wrong AKI in cert

2007-10-25 Thread Simon McMahon
Hi,

cross ref on support list: Re: refresh validity dates on a certificate.

While trying to refresh validity on certs I noticed that openssl x509 ... 
-signkey filename modifies the issuer name. It also preserves the 
extensions but appears to copy them verbatum. If there is a X509v3 
Authority Key Identifier in there then it may not match the issuers key 
in the resulting cert. If it is producing a self-signed cert then surely 
the AKI and the SKI should be the same.

Other openssl commands appear to try to verify this resulting cert and 
fail.

I think if openssl is going to set the issuer and resign the cert then it 
should also update the AKI if it is present in the extensions.
If it sets the subject public key then it should also update the X509v3 
Subject Key Identifier extension if present.

I was using 9.8b.

This is a cert where subject = issuer but ski != aki. In this case it 
should be aki = ski.

Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 15 (0xf)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit, 
CN=sslcln
Validity
Not Before: Oct 25 04:00:23 2007 GMT
Not After : Aug 14 04:00:23 2010 GMT
Subject: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit, 
CN=sslcln
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:a9:b1:99:5a:c2:d5:83:a6:6d:ea:d1:1f:f2:8c:
bf:43:6c:a2:09:07:f8:14:2f:f7:07:e4:cb:57:d9:
53:2e:55:68:86:c8:4d:8f:d2:3a:5a:81:ca:65:b0:
83:0a:97:6e:5a:15:f5:df:65:8f:e0:27:e3:dc:d1:
84:3a:ac:a2:d8:a9:9e:69:e1:5f:1d:88:10:72:85:
7e:ea:a4:db:79:43:0b:63:6b:4f:e0:8f:ee:09:9a:
66:14:bb:b1:48:2d:17:0f:da:c0:f9:12:8e:a2:98:
a5:61:86:85:14:10:30:c2:28:00:fd:0c:cb:ca:71:
9f:34:e0:8e:f5:25:f0:73:93
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
 8B:44:9A:12:AE:E1:D0:7F:6F:0C:60:87:1E:A6:8A:D8:9C:3D:57:57
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:89:9E:C2:C4:E6:87:4E:C2:DC:9E:DE:A7:D5:BE:64:F6:BF:2C:1E:2C

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
EMPTY

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
3a:15:9e:2d:0f:01:aa:b7:a2:86:b8:09:47:6b:00:7f:16:3a:
32:46:11:be:06:16:f0:b8:cc:67:6e:8e:fe:32:14:5d:87:1c:
ea:da:fa:81:e8:e7:e8:9f:c5:e1:06:4b:cc:2e:de:f7:bc:df:
9e:60:be:94:23:67:b9:76:c9:47:4d:0c:ab:61:a5:eb:5e:3e:
d3:50:c5:4b:4c:d3:92:a3:7e:31:03:dd:68:64:6a:e3:53:df:
26:0b:c0:a0:d7:ff:a6:7d:5b:29:6f:50:8a:b7:8e:45:90:c8:
1f:2e:a2:43:14:69:54:32:82:3c:90:b1:70:b2:8e:c1:b7:5d:
df:f7

Simon McMahon

__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List   openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: wrong AKI in cert

2007-10-25 Thread Kyle Hamilton
I think you're right, there's an issue with AKID/SKID in x509 - 
signkey.  (I'm sending this on to [EMAIL PROTECTED], to open a ticket  
for it.)


Repeat the mantra: Only the Certifier has AKID == SKID.   
Certificates have AKID == CA's SKID.


Now, forget the mantra, cuz the only exception is self-signed  
certificates.  (which is all a CA's certificate really is, if it's a  
trust anchor.)


Since x509 -signkey is supposed to create self-signed certificates,  
it's supposed to set AKID == SKID.


Now.  I'm on OpenSSL 0.9.8e 23 Feb 2007, and I just did the following  
sequence:


mkdir phase1
mkdir phase2
CA.pl -newca (generate demoCA/cacert.pem and demoCA/private/ 
cakey.pem) (SKID A8:2E, AKID A8:2E)
CA.pl -newcert (generate newcert.pem and newkey.pem) (SKID D8:75,  
AKID D8:75)

mv *.pem phase1
CA.pl -newreq (generate newreq.pem and newkey.pem)
CA.pl -sign (generate newcert.pem) (SKID FB:9E, AKID A8:2E)
mv *.pem phase2
cd phase2
openssl x509 -in newcert.pem -out intermediary.pem -signkey newkey.pem

intermediary.pem reports SKID FB:9E, AKID A8:2E.  It should set AKID  
= SKID for -signkey, and so the AKID should be FB:9E.


-Kyle H

On Oct 24, 2007, at 11:01 PM, Simon McMahon wrote:


Hi,

cross ref on support list: Re: refresh validity dates on a  
certificate.


While trying to refresh validity on certs I noticed that openssl  
x509 ...

-signkey filename modifies the issuer name. It also preserves the
extensions but appears to copy them verbatum. If there is a X509v3
Authority Key Identifier in there then it may not match the  
issuers key
in the resulting cert. If it is producing a self-signed cert then  
surely

the AKI and the SKI should be the same.

Other openssl commands appear to try to verify this resulting cert and
fail.

I think if openssl is going to set the issuer and resign the cert  
then it

should also update the AKI if it is present in the extensions.
If it sets the subject public key then it should also update the  
X509v3

Subject Key Identifier extension if present.

I was using 9.8b.

This is a cert where subject = issuer but ski != aki. In this case it
should be aki = ski.

Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 15 (0xf)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit,
CN=sslcln
Validity
Not Before: Oct 25 04:00:23 2007 GMT
Not After : Aug 14 04:00:23 2010 GMT
Subject: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit,
CN=sslcln
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:a9:b1:99:5a:c2:d5:83:a6:6d:ea:d1:1f:f2:8c:
bf:43:6c:a2:09:07:f8:14:2f:f7:07:e4:cb:57:d9:
53:2e:55:68:86:c8:4d:8f:d2:3a:5a:81:ca:65:b0:
83:0a:97:6e:5a:15:f5:df:65:8f:e0:27:e3:dc:d1:
84:3a:ac:a2:d8:a9:9e:69:e1:5f:1d:88:10:72:85:
7e:ea:a4:db:79:43:0b:63:6b:4f:e0:8f:ee:09:9a:
66:14:bb:b1:48:2d:17:0f:da:c0:f9:12:8e:a2:98:
a5:61:86:85:14:10:30:c2:28:00:fd:0c:cb:ca:71:
9f:34:e0:8e:f5:25:f0:73:93
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
 8B:44:9A:12:AE:E1:D0:7F:6F:0C:60:87:1E:A6:8A:D8:9C:3D:57:57
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:89:9E:C2:C4:E6:87:4E:C2:DC:9E:DE:A7:D5:BE:64:F6:BF:2C:1E:2C

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
EMPTY

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
3a:15:9e:2d:0f:01:aa:b7:a2:86:b8:09:47:6b:00:7f:16:3a:
32:46:11:be:06:16:f0:b8:cc:67:6e:8e:fe:32:14:5d:87:1c:
ea:da:fa:81:e8:e7:e8:9f:c5:e1:06:4b:cc:2e:de:f7:bc:df:
9e:60:be:94:23:67:b9:76:c9:47:4d:0c:ab:61:a5:eb:5e:3e:
d3:50:c5:4b:4c:d3:92:a3:7e:31:03:dd:68:64:6a:e3:53:df:
26:0b:c0:a0:d7:ff:a6:7d:5b:29:6f:50:8a:b7:8e:45:90:c8:
1f:2e:a2:43:14:69:54:32:82:3c:90:b1:70:b2:8e:c1:b7:5d:
df:f7

Simon McMahon

__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List   openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]


__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List   openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]


[openssl.org #1596] Re: wrong AKI in cert

2007-10-25 Thread Kyle Hamilton via RT
I think you're right, there's an issue with AKID/SKID in x509 - 
signkey.  (I'm sending this on to [EMAIL PROTECTED], to open a ticket  
for it.)

Repeat the mantra: Only the Certifier has AKID == SKID.   
Certificates have AKID == CA's SKID.

Now, forget the mantra, cuz the only exception is self-signed  
certificates.  (which is all a CA's certificate really is, if it's a  
trust anchor.)

Since x509 -signkey is supposed to create self-signed certificates,  
it's supposed to set AKID == SKID.

Now.  I'm on OpenSSL 0.9.8e 23 Feb 2007, and I just did the following  
sequence:

mkdir phase1
mkdir phase2
CA.pl -newca (generate demoCA/cacert.pem and demoCA/private/ 
cakey.pem) (SKID A8:2E, AKID A8:2E)
CA.pl -newcert (generate newcert.pem and newkey.pem) (SKID D8:75,  
AKID D8:75)
mv *.pem phase1
CA.pl -newreq (generate newreq.pem and newkey.pem)
CA.pl -sign (generate newcert.pem) (SKID FB:9E, AKID A8:2E)
mv *.pem phase2
cd phase2
openssl x509 -in newcert.pem -out intermediary.pem -signkey newkey.pem

intermediary.pem reports SKID FB:9E, AKID A8:2E.  It should set AKID  
= SKID for -signkey, and so the AKID should be FB:9E.

-Kyle H

On Oct 24, 2007, at 11:01 PM, Simon McMahon wrote:

 Hi,

 cross ref on support list: Re: refresh validity dates on a  
 certificate.

 While trying to refresh validity on certs I noticed that openssl  
 x509 ...
 -signkey filename modifies the issuer name. It also preserves the
 extensions but appears to copy them verbatum. If there is a X509v3
 Authority Key Identifier in there then it may not match the  
 issuers key
 in the resulting cert. If it is producing a self-signed cert then  
 surely
 the AKI and the SKI should be the same.

 Other openssl commands appear to try to verify this resulting cert and
 fail.

 I think if openssl is going to set the issuer and resign the cert  
 then it
 should also update the AKI if it is present in the extensions.
 If it sets the subject public key then it should also update the  
 X509v3
 Subject Key Identifier extension if present.

 I was using 9.8b.

 This is a cert where subject = issuer but ski != aki. In this case it
 should be aki = ski.

 Certificate:
 Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number: 15 (0xf)
 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
 Issuer: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit,
 CN=sslcln
 Validity
 Not Before: Oct 25 04:00:23 2007 GMT
 Not After : Aug 14 04:00:23 2010 GMT
 Subject: C=AU, ST=Queensland, O=IBM, L=Gold Coast, OU=GSKit,
 CN=sslcln
 Subject Public Key Info:
 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
 RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
 Modulus (1024 bit):
 00:a9:b1:99:5a:c2:d5:83:a6:6d:ea:d1:1f:f2:8c:
 bf:43:6c:a2:09:07:f8:14:2f:f7:07:e4:cb:57:d9:
 53:2e:55:68:86:c8:4d:8f:d2:3a:5a:81:ca:65:b0:
 83:0a:97:6e:5a:15:f5:df:65:8f:e0:27:e3:dc:d1:
 84:3a:ac:a2:d8:a9:9e:69:e1:5f:1d:88:10:72:85:
 7e:ea:a4:db:79:43:0b:63:6b:4f:e0:8f:ee:09:9a:
 66:14:bb:b1:48:2d:17:0f:da:c0:f9:12:8e:a2:98:
 a5:61:86:85:14:10:30:c2:28:00:fd:0c:cb:ca:71:
 9f:34:e0:8e:f5:25:f0:73:93
 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
 X509v3 extensions:
 X509v3 Basic Constraints:
 CA:FALSE
 Netscape Comment:
 OpenSSL Generated Certificate
 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
  8B:44:9A:12:AE:E1:D0:7F:6F:0C:60:87:1E:A6:8A:D8:9C:3D:57:57
 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
  keyid:89:9E:C2:C4:E6:87:4E:C2:DC:9E:DE:A7:D5:BE:64:F6:BF:2C:1E:2C

 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
 EMPTY

 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
 3a:15:9e:2d:0f:01:aa:b7:a2:86:b8:09:47:6b:00:7f:16:3a:
 32:46:11:be:06:16:f0:b8:cc:67:6e:8e:fe:32:14:5d:87:1c:
 ea:da:fa:81:e8:e7:e8:9f:c5:e1:06:4b:cc:2e:de:f7:bc:df:
 9e:60:be:94:23:67:b9:76:c9:47:4d:0c:ab:61:a5:eb:5e:3e:
 d3:50:c5:4b:4c:d3:92:a3:7e:31:03:dd:68:64:6a:e3:53:df:
 26:0b:c0:a0:d7:ff:a6:7d:5b:29:6f:50:8a:b7:8e:45:90:c8:
 1f:2e:a2:43:14:69:54:32:82:3c:90:b1:70:b2:8e:c1:b7:5d:
 df:f7

 Simon McMahon

 __
 OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
 Development Mailing List   openssl-dev@openssl.org
 Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]

__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List   openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager   [EMAIL PROTECTED]