Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/16/15 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Matt- the 'precognitive' physical world functions in all three modes: 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.  After all, the habits of 
formation of a molecule of water are an example of Thirdness and an 
example, according to Peirce, of the operation of Mind. I will yet 
again, repeat from 4.551 (I ought to know it by heart by now!)...
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the 
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world".


Yeah, "pre-cognitive" was a bad choice of words, since "cognition" is 
distinguished from "thought". I conflated the two terms. I was just 
thinking of Secondness.


Hmm,  I find your comment that 'a constructed god' is as real as 
gravity to be questionable. Gravity is a natural force; an ideology 
about a god(s) is imagined by man.


I was talking about the law of gravity, which isn't a force.

Margolis counts the world of secondness as prior to any construction. 
I'm weighing this against the more Madhyamaka idea of it all. I can see 
how we should think that the secondness abstracted from the law of 
gravity is not a construction.


If you're referring to gravity as a third, then you're making the 
distinction, about what is constructed and what isn't, in a different 
place than me. I think all thirds are constructions.


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

The Existential Triad of Burgin  was missing in my previous post which is
given below:




*   World of structures  *

*  /\*

*/\*

*  /\*

*   Physical world   --  Mental world  *



*Figure 1.  *The Existential Triad of the world.  Reproduced from [1].



If ITR (Irreversible Triadic Relation) indeed applies to Figure 1 as
suggested in Figure 3 in my previous post, the following logical inferences
may be made:


(1) The World cannot be reduced to any one or two of the triad, e.g., to
the duality of the Physical world and the Mental world, as advocated by
Descartes.


(2) The World of Structures are as real as the Physical or the Mental
world, meaning that, just as the Mental World is unthinkable without the
Physical World, so is the Mental World unthinkable without the World of
Structures.  Nor the Physical World thinkable without the World of
Structures.


(3) In other words, the World may be ultimately *irreducibly triadic, *i.e,
*Peircea*n !


(4)  The World is also recursive with respect to ITR.  That is, there are
many ITR's embedded within each of the three worlds, reminiscent of the
Russian babushka dolls.  Each ITR can be visualized as a babushka doll, or
simply as a 'bab', the term introduced by the Austrian theologian, H.-F.
Angel, in 2006 in connection with his theory of the believing processes
called "credition" [2].


(5) If (4) is right, it would follow that the World is the Largest Bab
enclosing many smaller babs which divide into three groups belonging to the
Physical world (I), the Mental world (II), and the World of structures
(III)".


 *Bab = Bab (I)*Bab (II)*Bab (III)  *

 (I)




where the symbol * indicates the irreducibly triadic relation depicted in
Figure 3.



With all the best.


Sung


Reference:


   [1] Burgin, M. (2010).  Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity
and Unification.  World Scientific, New Jersey, p. 60.
   [2] *Angel, H.-F. (2015). A Process of Merging Interior and Exterior
Reality: A Short View on the Structure of Credition, in: Teixeira,
Maria-Teresa (Ed): **Mind in Nature, in: European Studies in Process
Thought, 2016, Cambridge Scholars Publishing [in press].*




On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 7:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Stephen, Jeffrey, Edwina, lists,
>
> (1)  In connection with the debate on nominalism vs. realism,  it may be
> of some interest to consider the Existential Triad  of Burgin proposed in
> [1] (see the figure below) that seems similar to the triadic models of the
> world advocated by Popper and Penrose [2].  What is interesting to me is
> that in all these models, a distinction is made between the Mental world
> and the World of structures (which I used to think to be equivalent):
>
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
> (Reproduced from [1])
>
> (2)  As the possible 'residents' (or constituents) of the World of
> structures (WS), I am inclined to suggest the concepts of (i) ITR
> (Irreducible Triadic Relation) [3], (ii) the Golden ratio [3], (iii)
> Fibonacci series [3], and PDE (Planckian distributions equation) [4] which
> I have already discussed on these lists.
>
> (3) The main purpose of this post is to bring to your attention my recent
> findings
>
> (a) that a Gaussian distribution (indicating randomness) can be
> transformed into a right or a left long-tailed histogram (indicating
> non-randomness or order) simply by replacing the x-coordinates of the
> Gaussian distribution with Fibonacci numbers (or their derivatives such as
> F^0.5 and log(log F), where F is a segment of the Fibonacci series),while
> keeping its y coordinates invariant, and
> (b) that such Gaussian-derived long tailed histograms can be simulated
> with PDE using as its x-coordinates the same Fibonacci numbers used in
> (a).  I will refer to this combined procedure as the "*Fibonacci
> number-based transformation of Gaussian to Planckian distribution*"
> (FTGP), which can be schematically represented thus:
>
>
>  i)
> replace x with F
> * Gaussian Distribution*
>  ->  *Planckian Distribution *
>  (Random processes)  ii) keep y invariant
>(Non-random, i.e., ordered processes)
>[Thermal or Brownian motions]
>   [Selection processes driven by free energy]
>
>
> *Figure 1.*  A diagrammatic representation of FTGP. The transformation of
> the Gaussian distribution to the Planckian distribution by carrying out two
> operations, i) and ii), where F indicates a segment of the Fibonacci
> series, e.g., F = (5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 133, 277, 410).
>
> (4) The findings in (3) indicate 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Edwina,

This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time regarding 
the categories.


Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of gravity. No law needs to 
be instantiated, which means the second within that third need not be 
two existing things. Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real 
without regard to any physical effects that act in their accord. This is 
why I say, within relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity is a 
creation of man, whereas the bruteness of things acting in its accord 
may not be.


I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call 
bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a complex 
of thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that 
a second is within; but we can't say anything about that second. Seconds 
have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise you'll have to admit that 
there might be a second completely isolated from reality and therefore 
unknowable. So seconds' constant association with their thirds, in 
reality, I think leads some people to think they're experiencing 
secondness when it's really a less complex level of thirdness. A second 
without regard to a third cannot be defined. It has no character without 
that third, nor relation (e.g., there is no concept of measuring their 
distance without introducing a third, so the very concept of distance 
has no meaning without a third, nor is there a force of their impact 
until a third is introduced), so it can't be whiffed. This is the reason 
that idea of 'experiencing firstness' always struck me as an absurdity. 
I have to believe that they're only whiffing a paired down third.


Matt

On 10/16/15 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Matt- when I said that 'gravity is a natural force' - I meant it is a 
law that 'forces' matter to behave in interaction with other 
matter according to the strength of the gravity.
Is gravity a mode of Thirdness? Certainly, habits are arrived at via 
construction. Now, Secondness assumes that 'something concrete exists' 
- some THING...differentiated from some OTHER THING. That's where the 
idea of 'Secondness' comes in - that duality, that dyad.  Now, to be a 
'Thing' means that it is organized in itself. This, to me, suggests 
that it already is operating - just in itself - within the 
organizational mode of Thirdness.  So - the interaction between the 
two things may be strictly within a mode of Secondness but the 
existential nature of each thing - must include Thirdness. So - is 
gravity a mode of Thirdness?
I'm going to say - yes. I'm not 100% sure but I can't see it as 
anything else. Laws are, after all, Thirdness. Gravity is a natural 
law - a law 'natural' to matter and when gravity interacts with matter 
- it does X. When there is LESS gravity, then, matter behaves 
differently. So, this law, this gravity actually organizes how matter 
functions. So - I'll conclude that gravity is a mode of Thirdness.

Edwina

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 2:10 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

On 10/16/15 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- the 'precognitive' physical world functions in all three
modes: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.  After all, the
habits of formation of a molecule of water are an example of
Thirdness and an example, according to Peirce, of the operation
of Mind. I will yet again, repeat from 4.551 (I ought to know it
by heart by now!)...
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world".


Yeah, "pre-cognitive" was a bad choice of words, since "cognition"
is distinguished from "thought". I conflated the two terms. I was
just thinking of Secondness.


Hmm,  I find your comment that 'a constructed god' is as real as
gravity to be questionable. Gravity is a natural force; an
ideology about a god(s) is imagined by man.


I was talking about the law of gravity, which isn't a force.

Margolis counts the world of secondness as prior to any
construction. I'm weighing this against the more Madhyamaka idea
of it all. I can see how we should think that the secondness
abstracted from the law of gravity is not a construction.

If you're referring to gravity as a third, then you're making the
distinction, about what is constructed and what isn't, in a
different place than me. I think all thirds are constructions.

Matt


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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

I saw as soon as I sent this that I made two mistakes:

On 10/16/15 3:18 AM, Matt Faunce wrote:

In historicism, reality is what is here and possible from here.**


That's not right at all. Read the Venn link for an excellent explanation.


As for thinking in graphs and images, this is applied mathematics.


I was thinking of Stefan's examples. Obviously thinking can be in 
theoretical math...


If you get only one thing out of that post, I hope it's the Venn pages I 
linked to.


--
Matt


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RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, "The law of association of habits" was simply the title for my 2001
article to place in a brief summary form, its emphasis. It was taken from
the aforementioned quote by Peirce (with reference to "the law of
association of ideas"), and not intended as a precise expression of a
fundamental principle, in and of itself. It was careless of me to frame it
this way in this conversation, as it's only a headline grabber, not a
precisely articulated principle. I could just as easily have titled my paper
“The law of habituation of associations” and it would still be just as
clumsy, imprecise and incorrect. If this does not clarify your question for
you and what I was getting at in that title, then perhaps the following
simplistic example might, copy-pasted from something I posted to another
forum discussion:

In order to make a choice, perform an action, you need to have an objective,
something that matters. Say you want to get to the top of a flight of steps.
In order to achieve this simple objective, your brain constructs
"narratives"... I refer not to word narratives, but to sequences of logic,
habits and associations to coordinate muscles and movements. You begin your
motion up the stairs. Your first objective is the first step. You raise a
foot to the first step, recruiting the muscles and eye coordinations that
are associated together in the execution of that first step and locating
your foot's point of contact. You do this without thinking, but your brain’s
neurons are busily stringing nonverbal narratives together, again, in
accordance with their own habits/associations/motivations. This involves
habit (how your brain has been trained in muscle contractions within the
context of space and movement). It involves association (associating various
cues, visual, touch, contractions, etc) as you raise your foot and control
its ascent to the next step. It involves motivation, defining the goal that
matters and the sub-goals required to get there. In summary, every choice,
every decision, recruits the interconnected habits, associations and motives
required to realize them.

Now, given that I am not a Peirce scholar, you might like to reframe these
sorts of thought-narratives within the context of the categories and the
triadic scheme. But to summarize... my imprecise articulation as “the law of
association of habits” serves to imply the subconscious, nonverbal
narratives behind every choice. Every thought comes together as a context,
under the three aspects, being habit, association and "the desire to be"
(the "desire to be" is just another way of alluding to the pragmatic maxim).

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 12:23 AM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen - I am well read in all of Peirce's writings. That wasn't,
therefore, what I was asking; I was asking what YOU meant by it. Habit, as a
generalization and collation of 'ideas' or 'codes' or 'modes of
organization' is Peirce's definition. But you refer to the 'association of
habits' (not ideas)and therefore, I asked you what you meant by this.

 

Since you refer only to habit (Thirdness) and the 'association of habits' -
and don't refer to causality from brute interaction of discrete particles
(Secondness) or the spontaneous generation of a novel entity
(Firstness)...then, I consider that these modes of generation of
interactions - are not within your axiomatic model.

 

How can evolution and adaptation take place without the immediacy of a brute
interaction of Secondness and the spontaneity of Firstness? 

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
  ; 'Peirce-L'
  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:32 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Edwina

>”I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit
is the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set
of actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate
or network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.“

Peirce appreciated the central importance of habit and association in
cognitive processes, and this is evident throughout his writings. The
essence of his view is captured in Peirce (1931-1966): 
'There is a law in this succession of ideas. We may roughly say it is the
law of habit. It is the great "Law of Association of Ideas," - the one law
of all psychical action.' (CP 7.388) 

Habit and association are covered more specifically as aspects of a general
law of mind, in Book III, Philosophy of Mind (CP 7.388-7.523) (chapters 2
and 3 are on association and habit respectively), in Peirce (1931-1966)

>“Your 

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have “culture” not
just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have the
physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is nothing
magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of Peircean
biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human hands and
vocal chords are the “tools” that are especially important in the evolution
of human culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in god’s
image, none of that nonsense. It’s just natural law doing what it does. The
late Thomas Sebeok understood precisely this very point:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-
speech-theory.html

And in other conversations on this list, I compared dynamic cities that
restructure themselves with historical experience, to brains as colonies of
neurons, to suggest the dynamic way that functional specialisations in
brains emerge. I have never suggested that there is anything about culture
that is carved in stone. But I think I see where your objection emerges.
Cultures are resistant to change for the very same reason that personality
and the brain’s functional specialisations are resistant to change... habit.
In a very real sense, a culture is like a thought, with its own habits,
associations and motivations that we identify in what the culture stands
for.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:04 AM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

One further comment, Stephen - with regard to your point 10, where you write
that 'for humans that ecosystem is Culture'. I disagree, for you do not
examine where and how and why cultural behaviour and beliefs develop. And,
you seem to view culture as 'carved in stone'. My view is that cultural
behaviour and beliefs develop as logical adaptations to the real ecological
realities - i.e., you can't have an agricultural economy in the Arctic and
so, you develop a hunting economy- and it has a very different socioeconomic
mode of organization than an agricultural economy- and also, enables/limits
a different size population.

 

And - cultural behaviour and beliefs will change, as the technology enables
more food production and the population increases. 

 

[And I'm against historicism]

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
  ; 'Peirce-L'
  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my “law of association of habits” in conjunction with
“the desire to be,” before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment
between his three categories and my habits, association and “desire to be”
(the “desire to be” relates to the constellation of motivations, desires,
fears, thrills, etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic
framework can only ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton’s framework is
a best guess that thus far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown
to work very well. The list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my
thinking, taken from a somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of
years ago, was along the following lines (updated since then, for a more
informed readership):

1) The law of association of habits [title of my article that I got
published in Semiotica in 2001] provides the same sort of generality for
cognitive science that Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences in
his laws of motion. Moreover, it fits in perfectly with Peirce‘s philosophy
of Pragmatism (as in, usefulness – defining the things that matter);
2) Perhaps the law of association of habits relates also to matter, as per
Peirce’s famous reference to matter as “mind hidebound in habit”;
3) Our existence within cultures – and the fact that cultures can be
sustained over time – can be understood from the perspective of the law of
association of habits. For example – memes as habits, and imitation as a
subset of associative learning. Associative learning provides the mechanism
by which memes (habits) are transmitted. Imitation is one of the ways in
which we choose what to associate;
4) Persistence across time is the deal-breaker. No matter what accidental
complexity might manifest according to the laws of chance, the fact that
life persists across time, with all the thermodynamic forces (entropy)
acting against it, suggests that there is something more robust going on
than the mechanics of dumb luck;
5) The law of association 

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen, see my comments below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 5:41 AM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  SJ:Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have "culture" not 
just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have the 
physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is nothing 
magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of Peircean 
biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human hands and vocal 
chords are the "tools" that are especially important in the evolution of human 
culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in god's image, none of 
that nonsense. It's just natural law doing what it does. The late Thomas Sebeok 
understood precisely this very point:
  
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

  EDWINA: I'm not arguing for a magical nature of human culture! Nor am I 
talking about some anthropocentric man in god's image!! And what do you mean by 
defining them as 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'?  I disagree that 
'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of our species. These 
technological adaptations are vital but the important tool is the human brain, 
with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination, logic and symbolic 
language. This enables a species that can only live as a community, for its 
knowledge base is learned rather than innate, and is expressed and communicated 
via language. The actual format of the human culture is, in my view, developed 
as a logical adaptation to a particular biomic ecology; that is, as I've said 
before, you can't grow wheat in the Arctic and therefore, develop a hunting 
economy which is organized (family mode, economy, political etc)..very, very 
differently from an agricultural mode. 


  SJ: And in other conversations on this list, I compared dynamic cities that 
restructure themselves with historical experience, to brains as colonies of 
neurons, to suggest the dynamic way that functional specialisations in brains 
emerge. I have never suggested that there is anything about culture that is 
carved in stone. But I think I see where your objection emerges. Cultures are 
resistant to change for the very same reason that personality and the brain's 
functional specialisations are resistant to change... habit. In a very real 
sense, a culture is like a thought, with its own habits, associations and 
motivations that we identify in what the culture stands for.



  EDWINA: I'd agree - societies are  like giant organisms, and indeed, 
behaviour and beliefs are very resistant to change, for such would destabilize 
the community. All organisms require stability of processes - and in those that 
can adapt, change begins and develops in the periphery - and can be slow, or in 
other cases, can...when the system as a whole requires change...be apocalpytic 
and sudden.



  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:04 AM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

   

  One further comment, Stephen - with regard to your point 10, where you write 
that 'for humans that ecosystem is Culture'. I disagree, for you do not examine 
where and how and why cultural behaviour and beliefs develop. And, you seem to 
view culture as 'carved in stone'. My view is that cultural behaviour and 
beliefs develop as logical adaptations to the real ecological realities - i.e., 
you can't have an agricultural economy in the Arctic and so, you develop a 
hunting economy- and it has a very different socioeconomic mode of organization 
than an agricultural economy- and also, enables/limits a different size 
population.

   

  And - cultural behaviour and beliefs will change, as the technology enables 
more food production and the population increases. 

   

  [And I'm against historicism]

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek 

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my "law of association of habits" in conjunction with 
"the desire to be," before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of 
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my 
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment between 
his three categories and my habits, association and "desire to be" (the "desire 
to be" relates to the constellation of motivations, desires, fears, thrills, 
etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt - Since I'm not a fan of Margolis -  of any of his theories, then, I'll 
just briefly comment on his rejection of our species' innate capacity for 
language. I consider that our species does indeed have an innate capacity for 
symbolic communication; i.e., language. You wrote:

"In thinking from your side, one challenging question came to mind: How is it 
that linguistic competence is required to learn music, choreography, and 
mathematics, but no linguistic competence is required to first learn a 
language? (In his book, The Unraveling of Scientism, Margolis disputes 
Chomsky's idea of an innate language, so clearly Margolis wouldn't answer the 
question with that idea.) I think the answer has to do with the role us as 
historied selves.* (see glossary below). In Margolis, truth is relative to 
history; so since after having constructing our world throughout evolution up 
to now, despite whatever options we've passed up, we've chosen language as the 
main vehicle and road system to our world, then that's the reality we now have 
to live within"

I disagree; linguistic competence IS required to first learn a language; this 
competence is the innate capacity for logical structure and order; and the 
innate capacity for symbolism. Both, functioning together, are the basis of 
language.

And of course, I reject the idea that 'truth is relative to history'.

We have 'chosen' language? I wasn't aware, first, that man' constructed his 
world through evolution'  - and what does this actually mean? That man 
'evolved' [clarify?]and so, began to do what - grow wheat? And second, to 
'choose' language suggests that it existed a priori, along with other options, 
and mankind simply 'chose one option.

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: sb ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 3:18 AM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Stefan,

  In Venn's tunneling metaphor language includes all sign systems, so the 
digging beyond the scaffolding is, I suppose, vague thinking. A conventional 
sign system allows us to quickly tag ideas we come up with so we don't lose 
them. These signs allow us to securely hold the general in our head so we can 
do mental experiments on them, (e.g., reversing it, turning it inside out, 
extending one aspect of it), to see if new ideas arise which can be built on or 
around them. The new idea requires a new sign or a old sign with a new or 
expanded meaning: this is how thought expands the sign system (or language).

  The question of the relation between language, in the narrow sense, and other 
sign systems hinges on whether language is our main vehicle to access most of 
our world, especially the parts of the world that most people in our community 
consider most important. Art doesn't give us access to as much of the world as 
language, but it's a vehicle to some places considered important enough, which 
language can't get to. Let's say art sign systems are our mountain bike and 
hiking boots, and language is our car plus paved roads. If it weren't for my 
car I'd only be able to ride and bike in relatively local places, but with my 
car I can hike and cycle all over this continent. (And of course you can 
sometimes hike on paved roads, i.e., sometimes use non-languaged thinking to 
express what language can easily express.) So a non-languaged sign system isn't 
really limited by language, it's just that because our world was built with 
language as the main vehicle (especially our encultured world, but not as much 
our physical world), these other systems aren't as versatile in this world we 
created mainly around our main vehicle.

  In thinking from your side, one challenging question came to mind: How is it 
that linguistic competence is required to learn music, choreography, and 
mathematics, but no linguistic competence is required to first learn a 
language? (In his book, The Unraveling of Scientism, Margolis disputes 
Chomsky's idea of an innate language, so clearly Margolis wouldn't answer the 
question with that idea.) I think the answer has to do with the role us as 
historied selves.* (see glossary below). In Margolis, truth is relative to 
history; so since after having constructing our world throughout evolution up 
to now, despite whatever options we've passed up, we've chosen language as the 
main vehicle and road system to our world, then that's the reality we now have 
to live within. It's possible that, if our world always lacked access to a 
language, various non-language sign system could have developed, but this would 
have resulted in a world so different than ours now that if we were magically 
transported to it we'd be utterly lost in it. Their systems and ours would be 
incommensurable. In historicism, reality is what is here and possible from 
here.**

  Each art is bolstered with a broad cultural understanding; the breadth and 
depth of this understanding are tied together by 

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Here it is, Edwina... here lies the crux of our differences:
>”I disagree that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of
our species. These technological adaptations are vital but the important
tool is the human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning,
imagination, logic and symbolic language.“

My thesis, like that of Norman Doidge, 2007
 , is that the neuroplastic brain
wires itself in response to experience. The mind-body unity implies that the
mind-body is a whole, mind is not separate to body. However... for the sake
of illustration, it is via the body that the mind apprehends the experiences
that wire the brain. Now it is true that apes, chimps, etc also have hands
and they also use vocalisations, but their vocalisations are limited, and
their hands are not predisposed to holding biros or drawing complex symbols
or building complex things... they also have smaller brain-body weight
ratios. And so apes will never, at their current levels of evolution,
develop the sorts of complex cultures that we inhabit. 

You bring us back to this old tough nut to crack... innate. I insist that
nothing is innate (beyond the predispositions defined in the context of the
biosemiotic paradigm). You insist that “hypothetical reasoning, imagination,
logic and symbolic language“ are innate in humans. But a human infant raised
among wild wolves will unlearn whatever innateness there is quicker than you
can say “define the things that matter in a lupine den” and this is what
accounts for the phenomenon of the feral child. This is consistent with the
axiomatic framework that I outlined. Your insistence on innate
characteristics cannot be sustained within such an axiomatic framework. It
is anthropocentric because it designates something “special” about the human
condition. But we are different to animals in degree, not in kind. All
living things conform to the same Peircean-biosemiotic principles (this is
what I meant by 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'). We are not going
anywhere with this, and we have to just agree to disagree. There is no
crossing this Rubicon.

sj

PS: Koko the famous gorilla exhibits imagination and ability to work with
symbols. A lot of animals do. A lot of animals use tools. Just a moment ago,
I viewed a video clip of a wild bird snowboarding down a rooftop on a
margarine lid, just for the fun of it. There is nothing exceptional about
the human condition beyond the “tipping point” in development that has
enabled us to form the largest, most complex cultures. The human
exceptionalism that imbues humans with special powers is just another form
of anthropocentrism. Aha, I found the clip of the snowboarding bird:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB_I08ahD1c
The usual narrative for this kind of thing is that the bird is acting on an
adaptive instinct... this kind of typical genocentric narrative is hogwash.
Maybe the bird is doing exactly what it looks like it’s doing... just
curious and having a bit of fun.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:53 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen, see my comments below:

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
  ; 'Peirce-L'
  

Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 5:41 AM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

SJ:Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have “culture”
not just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have
the physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is
nothing magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of
Peircean biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human
hands and vocal chords are the “tools” that are especially important in the
evolution of human culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in
god’s image, none of that nonsense. It’s just natural law doing what it
does. The late Thomas Sebeok understood precisely this very point:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-
speech-theory.html

EDWINA: I'm not arguing for a magical nature of human culture! Nor am I
talking about some anthropocentric man in god's image!! And what do you mean
by defining them as 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'?  I disagree
that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of our species.
These technological adaptations are vital but the important tool is the
human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination,
logic and symbolic language. This enables a species that can only live as a
community, for its knowledge base is learned rather than innate, and is

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen J - I guess we disagree on a lot!

1) I don't see how, with regard to symbolic language, having hands has any 
causal role. After all, there ARE people born without hands who most certainly 
learn language. And I don't see how an ape hand could not, purely technically, 
draw a complex diagramme. It's their brain, guiding that hand, that is 
incapable. Therefore, I remain in the 'innate capacity to symbolic language' 
camp - based on the equally innate capacity for logical reasoning and 
hypothetical imagination...

2) What 'predispositions defined in the biosemiotic paradigm'? 

3) There cannot be any valid case of a human infant raised among wild wolves; 
imagine a week-old baby - impossible to be raised by a wolf. Now, can there be 
a case of an autistic or brain-damaged child of over the age of let's say, 
five, abandoned in the wild by his family, living among animals - that's 
slightly possible but his inability to speak would more likely be the brain 
damage.

No, to define a unique characteristic of a species is not 'anthropocentric'! 
After all, animals can have unique characteristics (whales, elephants, 
insects...)... The FACT that only the human species uses symbolic language is a 
unique characteristic - and is due primarily to the large brain - with its 
innate capacity for logic, reasoning and imagination.  And I don't agree that 
we are different from animals only in degree; the use of symbolic language, 
which rests entirely on memory and imagination - as well as logic - is a HUGE 
difference.

As for the bird - that's one bird; not the whole species. 

4) You haven't defined the Peircean biosemiotic principle.

Yes - we don't agree on very much!

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 10:30 AM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Here it is, Edwina... here lies the crux of our differences:
  >"I disagree that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of 
our species. These technological adaptations are vital but the important tool 
is the human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination, 
logic and symbolic language."

  My thesis, like that of Norman Doidge, 2007, is that the neuroplastic brain 
wires itself in response to experience. The mind-body unity implies that the 
mind-body is a whole, mind is not separate to body. However... for the sake of 
illustration, it is via the body that the mind apprehends the experiences that 
wire the brain. Now it is true that apes, chimps, etc also have hands and they 
also use vocalisations, but their vocalisations are limited, and their hands 
are not predisposed to holding biros or drawing complex symbols or building 
complex things... they also have smaller brain-body weight ratios. And so apes 
will never, at their current levels of evolution, develop the sorts of complex 
cultures that we inhabit. 

  You bring us back to this old tough nut to crack... innate. I insist that 
nothing is innate (beyond the predispositions defined in the context of the 
biosemiotic paradigm). You insist that "hypothetical reasoning, imagination, 
logic and symbolic language" are innate in humans. But a human infant raised 
among wild wolves will unlearn whatever innateness there is quicker than you 
can say "define the things that matter in a lupine den" and this is what 
accounts for the phenomenon of the feral child. This is consistent with the 
axiomatic framework that I outlined. Your insistence on innate characteristics 
cannot be sustained within such an axiomatic framework. It is anthropocentric 
because it designates something "special" about the human condition. But we are 
different to animals in degree, not in kind. All living things conform to the 
same Peircean-biosemiotic principles (this is what I meant by 'manifestations 
of Peircean biosemiotics'). We are not going anywhere with this, and we have to 
just agree to disagree. There is no crossing this Rubicon.

  sj

  PS: Koko the famous gorilla exhibits imagination and ability to work with 
symbols. A lot of animals do. A lot of animals use tools. Just a moment ago, I 
viewed a video clip of a wild bird snowboarding down a rooftop on a margarine 
lid, just for the fun of it. There is nothing exceptional about the human 
condition beyond the "tipping point" in development that has enabled us to form 
the largest, most complex cultures. The human exceptionalism that imbues humans 
with special powers is just another form of anthropocentrism. Aha, I found the 
clip of the snowboarding bird:
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB_I08ahD1c
  The usual narrative for this kind of thing is that the bird is acting on an 
adaptive instinct... this kind of typical genocentric narrative is hogwash. 
Maybe the bird is doing exactly what it looks like it's doing... just curious 
and having a bit of fun.

   

  From: 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Edwina,

By "we" I means 'the widest collective of creative agents.' By "we 
chose" I meant 'we chose to construct this out of nothing.' In that way 
we are like the Biblical God; and the real God is our construction. But 
that doesn't make Him any less real than gravity. It's just that He 
isn't eternal. Even the conception of 'creating' must have changed over 
our evolution, it just looks like creating from my perspective looking back.


I'm pretty sure Margolis draws the line in the middle of reality between 
encultured artifacts and the rest. In what I've read, he only questions 
whether we should include mathematics, but he doesn't commit. I'm pretty 
sure his stance on the pre-cognitive physical world (distinguished from 
cognitive determinations about what it is), which is so prominent in 
Secondness, is prior to any things we created. I push things maybe too 
far in the Madhyamaka direction, where everything even remotely 
conceivable is our construction. But hey, someone's gotta test the waters.


Matt

On 10/16/15 8:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
We have 'chosen' language? I wasn't aware, first, that man' 
constructed his world through evolution'  - and what does this 
actually mean? That man 'evolved' [clarify?]and so, began to do what - 
grow wheat? And second, to 'choose' language suggests that it existed 
a priori, along with other options, and mankind simply 'chose one option.

Edwina

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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting particles from 
generals, or counting particles. You gave everything I said the wrong 
interpretation. We have a serious communication breakdown here.


On 10/16/15 7:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Edwina,

This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time
regarding the categories.

1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of gravity.
No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within
that third need not be two existing things.
EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this (second without
that third).
2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real without
regard to any physical effects that act in their accord. This is
why I say, within relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity
is a creation of man, whereas the bruteness of things acting in
its accord may not be.
EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite
independently of mankind, and defined by its physical effects -
namely, the attraction of mass for other mass. Again, totally
independent of man - after all, gravity as a force existed long
before mankind! Surely  you aren't referring simply to the formula
for figuring out the effect (Newton's Law). Gravity as that force
is quite indifferent to the mathematical formula.

3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what
we call bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted
from a complex of thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the
form of a third, that a second is within; but we can't say
anything about that second.
EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual modes of
organization and there is no discrete particle (a Secondness)
within Thirdness.
4) MATT: Seconds have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise
you'll have to admit that there might be a second completely
isolated from reality and therefore unknowable. So seconds'
constant association with their thirds, in reality, I think leads
some people to think they're experiencing secondness when it's
really a less complex level of thirdness.
EDWINA: No- you don't abstract a particular from a general. What
happens is that the 'right-now' instantiation (Secondness)  of a
long-term general (Thirdness) is guided within its 'right-now'
emergence by the rules/laws of the general.
5) MATT: A second without regard to a third cannot be defined. It
has no character without that third, nor relation (e.g., there is
no concept of measuring their distance without introducing a
third, so the very concept of distance has no meaning without a
third, nor is there a force of their impact until a third is
introduced), so it can't be whiffed. This is the reason that idea
of 'experiencing firstness' always struck me as an absurdity. I
have to believe that they're only whiffing a paired down third.
EDWINA: Thirdness is not a third particular existential unit.
Thirdness is a continuous non-particular general mode of
organization. It cannot exist per se, i.e., on its own. It exists
only as expressed within individual instantiations (Secondness).

Your terms of 'second' and 'third' refer to NUMBERS, not to the
Peircean categorical modes - which are modes of organization - and
have nothing to do with  numbers.
Firstness is a mode of experiencing an interaction - it is an
'acceptance of stimuli' (say a blast of heat) _without_ awareness
of it as 'heat'; without even awareness of it as differentiation
from yourself.



Matt

On 10/16/15 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- when I said that 'gravity is a natural force' - I meant it
is a law that 'forces' matter to behave in interaction with other
matter according to the strength of the gravity.
Is gravity a mode of Thirdness? Certainly, habits are arrived at
via construction. Now, Secondness assumes that 'something
concrete exists' - some THING...differentiated from some OTHER
THING. That's where the idea of 'Secondness' comes in - that
duality, that dyad.  Now, to be a 'Thing' means that it is
organized in itself. This, to me, suggests that it already is
operating - just in itself - within the organizational mode of
Thirdness.  So - the interaction between the two things may be
strictly within a mode of Secondness but the existential nature
of each thing - must include Thirdness. So - is gravity a mode of
Thirdness?
I'm going to say - yes. I'm not 100% 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt- I think it's because you are understanding the terms of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness (which are mode of organization) as the same as the 
ordinal numbers of First, Second, Third.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting particles from 
generals, or counting particles. You gave everything I said the wrong 
interpretation. We have a serious communication breakdown here.

  On 10/16/15 7:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Edwina, 

  This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time regarding 
the categories.

  1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of gravity. No law 
needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that third need not be 
two existing things. 

  EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this (second without that 
third).

  2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real without regard to 
any physical effects that act in their accord. This is why I say, within 
relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity is a creation of man, whereas 
the bruteness of things acting in its accord may not be.

  EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite independently of 
mankind, and defined by its physical effects - namely, the attraction of mass 
for other mass. Again, totally independent of man - after all, gravity as a 
force existed long before mankind! Surely  you aren't referring simply to the 
formula for figuring out the effect (Newton's Law). Gravity as that force is 
quite indifferent to the mathematical formula. 

  3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call 
bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a complex of 
thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that a second 
is within; but we can't say anything about that second. 

  EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual modes of 
organization and there is no discrete particle (a Secondness) within Thirdness.

  4) MATT: Seconds have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise you'll have 
to admit that there might be a second completely isolated from reality and 
therefore unknowable. So seconds' constant association with their thirds, in 
reality, I think leads some people to think they're experiencing secondness 
when it's really a less complex level of thirdness. 

  EDWINA: No- you don't abstract a particular from a general. What happens 
is that the 'right-now' instantiation (Secondness)  of a long-term general 
(Thirdness) is guided within its 'right-now' emergence by the rules/laws of the 
general. 

  5) MATT: A second without regard to a third cannot be defined. It has no 
character without that third, nor relation (e.g., there is no concept of 
measuring their distance without introducing a third, so the very concept of 
distance has no meaning without a third, nor is there a force of their impact 
until a third is introduced), so it can't be whiffed. This is the reason that 
idea of 'experiencing firstness' always struck me as an absurdity. I have to 
believe that they're only whiffing a paired down third.

  EDWINA: Thirdness is not a third particular existential unit. Thirdness 
is a continuous non-particular general mode of organization. It cannot exist 
per se, i.e., on its own. It exists only as expressed within individual 
instantiations (Secondness). 
  Your terms of 'second' and 'third' refer to NUMBERS, not to the Peircean 
categorical modes - which are modes of organization - and have nothing to do 
with  numbers. 
  Firstness is a mode of experiencing an interaction - it is an 'acceptance 
of stimuli' (say a blast of heat) without awareness of it as 'heat'; without 
even awareness of it as differentiation from yourself.


  Matt

  On 10/16/15 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- when I said that 'gravity is a natural force' - I meant it is a 
law that 'forces' matter to behave in interaction with other matter according 
to the strength of the gravity.

Is gravity a mode of Thirdness?  Certainly, habits are arrived at via 
construction. Now, Secondness assumes that 'something concrete exists' - some 
THING...differentiated from some OTHER THING. That's where the idea of 
'Secondness' comes in - that duality, that dyad.  Now, to be a 'Thing' means 
that it is organized in itself. This, to me, suggests that it already is 
operating - just in itself - within the organizational mode of Thirdness.  So - 
the interaction between the two things may be 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Substitute these words in my post:

'quality' for 'first'
'reaction' or 'relation' for 'second'
'representation' or 'triadic sign' for 'third'.

Does my post not make sense with these substitutions? It should.

Matt

On 10/16/15 8:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Matt- I think it's because you are understanding the terms of 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness (which are mode of organization) as 
the same as the ordinal numbers of First, Second, Third.

Edwina

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting particles
from generals, or counting particles. You gave everything I said
the wrong interpretation. We have a serious communication
breakdown here.

On 10/16/15 7:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Edwina,

This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time
regarding the categories.

1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of
gravity. No law needs to be instantiated, which means the
second within that third need not be two existing things.
EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this (second
without that third).
2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real
without regard to any physical effects that act in their
accord. This is why I say, within relativist-historicism,
that the law of gravity is a creation of man, whereas the
bruteness of things acting in its accord may not be.
EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite
independently of mankind, and defined by its physical effects
- namely, the attraction of mass for other mass. Again,
totally independent of man - after all, gravity as a force
existed long before mankind! Surely  you aren't referring
simply to the formula for figuring out the effect (Newton's
Law). Gravity as that force is quite indifferent to the
mathematical formula.

3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether
what we call bruteness is really just a more refined third
abstracted from a complex of thirdness. We can deduce, from
knowledge of the form of a third, that a second is within;
but we can't say anything about that second.
EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual modes
of organization and there is no discrete particle (a
Secondness) within Thirdness.
4) MATT: Seconds have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise
you'll have to admit that there might be a second completely
isolated from reality and therefore unknowable. So seconds'
constant association with their thirds, in reality, I think
leads some people to think they're experiencing secondness
when it's really a less complex level of thirdness.
EDWINA: No- you don't abstract a particular from a general.
What happens is that the 'right-now' instantiation
(Secondness)  of a long-term general (Thirdness) is guided
within its 'right-now' emergence by the rules/laws of the
general.
5) MATT: A second without regard to a third cannot be
defined. It has no character without that third, nor relation
(e.g., there is no concept of measuring their distance
without introducing a third, so the very concept of distance
has no meaning without a third, nor is there a force of their
impact until a third is introduced), so it can't be whiffed.
This is the reason that idea of 'experiencing firstness'
always struck me as an absurdity. I have to believe that
they're only whiffing a paired down third.
EDWINA: Thirdness is not a third particular existential unit.
Thirdness is a continuous non-particular general mode of
organization. It cannot exist per se, i.e., on its own. It
exists only as expressed within individual instantiations
(Secondness).

Your terms of 'second' and 'third' refer to NUMBERS, not to
the Peircean categorical modes - which are modes of
organization - and have nothing to do with  numbers.
Firstness is a mode of experiencing an interaction - it is an
'acceptance of stimuli' (say a blast of heat) _without_
awareness of 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt - no. Quality is Firstness; Reaction is Secondness but I would be careful 
of using 'relation'. And I don't agree that Representation or Triadic Sign is a 
synonym for Thirdness. For example, you wrote:

"I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call bruteness is 
really just a more refined third abstracted from a complex of thirdness. We can 
deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that a second is within; but we 
can't say anything about that second. "

If I subsitute 'bruteness' for Secondness, then, I don't consider that 
Secondness is a 'more refined 'representation or triadic sign' from a complex 
of 'representation or triadic sign'. And, can you deduce from 'knowledge of the 
form of a 'representation/triadic sign' that a 'second' (second what, a 
reaction?)

And Thirdness does not have a FORM - it is a mode of organization, not a 
specific Form.

Edwina



  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 8:32 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Substitute these words in my post:

  'quality' for 'first'
  'reaction' or 'relation' for 'second'
  'representation' or 'triadic sign' for 'third'.

  Does my post not make sense with these substitutions? It should.

  Matt

  On 10/16/15 8:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- I think it's because you are understanding the terms of Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness (which are mode of organization) as the same as the 
ordinal numbers of First, Second, Third.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting particles from 
generals, or counting particles. You gave everything I said the wrong 
interpretation. We have a serious communication breakdown here.

  On 10/16/15 7:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Edwina, 

  This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time 
regarding the categories.

  1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of gravity. No 
law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that third need not 
be two existing things. 

  EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this (second without 
that third).

  2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real without 
regard to any physical effects that act in their accord. This is why I say, 
within relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity is a creation of man, 
whereas the bruteness of things acting in its accord may not be.

  EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite independently 
of mankind, and defined by its physical effects - namely, the attraction of 
mass for other mass. Again, totally independent of man - after all, gravity as 
a force existed long before mankind! Surely  you aren't referring simply to the 
formula for figuring out the effect (Newton's Law). Gravity as that force is 
quite indifferent to the mathematical formula. 

  3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we 
call bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a complex of 
thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that a second 
is within; but we can't say anything about that second. 

  EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual modes of 
organization and there is no discrete particle (a Secondness) within Thirdness.

  4) MATT: Seconds have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise you'll 
have to admit that there might be a second completely isolated from reality and 
therefore unknowable. So seconds' constant association with their thirds, in 
reality, I think leads some people to think they're experiencing secondness 
when it's really a less complex level of thirdness. 

  EDWINA: No- you don't abstract a particular from a general. What 
happens is that the 'right-now' instantiation (Secondness)  of a long-term 
general (Thirdness) is guided within its 'right-now' emergence by the 
rules/laws of the general. 

  5) MATT: A second without regard to a third cannot be defined. It has 
no character without that third, nor relation (e.g., there is no concept of 
measuring their distance without introducing a third, so the very concept of 
distance has no meaning without a third, nor is there a force of their impact 
until a third is introduced), so it can't be whiffed. This is the reason that 
idea of 'experiencing firstness' always struck me as an absurdity. I have 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt- see my replies below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Edwina, 

  This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long time regarding the 
categories.

  1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of gravity. No law needs 
to be instantiated, which means the second within that third need not be two 
existing things. 

  EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this (second without that 
third).

  2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real without regard to any 
physical effects that act in their accord. This is why I say, within 
relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity is a creation of man, whereas 
the bruteness of things acting in its accord may not be.

  EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite independently of 
mankind, and defined by its physical effects - namely, the attraction of mass 
for other mass. Again, totally independent of man - after all, gravity as a 
force existed long before mankind! Surely  you aren't referring simply to the 
formula for figuring out the effect (Newton's Law). Gravity as that force is 
quite indifferent to the mathematical formula. 

  3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call 
bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a complex of 
thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that a second 
is within; but we can't say anything about that second. 

  EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual modes of organization 
and there is no discrete particle (a Secondness) within Thirdness.

  4) MATT: Seconds have to be abstracted from Thirds, otherwise you'll have to 
admit that there might be a second completely isolated from reality and 
therefore unknowable. So seconds' constant association with their thirds, in 
reality, I think leads some people to think they're experiencing secondness 
when it's really a less complex level of thirdness. 

  EDWINA: No- you don't abstract a particular from a general. What happens is 
that the 'right-now' instantiation (Secondness)  of a long-term general 
(Thirdness) is guided within its 'right-now' emergence by the rules/laws of the 
general. 

  5) MATT: A second without regard to a third cannot be defined. It has no 
character without that third, nor relation (e.g., there is no concept of 
measuring their distance without introducing a third, so the very concept of 
distance has no meaning without a third, nor is there a force of their impact 
until a third is introduced), so it can't be whiffed. This is the reason that 
idea of 'experiencing firstness' always struck me as an absurdity. I have to 
believe that they're only whiffing a paired down third.

  EDWINA: Thirdness is not a third particular existential unit. Thirdness is a 
continuous non-particular general mode of organization. It cannot exist per se, 
i.e., on its own. It exists only as expressed within individual instantiations 
(Secondness). 
  Your terms of 'second' and 'third' refer to NUMBERS, not to the Peircean 
categorical modes - which are modes of organization - and have nothing to do 
with  numbers. 
  Firstness is a mode of experiencing an interaction - it is an 'acceptance of 
stimuli' (say a blast of heat) without awareness of it as 'heat'; without even 
awareness of it as differentiation from yourself.


  Matt

  On 10/16/15 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- when I said that 'gravity is a natural force' - I meant it is a law 
that 'forces' matter to behave in interaction with other matter according to 
the strength of the gravity.

Is gravity a mode of Thirdness?  Certainly, habits are arrived at via 
construction. Now, Secondness assumes that 'something concrete exists' - some 
THING...differentiated from some OTHER THING. That's where the idea of 
'Secondness' comes in - that duality, that dyad.  Now, to be a 'Thing' means 
that it is organized in itself. This, to me, suggests that it already is 
operating - just in itself - within the organizational mode of Thirdness.  So - 
the interaction between the two things may be strictly within a mode of 
Secondness but the existential nature of each thing - must include Thirdness. 
So - is gravity a mode of Thirdness?

I'm going to say - yes. I'm not 100% sure but I can't see it as anything 
else. Laws are, after all, Thirdness. Gravity is a natural law - a law 
'natural' to matter and when gravity interacts with matter - it does X. When 
there is LESS gravity, then, matter behaves differently. So, this law, this 
gravity actually organizes how matter functions. So - I'll conclude that 
gravity is a mode of Thirdness.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 2:10 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: 

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/16/15 6:04 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that 
third need not be two existing things.
Correction: No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second 
within that third need not be an existent thing. But yeah, nor two 
existing things.


Matt

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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/16/15 8:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Matt - no. Quality is Firstness; Reaction is Secondness but I would be 
careful of using 'relation'. And I don't agree that Representation or 
Triadic Sign is a synonym for Thirdness. For example, you wrote:
"I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call 
bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a 
complex of thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a 
third, that a second is within; but we can't say anything about that 
second. "
If I subsitute 'bruteness' for Secondness, then, I don't consider that 
Secondness is a 'more refined 'representation or triadic sign' from a 
complex of 'representation or triadic sign'.


Right there. I was trying to show that what we call bruteness isn't 
secondness, but here you are trying to insert 'bruteness' for 'secondness'.


And, can you deduce from 'knowledge of the form of a 
'representation/triadic sign' that a 'second' (second what, a 
reaction?)


Yes. If there's a representation, there's a second as a relation or 
reaction, that can be abstracted from it.


And Thirdness does not have a FORM - it is a mode of organization, not 
a specific Form.


Not a platonic form or a material form. But there's gotta be a way of 
thinking of a third and distinguishing it from a second or first; that 
way is what I referred to as its form. You can call it mode, whatever.


Matt


- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 8:32 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Substitute these words in my post:

'quality' for 'first'
'reaction' or 'relation' for 'second'
'representation' or 'triadic sign' for 'third'.

Does my post not make sense with these substitutions? It should.

Matt

On 10/16/15 8:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- I think it's because you are understanding the terms of
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness (which are mode of organization)
as the same as the ordinal numbers of First, Second, Third.
Edwina

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting
particles from generals, or counting particles. You gave
everything I said the wrong interpretation. We have a serious
communication breakdown here.

On 10/16/15 7:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ;
Peirce-L 
*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Edwina,

This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long
time regarding the categories.

1) MATT: Compare the laws of mathematics and the law of
gravity. No law needs to be instantiated, which means
the second within that third need not be two existing
things.
EDWINA: Sorry - I don't know what you mean by this
(second without that third).
2) MATT: Gravity and mathematics are laws that are real
without regard to any physical effects that act in their
accord. This is why I say, within
relativist-historicism, that the law of gravity is a
creation of man, whereas the bruteness of things acting
in its accord may not be.
EDWINA: Gravity is real and universal and exists quite
independently of mankind, and defined by its physical
effects - namely, the attraction of mass for other mass.
Again, totally independent of man - after all, gravity
as a force existed long before mankind! Surely  you
aren't referring simply to the formula for figuring out
the effect (Newton's Law). Gravity as that force is
quite indifferent to the mathematical formula.

3) MATT: I do question, within Peircean philosophy,
whether what we call bruteness is really just a more
refined third abstracted from a complex of thirdness. We
can deduce, from knowledge of the form of a third, that
a second is within; but we can't say anything about that
second.
EDWINA: No. Thirdness is a generalization of habitual

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt, I think you are mixing up 'ordinal numbers' (first, second, third) with 
the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. These latter 
have NOTHING to do with numbers.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:24 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  On 10/16/15 6:04 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that third 
need not be two existing things.

  Correction: No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within 
that third need not be an existent thing. But yeah, nor two existing things.

  Matt

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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Example.

My being is a first.
My being bothered is a second.
My understanding of being bothered is a third.

Within my understanding is my being bothered.
Within my being bothered is my being.

Yes or no? Don’t explain, because I’ll take what you’ve already said and 
keep it mind next time I revisit Peirce’s writings. And that will only 
be as early as next week.


Matt

On 10/16/15 10:04 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt - we aren't getting anywhere with this. This will be my last attempt.
1) To Peirce, Secondness is a mode of interaction that operates as a 
'brute action-reaction'.
2) Secondness is NOT a 'more refined Third[ness].  Again - you are 
mixing up numbers with modes of organization. There is no such thing 
as the 'form of Thirdness'.  If you are talking about the 'form of a 
third [object]' - that has NOTHING to do with the modal categories of 
Peirce.
3)And, can you deduce from 'knowledge of the form of a 
'representation/triadic sign' that a 'second' (second what, a 
reaction?)


MATT:Yes. If there's a representation, there's a second as a relation 
or reaction, that can be abstracted from it.
EDWINA: No - the triadic sign is NOT the same as Thirdness; NOT the 
same as the Representamenand if you are NOW using the term of 
'representation' to mean the triadic sign (and not Thirdness, not the 
Representamen)...then, this does not mean that there is another entity 
in a mode of Secondness. Or do you mean - the ordinal number of 'second'..
And - no, you cannot necessarily 'abstract' a unit in a mode of 
Secondness from a triadic sign. What if that Sign, the triad, is 
totally operating in a mode of Firstness?

Are you aware of the ten classes of signs?
4) And Thirdness does not have a FORM - it is a mode of organization, 
not a specific Form.


MATT: Not a platonic form or a material form. But there's gotta be a 
way of thinking of a third and distinguishing it from a second or 
first; that way is what I referred to as its form. You can call it 
mode, whatever.
Again- you are misusing the terms.  Thirdness is a mode of 
organization - these are Peircean terms - I am not using the term 
'mode' arbitrarily; these are Peirce's terms - and refers to a 
habitual pattern of organization.
You have mixed up ordinal numbers of first, second, third..referring 
to a first thing, a second thing, a third thingand are confusing 
these terms with the Peircean categorical modes of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness.

_There is no comparison; they are not the same thing_.

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 9:13 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

On 10/16/15 8:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt - no. Quality is Firstness; Reaction is Secondness but I
would be careful of using 'relation'. And I don't agree that
Representation or Triadic Sign is a synonym for Thirdness. For
example, you wrote:
"I do question, within Peircean philosophy, whether what we call
bruteness is really just a more refined third abstracted from a
complex of thirdness. We can deduce, from knowledge of the form
of a third, that a second is within; but we can't say anything
about that second. "
If I subsitute 'bruteness' for Secondness, then, I don't consider
that Secondness is a 'more refined 'representation or triadic
sign' from a complex of 'representation or triadic sign'.


Right there. I was trying to show that what we call bruteness
isn't secondness, but here you are trying to insert 'bruteness'
for 'secondness'.


And, can you deduce from 'knowledge of the form of a
'representation/triadic sign' that a 'second' (second what, a
reaction?)


Yes. If there's a representation, there's a second as a relation
or reaction, that can be abstracted from it.


And Thirdness does not have a FORM - it is a mode of
organization, not a specific Form.


Not a platonic form or a material form. But there's gotta be a way
of thinking of a third and distinguishing it from a second or
first; that way is what I referred to as its form. You can call it
mode, whatever.

Matt


- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce 
*To:* Edwina Taborsky  ; Peirce-L

*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 8:32 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

Substitute these words in my post:

'quality' for 'first'
'reaction' or 'relation' for 'second'
'representation' or 'triadic sign' for 'third'.

Does my post not make sense with these substitutions? It should.

Matt

On 10/16/15 8:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

   

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Paradoxically, I actually owe Dawkins for my divergence into semiotics. As a 
university student, I was plodding along within the context of the mainstream 
“it’s all in the selfish genes” narrative for some considerable time until I 
discovered memetics. That got me thinking first in terms of imitation as a 
fundamental principle not just for humans but for any organism, including cells 
and neurons, and developed on from there. It was very innovative for Dawkins to 
introduce memetics into the narrative. It’s unfortunate that he never developed 
it further than that.

Animism may have been common, but the anthropocentrism seating the human form 
in the image of god at the centre of the universe is not very helpful, and has 
held us back... contrast this Occidental anthropocentrism against Buddhism. A 
Copernican scale of revolution in the life sciences is long overdue.

sj

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 10:42 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

 

On Oct 15, 2015, at 5:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

 

It is the "life because genes because natural selection" narrative.

 

Does he push that?  Certainly he does pushback against various primarily 
religiously inspired beliefs that tend to dismiss the history of evolution. 
However I don’t think he claims that explains life. 

 

I certainly think his particular approach to atheism could use a heavy dose of 
careful philosophical study. But in terms of evolution I’m not sure I have a 
whole lot of complaints beyond his thinking it says more about religion than it 
does. (It’s always easier to go up against non-sense arguments by the ill 
informed than from sophisticated interlocutors) 

 

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric 
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm 
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. 

 

I’m not sure what you mean here. Animism was a fairly common belief even in 
late antiquity. At a minimum the platonists ascribed to the planets 
consciousness. (They are the daemons often) I don’t know enough about the 
nuances of late antiquity to say much about how animals were views. Again I 
don’t know the details of the views of St. Francis of Assisi or his later 
followers but I’d assume they’d give animals a bit more status than even many 
today do.

 

Certainly Peirce is far more expansive in what he calls mind. (Consciousness is 
a bit trickier but at times he appears to see consciousness as the inward part 
of a “swerve” of chance - and thus inherent in the universe)

 

The introduction of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that.

 

Biosemiotics is certainly interesting. I’m not quite sure it is as 
revolutionary to a Peircean perspective as you suggest. (I’m not sure that’s 
worth getting bogged down into mind you) It seems to me Peirce already saw his 
semiotics as having great breadth in biology.

 

 


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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt- the 'precognitive' physical world functions in all three modes: 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.  After all, the habits of formation of a 
molecule of water are an example of Thirdness and an example, according to 
Peirce, of the operation of Mind. I will yet again, repeat from 4.551 (I ought 
to know it by heart by now!)...

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world". 

Hmm,  I find your comment that 'a constructed god' is as real as gravity to be 
questionable. Gravity is a natural force; an ideology about a god(s) is 
imagined by man. 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 12:13 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  Edwina, 

  By "we" I means 'the widest collective of creative agents.' By "we chose" I 
meant 'we chose to construct this out of nothing.' In that way we are like the 
Biblical God; and the real God is our construction. But that doesn't make Him 
any less real than gravity. It's just that He isn't eternal. Even the 
conception of 'creating' must have changed over our evolution, it just looks 
like creating from my perspective looking back.

  I'm pretty sure Margolis draws the line in the middle of reality between 
encultured artifacts and the rest. In what I've read, he only questions whether 
we should include mathematics, but he doesn't commit. I'm pretty sure his 
stance on the pre-cognitive physical world (distinguished from cognitive 
determinations about what it is), which is so prominent in Secondness, is prior 
to any things we created. I push things maybe too far in the Madhyamaka 
direction, where everything even remotely conceivable is our construction. But 
hey, someone's gotta test the waters.

  Matt

  On 10/16/15 8:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

We have 'chosen' language? I wasn't aware, first, that man' constructed his 
world through evolution'  - and what does this actually mean? That man 
'evolved' [clarify?]and so, began to do what - grow wheat? And second, to 
'choose' language suggests that it existed a priori, along with other options, 
and mankind simply 'chose one option.

Edwina 



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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt- when I said that 'gravity is a natural force' - I meant it is a law that 
'forces' matter to behave in interaction with other matter according to the 
strength of the gravity.

Is gravity a mode of Thirdness?  Certainly, habits are arrived at via 
construction. Now, Secondness assumes that 'something concrete exists' - some 
THING...differentiated from some OTHER THING. That's where the idea of 
'Secondness' comes in - that duality, that dyad.  Now, to be a 'Thing' means 
that it is organized in itself. This, to me, suggests that it already is 
operating - just in itself - within the organizational mode of Thirdness.  So - 
the interaction between the two things may be strictly within a mode of 
Secondness but the existential nature of each thing - must include Thirdness. 
So - is gravity a mode of Thirdness?

I'm going to say - yes. I'm not 100% sure but I can't see it as anything else. 
Laws are, after all, Thirdness. Gravity is a natural law - a law 'natural' to 
matter and when gravity interacts with matter - it does X. When there is LESS 
gravity, then, matter behaves differently. So, this law, this gravity actually 
organizes how matter functions. So - I'll conclude that gravity is a mode of 
Thirdness.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 2:10 PM
  Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality


  On 10/16/15 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- the 'precognitive' physical world functions in all three modes: 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.  After all, the habits of formation of a 
molecule of water are an example of Thirdness and an example, according to 
Peirce, of the operation of Mind. I will yet again, repeat from 4.551 (I ought 
to know it by heart by now!)...

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work 
of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world". 

  Yeah, "pre-cognitive" was a bad choice of words, since "cognition" is 
distinguished from "thought". I conflated the two terms. I was just thinking of 
Secondness.


Hmm,  I find your comment that 'a constructed god' is as real as gravity to 
be questionable. Gravity is a natural force; an ideology about a god(s) is 
imagined by man. 


  I was talking about the law of gravity, which isn't a force.

  Margolis counts the world of secondness as prior to any construction. I'm 
weighing this against the more Madhyamaka idea of it all. I can see how we 
should think that the secondness abstracted from the law of gravity is not a 
construction.

  If you're referring to gravity as a third, then you're making the 
distinction, about what is constructed and what isn't, in a different place 
than me. I think all thirds are constructions.

  Matt



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