Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Ed,

Thanks for your response.
You wrote :

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a
product of the human brain,(111815-1)
and therefore it is not logical."

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is
not surprising(111815-2)
that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens
in the Universe."

All the best.

Sung






On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian  wrote:

> Sung,
>
> You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true.
> "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a
> product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its
> language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational
> language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD).
> Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really
> there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the
> art of calculating, refers to "what *could be* there" (cf. my 2012 essay
> "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website
> www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an
> "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is
> "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the
> reality and measurability of space and time)
>
> Ed.
>
> --
> *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im
> Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji
> *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29
> *An:* PEIRCE-L
> *Cc:* biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian;
> Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
> *Betreff:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
>
> Hi,
>
> A correction:
>
> Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*)
> with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".
>
> Thanks.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Sungchul Ji 
> Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
> To: PEIRCE-L 
> Cc: biosemiotics , Sergey Petoukhov <
> spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian , "Robert E.
> Ulanowicz" 
>
>
> (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)
>
> Franklin, Gary R, lists,
>
> In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be
> published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed
> in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would
> appreciate hearing from you.
>
> There are several points that need explanations:
>
> (*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to
> facilitate discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with
> what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.
>
> (*2*)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics
> to biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own
> references here despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only
> justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists
> that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my
> published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants
> on these lists.)
>
> (*3*)  When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell
> biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation"
> (see the second row, *Table 1*)  in order to account for some of the
> cellular metabolism and processes.  I then decided to export this concept
> back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the
> distinction between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple
> syllogisms.  This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that
>
> 1) *words denote  *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic
> signs that I listed in my previous post)
>
> 2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs)
>
> 3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.*
>
>
>
> __
>
> *Table 1*.  The common structures of the languages at three levels --
> 'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].'
>
> __
>
>
>*1st articulation 2nd articulation  '3rd
> articulation'*
>
> __
>
> 'humanese'  wordsletters
>  sentences
> | |
>   |
>V 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Franklin Ransom]

Jon,

Yes, I agree, even though I haven't read through it. It was my plan to be
getting to Vol. 3, which includes the LOR, next. Then after starting Vol.
3, I decided reading precursors like Boole and De Morgan would be a good
idea. Anyway, I've been sidetracked for the moment with conversations on
Peirce-L. With respect to Jeff's ideas, I'd like to offer as much as I can
to thought for now, before I get back to my reading.

-- Franklin



On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 9:36 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Re: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
> Re: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
>
> Franklin, Jeff, all ...
>
> In order to understand what Peirce is saying one has to understand
> what he is talking about.  When it comes to the logic of relatives
> and the mathematics of relations, my personal recommendation for
> the best place to start would be the 1870 Logic of Relatives.
> There Peirce is writing for people who already inhabit the
> space he is talking about and his task reduces to that of
> giving them better maps and microscopes and telescopes
> for exploring and describing the territory in view.
> That is by no means an insignificant assignment but
> it's still more tractable than starting from zip.
>
> My study of the 1870 LOR, as far as I've got for now, is here:
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce's_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Symposium on Peirce's Mathematics at Universidad Nacional de Columbia

[Gary Richmond]

List,

This is a reminder that the Symposium on Peirce's Mathematics commences
next week. Besides the PDF attachment I've already posted, here's the final
roster of speakers pasted to the face of this message below my signature.
I'm looking forward to hearing their talks in Bogota.

Best,

Gary

*Universidad Nacional de Colombia – Sede Bogotá – Departamento de
Matemáticas – Departamento de Filosofía*


*PEIRCE'S MATHEMATICS*

*Noviembre 25-27 2015*

*Departamento de Biología (edif. 421) - 2º piso - Sala TIC*



miércoles 25

jueves 26

viernes 27



09.00-10-30


*Matthew Moore*

Brooklyn College - CUNY, USA


*The Historical Position of Peirce's Continuum*



*Giovanni Maddalena*

Università del Molise, Italia


*Peirce and Mathematical Constructions*


*Catherine Legg*

University of Waikato, New Zealand


*Grasping Real Mathematical Thirdness*



10.30-12.00


*Jérôme Havenel*

College Ahuntsic, Canada


*Peirce's Meditations on Continuity:*

*From Transitivity to Topology*


*William James McCurdy*

Idaho State University, USA


*Trichotomic Mathematics: A Plea for Direct *

*Attention (with some examples from the author)*



*Jeff Downard*

Northern Arizona University, USA


*On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Bases of Mathematics:  Drawing on
Peirce’s Categories*








15.00-16.30


*Francisco Vargas*

Paedagogische Hochschule-Ludwigsburg, Germany


*Modeling Mathematically Peirce's Continuum:*

*Theme and Variations*


*Arnold Oostra*

Universidad del Tolima, Colombia


Main Conference (15.00-17.30)



*Fernando Zalamea*

Universidad Nacional, Colombia


*Summary of the Meeting –*

*Problems and Perspectives*



16.30-18.00


*Gustavo Arengas*

Universidad Nacional, Colombia


*Category-Theoretic Models for the*

*Pragmatic(ist) Maxim*


*(1) Peirce in Tolima*

*(2) Peirce and Propositional Completeness*

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Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

A correction:

Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*)
with "nucleotides,
A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".

Thanks.

Sung



-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji 
Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
To: PEIRCE-L 
Cc: biosemiotics , Sergey Petoukhov <
spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian , "Robert E.
Ulanowicz" 


(The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)

Franklin, Gary R, lists,

In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be
published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed
in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would
appreciate hearing from you.

There are several points that need explanations:

(*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to
facilitate discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with
what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.

(*2*)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to
biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own references
here despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only justification I have
for doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the
statements that I make on these posts are supported by my published
research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants on these
lists.)

(*3*)  When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology,
I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the
second row, *Table 1*)  in order to account for some of the cellular
metabolism and processes.  I then decided to export this concept back to
humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction
between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple syllogisms.
This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that

1) *words denote  *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs
that I listed in my previous post)

2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs)

3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.*



__

*Table 1*.  The common structures of the languages at three levels --
'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].'

__


   *1st articulation 2nd articulation  '3rd
articulation'*

__

'humanese'  wordsletters
 sentences
| |
|
   VV
V
 sentenceswords
 syllogisms/texts
___

'cellese'   1-D biopolymers   monomers  3-D
biopolymers
  | |
 |
 VV
  V
3-D biopolymers  1-D biopolymers chemical
waves [8]



'cosmese' terms  X
  propositions
(or logic ?)|   |
  |
V  V
V
propositions  terms
arguments
_


(*4*)  You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row.  I
was led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry consideration
with respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am at  a loss
what this may be.  Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce discussed
something related to this ?  Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups of signs
(i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign,
and argument) ?  If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to the monomers
in biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA, and 20
amino acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in human languages.
This may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups and 10 classes,
which I referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite signs",
respectively, in [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from
Franklin in his recent post and Edwina in 2012.

(*5*)  If the above considerations are right in principle, we may conclude
that language is one of those 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
Re: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626

Franklin, Jeff, all ...

In order to understand what Peirce is saying one has to understand
what he is talking about.  When it comes to the logic of relatives
and the mathematics of relations, my personal recommendation for
the best place to start would be the 1870 Logic of Relatives.
There Peirce is writing for people who already inhabit the
space he is talking about and his task reduces to that of
giving them better maps and microscopes and telescopes
for exploring and describing the territory in view.
That is by no means an insignificant assignment but
it's still more tractable than starting from zip.

My study of the 1870 LOR, as far as I've got for now, is here:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce's_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives

Regards,

Jon

On 11/18/2015 1:58 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:

Jeff, list,




Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a
thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that
thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title.

I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need
to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in
your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy".
Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post:
Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902
and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In
particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the
details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other
relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more
extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just
thought I'd ask.

I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend.

-- Franklin



Franklin, List,

Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your
earlier questions wasn't sent.  Let me send it now, along with some
additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum."  Your
questions are in quotes.  Short responses follow.

A.  "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate
object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant
is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents
belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I
suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent,
but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such."  Point
made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce:  "That said,
let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is
a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the
Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with
Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between
kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the
immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes.
Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept
that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold
classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold
account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant.  In my
efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and
66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict
here.  After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad
is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final
interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis.

B.  "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for
the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual
judgment."  I should have made it clearer that I was trying to point out
that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the qualisign is,
taken as a token instance, the sinsign that stands in relation to the
dynamical interpretant.  The curved line was meant to show that it is
carried over--along with its relation to qualisign and immediate object
(percept) into the open blank.

C.  A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the
first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema
in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and
something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I
thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than
it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through
a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation."  There are diagrams at

[PEIRCE-L] CSP and the Hisory of Organic Chemistry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Fron time to time, I have noted that the chemical sciences of today are remote 
from the philosophy and logic of CSP.

A recent book "Theoretical Organic Chemistry" edited by C. Parkanyi, opens with 
chapter,

"Theoretical Organic Chemistry" : Looking Back in Wonder.  Jan J.C. Mulder.

This is available on line (Google)

https://books.google.com/books?id=aKmIdil6P3oC=PA6=Chemistry+and+Algebra,+Sylvestor=en=X=0CE8Q6AEwCWoVChMIiozY_fKayQIVQhoeCh0TTwDT#v=onepage=Chemistry%20and%20Algebra%2C%20Sylvestor=false:
 

Personally, I was struck by the virtual absence of any sense of the logic of 
chemistry in the chapter. It does note the work of CSP colleagues at John 
Hopkins, Sylvestor and Clifford, with respect to invariance.

This chapter gives some clues how the view of physical chemists has changed in 
the three time frames indicated by the index.  Note that the second Period 
begins toward the end of CSP's time and describes the discovery of the 
electrical relations between atoms and molecules, and the grounding of Quantum 
Mechanics.


Cheers

jerry






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[PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Helmut Raulien]

Stan, all,

am I right with guessing, that "logic"  is, what Peirce calls "argumentation", and may lead to a cosmological concept of "universe", and what might lead to an idea, a guess, or a perception of "everything", might be, what Peirce calls "neglected argument", or "humble argument"?  So, two completely different types of inference, both started from the focal level "humans" we cannot escape, pointing in two different directions, the lowest and the highest level of this hierarchy.

Helmut

 

18. November 2015 um 21:33 Uhr
"Stanley N Salthe" 
 



Sung, all --

Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture.

{everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}

 

STAN


 
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:


Ed,
 

Thanks for your response.

You wrote :

 

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain,        (111815-1)

and therefore it is not logical."

 

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

 

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not surprising                    (111815-2)

that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in the Universe."

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 

 

 

 

 


 
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian  wrote:



Sung,

 

You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers to "what could be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the reality and measurability of space and time) 

 

Ed.  
 


Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von Sungchul Ji
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29
An: PEIRCE-L
Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
Betreff: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
 

 

Hi,
 

A correction: 

 

Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (4) with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".

 

Thanks.

 

Sung

 

 

 
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji 
Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
To: PEIRCE-L 
Cc: biosemiotics , Sergey Petoukhov , Ed Dellian , "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 

 

(The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)

 
Franklin, Gary R, lists,

 

In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would appreciate hearing from you.

 

There are several points that need explanations:

 

(1) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to facilitate discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.

 

(2)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own references here despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants on these lists.)

 

(3)  When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the second row, Table 1)  in order to account for some of the cellular metabolism and processes.  I then decided to export this concept back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction between sentences and linguistic texts including simple syllogisms.  This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that

 

1) words denote  (first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs that I listed in my previous post)

 

2) sentences decide or 

SV: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Søren Brier]

I think that that what Piece was looking for was the connection between the 
evolving universe and the rationality of the human way thinking. I have tried 
to explain more here 
https://www.academia.edu/18590495/The_riddle_of_the_Sphinx_answered_On_how_C._S._Peirce_s_transdisciplinary_semiotic_philosophy_of_knowing_links_science_and_spirituality
  on the background for his thinking.

  Best
 Søren

Fra: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sendt: 19. november 2015 00:04
Til: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Ed Dellian; PEIRCE-L; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. 
Ulanowicz; Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
Emne: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Stan, all,
am I right with guessing, that "logic"  is, what Peirce calls "argumentation", 
and may lead to a cosmological concept of "universe", and what might lead to an 
idea, a guess, or a perception of "everything", might be, what Peirce calls 
"neglected argument", or "humble argument"?  So, two completely different types 
of inference, both started from the focal level "humans" we cannot escape, 
pointing in two different directions, the lowest and the highest level of this 
hierarchy.
Helmut

18. November 2015 um 21:33 Uhr
"Stanley N Salthe" >


Sung, all --

Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in 
cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture.

{everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}



STAN

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
Ed,

Thanks for your response.
You wrote :

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product 
of the human brain,(111815-1)
and therefore it is not logical."

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not 
surprising(111815-2)
that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in 
the Universe."

All the best.

Sung






On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian  wrote:
Sung,

You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. "Logic" 
is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the 
human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not the human 
mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the Universe is 
Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art of measuring 
refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has its distinct 
measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers to "what could 
be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my 
website www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry 
nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human 
brain only; geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of 
Nature (based on the reality and measurability of space and time)

Ed.


Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von 
Sungchul Ji
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29
An: PEIRCE-L
Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; Auletta 
Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
Betreff: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments


Hi,

A correction:

Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (4) with 
"nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA".

Thanks.

Sung



-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji 
Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
To: PEIRCE-L 
Cc: biosemiotics , Sergey Petoukhov 
, Ed Dellian , "Robert E. 
Ulanowicz" 


(The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.)

Franklin, Gary R, lists,

In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be 
published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed in 
Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would appreciate 
hearing from you.

There are several points that need explanations:

(1) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to facilitate 
discussions.  I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with what we call 
logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'.

(2)  I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to 
biology in 1997 [1-6].  (I feel funny to list so many of my own references here 
despite Franklin's recent criticism.  The only justification I have for doing 
so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the 

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

Lists,

At the end of the 19th Century there was a reaction against the idea that logic 
was a human creation and depended on the mind. This view is called 
psychologism. The founders of modern logic, including in particular Frege and 
Peirce, were anti-psychologists who argued that logic is independent of human 
psychology. I won’t give the arguments here, since they are readily available 
(see, e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/). Whether logic is 
independent of thought depends on what you take thought to be. An idealist like 
Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by Platonists like 
Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that thoughts are out 
there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires further argument 
from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position is that propositions 
but not thoughts are out there in the world (early Wittgenstein is an example – 
a view I share, though I don’t share his view that true propositions = facts).

Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans 
requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are 
meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with Jerry, 
I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just as can 
mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both logical and 
mathematical. I go a bit further and argue that logic and mathematics depend on 
the nature of the world, and that we must discover them through hypothetical 
reasoning rather than a priori (for example whether continuity exists, the 
infinite exists and similar). This allows a version of non-psychologistic 
naturalism that is somewhat similar to what I take to be Mill’s position, 
though he is often interpreted as a psychologist. So I don’t see Jerry’s worry 
that there is a gap between the formal aspects of, say, information theory and 
its manifestation as making sense. It seems to me that this presupposes that 
the formal aspects can exist independently, involving either a rationalism or 
an idealism or both that I cannot accept, as I find it ontological otiose. This 
is my argument against Jerry’s objection. I also deviate from Peirce here, I 
think, and certainly from my philosophical hero, Bertrand Russell.

However my views may be, there is a clear antipsychologist position on logic 
that is associated with the greatest logicians, and I think it very hasty to 
adopt Stan’s classification of logic.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 18 November 2015 10:34 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Ed Dellian; PEIRCE-L; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Auletta 
Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
Subject: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Sung, all --
Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in 
cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture.
{everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}

STAN

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji 
> wrote:
Ed,

Thanks for your response.
You wrote :

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product 
of the human brain,(111815-1)
and therefore it is not logical."

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not 
surprising(111815-2)
that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in 
the Universe."

All the best.

Sung






On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian 
> wrote:
Sung,

You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. "Logic" 
is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the 
human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not the human 
mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the Universe is 
Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art of measuring 
refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has its distinct 
measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers to "what could 
be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my 
website www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry 
nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human 
brain only; geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of 
Nature (based on the reality and measurability of space and time)

Ed.


Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com 
[mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von 
Sungchul Ji
Gesendet: Mittwoch,