RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of 
Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides signs 
“according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's 
having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that 
object, or in its relation to an interpretant” (CP 2.243).

 

My reason for including Peirce’s text in these posts is mostly to bring us back 
to his own terminology, since it is his analysis of semiosis that we are 
investigating here. Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make 
no positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if 
Peirce says that “an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does 
here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is 
not a sign, or that a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult 
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually 
says.

 

So here is the second trichotomy:

 

 

CP 2.247. According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an 
Index, or a Symbol. 

An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue 
of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any 
such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such 
an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its 
character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or 
law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a 
sign of it. 

248. An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of 
being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, 
because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so 
far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in 
common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the 
Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a 
peculiar kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these 
respects, which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the 
Object. 

249. A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of 
a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the 
Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a 
general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. 
Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a 
general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which 
it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the 
Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,” existent in the 
possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will 
indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those 
instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index 
of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight 
effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant 
character of the Symbol. 

 

 

Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second trichotomy 
with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy. Since the 
Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective trichotomies, each 
exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The Firstness of the Qualisign 
is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness of the Icon, on the other hand, 
is the Firstness of its relation to its Object, specifically the fact that it 
“refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its 
own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually 
exists or not.”

 

Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the Secondness 
of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or event. The Index 
“refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by 
that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its relation to its Object — 
which, as a genuine Secondness, involves a Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). 
The peculiarity of that Firstness, I would guess, is that its genuine 
Secondness to the Object does have something to do with its character, which is 
not the case with the Icon as defined above.

 

Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The 
Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general type.” 
The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being but also in 
its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts through a Replica, and 
that there must be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we 
must here understand by “existent,” existent in the 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations & Their Relatives

[Jon Awbrey]

Inquiry Blog
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/12/08/relations-their-relatives-16/
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/12/10/relations-their-relatives-17/
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/12/12/relations-their-relatives-18/

Peirce List
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17902
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17907
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17911
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17916
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17955
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17956
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17958
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17991
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18002
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18003
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18007

Helmut, List,

I would not want the dyadic case to detain us too long,
as often happens when we frame a simple example for the
purpose of illustration and then fail to rise beyond it.

I raised the example of biblical brothers simply as a way of
illustrating the distinction between a relation proper, like
that symbolized by the formula “x is y's brother” and any of
its elementary relations, like the ordered pair (Cain, Abel).

There are, however, a few more points that could be
illustrated within the scope of this simple example.

Recall that we had a universe of discourse X consisting of
biblical figures and a 2-place relation B forming a subset
of the cartesian product X x X such that (x, y) is in B if
and only if x is a brother of y.

The “biblical brother relation” B would contain a large number of
elementary dyadic relations, or ordered pairs (x, y), for example:

(Abel, Cain), (Isaac, Ishmael), (Esau, Jacob), (Benjamin, Joseph), …
(Cain, Abel), (Ishmael, Isaac), (Jacob, Esau), (Joseph, Benjamin), …

Because B is a symmetric relation, each unordered pair {x, y}
makes its appearance as two ordered pairs, (x, y) and (y, x).

The extension of the elder brother relation E would have the pairs:

(Cain, Abel), (Ishmael, Isaac), (Esau, Jacob), (Joseph, Benjamin), …

Peirce regarded a set of tuples as an “aggregate” or “logical sum”
and would have written the above subset of B in the following way:

B = Abel:Cain +, Isaac:Ishmael +, Esau:Jacob +, Benjamin:Joseph +, …
 +, Cain:Abel +, Ishmael:Isaac +, Jacob:Esau +, Joseph:Benjamin +, …

So what does all this -- the distinction between relations in general
and elementary relations plus the analysis of relations in general
as sets or sums of elementary relations -- imply for the case of
triadic relations in general and sign relations in particular?

It means that non-trivial examples of triadic relations are aggregates,
logical sums, or sets of many elementary triadic relations or triples.

As a result, the classification of single triples and their components
gets us only so far in the classification of triadic relations proper,
and except in very special cases not very far at all.

Regards,

Jon

On 12/12/2015 4:32 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Supplement: I suspect, that my below consideration is non-Peircean, as far as I
know, because I ony know examples by Peirce, that are about relatives, that is
terms, i.e. language. Language, of course, can only be inter-subjective. An
intra-subjective consideration as below may be weird or incalculable, but I
guess, it can be interesting: In the mentioned (Alice loves Bob) case, it shows
a difference between language and reality: Language suggests, that "loves" in
"Alice loves Bob" denotes a relation between Alice and Bob. But a closer look
shows, that in fact it is about a relation inside Alices mind (Bob might be a
movie star, whom Alice only has seen on a TV screen).
Jon, List,
Thank you. I am happy, that I now am more or less clear about the difference eg.
between relation and relative term, and general and elementary. I find it
complicated to apply the mathematical relation concept to realworld situations.
There seem to be relations (and relative terms) of the mind, and others of the
material-energetic world. Eg. if there is a wall made of bricks, one can tell
the relations each brick has towards another brick, and so define the topology
of the wall with relations from relative terms like "is above of", "is north
of", and so on.  But if Alice loves Bob, then this is a relation in Alices mind
(a subset of a product of the set of all aspects in Alices mind with itself).
And "Alice and Bob love each other" perhaps is a relation between the relations
in Alices mind, and those in Bobs mind. But which are these aspects of the mind?
Not very easy, all this, I mean, at least at this intra-subjective level. Maybe
it leads 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F. list,

Gary wrote:

I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial*
distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various
ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his
semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:

GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here), I
don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is *not* a
sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually
says.


However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an *Icon* is a
sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in
some *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a
whole is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns,
sinsigns, or legisigns.

So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking
which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as
such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one* of
the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz.
(1, 2, and 5), all
​three of these being,
 btw, 'rhematic'
​. In
 like manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which *are*
rhematic as 'rhemes"
​since
 one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six
are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'.
​ Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the
symbolic legisign).​


So, again, what I'm suggesting is
​that ​
there is a kind of unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the
course of his analysis. While this most certain
​ly​
 *is* problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us into
discussing aspects
​ (expressed more properly as adjectives)​
of the sign
​as if they ​
were the whole of the sign
​:
the sign *as* sign. I do not see this distinction as being, say,
​'​
fastidious
​'​
.

In short, one needs to recall that at 2.264 that Peirce writes: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS," and I consider it a grave error in semiotic analysis not to clearly
distinguish the elements of the trichotomies from the classes. Or, in other
words,
​conflating
 those three trichotomies involving nine categorial parameters with the ten
classes themselves has, in my opinion, historically brought about a great
deal of confusion, so that it behooves us to clear up--and not gloss
over--the potential confusion
​s​
resulting from that conflation.

I should add that I agree with you (and what I took John Collier to be
saying recently) in opposing what Edwina has been arguing, namely,
​y​
our holding, contra Edwina, that the sign is *not* three relations, but one
genuine triadic relation. Peirce has been quoted here repeatedly as stating
that a sign should *not *be conceived as "a complexus of dyadic relations"
(although, admittedly, his terminology can get a little loose in this
matter as well). Finally, the *integrity* of the sign is further emphasized
by his insisting that the interpretant stands in *the same relation* to the
object as the sign itself stands (I don't see that Edwina deals with that
last principle in her three-relations analysis whatsoever).

You concluded:

GF: I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on
awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement*described above is a sort
of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts are
applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia.


I would very much like to take up this mirror image notion in terms of
involvement (categorial involution) *and* degeneracy (and the relation of
the two), although I don't think that this thread is the place to do it. I
began another thread on that 'mirror' theme, and perhaps after the first of
the year we can take up these issues there if you and others are interested.

Meanwhile, I wish you and all Peirce e-forum members a happy, healthy, and
intellectually productive new year!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:12 PM,  wrote:

> Resuming the close examination of 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Jon,

That is an excellent point.
Can we then say that

"All actual signs derive from potential signs but not all potential signs
need be actual signs."   (122115-1)

This statement may be related to the the fact that

"There can be no Thirdness without Secondness and Firstness;
 (122115-2)
there can be no Secondness without Firstness."

If (122115-2) is true, then why stop at Firstness?  Why can't we continue
and say

"There can be no Firstness without 'Zeroness'."
 (122115-3)

The concept of Zeroness was invoked in 2013 as a logical consequence of the
9 types of signs defined by Peirce as detailed in [biosemiotics:4440]
forwarded to you separately.

All the best.

Sung

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Sung,
>
> Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone
> of something. The first is potential, the second is actualization.
>
> Regards,
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
> Edwina,
>
> You said
>
> "All signs are triads".
>
> I disagree.  Not all signs are triads.  Only symbols are.  There can be
> signs without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it;
> see below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometric line), according to Peirce:
>
>
> "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it
> significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil
> streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,
> at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant.
> Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign
> of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is
> a hole there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or
> not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
> sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which
> signifies what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that
> signification."
>
> (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in
> http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf).
>
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the
>> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of
>> that Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It
>> is not in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'.
>>
>> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be
>> functioning within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those
>> three relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary
>> sign'. All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O],
>> my Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON,
>> to result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O.
>> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign.
>>
>> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic
>> relations
>>
>> Hi Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms.
>>   (122015-1)
>> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the
>> Representamen and the Object."
>>
>> I disagree.
>>
>> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their
>> names.
>>
>> We agree that the *meaning *of 'icon' is *the relation between
>> representamen and object in the mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the *name* of (and
>> hence a sign for) *the relation between representamen and object in the
>> mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat.
>>
>> *Sung*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before
>>> you jump in with your views.
>>> We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon'
>>> refers to the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So,
>>> no-one, including me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine
>>> terms refer to the Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R,
>>> between R-O, and R-I.
>>>
>>> These 9