuites disabled by default.
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
+OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th August 2016 by Karthikeyan
+Bhargavan and Gaetan Leurent (INRIA). The fix was developed by Rich Salz of the
+OpenSSL development team.
+
+OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)
+==
+
+Severity: Low
+
+An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
+
+The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
+on most platforms.
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2i
+OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1u
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 11th August 2016 by Shi Lei (Gear Team,
+Qihoo 360 Inc.). Th

[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
   via  52a69c480d243f727c8393fb42b9ff9da742c143 (commit)
   via  888759a1d38197f29de7227876c3b58fbff8549f (commit)
   via  16ec56f0cd6337a2506dce4a1e7ef91e0b7ecb76 (commit)
   via  ab650f07a0dabc01a4410f8f702c3cea7932da62 (commit)
   via  2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137 (commit)
  from  151adf2e5cc23284a059e0f155505006a1c9fad9 (commit)


- Log -
commit 52a69c480d243f727c8393fb42b9ff9da742c143
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:31:45 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.0.1v-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 888759a1d38197f29de7227876c3b58fbff8549f
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:30:27 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.0.1u release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 16ec56f0cd6337a2506dce4a1e7ef91e0b7ecb76
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 23:20:45 2016 +0100

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit ab650f07a0dabc01a4410f8f702c3cea7932da62
Author: Dmitry Belyavsky 
Date:   Mon Sep 19 16:05:53 2016 +0100

Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

commit 2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:08:45 2016 +0100

Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

---

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES   | 164 +-
 NEWS  |  16 +-
 README|   2 +-
 crypto/opensslv.h |   6 +-
 openssl.spec  |   2 +-
 ssl/s3_clnt.c |  19 ---
 ssl/t1_lib.c  |  24 +---
 7 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index f89b50b..e2edbaf 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,12 +2,170 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  ___
 
- Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [xx XXX ]
+ Changes between 1.0.1u and 1.0.1v [xx XXX ]
 
-  *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183),
- the DES ciphers were moved from HIGH to MEDIUM.
+  *)
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016]
+
+  *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be 
unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds 
using
+ the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6304)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
+ HIGH to MEDIUM.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
+ Leurent (INRIA)
+ (CVE-2016-2183)
  [Rich Salz]
 
+  *) OOB write in MDC2_Update()
+
+ An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+ through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+ call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+ can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
+
+ The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which 

[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2i create

[Matt Caswell]

The annotated tag OpenSSL_1_0_2i has been created
at  c3b111de3699ae812738e61c6b01101ea6a12b74 (tag)
   tagging  32c130160f7dac2cef5d0e30d94b335e4a87104d (commit)
  replaces  OpenSSL_1_0_2h
 tagged by  Matt Caswell
on  Thu Sep 22 11:24:53 2016 +0100

- Log -
OpenSSL 1.0.2i release tag
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

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YmWOFvHt2r5sUKMSTHldT2rY27M7v9LIIwxOL0BWSQ+odtxFMK8UxWwTBdKDKsaL
c1+SGHiw7m2Eqqkc/RLGM5mc2EflnG0I3UDTMTAazzaev6SPDiN1F+bR3tqI6VMt
DE0+5qYxlmgbJw0ndTUjqj4sH7bv7b3c2mR/DyE7AsrwVvUDq0siYi9BNTNn0aV8
O5sRNsioqdEoZ/o/nil3FIsfdsgnOoOXxUpe69nSBExjsSRpB8IcvUlT3nIFsBA=
=2QfE
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

Alessandro Ghedini (1):
  Avoid double declaration of COMP_METHOD Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
 Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx  
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz  (Merged from 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1083)

Andy Polyakov (16):
  rand/randfile.c: remove _XOPEN_SOURCE definition.
  hmac/hmac.c: switch to OPENSSL_cleanse.
  crypto/mem_clr.c: switch to OPENSSL_cleanse implementation from master.
  crypto/mem.c: drop reference to cleanse_ctr and fix no-asm builds.
  crypto/sparccpuid.S: limit symbol visibility.
  aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl: fix XTS decrypt test failure.
  aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl: omit redundant stores in XTS subroutines.
  doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod: harmonize with actual declaration.
  SPARC assembly pack: enforce V8+ ABI constraints.
  sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl: fix crash in SHAEXT code on Windows.
  ec/ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.
  bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.
  ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.
  ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.
  ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize 
cmovb.
  crypto/bn/*: x86[_64] division instruction doesn't handle constants, 
change constraint from 'g' to 'r'.

Cesar Pereida (1):
  Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME

Cristian Stoica (1):
  remove double initialization of cryptodev engine

Cynh (1):
  Fix SRP client key computation

David Benjamin (2):
  Don't send signature algorithms when client_version is below TLS 1.2.
  Don't check for malloc failure twice.

David Woodhouse (4):
  Fix SSL_export_keying_material() for DTLS1_BAD_VER
  Fix ubsan 'left shift of negative value -1' error in satsub64be()
  Add basic test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER and record replay handling
  Avoid EVP_PKEY_cmp() crash on EC keys without public component

Dirk Feytons (1):
  Fix build with no-cmac

Dmitry Belyavsky (1):
  Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Dr. Matthias St. Pierre (1):
  RT3925: Remove trailing semi from #define's.

Dr. Stephen Henson (50):
  add documentation
  Fix double free in d2i_PrivateKey().
  Fix name length limit check.
  Always try to set ASN.1 parameters for CMS.
  Use default ASN.1 for SEED.
  Only set CMS parameter when encrypting
  Tidy up PKCS12_newpass() fix memory leaks.
  Constify PKCS12_newpass()
  Only call FIPS_update, FIPS_final in FIPS mode.
  Typo.
  Add -signcert to CA.pl usage message.
  Parameter copy sanity checks.
  Don't skip leading zeroes in PSK keys.
  Fix link error.
  Fix omitted selector handling.
  Don't indicate errors during initial adb decode.
  Fix print of ASN.1 BIGNUM type.
  Check and print out boolean type properly.
  Support PKCS v2.0 print in pkcs12 utility.
  Send alert on CKE error.
  Sanity check in ssl_get_algorithm2().
  Clarify digest change in HMAC_Init_ex()
  Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
  Send alert for bad DH CKE
  Use newest CRL.
  Set error if EVP_CipherUpdate fails.
  Note cipher BIO write errors too.
  Fix CRL time comparison.
  Check for overlows and error return from ASN1_object_size()
  Check for overflows in ASN1_object_size().
  include 
  Calculate sequence length properly.
  Limit status message sisze in ts_get_status_check
  Check for overflows in i2d_ASN1_SET()
  Limit recursion depth in old d2i_ASN1_bytes function
  Leak fixes.
  Sanity check input length in OPENSSL_uni2asc().
  Check for errors in a2d_ASN1_OBJECT()
  Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()
  Limit reads in do_b2i_bio()
  Sanity check ticket length.
  Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update()
  Fix memory leak on error.
  Fix memory leak on error.
  Fix memory leak on realloc error.
  update default dependencies
  Fix small OOB reads.
  Remove unnecessary check.
  Use 

[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_1u create

[Matt Caswell]

The annotated tag OpenSSL_1_0_1u has been created
at  1883c9e66f488b03bacf2fb634ae0cda438352b1 (tag)
   tagging  888759a1d38197f29de7227876c3b58fbff8549f (commit)
  replaces  OpenSSL_1_0_1t
 tagged by  Matt Caswell
on  Thu Sep 22 11:30:27 2016 +0100

- Log -
OpenSSL 1.0.1u release tag
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1

iQEcBAABAgAGBQJX47LDAAoJENnE0m0OYESREagIAIhmezllxDLm/jxDP+YfrcpO
R2sN77jbIR4v+V0O4ox+UI0QCI45YhiQAc9RbhmQzw6vlZk6bpCwRElQREPhZfRG
9zTU8uA7Cdmc6u2u84a//ciKtjcts1QsfT+yVYOM4QjijYNzl5W6/JVNhtCszv2v
GaDpcExS8MHsKqLZc8PalLxLRF2aSs9oVQ9K2thVPc4R0wuetsLoEIhxKY9Prc8b
PNpXp6QoKvpFFqsI1alZ/PQl6Oj/IpWYch66o2TzhkDqsuHX/qzSfkODhFmxGaps
b+mVtdwUMsPc0oWBphvjD81pdJs61/S2gCAEOy+giLDItaRJkg9OL+t5um410Qk=
=sOzA
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

Cesar Pereida (1):
  Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME

David Woodhouse (1):
  Fix SSL_export_keying_material() for DTLS1_BAD_VER

Dmitry Belyavsky (1):
  Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Dr. Stephen Henson (29):
  add documentation
  Fix double free in d2i_PrivateKey().
  Fix name length limit check.
  Always try to set ASN.1 parameters for CMS.
  Use default ASN.1 for SEED.
  Only set CMS parameter when encrypting
  Tidy up PKCS12_newpass() fix memory leaks.
  Constify PKCS12_newpass()
  Only call FIPS_update, FIPS_final in FIPS mode.
  Update S/MIME certificates.
  Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
  Check for overlows and error return from ASN1_object_size()
  Check for overflows in ASN1_object_size().
  include 
  Calculate sequence length properly.
  Check for overflows in i2d_ASN1_SET()
  Limit recursion depth in old d2i_ASN1_bytes function
  Leak fixes.
  Sanity check input length in OPENSSL_uni2asc().
  Check for errors in a2d_ASN1_OBJECT()
  Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()
  Limit reads in do_b2i_bio()
  Sanity check ticket length.
  Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update()
  Fix small OOB reads.
  Remove unnecessary check.
  Use SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH instead of 4.
  Make message buffer slightly larger than message.
  update default dependency options

Kazuki Yamaguchi (1):
  Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()

Kurt Roeckx (2):
  Return error when trying to print invalid ASN1 integer
  Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()

Matt Caswell (16):
  Prepare for 1.0.1u-dev
  Check that the obtained public key is valid
  Fix error return value in SRP functions
  Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
  Update CONTRIBUTING
  More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
  Change usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes
  Convert memset calls to OPENSSL_cleanse
  Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug
  Fix DTLS replay protection
  Update function error code
  Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
  Prevent DTLS Finished message injection
  Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
  Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release
  Prepare for 1.0.1u release

Rich Salz (3):
  Recommend GH over RT, per team vote.
  RT3940: For now, just document the issue.
  SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183): Move DES from HIGH to MEDIUM

Richard Levitte (4):
  Check that the subject name in a proxy cert complies to RFC 3820
  Fix proxy certificate pathlength verification
  Allow proxy certs to be present when verifying a chain
  make update to have PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG defined

Viktor Dukhovni (2):
  Clarify negative return from X509_verify_cert()
  Ensure verify error is set when X509_verify_cert() fails

---
_
openssl-commits mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-commits

[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
   via  5fe5914d3068128cdc6b08fe72746bb516a30b8a (commit)
   via  ac2c44c6289f9716de4c4beeb284a818eacde517 (commit)
   via  f3e189613fdbe7404bfbbca2caccf5cbd19e2ffc (commit)
   via  d3c9d6e99f075e6fbdab94db00b220cfa08b5c4b (commit)
   via  63658103d4441924f8dbfc517b99bb54758a98b9 (commit)
   via  6d32c2ae28952b5c1d7a24968e488532fcadc51a (commit)
   via  f6a7505e64d06f9d41e01b763b684e4e2df34922 (commit)
   via  7409b0aae569b5ba4476076fbea3226d606c50ba (commit)
   via  1645f3f4b9f717133ffcaf3398508ed2ddc81374 (commit)
   via  a59ab1c4dd27a4c7c6e88f3c33747532fd144412 (commit)
  from  d8e94b0d8fe412c19bc230593a960b7db73a8e7b (commit)


- Log -
commit 5fe5914d3068128cdc6b08fe72746bb516a30b8a
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:15:54 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.1.0b-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit ac2c44c6289f9716de4c4beeb284a818eacde517
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:14:50 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.1.0a release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit f3e189613fdbe7404bfbbca2caccf5cbd19e2ffc
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 21:59:49 2016 +0100

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit d3c9d6e99f075e6fbdab94db00b220cfa08b5c4b
Author: Dmitry Belyavsky 
Date:   Mon Sep 19 15:53:35 2016 +0100

Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

commit 63658103d4441924f8dbfc517b99bb54758a98b9
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Sat Sep 10 21:24:40 2016 +0100

Fix a hang with SSL_peek()

If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.

CVE-2016-6305

GitHub Issue #1563

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit 6d32c2ae28952b5c1d7a24968e488532fcadc51a
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:53:39 2016 +0100

Fix a mem leak in NPN handling

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit f6a7505e64d06f9d41e01b763b684e4e2df34922
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Tue Sep 13 17:02:03 2016 +0100

Add some more OCSP testing

Test that the OCSP callbacks work as expected.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit 7409b0aae569b5ba4476076fbea3226d606c50ba
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Tue Sep 13 23:26:53 2016 +0100

Add OCSP_RESPID_match()

Add a function for testing whether a given OCSP_RESPID matches with a
certificate.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit 1645f3f4b9f717133ffcaf3398508ed2ddc81374
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Mon Sep 12 17:39:55 2016 +0100

Add the ability to set OCSP_RESPID fields

OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for
setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit a59ab1c4dd27a4c7c6e88f3c33747532fd144412
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:08:45 2016 +0100

Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time 

[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
   via  9d264d11a93413d2724b7c8c873e56b2ddd8c53f (commit)
   via  32c130160f7dac2cef5d0e30d94b335e4a87104d (commit)
   via  35aede1cd7411aa404512facfcb22e3859966ef6 (commit)
   via  92c8d6ae0d741fdca3b72baf627d16908dae64ce (commit)
   via  38f59bd1f1da9f5ef67044b35af26528e5b183dd (commit)
   via  ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f (commit)
  from  90d6f35162a9515287e75248e1f880cd1cc92c1f (commit)


- Log -
commit 9d264d11a93413d2724b7c8c873e56b2ddd8c53f
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:25:49 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.0.2j-dev

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 32c130160f7dac2cef5d0e30d94b335e4a87104d
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 11:24:53 2016 +0100

Prepare for 1.0.2i release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 35aede1cd7411aa404512facfcb22e3859966ef6
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 21:59:49 2016 +0100

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 92c8d6ae0d741fdca3b72baf627d16908dae64ce
Author: Dmitry Belyavsky 
Date:   Mon Sep 19 16:05:53 2016 +0100

Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

commit 38f59bd1f1da9f5ef67044b35af26528e5b183dd
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:53:39 2016 +0100

Fix a mem leak in NPN handling

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit ea39b16b71e4e72a228a4535bd6d6a02c5edbc1f
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:08:45 2016 +0100

Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

---

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES   | 162 +-
 NEWS  |  16 +-
 README|   2 +-
 crypto/opensslv.h |   6 +-
 openssl.spec  |   2 +-
 ssl/s3_clnt.c |  19 ---
 ssl/t1_lib.c  |  29 +++---
 7 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 6502fc3..c072379 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,14 +2,170 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  ___
 
- Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [xx XXX ]
+ Changes between 1.0.2i and 1.0.2j [xx XXX ]
 
   *)
 
-  *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183),
- the DES ciphers were moved from HIGH to MEDIUM.
+ Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016]
+
+  *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be 
unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds 
using
+ the "no-ocsp" 

[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch master has been updated
   via  39c136cc53d7b6fafdd1a0b52c035fd24358e01c (commit)
   via  41b42807726e340538701021cdc196672330f4db (commit)
   via  b8d243956296458d1782af0d6e7ecfe6deae038a (commit)
   via  c31dbed70c0be1578276367a1ba420ac935d0c68 (commit)
   via  ba881d3b39829d22eede8f69412d187aaab487e9 (commit)
   via  a671b3e64abe782d37c705ae51e93f2013672f9d (commit)
   via  e12c0beb5a652ba0c3a71e633a77fafbb4f86aa4 (commit)
   via  e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a7771c15b (commit)
  from  a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889 (commit)


- Log -
commit 39c136cc53d7b6fafdd1a0b52c035fd24358e01c
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 21:59:49 2016 +0100

Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

commit 41b42807726e340538701021cdc196672330f4db
Author: Dmitry Belyavsky 
Date:   Mon Sep 19 15:53:35 2016 +0100

Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

commit b8d243956296458d1782af0d6e7ecfe6deae038a
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Sat Sep 10 21:24:40 2016 +0100

Fix a hang with SSL_peek()

If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an
infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and
never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in
a Denial Of Service attack.

CVE-2016-6305

GitHub Issue #1563

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit c31dbed70c0be1578276367a1ba420ac935d0c68
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:53:39 2016 +0100

Fix a mem leak in NPN handling

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit ba881d3b39829d22eede8f69412d187aaab487e9
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Tue Sep 13 17:02:03 2016 +0100

Add some more OCSP testing

Test that the OCSP callbacks work as expected.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit a671b3e64abe782d37c705ae51e93f2013672f9d
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Tue Sep 13 23:26:53 2016 +0100

Add OCSP_RESPID_match()

Add a function for testing whether a given OCSP_RESPID matches with a
certificate.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit e12c0beb5a652ba0c3a71e633a77fafbb4f86aa4
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Mon Sep 12 17:39:55 2016 +0100

Add the ability to set OCSP_RESPID fields

OCSP_RESPID was made opaque in 1.1.0, but no accessors were provided for
setting the name/key value for the OCSP_RESPID.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

commit e408c09bbf7c3057bda4b8d20bec1b3a7771c15b
Author: Matt Caswell 
Date:   Fri Sep 9 10:08:45 2016 +0100

Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 

---

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES |  77 -
 NEWS|  11 +-
 crypto/ocsp/ocsp_srv.c  |  73 ++--
 doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod |  34 +-
 

[openssl-commits] Passed: openssl/openssl#6141 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable - d8e94b0)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6141
Status: Passed

Duration: 7 minutes and 28 seconds
Commit: d8e94b0 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable)
Author: Richard Levitte
Message: Fix error message typo, wrong function code

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
(cherry picked from commit a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/2178c52a8bac...d8e94b0d8fe4

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161849972

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[openssl-commits] Errored: openssl/openssl#6141 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable - d8e94b0)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6141
Status: Errored

Duration: 42 minutes and 3 seconds
Commit: d8e94b0 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable)
Author: Richard Levitte
Message: Fix error message typo, wrong function code

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
(cherry picked from commit a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/2178c52a8bac...d8e94b0d8fe4

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161849972

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: openssl/openssl#6140 (master - a449b47)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6140
Status: Fixed

Duration: 40 minutes and 44 seconds
Commit: a449b47 (master)
Author: Richard Levitte
Message: Fix error message typo, wrong function code

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/48c054fec350...a449b47c7d8e

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161849909

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[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch master has been updated
   via  a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889 (commit)
  from  48c054fec3506417b2598837b8062aae7114c200 (commit)


- Log -
commit a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889
Author: Richard Levitte 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 10:15:02 2016 +0200

Fix error message typo, wrong function code

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

---

Summary of changes:
 ssl/statem/statem.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c
index 8bc1feb..5faf6ae 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
(int)s->s3->tmp.message_size
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
 return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
 }
 
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[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
   via  d8e94b0d8fe412c19bc230593a960b7db73a8e7b (commit)
  from  2178c52a8bacfd097a41f3f348fe51d8e4d1873e (commit)


- Log -
commit d8e94b0d8fe412c19bc230593a960b7db73a8e7b
Author: Richard Levitte 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 10:15:02 2016 +0200

Fix error message typo, wrong function code

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
(cherry picked from commit a449b47c7d8e20efc8cc524ed695a060b11ef889)

---

Summary of changes:
 ssl/statem/statem.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c
index 8bc1feb..5faf6ae 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
(int)s->s3->tmp.message_size
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
 return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
 }
 
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[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
   via  90d6f35162a9515287e75248e1f880cd1cc92c1f (commit)
  from  22646a075e75991b4e8f5d67171e45a6aead5b48 (commit)


- Log -
commit 90d6f35162a9515287e75248e1f880cd1cc92c1f
Author: Richard Levitte 
Date:   Thu Sep 22 10:01:38 2016 +0200

mk1mf.pl: check for no-tls1 here as well

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 

---

Summary of changes:
 util/mk1mf.pl | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 4eded5a..7a3ae11 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SOCK" if $no_sock;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2" if $no_ssl2;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL3" if $no_ssl3;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT" if $no_tlsext;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLS1" if $no_tls1;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SRP" if $no_srp;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CMS" if $no_cms;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ERR"  if $no_err;
@@ -1205,6 +1206,7 @@ sub read_options
"no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3,
"no-ssl3-method" => 0,
"no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext,
+   "no-tls1" => \$no_tls1,
"no-srp" => \$no_srp,
"no-cms" => \$no_cms,
"no-jpake" => \$no_jpake,
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[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
   via  2178c52a8bacfd097a41f3f348fe51d8e4d1873e (commit)
  from  db610cb29cd2658c4feb60f4899856f0ac5e9dab (commit)


- Log -
commit 2178c52a8bacfd097a41f3f348fe51d8e4d1873e
Author: Richard Levitte 
Date:   Wed Sep 21 14:44:42 2016 +0200

test/x509aux.c: Fix argv loop

There are cases when argc is more trustable than proper argv termination.
Since we trust argc in all other test programs, we might as well treat it
the same way in this program.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell 
(cherry picked from commit 780bbb96bf514f0b4013e9c5725614ba5153c497)

---

Summary of changes:
 test/x509aux.c | 17 +++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/test/x509aux.c b/test/x509aux.c
index 4f00196..2c20d6d 100644
--- a/test/x509aux.c
+++ b/test/x509aux.c
@@ -180,7 +180,6 @@ static int test_certs(BIO *fp)
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
 BIO *bio_err;
-const char *certfile;
 const char *p;
 int ret = 1;
 
@@ -197,24 +196,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
 CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
 
-while ((certfile = *++argv) != NULL) {
-BIO *f = BIO_new_file(certfile, "r");
+argc--;
+argv++;
+
+while (argc >= 1) {
+BIO *f = BIO_new_file(*argv, "r");
 int ok;
 
 if (f == NULL) {
 fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening cert file: '%s': %s\n",
-progname, certfile, strerror(errno));
+progname, *argv, strerror(errno));
 EXIT(ret);
 }
 ret = !(ok = test_certs(f));
 BIO_free(f);
 
 if (!ok) {
-printf("%s ERROR\n", certfile);
+printf("%s ERROR\n", *argv);
 ret = 1;
 break;
 }
-printf("%s OK\n", certfile);
+printf("%s OK\n", *argv);
+
+argc--;
+argv++;
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
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[openssl-commits] Broken: openssl/openssl#6129 (master - 48c054f)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6129
Status: Broken

Duration: 45 minutes and 42 seconds
Commit: 48c054f (master)
Author: Matt Caswell
Message: Excessive allocation of memory in dtls1_preprocess_fragment()

This issue is very similar to CVE-2016-6307 described in the previous
commit. The underlying defect is different but the security analysis and
impacts are the same except that it impacts DTLS.

A DTLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the
message.
This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length
are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending
reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed
to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that
memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive
message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could
mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a
connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory
exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place,
and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the
application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner
then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again.
Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature.
This then means that there is only a security impact if:

1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the
event that the connection fails
or
2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there
is very little free memory
or
3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there
are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for
the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is
insufficient memory to service the multiple requests.

Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to
be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack
of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.

This issue does not affect TLS users.

Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.).

CVE-2016-6308

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/41bff723c678...48c054fec350

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161730913

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: openssl/openssl#6128 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable - f757ce2)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6128
Status: Fixed

Duration: 43 minutes and 39 seconds
Commit: f757ce2 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable)
Author: Andy Polyakov
Message: Configure: clarify and refine -static.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte 
(cherry picked from commit 047d97afd97520eae268f6d8a36fbf9a0239a994)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/1fdeda4cc994...f757ce2a3df9

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161728954

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: openssl/openssl#6127 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable - 1fdeda4)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6127
Status: Fixed

Duration: 39 minutes and 12 seconds
Commit: 1fdeda4 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable)
Author: Matt Caswell
Message: Don't leak on an OPENSSL_realloc() failure

If OPENSSL_sk_insert() calls OPENSSL_realloc() and it fails, it was leaking
the originally allocated memory.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
(cherry picked from commit 41bff723c6784cc846054a4fd4add6dbec8c2c64)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/6915f39e68f0...1fdeda4cc994

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161726513

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[openssl-commits] Fixed: openssl/openssl#6125 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable - 6915f39)

[Travis CI]

Build Update for openssl/openssl
-

Build: #6125
Status: Fixed

Duration: 49 minutes and 45 seconds
Commit: 6915f39 (OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable)
Author: Matt Caswell
Message: Don't allow too many consecutive warning alerts

Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz 
(cherry picked from commit af58be768ebb690f78530f796e92b8ae5c9a4401)

View the changeset: 
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/e7498968e229...6915f39e68f0

View the full build log and details: 
https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/builds/161724382

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