RE: Re: Verify intermediate certificate

2012-01-16 Thread Eisenacher, Patrick
 -Original Message-
 From: Steffen DETTMER

 * Johannes Bauer wrote on Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 14:22 +0100:
  [...]
   Or, in other words: Let's assume I have a ultimate root
   (self-signed) Root and a branched CA X. I would like to
   trust X and all it's children, but not Root. Is this
   not possible?
 [yes, it is not possible by default]

  Thank you for your clarification. I also do not really see the
  point why the anchor of trust has to be self-signed.

 I also wondered about this time ago. I think when a user
 explicitely puts a sub-CA or even a non-CA certificate into the
 database of trusted certificates, chain verification could stop
 there without knowing the root-CA.

If I remember correctly, there is work going on to enable such functionality in 
an upcoming release. Perhaps Steve can shed some light on its status.

Patrick Eisenacher
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Re: Re: Verify intermediate certificate

2012-01-16 Thread Dr. Stephen Henson
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012, Eisenacher, Patrick wrote:

  -Original Message-
  From: Steffen DETTMER
 
  * Johannes Bauer wrote on Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 14:22 +0100:
   [...]
Or, in other words: Let's assume I have a ultimate root
(self-signed) Root and a branched CA X. I would like to
trust X and all it's children, but not Root. Is this
not possible?
  [yes, it is not possible by default]
 
   Thank you for your clarification. I also do not really see the
   point why the anchor of trust has to be self-signed.
 
  I also wondered about this time ago. I think when a user
  explicitely puts a sub-CA or even a non-CA certificate into the
  database of trusted certificates, chain verification could stop
  there without knowing the root-CA.
 
 If I remember correctly, there is work going on to enable such functionality 
 in an upcoming release. Perhaps Steve can shed some light on its status.
 

There is experimental support for this in HEAD only. You need to set an
explicit trust option on the intermediate CA and it should verify OK even if
the root is absent.

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
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Re: Re: Verify intermediate certificate

2012-01-13 Thread Steffen DETTMER
* Johannes Bauer wrote on Fri, Jan 13, 2012 at 14:22 +0100:
 [...] 
  Or, in other words: Let's assume I have a ultimate root
  (self-signed) Root and a branched CA X. I would like to
  trust X and all it's children, but not Root. Is this
  not possible?
[yes, it is not possible by default]

 Thank you for your clarification. I also do not really see the
 point why the anchor of trust has to be self-signed.

I also wondered about this time ago. I think when a user
explicitely puts a sub-CA or even a non-CA certificate into the
database of trusted certificates, chain verification could stop
there without knowing the root-CA.

Only point to require root-CA is to check if it still is valid
and require it in order to be able to check it's CRL for the
sub-CA being included.

Personally, I still wonder why I should be stopped from trusting
a sub-CA even if the root-CA revoked it when I explicitely
configure it to do so, but anyway usually OS or browser vendors
seem to decide for the users whom to trust ;-)

 In my scenario this restriction actually makes the whole system
 less secure (since it allows a superset of certificates to be
 valid instead of just a tiny subset).

Certify the identity to be authentic, that means that the name
given in the certificate is authentic. This is like an ID card or
passport.

From this it cannot be concluded whether the authentic name owner
is authorized for communication (or whatever). For this, some
list of allowed names is needed. This is like a guest list.

Unfortunately it seems to happen from time to time to meet some
projects/installations that check only whether a peer is
authentic but not it authorized (like: anyone with a valid
password can use the VIP entry, because no guest list check is
performed).

For example, in a typical webbrowser I think you cannot configure
NOT to communicate with authentic badguy.malware.com; if TLS
makes it absolutely sure that you really communicate with
`badguy', you will get a green security symbol :-)

oki,

Steffen



























































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