Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry Rhee]

*Deus, sive Natura*:
“That eternal and infinite being we call *God*, or *Nature*, acts from the
same necessity from which he exists”
(Part IV, Preface), Spinoza

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 6:36 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Edwina, list
>
>
>
> It is clear that the concept of god  in panentheism is not a personal god,
> but a transcendent creative principle at the center of reality “before” and
> “outside” time that from Toho va Bohu sets of the self-organizing
> capability of the emerging universe ( which corresponds to the immanence
> aspect of god (working as agapism in Peirce’s conceptualization). It is the
> tendency to take habits. So – as I understand it –  the concept of god is
> used to explain these two creative and dynamical aspects of reality.
> Hartshorne and Reese in 1853 published the work *Philosophers Speak of
> God: Readings in theology and analysis of theistic ideas”* where they
> discusses these views historically and conceptually.
>
>
>
> Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* 23. oktober 2016 21:23
> *To:* Søren Brier; Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Thanks Soren, but -the problem with terms such as pantheism and
> panentheism - is that they don't define the term 'god'.
>
>
>
>  By the way, when/if I refer to Peirce as a 'pantheist', I am possibly -
> and  probably- using the term incorrectly.
>
>
>
> I really mean 'pansemiotician'; i.e., that semiosis functions within all
> realms of matter/mind. This then means that one must ask 'what is semiosis'
> - and I consider that it is the morphological development of matter-mind,
> within the three categories, within the triadic format. ..And that this
> takes place in all realms: the physico-chemical, biological and
> socio-conceptual.
>
>
>
> The 'origin' and 'ultimate/final cause' of this semiosis - I don't locate
> it OUTSIDE of semiosis. And I see the justification for this in Peirce's
> 1.412 outline. Others, such as Jon and Gary R, focus more on the NA
> and therefore locate this ultimate/final cause in a supreme force, [which
> must be accepted without question] termed 'God'.   I see this outline as an
> inexplicable contradiction to 1.412 - despite Jon's claim that he has
> 'solved' the contradiction.
>
>
>
> So- I apologize; I think I've been using the term 'pantheist' incorrectly
> - as my focus on 1.412, doesn't attribute the formation and generation of
> the universe to any non-immanent agent [god].
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Søren Brier 
>
> *To:* 'Edwina Taborsky'  ; Gary Richmond
>  ; Peirce-L 
>
> *Sent:* Sunday, October 23, 2016 1:28 PM
>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon , list
>
>
>
> I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as
> panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.
>
>
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
> *Sent:* 22. oktober 2016 19:16
> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Gary R, list:
>
>
>
> Exactly. You wrote:
>
> "For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
> "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds'
> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon."
>
>
>
> That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them,
> empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is
> self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an
> non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on
> belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one
> or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them!
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>
> *To:* Peirce-L 
>
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,
>
>
>
> Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the Mind-like
> Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*.  As I have
> pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for
> "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is*not* someone or
> something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke, list:



I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for
same/different in the following:



“Only *everybody* can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less…



“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real.” ~Peirce

___



As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce,



“…*the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to
speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other
minds*.”…



I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and
old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is,
nowadays.  Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of
that community; us and our neighbors.  We seek to do well and by doing
well, to fare well.



What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share
it?  But how to share it when a single method *appears* to lead to
different convictions about problems and solutions?  I think this is
implied of your statement:

“It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of
thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics
by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.”



I tend to think he *succeeded* but to say this is a statement of more or
less.

More or less, depending on to what you are looking.


Semiotic or abduction?  …Or abduction using semiotic?  Or abduction using
computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using
experimentation and computation and semiotic…

Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis…
or science… or….



Best,

Jerry R

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
>
> I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual
> (whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.
>
>
>
> With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just
> remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of
> the community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the
> indefinite truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth
> prevails, on the short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along
> that way.  It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both
> strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of
> semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a
> sustem of semiotics must not only account for the scientific enterprise,
> but also for our day to day communication, not regulated by a knowledge
> ideal, but by other interests.
>
>
>
> Best, Auke
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Verzonden:* zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
> *Aan:* Auke van Breemen 
> *CC:* Peirce-L 
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
>
>
> Auke, Kirsti, list:
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of
> things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I
> would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first…
>
>
>
> But Aristotle also said:
>
> “*For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less
> knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct
> our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without
> qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is
> more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to
> oneself.*”
>
>
>
> Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the
> individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it
> is also about the community knowing.
>
>
>
> So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the
> community.  This, I know.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen 
> wrote:
>
> Dear Kirsti,
>
> As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In
> discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my
> detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become
> more clear.
>
> I will add some words between the lines.
>
> K:
> Dear Auke & al.
>
> It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not
> share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
> --
>
> AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.
>
>
> K:
> Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was
> "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I
> had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.
>
> This is were my work, since 1970's comes 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual 
(whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding.

 

With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just 
remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the 
community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite 
truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the 
short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way.  It is my 
contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and 
enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference 
for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only 
account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day 
communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests.

 

Best, Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 

Auke, Kirsti, list:

 

You said:

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things 
firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, 
in the order of understanding thirdness is first…

 

But Aristotle also said:

“For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less knowable 
by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to 
start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good 
good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable to oneself 
and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself.”

 

Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the 
individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it is 
also about the community knowing.  

 

So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the 
community.  This, I know.  

 

Best,
Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen  > wrote:

Dear Kirsti,

As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In 
discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my 
detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become more 
clear.

I will add some words between the lines.

K:
Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not share. 
And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
--

AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.


K:
Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was 
"babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I had 
any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.

This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much to 
rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at Helsinki 
2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with the handout in 
the conference. Which he has quoted several times. Lately in a book chapter of 
his.

The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in taking 
ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the more 
restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a Fichtean 
philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, nor as a 
scientist.

Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in semiotics. - 
C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap.

--
AvB: I do not think here we disagree, at least on this level of detail of 
discussing matters. His animal examples show that he even didn’t confine to 
childhood, but extended the thought to an evolutionary scale. With his 
distinction between a logica utens and a logica docens and his architectonic of 
sciences, each of the cenoscopic sciences preceding the special sciences and 
being devoted  to:
About positive phenomena in general, such as are available to every person at 
every waking moment, and not about special classes of phenomena. Does not 
resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle theoretical 
questions.

What I did intend to state is that it is when we look at a sign that inscribes 
itself, the question of the connection between the two divisions of 
interpretants comes into clear sight. For, I would add now, it is then that we 
must ask for the connection between both trichotomies of interpretants.
If Peirce wouldn't have been of the opinion that nothing is lost if we don't 
pay attention to the
apprehension of the sign as an object, cf 8.2.1, he, as a consequence, probably
could have made the same arrangement as Van Driel, which is the arrangement I 
propose.

K:
Sheets of assertion serve as ground (in the more general sense) only 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Auke, Kirsti, list:



You said:

AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of
things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I
would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first…



But Aristotle also said:

“*For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less
knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct
our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without
qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is
more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to
oneself.*”



Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the
individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it
is also about the community knowing.



So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the
community.  This, I know.



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Dear Kirsti,
>
> As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In
> discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my
> detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become
> more clear.
>
> I will add some words between the lines.
>
> K:
> Dear Auke & al.
>
> It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not
> share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
> --
>
> AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.
>
>
> K:
> Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was
> "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I
> had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.
>
> This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much
> to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at
> Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with the
> handout in the conference. Which he has quoted several times. Lately in a
> book chapter of his.
>
> The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in taking
> ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the more
> restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a Fichtean
> philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, nor as a
> scientist.
>
> Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in semiotics.
> - C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap.
>
> --
> AvB: I do not think here we disagree, at least on this level of detail of
> discussing matters. His animal examples show that he even didn’t confine to
> childhood, but extended the thought to an evolutionary scale. With his
> distinction between a logica utens and a logica docens and his
> architectonic of sciences, each of the cenoscopic sciences preceding the
> special sciences and being devoted  to:
> About positive phenomena in general, such as are available to every person
> at every waking moment, and not about special classes of phenomena. Does
> not resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle
> theoretical questions.
>
> What I did intend to state is that it is when we look at a sign that
> inscribes itself, the question of the connection between the two divisions
> of interpretants comes into clear sight. For, I would add now, it is then
> that we must ask for the connection between both trichotomies of
> interpretants.
> If Peirce wouldn't have been of the opinion that nothing is lost if we
> don't pay attention to the
> apprehension of the sign as an object, cf 8.2.1, he, as a consequence,
> probably
> could have made the same arrangement as Van Driel, which is the
> arrangement I propose.
>
> K:
> Sheets of assertion serve as ground (in the more general sense) only
> within teh system of existential graphs. Which is the only mode of graphs
> CSP comleted to his satifaction.
>
> It does not, however, follow that he consided them to be the key, the part
> and parcel of his diagrammatic method.
>
> It is just the easest to grasp for in cultural cnditions where
> nominalistic ways of thought retain the upper händ.
> --
> AvB: agreed. I did not argue that. We always must keep the distinction
> between an utens and a docens in mind. The existential graphs are part of
> the docens, as an (iconic) reflection on the utens of reasoning. De
> Tienne's sheets of description (phenomenology), if possible to shape
> diagrammatical, will be different. As is our (besides me, Sarbo and Farkas)
> diagrammatic KiF-proposal for semiotics.  To my great surprise, and thanks
> to the late Irving Anellis, Peirce anticipated our proposal with his x-box
> arrangement of the 16 Boolean relations, arranged from  to  .  This
> passage from primordial soup to a response only makes sense if it is
> conceived as a process, the response mediating state and effect. The
> process in between being triadic in itself. But, of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Thanks Soren, but -the problem with terms such as pantheism and panentheism - 
is that they don't define the term 'god'. 

 By the way, when/if I refer to Peirce as a 'pantheist', I am possibly - and  
probably- using the term incorrectly. 

I really mean 'pansemiotician'; i.e., that semiosis functions within all realms 
of matter/mind. This then means that one must ask 'what is semiosis' - and I 
consider that it is the morphological development of matter-mind, within the 
three categories, within the triadic format. ..And that this takes place in all 
realms: the physico-chemical, biological and socio-conceptual. 

The 'origin' and 'ultimate/final cause' of this semiosis - I don't locate it 
OUTSIDE of semiosis. And I see the justification for this in Peirce's 1.412 
outline. Others, such as Jon and Gary R, focus more on the NA and therefore 
locate this ultimate/final cause in a supreme force, [which must be accepted 
without question] termed 'God'.   I see this outline as an inexplicable 
contradiction to 1.412 - despite Jon's claim that he has 'solved' the 
contradiction. 

So- I apologize; I think I've been using the term 'pantheist' incorrectly - as 
my focus on 1.412, doesn't attribute the formation and generation of the 
universe to any non-immanent agent [god].

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Søren Brier 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2016 1:28 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, Jon , list

   

  I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as 
panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.

   

   Søren

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: 22. oktober 2016 19:16
  To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

   

  Gary R, list: 

   

  Exactly. You wrote:

  "For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

   

  That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Gary Richmond 

To: Peirce-L 

Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

 

Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

 

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.

 

I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") 
only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I 
too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely 
implausible and inexplicable. 

 

But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs 
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy 
(to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who 
are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm 
not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need 
for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, 
presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, 
the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a 
rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.

 

Meanwhile, and while I think , 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Auke van Breemen]

Dear Kirsti,

As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In 
discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my 
detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become more 
clear.

I will add some words between the lines.

K:
Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not share. 
And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.
--

AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree.


K:
Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was 
"babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I had 
any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.

This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much to 
rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at Helsinki 
2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with the handout in 
the conference. Which he has quoted several times. Lately in a book chapter of 
his.

The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in taking 
ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the more 
restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a Fichtean 
philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, nor as a 
scientist.

Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in semiotics. - 
C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap.

--
AvB: I do not think here we disagree, at least on this level of detail of 
discussing matters. His animal examples show that he even didn’t confine to 
childhood, but extended the thought to an evolutionary scale. With his 
distinction between a logica utens and a logica docens and his architectonic of 
sciences, each of the cenoscopic sciences preceding the special sciences and 
being devoted  to:
About positive phenomena in general, such as are available to every person at 
every waking moment, and not about special classes of phenomena. Does not 
resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle theoretical 
questions.

What I did intend to state is that it is when we look at a sign that inscribes 
itself, the question of the connection between the two divisions of 
interpretants comes into clear sight. For, I would add now, it is then that we 
must ask for the connection between both trichotomies of interpretants.
If Peirce wouldn't have been of the opinion that nothing is lost if we don't 
pay attention to the
apprehension of the sign as an object, cf 8.2.1, he, as a consequence, probably
could have made the same arrangement as Van Driel, which is the arrangement I 
propose. 

K:
Sheets of assertion serve as ground (in the more general sense) only within teh 
system of existential graphs. Which is the only mode of graphs CSP comleted to 
his satifaction.

It does not, however, follow that he consided them to be the key, the part and 
parcel of his diagrammatic method.

It is just the easest to grasp for in cultural cnditions where nominalistic 
ways of thought retain the upper händ.
--
AvB: agreed. I did not argue that. We always must keep the distinction between 
an utens and a docens in mind. The existential graphs are part of the docens, 
as an (iconic) reflection on the utens of reasoning. De Tienne's sheets of 
description (phenomenology), if possible to shape diagrammatical, will be 
different. As is our (besides me, Sarbo and Farkas) diagrammatic KiF-proposal 
for semiotics.  To my great surprise, and thanks to the late Irving Anellis, 
Peirce anticipated our proposal with his x-box arrangement of the 16 Boolean 
relations, arranged from  to  .  This passage from primordial soup to a 
response only makes sense if it is conceived as a process, the response 
mediating state and effect. The process in between being triadic in itself. 
But, of course, my "self" image may be at fault.


K:
Eugene Halton has written an excellent paper on Peirce and the distorted view 
Morris spread around early on. The article titled " Situation, Structure and 
... * I also find valid´, even excellent.
--

AvB: I indicated some of Morris' distortions short in my "The semiotic 
Framework: Peirce and Stamper". Many early bird information scientists were 
introduced to Peircean semiotics through Morris, as Ronald Stamper and his 
group was. I experience my talks with them as an exchange between fundamental 
research and application. In use of technical terminology we may differ, in way 
of looking, the similarities prevail. Also in mastery of semiotics a 
subdivision between docens and utens can be made. The utens pointing the way 
for the docens or at least delivering content.

K:
I personally came across the dominance of Secondness by makind a thorough 
inspection on Umberto Eco and his references to Collected Papers in his book 
Theory of Semiotics. I was to make a selection for a study cirle on CSP. Quite 
a reluctant one, for that matter. It was late 1970's.

It was only later that I realized how 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Jeff, list

Thanks. That is also my impression, but I was not sure.

Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 22. oktober 2016 05:29
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

SB:  I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and 
mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and 
outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does 
that also mean that all mind is matter like inside?

No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as 
derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24).  Peirce 
famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere 
specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he 
never described mind as "lively matter."

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier 
> wrote:
Jon

Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still 
somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from 
which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – 
or inside and outside, which I  find easier to comprehend and  fits with his 
development of Aristotle’s  hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive 
“inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But 
still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to 
day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through 
his theory of the hidden third  
http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf 
, levels of reality and logic of the included middle 
http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf  and 
http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf  and he is 
pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics 
and philosophy.
Best
Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Søren, List:

I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to 
do with it.  Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of 
Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into 
Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the 
whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram.  In semeiotic terms, 
per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the 
aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the 
Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the 
"living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier 
> wrote:
Jeff. List

My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is 
that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get 
from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument 
to a physical as well as chemical theory of  matter. How do we get from the 
three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem 
of global warming?

   Best
 Søren

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Soren, list:

I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without 
a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living 
in language and culture.

Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of 
phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that 
is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which 
supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism?

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier 
> wrote:
Jon and list

Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure 
mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops 
phaneroscopic metaphysics,  which develop worlds and which is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

A most importan note! Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 21.10.2016 20:55:

On 10/21/2016 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

By "scientific causality," do you mean /efficient/ causality (i.e.,
brute reactions), /final/ causality (i.e., laws of nature), both,
or something else altogether?


Scientific causality is not so constrained as your question suggests.


In discussing what Peirce meant, it's important to read his sources,
especially the ancient Greeks and the Scholastic logic and philosophy
built on their work.

The English word 'cause' is derived from the Latin 'causa', which
was a translation of Aristotle's 'aitia'.  But the modern word
has become specialized to the single sense of efficient cause.

To see how far the ancient words evolved, note that the French word
'chose' (usually translated as 'thing') is the direct descendant of
the Latin 'causa'.  The modern French 'cause' was borrowed from
Latin in a sense that corresponds to the English 'cause'.

In a discussion of the historical sense of the four aitiai or causae,
it's better to call them four modes of explanation.  Peirce would
certainly have understood the difference.

In any particular text, it's important to determine whether Peirce
was using the word 'cause' in a modern sense or its historical sense
as a mode of explanation.

John



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[kirstima]

Dear Auke & al.

It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not 
share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere.


Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point 
was "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even 
before I had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce.


This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not 
much to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde 
conference, at Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provided 
Eugene Halton with the handout in the conference. Which he has quoted 
several times. Lately in a book chapter of his.


The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in 
taking ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the 
more restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a 
Fichtean philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, 
nor as a scientist.


Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in 
semiotics. - C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap.


Sheets of assertion serve as ground (in the more general sense) only 
within teh system of existential graphs. Which is the only mode of 
graphs CSP comleted to his satifaction.


It does not, however, follow that he consided them to be the key, the 
part and parcel of his diagrammatic method.


It is just the easest to grasp for in cultural cnditions where 
nominalistic ways of thought retain the upper händ.


Eugene Halton has written an excellent paper on Peirce and the distorted 
view Morris spread around early on. The article titled " Situation, 
Structure and ... * I also find valid´, even excellent.


I personally came across the dominance of Secondness by makind a 
thorough inspection on Umberto Eco and his references to Collected 
Papers in his book Theory of Semiotics. I was to make a selection for a 
study cirle on CSP. Quite a reluctant one, for that matter. It was late 
1970's.


It was only later that I realized how narrow and misleading was Eco's 
presentation. - It still seems to have the upper hand. In one form or 
another.


Existential graphs are all about Secondness. The other parts never got 
completed by CSP. Not even outlined, at leasta in the selections so far 
published.


All serious, devoted Peirceans know that triadicity forms the key to all 
Peircean thought. No taking Secondness as the one and only.


With you, Auke, I have had some rewarding exchange of communication 
early on, after I joined the List.


This is why I take this time to comment your post. - You do as you wish. 
- I'll do the same after reading your response. If so happens that 
you'll write one.


My very best wishes to you!

Kirsti Määttänen










Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 20.10.2016 13:11:

Jon,

Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below.

With regard to sheets I suggest to read for

a. Sheets of assertion:

Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A
Perfusion

of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

b. Descriptive sheets

De Tienne:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf
[1]

c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do.

_The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current
discussion._

A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as
follows:

Sign  -proces of interpretation-  interpretant/sign -proces of
interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc.

Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the
interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes
between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process
an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets
reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system.
This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man
is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself
in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet.

(1) Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist
(Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences).

(2) Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself,
we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of
sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system
interprets a sign (critic).

(3) Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of
semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris
and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the
matter. Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each
other (a,b -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b).

The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants
(emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or
radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and
normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in
2. It sets of with

Kant gives the erroneous 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Søren Brier]

Dear Jerry

Good but difficult question. I can give my tentative answers from the top of my 
head:


What is the role of efficient causality in your thinking about biology?  I SEE 
IT AS PART OF SELF-ORGANIZING AUTOPOIETIC TENDENCIES PARTLY BASED ON 
NONE-EQULIBRIUM THERMODYNAMICS.

What is the role of final causality in your thinking about biology? I SEE IT AS 
SELF-ORGANIZING AUTOPOIETIC TENDENCY IN THE SPOMTANEOUSLY STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
AND PROCREATION.

What is the role of emergent causality in your thinking about biology?  I 
CANNOT IMMAGE EMERGENCY WITHOUT INCLUDING TRIADIC SIGNS TENDENCY TO 
SELF-ORGANIZE AND GROW, ESPECIALLY SYMBOLS. THEN AS PEIRCE AND LEE SMOLIN I SEE 
IT AS RESPONTIBLE FOR NEW STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS , PROCESSES AND LAWS.

What is the role of electricity in your thinking about emergence (material 
amplicative logic) of life?  ONE POWER AMONG MANY

What is the role of CSP’s notion of “chemical radicals” in the relations 
between icons and rhema in relation to the amplicative logic necessary for 
development of an individual from a fertilized egg? I DO NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT 
THAT.

Do you accept the hegemony of physical philosophy in framing your philosophy of 
bio-cybernetics? NO. I CANNOT SEE HOW WE CAN COME FROM PHYSICS - AS WE KNOW IT 
- TO LIFE AND MIND. IN MY CYBERSEMIOTICS I CLAIM AS A PREREQUSITE FOR THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH FOUR WORLDS: THE PHYSIO-CHEMICAL, THE 
LIVING, THE EXPERIENTIAL AND THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSISTING OG SIGN GAMES AND 
LANGUAGE GAMES. I REALIZE THAT IN A PEIRCEAN ONTOLOGY I ONLY NEED THREE AS 
MATTER IS NOT DEAD IN HIS VIEW IN OPPOSITION TO CLASSICAL PHYSICS. IN QUANTUM 
PHYSICS MATTER HAS SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY, BUT STILL NO BASIC FEELING.

Søren

These are the sorts of questions that interest me from a quantitative 
perspective.
And from a CSP logical perspective.
And from a molecular biological perspective.

No need to iterate arguments based on Ockham’s razor or the procrustean beds of 
physical approximations and computer science or the entropy content of 
information. Such arguments are insufficient to relate the consequences to the 
antecedent causes. In other words and symbols and indexes and icons, the atomic 
numbers are facts and the addition of atomic numbers follow the conservation 
laws of physics.

Cheers

Jerry


On Oct 21, 2016, at 7:32 PM, Søren Brier > 
wrote:

Jon

Yes it is both efficient and final causation and how they are related. I do 
know Peirce has several papers on that. But still how does it relate to the 
world as we know it today? Or rather how can we make a postmodern 
transdisciplinary framework that allows us to combine them?

   Søren

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 21. oktober 2016 17:59
To: Jerry LR Chandler
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry C., List:

JC:  Would it be fair to say that you seek to understand how CSP’s writings 
relate to scientific causality?

By "scientific causality," do you mean efficient causality (i.e., brute 
reactions), final causality (i.e., laws of nature), both, or something else 
altogether?

JC:  I think it is fair to ask if Jon’s views on engineering wrt CSP writings 
are typical of modern engineering disciplines, such as chemical engineering and 
molecular-biological engineering in which specific causal processes must be 
arranged from the body of scientific information (chemical / biological) 
available.

My discipline is structural engineering, in which most of the relevant causal 
processes and corresponding diagrammatic representational system rules are 
quite well-established.  I would welcome feedback on whether and how my "logic 
of ingenuity" thesis is applicable to other fields of engineering, especially 
those in which this is not (yet) the case.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 10:20 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> wrote:
Soren:

Would it be fair to say that you seek to understand how CSP’s writings relate 
to scientific causality?

I think it is fair to ask if Jon’s views on engineering wrt CSP writings are 
typical of modern engineering disciplines, such as chemical engineering and 
molecular-biological engineering in which specific causal processes must be 
arranged from the body of scientific information (chemical / biological) 
available.  Within the professions, these are referred to a “scale-up” 
problems.  Or, otherwise as “from the lab-bench to production”.

BTW, Soren, on a personal note and in reference to an earlier exchange here 
(2014?) on the role of  electricity in bio-cybernetics / biosemiotics, I have 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I haven’t been following this discussion closely due to illness, but it seems 
to me that a lot of the trouble with the role of subjects and predicates can be 
alleviated in favour of predicates) by Peirce’s colocalization. The SP 
distinction can be reinterpreted so that the subject becomes identified by a 
predicate with an index, making it in itself a dicisgn (proposition). So a 
subject-predicate form really combines two (or more) propositions). There is an 
extensive discussion of this in Frederik Sternfelt,  Natural Propositions, 4.2 
Co-localization as the basis of syntax (pp. 108-114). Unfortunately, to fully 
understand what Sternfelt is saying and how it relates to Peirce requires 
reading a good deal more in chapter 4 as well as chapter 3.

I am not sure that this solves the problem of the relation between Categories 
and Universes, but it did help me.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 20 October 2016 3:15 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jeff, List:

JD:  I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes 
of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants.

That is certainly the dominant interpretation.  I only started questioning it 
because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in 
the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that 
Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates 
(including relations).  However, I now notice that he added the caveat that 
whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then 
proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain 
why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the 
Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  So I am back to being confused about the 
distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially 
since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction.

JD:  As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ...

Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:

Hi Jon S,

I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of 
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in 
the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of 
the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the 
basis of this division.

So, we have the following classifications of signs:
A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign
B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, 
Copulatives
C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, 
Relatives
D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives
E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals
F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce 
feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self 
control)
G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), 
Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule)
H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. 
interrogatives), Indicatives
I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), 
Argument (Delome)
J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and 
interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form

So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, 
imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to 
dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How 
might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a 
character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories 
from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic 
and triad relations is meant to work that out.

--Jeff

--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
>
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM
To: