Re: [OPSAWG] bof proposal review

2016-10-05 Thread Brian E Carpenter
> Description: With the dynamic nature of SDN/NFV networks, providers and 
> data center operators have to manage more dynamically the IP addressing 
> and provisioning of network nodes,

Undoubtedly true. I would like to mention that this is clearly a target area
for autonomic networking too; in fact one of the Anima use cases is a subset
of this problem area. Not that I propose to derail the BOF with this comment,
but the word "centralised" in one of the draft names suggests a specific
approach and it may not be the only one. The model in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-prefix-management is definitely
not centralised (apart from policy).

Regards
   Brian

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Re: [OPSAWG] bof proposal review

2016-10-05 Thread Marc Blanchet



On 5 Oct 2016, at 12:45, joel jaeggli wrote:


On 10/4/16 8:02 AM, Marc Blanchet wrote:

Hello,
 the bof proposal below have been sent to OPS ADs (and INT ADs) and
posted on the BOF wiki page. Benoît asked that this to be  discussed
here, since there is no public mailing list yet for this topic (we
shall soon).


So, I think we dicussed this is little bit back in march when the 
drafts

were initially submitted. I think generally I'm postive on the idea of
working on a yang model for data interchange between ipam systems or
ipam systems and agents.

Where I get into a little trouble is with the architecture, because it
describes a couple of particular scenarios and my experience of 
carrier

ipam systems doesn't really jive with that. In my experience, carrier
ipam systems are part of a software stack associated with resource
management of which address management is a component, not just ipam,
and they tend as a result to be somewhat idioscratic. to my mind
allocating resources for transition technologies is about the least
interesting application I can imagine for such a tool and a very small
portion of what it does, ours deals with v4 and v6 assignment simply 
as

a matter of course.

even on a somewhat smaller scale our ipam system has adopted json 
input

and output so I think there is certainly a great arguement for
standardizing the interchange format.



in some ways, you are exactly stating the purpose of the bof: having 
other operators (than the original set) to chime in and provide their 
input and requirements. With more open forum, we shall be able to get a 
better set of common requirements and more focus and scope.


Regards, Marc.


thanks
joel



 The primary purpose of the BOF is to extend the discussion to more
operators (and other parties obviously) than the initial set to get 
an

(hopefully) common set of requirements and identifying possible
protocol work. It is a non- wg forming.

Regards, Marc.

===

Name: IP Provisioning for SDN/NFV (ipprov)
Description: With the dynamic nature of SDN/NFV networks, providers
and data center operators have to manage more dynamically the IP
addressing and provisioning of network nodes, including various
network transition scenarios such as IPv4 as a service, where IP
address and prefixes consumption are critical and require timely and
dynamic reallocations. An initial set of providers have expressed
requirements, but with different scopes (eg: only IP addressing and
prefix management and delegation, vs larger provisioning scope). Some
initial prototyping of solutions and field trial has started. The
intent of the bof is to gather a common set of requirements from a
larger set of operators and, if needed, possible protocol work
milestones and scope.
Status: not WG-forming
Drafts: draft-xi-ps-centralized-address-management
draft-sun-i2apm-address-pool-management-arch
draft-sun-i2apm-address-pool-management-yang
The responsible Area Director (AD): OPS or INT
BoF Chairs (or the ADs as placeholders): Marc Blanchet and ...
Proponents: Chongfeng Xie(CT), Ying Cheng(CU)
Number of people expected to attend: 100
Length of session: 1.5 hour
Conflicts to avoid (first priority): sdnrg, nfv, intarea, nfvrg, 
opsawg

Conflicts to avoid (second priority): dtn, sunset4

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Re: [OPSAWG] bof proposal review

2016-10-05 Thread joel jaeggli
On 10/4/16 8:02 AM, Marc Blanchet wrote:
> Hello,
>  the bof proposal below have been sent to OPS ADs (and INT ADs) and
> posted on the BOF wiki page. Benoît asked that this to be  discussed
> here, since there is no public mailing list yet for this topic (we
> shall soon).

So, I think we dicussed this is little bit back in march when the drafts
were initially submitted. I think generally I'm postive on the idea of
working on a yang model for data interchange between ipam systems or
ipam systems and agents.

Where I get into a little trouble is with the architecture, because it
describes a couple of particular scenarios and my experience of carrier
ipam systems doesn't really jive with that. In my experience, carrier
ipam systems are part of a software stack associated with resource
management of which address management is a component, not just ipam,
and they tend as a result to be somewhat idioscratic. to my mind
allocating resources for transition technologies is about the least
interesting application I can imagine for such a tool and a very small
portion of what it does, ours deals with v4 and v6 assignment simply as
a matter of course.

even on a somewhat smaller scale our ipam system has adopted json input
and output so I think there is certainly a great arguement for
standardizing the interchange format.

thanks
joel

>
>  The primary purpose of the BOF is to extend the discussion to more
> operators (and other parties obviously) than the initial set to get an
> (hopefully) common set of requirements and identifying possible
> protocol work. It is a non- wg forming.
>
> Regards, Marc.
>
> ===
>
> Name: IP Provisioning for SDN/NFV (ipprov)
> Description: With the dynamic nature of SDN/NFV networks, providers
> and data center operators have to manage more dynamically the IP
> addressing and provisioning of network nodes, including various
> network transition scenarios such as IPv4 as a service, where IP
> address and prefixes consumption are critical and require timely and
> dynamic reallocations. An initial set of providers have expressed
> requirements, but with different scopes (eg: only IP addressing and
> prefix management and delegation, vs larger provisioning scope). Some
> initial prototyping of solutions and field trial has started. The
> intent of the bof is to gather a common set of requirements from a
> larger set of operators and, if needed, possible protocol work
> milestones and scope.
> Status: not WG-forming
> Drafts: draft-xi-ps-centralized-address-management
> draft-sun-i2apm-address-pool-management-arch
> draft-sun-i2apm-address-pool-management-yang
> The responsible Area Director (AD): OPS or INT
> BoF Chairs (or the ADs as placeholders): Marc Blanchet and ...
> Proponents: Chongfeng Xie(CT), Ying Cheng(CU)
> Number of people expected to attend: 100
> Length of session: 1.5 hour
> Conflicts to avoid (first priority): sdnrg, nfv, intarea, nfvrg, opsawg
> Conflicts to avoid (second priority): dtn, sunset4
>
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>




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Re: [OPSAWG] Start of WGLC for TACACS+ document.

2016-10-05 Thread Alan DeKok
  Some comments.  Mostly little nits and clarifications.

  The major points for me are related to security.  The "Security 
Considerations" section is almost empty, and will certainly not pass a review 
from the security area.  They will in all likelihood block publication until 
substantive comments have been added.

 -- 

3.3.  Single Connect Mode


   The packet header (see below) contains a flag to allow sessions to be
   multiplexed on a connection.

* it would be good to name the flag here.

   If the server sets this flag in the first reply packet in response to
   the first packet from a client, this indicates its willingness to
   support single-connection over the current connection.  The server
   may set this flag even if the client does not set it, but the client
   is under no obligation to honor it.

* what happens if the client does not honour the flag?

   The flag is only relevant for the first two packets on a connection,
   to allow the client and server to establish single connection mode.
   The flag MUST be ignored after these two packets since the single-
   connect status of a connection, once established, must not be
   changed.  The connection must instead be closed and a new connection
   opened, if required.

  Why would it be required to change the mode?  It would be good to explain the 
use-cases, and why (or not) they make sense.

   TAC_PLUS_UNENCRYPTED_FLAG := 0x01

   If this flag is set, then body encryption is not used.  If this flag
   is cleared, the packet is encrypted.  Unencrypted packets are
   intended for testing, and are not recommended for normal use.

* it would be good to have a pointer to the security considerations, with a 
discussion of the implications.

*  Also, it's odd that a completely insecure mode is just "not recommended for 
normal use".  I would suggest more panic-inducing phrasing.  e.g. ."Unencrypted 
packets offer a complete compromise of all security related to the protocol and 
MUST NOT be used outside of a testing environment"

   TAC_PLUS_SINGLE_CONNECT_FLAG := 0x04

   This flag is ussequernt, ed to allow a client and server to agree whether
   multiple sessions may be multiplexed onto a single connection.

* I find the "agree" phrasing odd.  I've mentioned before that the tone of the 
document is often philosophical.  Perhaps saying instead "this flag signals 
whether the client and server are capable of performing session multiplexing"

* i.e. the flag is a signal, not a capability for the systems to agree.

   session_id

   The Id for this TACACS+ session.  The session id is to be selected
   randomly.  This field does not change for the duration of the TACACS+
   session.  (If this value is not a cryptographically strong random
   number, it will compromise the protocol's security, see  RFC 1750

* it would be good to update the paragraph to be more prescriptive.  i.e.

   The Id for this TACACS+ session.  The session id MUST be taken
   fro a cryptographically strong random number generation.  If not,
   the protocol's security will be compromised.  See  RFC 1750
   for further information

...

   length

   The total length of the packet body (not including the header).  This
   value is in network byte order.  Packets are never padded beyond this
   length.

* Why is the text on "padding" there?  The TACACS+ packets are sent over TCP, 
not UDP.  So any "padding" would be outside of the scope of the current packet, 
and be seen by the other end as a subsequent, but invalid, TACACS+ packet.

3.5 ...

  - Unused fixed length fields SHOULD have values of zero.

* what happens when they don't?  I suggest adding text saying that the fields 
are ignored.

 - There will be no padding in any of the fields or at the end of a
  packet.

* I wonder again what "padding" means here.

3.6.  Encryption


   The body of packets may be encrypted.   ...

* Which is not a standard encryption method.  Security people will complain 
here.  I suggest (as before) using the term "obfuscated".  With a note that for 
historical reasons, the flags / fields / etc. refer to TACACS+ "encryption".

 ...  This document does not discuss the management and storage of
   those keys.  ...

* there should be some discussion in the Security Considerations section about 
this.  Otherwise, this subject will be brought up in the security review.

  ...  It is an implementation detail of the server and client,
   as to whether they will maintain only one key, or a different key for
   each client or server with which they communicate.  For security
   reasons, the latter options MUST be available, but it is a site
   dependent decision as to whether the use of separate keys is
   appropriate.

* those sentences seem to disagree with each other.  It's an "implementation 
detail", but it MUST be supported.  I suggest requiring the capability of 
per-server and per-client keys.

  ...   The session id is used in network byte order.

* nit: if the session