SSL server send packet FIN than data user.More the client answer with RST packet

2022-05-05 Thread Souheila Hechaichi
After establishing a secure connection between my SSL server and SSL client 
with OpenSSL library installed on separate Linux hosts, the SSL server send the 
packet FIN than the user data. The use of ssldump command indicates the 
presence of the following traces:
TCP: dc01dshared1p(2524) -> dc01dadaperf1p.atempo.dev(50814) Seq 2822753961.(0) 
ACK 136721005 FIN
1057311.4840 (57311.0739)  S>C  TCP FIN
They mean SSL server send end of send data (FIN packet).
On the packet FIN, the client sends RST packet
TCP: dc01dadaperf1p.atempo.dev(50814) -> dc01dshared1p(2524) Seq 136721005.(0) 
ACK 2822753962 RST
1057311.6295 (0.1454)  C>S  TCP RST

Can you help me to known why the SSL server send FIN then data user and to 
resolve the problem?
Best regards;






Re: [EXTERNAL] Using openssl-rsautl for verifying signatures.

2022-05-05 Thread Philip Prindeville
Bonjour.  Et milles mercis.

That was helpful.

One more question: if I want to reproduce RSA_sign() (and RSA_verify()) using 
evp_key_sign() and evp_key_verify() then I'll need add code to do the ASN.1 
marshaling, right?  There's no convenience function to do that (seems like an 
oversight if that's the case)?

-Philip


> On May 4, 2022, at 3:45 AM, Erwann Abalea  wrote:
> 
> Bonjour,
> 
> The ASN.1 structure (it's a DigestInfo) is part of the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding 
> for signature operations.
> PKCS#1v1.5 is rewritten in RFC2313.
> 
> Using the command line tool, you can reproduce this:
> 
> echo -n "Mary had a little lamb." > datatosign
> 
> either one of the following can be used to sign data:
>   openssl dgst -sha1 -sign tests/keys/rsa_key1.key datatosign > signing
>   openssl pkeyutl -inkey tests/keys/rsa_key1.key -in <(openssl dgst -sha1 
> -binary datatosign) -sign -pkeyopt digest:sha1 > signing
> 
> and you can display the signature either way (this will not "verify", it will 
> only perform the RSA verify operation with PKCS#1v1.5 padding, without 
> checking the validity or even if what has been signed is a DigestInfo 
> structure, and output the result of the RSA operation):
>   openssl rsautl -verify -inkey tests/keys/rsa_key1.pub -pubin -in signing 
> -asn1parse
>   openssl pkeyutl -verifyrecover -inkey tests/keys/rsa_key1.pub -pubin -in 
> signing -asn1parse
> 
> or you can actually verify the thing without displaying the result of the RSA 
> verify crypto operation:
>   openssl pkeyutl -verify -inkey tests/keys/rsa_key1.pub -pubin -in <(openssl 
> dgst -sha1 -binary datatosign) -sigfile signing -pkeyopt digest:sha1
>   openssl dgst -verify tests/keys/rsa_key1.pub -signature signing -sha1 
> datatosign
> 



Re: X509_STORE_CTX object doubt

2022-05-05 Thread Matt Caswell




On 05/05/2022 13:02, Srinivas, Saketh (c) wrote:

Hi,

for X509_STORE_CTX object we have a function X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert to 
set the cert pointer  (x509* cert)

is there any get function for this variable.

X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert**is not for cert. Because, there is 
another variable current_cert.



X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert() does this:

https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert.html

Matt



thanks,
Saketh.


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X509_STORE_CTX object doubt

2022-05-05 Thread Srinivas, Saketh (c)
Hi,

for X509_STORE_CTX object we have a function X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert to set the 
cert pointer  (x509* cert)
is there any get function for this variable.

X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert is not for cert. Because, there is another 
variable current_cert.

thanks,
Saketh.


Notice: This e-mail together with any attachments may contain information of 
Ribbon Communications Inc. and its Affiliates that is confidential and/or 
proprietary for the sole use of the intended recipient. Any review, disclosure, 
reliance or distribution by others or forwarding without express permission is 
strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the 
sender immediately and then delete all copies, including any attachments.

Re: 3.0.3 - EVP_EC_gen() segfault without init

2022-05-05 Thread Tomas Mraz
Fix is here:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18247

On Thu, 2022-05-05 at 07:54 +0200, Tomas Mraz wrote:
> Yes, this is unfortunately a bug in 3.0.3 release. Calling
> OPENSSL_init_crypto should not be necessary.
> 
> Tomas Mraz
> 
> On Wed, 2022-05-04 at 21:58 +0200, Klaus Keppler wrote:
> > Hello,
> > 
> > yesterday we updated OpenSSL from 3.0.2 to 3.0.3, what made some of
> > our 
> > unit tests crash.
> > 
> > I've boiled the problem down to the following example code:
> > 
> > ---cut---
> > #include 
> > #include 
> > #include 
> > 
> > int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
> >  //OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
> >  if (! EVP_EC_gen("P-384")) return -1;
> >  return 0;
> > }
> > ---/cut---
> > 
> > Compile with:
> > 
> >    gcc -Wall -Werror -pedantic -o test test.c -lcrypto
> > 
> > With OpenSSL 3.0.2 this runs just fine, with OpenSSL 3.0.3 we get a
> > segmentation fault during a string comparison within
> > EVP_PKEY_Q_keygen 
> > (EVP_EC_gen is just a macro).
> > 
> > I assume that the curve names are not properly initialized, when you 
> > uncomment the call to "OPENSSL_init_crypto()", everything works just
> > fine.
> > 
> > The documentation [1] of OPENSSL_init_crypto() states that explicit
> > initialization is not required. Man page of EVP_EC_gen [2] says
> > nothing 
> > about initialization.
> > Considering that 3.0.3 is only a minor update and 3.0.2 worked as 
> > expected, we might have hit a bug. If this (above) is "just" a usage 
> > error, the documentation should describe in which cases an explicit
> > initialization is required.
> > 
> > Anyway, thank you for all your efforts!
> > 
> > Best regards
> > 
> >     -Klaus Keppler
> > 
> > 
> > [1] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/OPENSSL_init_crypto.html
> > [2] https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/EVP_EC_gen.html
> 

-- 
Tomáš Mráz, OpenSSL