Re: Re: RE: Re: Stop using SYS, SYSTEM?

2003-11-15 Thread Nuno Souto
Facetious, but correct. What you need
is auditing. Not clipping userids.
Achieves nothing.

Cheers
Nuno Souto
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- Original Message - 

 What I was saying is that having a different username for each DBA helps you 
 identify the WHOM. Of course a hacker
could always cut knock the DBA unconscious and prop up his head to fool an eye retina 
scan, à la James Bond, but by that
argument any username or IP address or whatever else you use is meaningless.
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RE: Re: RE: Re: Stop using SYS, SYSTEM?

2003-11-14 Thread Cupp Michael E Contr Det 1 AFRL/WSI


-Original Message-
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 10:49 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list ORACLE-L

SNIP
Stopping someone from using a given set of accounts achieves preciously 
nothing in terms of security (or auditing) IF the functionality of those accounts 
is then replicated to other accounts.
SNIP

Not if someone (I.e. an 'operator') is only using a portion of the access (COMPLETE) 
that is given to sys and/or system.


Fact is a DBA needs to be able to exp/imp (debatable, but let's ignore that).  
And manage rights.  And manage space.  And manage allocations,
And monitor the system.  And a myriad of other tasks immaterial to the 
point I'm trying to make.

But a user account for Joe DBA and another user account for Jane DBA, etc, etc will 
provide accountability and tracability, vs a 'public' account does not.


Just my $0.02
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RE: Re: RE: Re: Stop using SYS, SYSTEM?

2003-11-14 Thread Jacques Kilchoer
 -Original Message-
 Nuno Pinto do Souto
 
 I don't want to know that SYSTEM or SOUTON with a subset
 of its rights stuffed up my database or exported my main accounts
 and clients tables.  What I want to know is WHY, WHEN, HOW and 
 by WHOM.

What I was saying is that having a different username for each DBA helps you identify 
the WHOM. Of course a hacker could always cut knock the DBA unconscious and prop up 
his head to fool an eye retina scan, à la James Bond, but by that argument any 
username or IP address or whatever else you use is meaningless.
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Author: Jacques Kilchoer
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Re: Re: RE: Re: Stop using SYS, SYSTEM?

2003-11-13 Thread Nuno Pinto do Souto
 Arup Nanda [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 I'm not sure that's what the OP wanted. He wanted to know if stopping
 use of
 SYS and SYSTEM on a regular basis will be acceptable, not disable
 them. It
 sure is.
 Besides, how does one disable the account? Lock it? SYSTEM can be
 locked but
 SYS can't be; hence the whole concept of disabling does not make
 sense.


I hear what you're saying, but define acceptable.  And how do you stop 
someone from using a given userid other than disabling it?  How do you 
disable is of course dependent on what the software maker provides you.

In the case of SYS, probably change passwords is the only way.
In the case of SYSTEM I think it can be disabled, although I'm not
sure of the impact of that on tools that may need it.  I'd rather use the 
password method, that way all I need do to enable it is change
the password again.


 I feel the auditors merely wanted the OP to stop using SYS and SYSTEM
 on a
 regular basis in operations that require a DBA access - such as full
 exports
 and selecting from disctionary tables. IMHO this is a very valid
 advisory
 and not difficult to follow.


Stopping someone from using a given set of accounts achieves preciously 
nothing in terms of security (or auditing) IF the functionality of those accounts 
is then replicated to other accounts.


Fact is a DBA needs to be able to exp/imp (debatable, but let's ignore that).  
And manage rights.  And manage space.  And manage allocations,
And monitor the system.  And a myriad of other tasks immaterial to the 
point I'm trying to make.


Those are conveniently provided for by Oracle on a default install using
the SYSTEM account.  This is what it is for, this is the work of a DBA,
this is WHY that account has been given those access rights.  SYS is
debatable and Oracle may now want to discourage people from using
it.  Fair enough.  But SYSTEM is the DBA account par excellence,
the same that root is also a sysadmin account.


Now you may take away the accounts, but you MUST provide the
functionality (or a subset) SOMEHOW, or else the DBA (or the sysadmin) 
can NOT do his/her work.


If you provide the function through another account, then EFFECTIVELY,
all you have achievced is change the name of the account that does that
function.  Security wise, you are back exactly where you started!
And all you have achieved is create a whole lot of risks for the next
person that comes along and installs some software.


The auditors should be defining a set of functions that must be audited
and to what level, and the DBA (and Oracle!) should look at how to 
implement those.  If they are executed by logonid  A, B or MXYZPTLK
is essentially just spurious information (other than of course knowing
WHO has the password for that ID!).  Does Oracle provide a facility
to properly audit all this?  IMHO, far from it.  But it's getting better.


I don't want to know that SYSTEM or SOUTON with a subset
of its rights stuffed up my database or exported my main accounts
and clients tables.  What I want to know is WHY, WHEN, HOW and 
by WHOM.  So that I can reconstruct the events, and hopefully prevent 
the problem from ever happening again.


Changing the login names DBAs use doesn't cut it for this, other than 
look good in auditor's reports. If there is one thing that the military are 
good at (!) is in defining precisely what security and auditing consists
of.  

Have a look at a secure military installation and you'll find it's not about 
stopping people from using this or that, it's about KNOWING who
did what, how and when.

Cheers
Nuno Souto
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Author: Nuno Pinto do Souto
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