Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)
On Wed, 14 Apr 2010 21:14:49 -0400 zzzjethro...@email2me.net wrote: Thanks. This brings up a couple of questions. One, The Onion Router.doc re= commends against choosing one's exit nodes. Is your recommendation I exclu= de these naughty exit nodes, that are determined as such by Tor authoritie= s? You may have missed a distinction there. ExcludeExitNodes does not choose your exit nodes, but rather tells your client which nodes *not* to use. The .doc (Section 4.9--Can I control what nodes I use for entry/exit?), sa= ys,=20 We don't actually recommend you use these for normal use--you get the bes= t security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor.= If you agree, why do you do this? I am assuming that is part of what you= r post implied or meant, i.e. that you do this in spite of Tor's recommend= ation. There are two cases here to discuss. The first is when one is testing a particular exit that one suspects may be corrupted or dysfunctional in some other way that you find unacceptable. Until the most recent versions of tor, one could perform such a test by choosing the exit with the .exit notation in a host+domainname (e.g., some.website.com.privacynow.exit), which tells the client to build a circuit that uses PrivacyNow as the exit node. Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to perform such tests. I've asked recently on this list whether some other easy way were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there still is none. The second case is when a malfunctioning exit has been affirmatively identified. In such a case, one should post a message either here or on tor-rel...@torproject.org to notify all subscribers to the selected list. The directory authority operators read these lists, and if they are in agreement about your complaint, they will assign a BadExit flag to the offending node. While you and others wait for them to notice your message and decide what, if anything, to do about it, you and others need a way to enforce exclusion of that node from the circuit route selection process for use as an exit node. The ExcludeExitNodes statements in torrc are used to accomplish that exclusion. Also, sometimes the authority operators may disagree with your evaluation of a particular case and therefore refuse to flag the exit node with a BadExit flag in the directory. You can still force your own client to abide by your evaluation and decision through use of the ExcludeExitNodes statement in torrc. W.r.t. the documentation you cite, it is worth noting that being far more reluctant to exclude misbehaving nodes from use as exits was a bigger issue in the days when the tor network only had, say, 200 or fewer exits running at any one time. Now that there are usually 400 - 700 exits running at any given time, there isn't much anonymity to be preserved by allowing the use of such exits, and there may be much to be lost, depending upon the situation. I've accumulated a fairly lengthy list of excluded exits, but I do go through it every year or two to see which excluded exit nodes a) are still around and running and b) have corrected whatever I had found objectionable, as well as c) which are no longer around and can be eliminated from the list anyway. When I find nodes that are no longer a problem, I remove them from my exclusions. Two, in my Home Folder/Library, I have two (2), torrc files. one is torrc,= the other is torrc.orig.1 The first one (torrc), has: # This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not be pres= I think the comment may be a lie. It's most likely a torrc produced by vidalia, not tor. (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some special case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.) erved # The old torrc file was renamed totorrc.orig.1 or similar, and Tor will= ignore it # If set, Tor will accept connectionsfrom the same machine (localhost onl= y) # on this port, and allow thoseconnections to control the Tor process usin= g # the Tor Control Protocol (described incontrol-spec.txt). ControlPort 9051 # Store working data, state, keys, andcaches here. DataDirectory /Users/zZ/.tor/ # Where to send logging messages. Format is minSeverity[-maxSeverity] # (stderr|stdout|syslog|file FILENAME). Log notice stdout The second (torrc.orig.1), has nothing in it.=20 Which should I use? And, most importantly, what exactly do I write or ente= Not the empty one, obviously. :-) r into this file?=20 I really don't understand this: entry nodes nickname, nickname,... This is where one does this, is it not? Please be exact, detailed and clea= r. Unfortunately, what is clear to most of you goes way over my head :() That is why tor is distributed with a complete set of documentation. It would be well worth your time to read it. Remember, too, that the web site *strongly* recommends reading much of it before
Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)
On Apr 15, 2010, at 8:17 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to perform such tests. I've asked recently on this list whether some other easy way were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there still is none. If you want the functionality, feel free to set the AllowDotExit config option to 1. Note that this can't be recommended, because it opens you up for attacks where the exit node can choose who your exit is going to be, unless you use encrypted protocols when webbrowsing only. # This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not be pres= I think the comment may be a lie. It's most likely a torrc produced by vidalia, not tor. (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some special case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.) I think it is more likely that the file was written by Tor, via the SAFECONF torctl command. Sebastian *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)
On Thu, 15 Apr 2010 08:25:07 +0200 Sebastian Hahn m...@sebastianhahn.net wrote: On Apr 15, 2010, at 8:17 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to perform such tests. I've asked recently on this list whether some other easy way were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there still is none. If you want the functionality, feel free to set the AllowDotExit config option to 1. Note that this can't be recommended, because it opens you up for That is what I have been doing in order to be able to test for exit misbehavior. However, the ChangeLog notes under Minor bugfixes for 0.2.2.9-alpha the following: - Resume handling .exit hostnames in a special way: originally we stripped the .exit part and used the requested exit relay. In 0.2.2.1-alpha we stopped treating them in any special way, meaning if you use a .exit address then Tor will pass it on to the exit relay. Now we reject the .exit stream outright, since that behavior ^^^ might be more expected by the user. Found and diagnosed by Scott ?? Bennett and Downie on or-talk. I understood the Now we reject part as meaning that the .exit support had been completely removed. I do not understand why that behavior might be more expected by the user. In any case, the above note is why I've paused at 0.2.2.7-alpha while waiting to discover some fairly easy-to-use alternative method of testing exit behavior. attacks where the exit node can choose who your exit is going to be, unless you use encrypted protocols when webbrowsing only. Regarding the attack route you mention, I have some firefox plug-ins like NoRedirect and RefreshBlocker installed in addition to the recommended plug-ins (including QuickJava, NoScript, and Torbutton especially) that should help with automated stuff, and I'm in the habit of checking the actual URLs in links before using the links manually. In many cases, I don't even use firefox to get stuff from the links, but rather do a copy-and-paste to a wget(1) or some other downloader command in an xterm(1), so I have plenty of opportunity to notice that sort of interference. If those strategies still miss something, please do let me know. # This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not be pres= I think the comment may be a lie. It's most likely a torrc produced by vidalia, not tor. (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some special case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.) I think it is more likely that the file was written by Tor, via the SAFECONF torctl command. Okay, I guess I had forgotten tor implemented such a command, but who is issuing the command? Vidalia? Thanks for the information, Sebastian. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * ** *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)
On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:11 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: On Thu, 15 Apr 2010 08:25:07 +0200 Sebastian Hahn m...@sebastianhahn.net wrote: On Apr 15, 2010, at 8:17 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to perform such tests. I've asked recently on this list whether some other easy way were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there still is none. If you want the functionality, feel free to set the AllowDotExit config option to 1. Note that this can't be recommended, because it opens you up for That is what I have been doing in order to be able to test for exit misbehavior. However, the ChangeLog notes under Minor bugfixes for 0.2.2.9-alpha the following: - Resume handling .exit hostnames in a special way: originally we stripped the .exit part and used the requested exit relay. In 0.2.2.1-alpha we stopped treating them in any special way, meaning if you use a .exit address then Tor will pass it on to the exit relay. Now we reject the .exit stream outright, since that behavior ^^^ might be more expected by the user. Found and diagnosed by Scott ?? Bennett and Downie on or-talk. I understood the Now we reject part as meaning that the .exit support had been completely removed. I do not understand why that behavior might be more expected by the user. In any case, the above note is why I've paused at 0.2.2.7-alpha while waiting to discover some fairly easy-to-use alternative method of testing exit behavior. Ah no, that's not what is meant here. The idea is that when .exit is disabled, we reject connections to some domain ending in .exit, instead of passing that URL to the exit node. This is more expected behaviour because there is no .exit tld currently, so people telling to to go to xyz.exit are most likely thinking that they are talking to a tor with the .exit functionality enabled. attacks where the exit node can choose who your exit is going to be, unless you use encrypted protocols when webbrowsing only. Regarding the attack route you mention, I have some firefox plug- ins like NoRedirect and RefreshBlocker installed in addition to the recommended plug-ins (including QuickJava, NoScript, and Torbutton especially) that should help with automated stuff, and I'm in the habit of checking the actual URLs in links before using the links manually. In many cases, I don't even use firefox to get stuff from the links, but rather do a copy-and-paste to a wget(1) or some other downloader command in an xterm(1), so I have plenty of opportunity to notice that sort of interference. If those strategies still miss something, please do let me know. I suppose you still load images and possibly other resources, too; those can be fetched from arbitrary locations unless disabled via special-purpose addons like RequestPolicy. # This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not be pres= I think the comment may be a lie. It's most likely a torrc produced by vidalia, not tor. (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some special case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.) I think it is more likely that the file was written by Tor, via the SAFECONF torctl command. Okay, I guess I had forgotten tor implemented such a command, but who is issuing the command? Vidalia? Thanks for the information, Sebastian. Yes, Vidalia as the only Tor controller in a typical setup would be issuing the saveconf command. Sebastian *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: [or-talk] Re: huge pages, was where are the exit nodes gone?
On Wed, 14 Apr 2010 17:23:35 +0200 Olaf Selke olaf.se...@blutmagie.de wrote: Scott Bennett wrote: It appears memory consumption with the wrapped Linux malloc() is still larger than than with openbsd-malloc I used before. Hugepages don't appear to work with openbsd-malloc. Okay, that looks like a problem, and it probably ought to be passed along to the LINUX developers to look into. yes, but I don't suppose this problem being related to hugepages wrapper. Linking tor against standard glibc malloc() never worked for me in the past. Always had the problem that memory leaked like hell and after a few days tor process crashed with an out of memory error. Running configure script with --enable-openbsd-malloc flag solved this issue but apparently it doesn't work with libhugetlbfs.so. After 17 hours of operation resident process size is 1 gig. PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEMTIME+ P COMMAND 21716 debian-t 20 0 1943m 1.0g 24m R 79.4 26.9 927:51.27 1 tor On the other hand cpu load really seems to be reduced compared with standard page size. Olaf, if you're awake and on-line at/near this hour:-), how about an update, now that blutmagie has been running long enough to complete its climb to FL510 and accelerate to its cruising speed? Also, how about some numbers for how it ran without libhugetlbfs, even if only approximate, for comparison? (The suspense is really getting to me.:^) Thanks! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * ** *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)
On Thu, 15 Apr 2010 09:17:39 +0200 Sebastian Hahn m...@sebastianhahn.net wrote: On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:11 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: On Thu, 15 Apr 2010 08:25:07 +0200 Sebastian Hahn m...@sebastianhahn.net wrote: On Apr 15, 2010, at 8:17 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to perform such tests. I've asked recently on this list whether some other easy way were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there still is none. If you want the functionality, feel free to set the AllowDotExit config option to 1. Note that this can't be recommended, because it opens you up for That is what I have been doing in order to be able to test for exit misbehavior. However, the ChangeLog notes under Minor bugfixes for 0.2.2.9-alpha the following: - Resume handling .exit hostnames in a special way: originally we stripped the .exit part and used the requested exit relay. In 0.2.2.1-alpha we stopped treating them in any special way, meaning if you use a .exit address then Tor will pass it on to the exit relay. Now we reject the .exit stream outright, since that behavior ^^^ might be more expected by the user. Found and diagnosed by Scott ?? Bennett and Downie on or-talk. I understood the Now we reject part as meaning that the .exit support had been completely removed. I do not understand why that behavior might be more expected by the user. In any case, the above note is why I've paused at 0.2.2.7-alpha while waiting to discover some fairly easy-to-use alternative method of testing exit behavior. Ah no, that's not what is meant here. The idea is that when .exit is disabled, we reject connections to some domain ending in .exit, instead of passing that URL to the exit node. This is more expected behaviour because there is no .exit tld currently, so people telling to to go to xyz.exit are most likely thinking that they are talking to a tor with the .exit functionality enabled. Great! Thanks for the clarification. I'll go ahead and upgrade soon. attacks where the exit node can choose who your exit is going to be, unless you use encrypted protocols when webbrowsing only. Regarding the attack route you mention, I have some firefox plug- ins like NoRedirect and RefreshBlocker installed in addition to the recommended plug-ins (including QuickJava, NoScript, and Torbutton especially) that should help with automated stuff, and I'm in the habit of checking the actual URLs in links before using the links manually. In many cases, I don't even use firefox to get stuff from the links, but rather do a copy-and-paste to a wget(1) or some other downloader command in an xterm(1), so I have plenty of opportunity to notice that sort of interference. If those strategies still miss something, please do let me know. I suppose you still load images and possibly other resources, too; those can be fetched from arbitrary locations unless disabled via special-purpose addons like RequestPolicy. Hmmm...yes, some images load without intervention, although many do not. Okay, I'll change my habits, so that torrc will have it turned off by default, and I'll only turn it on (and send tor a SIGHUP) when I really need it. OTOH, thanks very much for the tip about RequestPolicy. I didn't know about that one, so I'll check into it. # This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not be pres= I think the comment may be a lie. It's most likely a torrc produced by vidalia, not tor. (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some special case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.) I think it is more likely that the file was written by Tor, via the SAFECONF torctl command. Okay, I guess I had forgotten tor implemented such a command, but who is issuing the command? Vidalia? Thanks for the information, Sebastian. Yes, Vidalia as the only Tor controller in a typical setup would be issuing the saveconf command. Okay, so tor does the actual (re)write, but Vidalia is still the perpetrator as far as the OP should be concerned. :-) Thanks again. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army. * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 *
Tor using StrictExitNodes
Hello, I am using StrictExitNodes 1 and a list of permitted exit nodes. I also tried country code. But I have problems, because although I see at least one or two permitted exit nodes as available on Tor Network Map in Vidalia, Tor still does not want to connect with them. I am getting warning messages repeatedly instead: apr 15 13:39:03.590 [Warning] No specified exit routers seem to be running, and StrictExitNodes is set: can't choose an exit. apr 15 13:39:30.595 [Warning] failed to choose an exit server It is interesting that this thing worked at first, but ceased working about a week ago. Thanks for any hint! *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: [or-talk] Re: huge pages, was where are the exit nodes gone?
Scott Bennett wrote: Olaf, if you're awake and on-line at/near this hour:-), how about an update, now that blutmagie has been running long enough to complete its climb to FL510 and accelerate to its cruising speed? Also, how about some numbers for how it ran without libhugetlbfs, even if only approximate, for comparison? (The suspense is really getting to me.:^) tor process is still growing: anonymizer2:~# hugeadm --pool-list Size Minimum Current Maximum Default 2097152 100 319 1000* PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEMTIME+ P COMMAND 21716 debian-t 20 0 2075m 1.1g 25m R 95.2 29.4 2020:29 0 tor It hard to tell after only one day how throughput is affected. Pls give me some more days. In the meanwhile everybody can do his own assessment from mrtg data http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/public_mrtg There are additional non-public graphs for environmental data monitoring like temperatures, fan speeds, and other super secret stuff which gives me a hint if someone is messing with my hardware. Olaf *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Howto build static linux binary?
Hi, I would like to build a statically linked binary of tor. Is there an easy way to accomplish this, e.g. by passing a simply command line option to configure? Thank you in advance, Clemens *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Howto build static linux binary?
On Apr 15, 2010, at 3:32 PM, Clemens Eisserer wrote: Hi, I would like to build a statically linked binary of tor. Is there an easy way to accomplish this, e.g. by passing a simply command line option to configure? Thank you in advance, Clemens Hey Clemens, yesterday a patch was accepted to allow statically linking zlib. This means you can now pass --enable-static-(openssl|zlib|libevent) to configure to link those parts statically, if you use the latest development version from git. Other options are unknown to me. Sebastian *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Howto build static linux binary?
Hi Sebastian yesterday a patch was accepted to allow statically linking zlib. This means you can now pass --enable-static-(openssl|zlib|libevent) to configure to link those parts statically, if you use the latest development version from git. Other options are unknown to me. Hmm, I would prefer to have all libraries statically linked (including libc) - so that the resulting executable would have no external dependencies (except for the kernel-syscall interface of course ^^). Sad this isn't possible ... maybe I can find a way to do this manually. Thanks, Clemens *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Howto build static linux binary?
On Apr 15, 2010, at 11:46 PM, Clemens Eisserer wrote: Hmm, I would prefer to have all libraries statically linked (including libc) - so that the resulting executable would have no external dependencies (except for the kernel-syscall interface of course ^^). Sad this isn't possible ... maybe I can find a way to do this manually. Thanks, Clemens Someone in #tor was experimenting with CFLAGS=-static, maybe that can help you a bit. *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: TOR Not Starting after upgrade
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Edward Langenback wrote: I've just upgraded to vidalia-bundle-0.2.1.25-0.2.7.exe and now TOR is not starting at all. I've tried a full uninstall-reinstall with no changes. Any ideas what the problem is? I'm still getting the same behavior after several reboots and complete re-installs. - -- The best way to get past my spam filter is to sign or encrypt your email to me. My PGP KeyId: 0x84D46604 http://blogdoofus.com http://tinfoilchef.com http://www.domaincarryout.com Un-official Freenet 0.5 alternative download http://peculiarplace.com/freenet/ Mixminion Message Sender, Windows GUI Frontend for Mixminion http://peculiarplace.com/mixminion-message-sender/ -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQEVAwUBS8fPZHV+YnyE1GYEAQjVngf/fMzMaHyNsD8XggBmJOblCx469gsXahOe 3LU6NictbG6V8WdBVqxsPB6iq6YNMNQlkB4wWV3oOPLNfwIBA8VtcfIWGWpOkmqU PfcL9Dyf3hXmq6E5D4ggKagXHUMqOyzcQ4bGV476mN2lgVma5Bk7zL0m4VAfFfp/ mpWJQ0bipp766xpqDR2QFjDshm9I8uEdBYUqsFBdWTBaOjz23CQ2Zp+sWKPI0+2Y +6zkBjgZh2TQVc7joyMxC3cwbcftoZdEUS1iyiNQw/QFstnQ3lvc8HCtrJDA5N8y Qe8ychDAEX4f16gXX4LQH/rBvmSQTpTaa58krMKMP3+uqjmBjOtc0A== =h6aT -END PGP SIGNATURE- *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: TOR Not Starting after upgrade
On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 09:45:56PM -0500, Edward Langenback wrote: I've just upgraded to vidalia-bundle-0.2.1.25-0.2.7.exe and now TOR is not starting at all. I've tried a full uninstall-reinstall with no changes. Any ideas what the problem is? I'm still getting the same behavior after several reboots and complete re-installs. 1) Your insecurity software may have detected changed .exe files and therefore blocked Tor from starting (it is easy to miss the prompt). 2) The Tor might have started but browsing though it with Firefox not be working due to a legacy Privoxy hanging around (it was not automatically uninstalled by previous bundles for some reason) and occupying port 8118 so Polipo cannot start. 3) Check the Tor log file for other possibilities. Check the Windows Events log for related System and Application events. signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: TOR Not Starting after upgrade
On Tue, Apr 13, 2010 at 10:17:21PM -0500, apos...@peculiarplace.com wrote 13K bytes in 270 lines about: : Apr 13 22:12:36.875 [Warning] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: : Connecting to directory server. (Socket is not connected [WSAENOTCONN : ]; NOROUTE; count 1; recommendation warn) It seems like your path to the directory authorities is blocked. This could be by local firewall or antivirus software, or something on the network. Do you have the same config file before and after the upgrade? -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://www.torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: MacFUSE
On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 09:33:24PM -0400, zzzjethro...@email2me.net wrote 2.6K bytes in 74 lines about: : Tor wouldn't work until, I reinstalled MacFUSE. Actually it is more accurate to say, until it somehow reinstalled itself. : Now, I'm not 100% sure of my memory in that regard as I couldn't open Vidalia/Tor first. I had to go through a True Crypt file first, but if memory serves me, the very first time I rid myself of MacFUSE, it was Tor that didn't work. Truecrypt on os x needs macfuse to work. If your tor/vidalia is installed to the truecrypt volume, then you need truecrypt to work. If you remove macfuse, but not truecrypt, you have a broken truecrypt installation. If your truecrypt is broken, then you can't get to your tor/vidalia app to run it. See the dependencies there? -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://www.torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: Tor using StrictExitNodes
On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 01:41:14PM +0200, linuxu...@gmx.us wrote 0.8K bytes in 19 lines about: apr 15 13:39:03.590 [Warning] No specified exit routers seem to be running, and StrictExitNodes is set: can't choose an exit. apr 15 13:39:30.595 [Warning] failed to choose an exit server It is interesting that this thing worked at first, but ceased working about a week ago. Are the exit nodes you chose still active now? -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://www.torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
Re: MacFUSE
Hello. Yes I do and thanks for that. -Original Message- From: and...@torproject.org To: or-talk@freehaven.net Sent: Fri, Apr 16, 2010 10:49 am Subject: Re: MacFUSE On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 09:33:24PM -0400, zzzjethro...@email2me.net wrote 2.6K bytes in 74 lines about: : Tor wouldn't work until, I reinstalled MacFUSE. Actually it is more accurate to say, until it somehow reinstalled itself. : Now, I'm not 100% sure of my memory in that regard as I couldn't open Vidalia/Tor first. I had to go through a True Crypt file first, but if memory serves me, the very first time I rid myself of MacFUSE, it was Tor that didn't work. Truecrypt on os x needs macfuse to work. If your tor/vidalia is installed to the truecrypt volume, then you need truecrypt to work. If you remove macfuse, but not truecrypt, you have a broken truecrypt installation. If your truecrypt is broken, then you can't get to your tor/vidalia app to run it. See the dependencies there? -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://www.torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject *** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talkin the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
