Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 8:01 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by 
> individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign 
> and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables 
> consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is a 
> list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called memorial 
> maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage which is 
> indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the consideration 
> of the first, the sign.  That is the effect, the practical outcome of the 
> triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua non of inquiry 
> itself?

I’m not sure I’d agree with the conscious part. What’s so interesting to me in 
Peirce’s semiotic is the place of continuity which presupposes a kind of 
unconscious/hidden aspect to all sign processes. Likewise his externalism makes 
me think that most of what happens happens outside of consciousness.

That’s not to say his semiotic isn’t extremely useful for thinking through 
conscious deliberation but I think the consequence of that analysis will always 
be that a lot more is going on.

> Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was 
> trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was 
> that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was 
> also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the 
> outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I 
> want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all aim 
> at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be taught to 
> replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture and 
> understanding generally. 

I must have missed a post. I assume you mean Joseph Brent’s biography. I 
confess I’ve not read it. Could you possibly summarize that? I’m missing 
something here. (Undoubtedly my fault - my apologies I sometimes can’t keep up 
with the list and never quite find the time to go back and catch up)
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, 
> are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that 
> are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, 
> then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the 
> realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which 
> is a virtue, no doubt). 

I’ll confess it’s been a while since I last studied Mill in any depth, but 
going by my distant memory I’d say the bigger facet between Mill and Peirce is 
vagueness. That is much of Mill’s writing presupposes that the entities in 
question are present in some way to consciousness or at least to some logical 
analysis. Peirce in contrast has a very significant logic of vagueness such 
that some properties are indeterminate but not available to the inquirer.  

This obviously problematizes Mill’s meta-ethic. My distant memory is that it 
also is a problem for his epistemology. His associationism I just don’t 
remember well at all so that may avoid this problem but I’d not be shocked to 
discover that depends upon fully determinate parts out of which larger 
knowledge is built. (My distance memory is that Mill is somewhat similar to 
Husserl & Russell in therms of knowledge by acquaintance but I might be 
completely wrong on that)

That’s somewhat of a tangent to your point but I raise it more to note that 
there are other elements of logic/metaphysics that are pretty crucial in 
distinguishing Peirce from his rough contemporaries. 

In a sense the nominalist presupposes less, but there are practical 
implications for what they do presuppose and often they presuppose more than 
Peirce. (The common assumption of completeness that really didn’t come under 
sustained attack until the mid to late 20th century is an example) I think 
externalism is an other example of this. Admittedly those who allow for robust 
knowledge by acquaintance can do more here. But I think that a more robust 
externalism is pretty important metaphysically although that does become 
significant in the more early 20th century with Sartre, Heidegger and others. 
(The reemergence of pragmatism as strong position with Putnam and others also 
comes to question these assumptions)

All of this is a round about way of saying I’m pretty skeptical the issue is 
always realism/nominalism. I think I’d want to see a solid argument to think 
it’s not dwarfed by other factors.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Stephen C. Rose]

I keep wondering to what these wonderful posts refer. I am not being
ironical or sarcastic. Jeff's first paragraph sweeping description of
first, second and third is beautiful. But to what does it refer? What is
its practical effect? How is it used?

Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by
individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign
and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables
consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is
a list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called
memorial maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage
which is indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the
consideration of the first, the sign.  That is the effect, the practical
outcome of the triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua
non of inquiry itself?

Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was
trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was
that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was
also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the
outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I
want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all
aim at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be
taught to replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture
and understanding generally.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 7:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Clark, List,
>
>
> The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions
> concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of
> the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real
> that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves
> to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles
> of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of
> metaphysics.
>
>
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like
> Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like
> Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of
> metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the
> things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to
> presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the
> differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of
> the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special
> sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and
> principles that ought to govern inquiry.
>
>
> On that front, I believe the differences between these types of
> positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are
> real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding
> how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative
> theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from
> within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to
> engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are
> engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter.
>
>
> When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
> proper order, I support these sorts of moves.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.
>
>
> Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely
> interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical
> since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference
> between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars.
> Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course
> matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity
> playing a very different role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly
> content to allow terms to refer to an infinite number of entities even if
> some are more like mathematical constructivists requiring a bit more care.
>
> As I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



It is statements like the following that makes the whole matter of adopting
CP 5.189 and not CP 5.402 that much more baffling.



“When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
proper order, I support these sorts of moves.” ~Jeff



Oh well, I suppose this yet another instance where

"The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us.



…so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements
predicated as constituting the definable form.



Now since we have shown above that attributes predicated as belonging to
the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary, and
since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad, or in any other
subject whose attributes we select in this way, are predicated as belonging
to its essential nature, triad will thus possess these attributes
necessarily.



Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method.



But, in fact, the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a
difference — it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped, or
biped-animal-tame.



In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in
view:



(1) the admission only of elements in the definable form,

(2) the arrangement of these in the right order,

(3) the omission of no such elements.



The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary,
and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the
others but not all they of it; since there must be one such term.



On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a
consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration the Many
are more ‘elementary’ than the One, and prior to it in their nature.”
~Aristotle



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Clark, List,
>
>
> The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions
> concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of
> the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real
> that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves
> to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles
> of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of
> metaphysics.
>
>
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like
> Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like
> Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of
> metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the
> things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to
> presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the
> differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of
> the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special
> sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and
> principles that ought to govern inquiry.
>
>
> On that front, I believe the differences between these types of
> positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are
> real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding
> how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative
> theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from
> within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to
> engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are
> engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter.
>
>
> When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
> proper order, I support these sorts of moves.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.
>
>
> Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely
> interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical
> since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference
> between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars.
> Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course
> matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Clark, List,


The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions concerning 
the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of the normative 
theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real that is needed 
for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves to richer notions as 
he tries to classify, explain and justify principles of synthetic inference. 
With that in hand, he then turns to questions of metaphysics.


If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, 
are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that are 
more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, then we 
will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the realists 
say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which is a virtue, 
no doubt). Having said that, the differences come to the fore when we shift 
attention from the character of the conclusions we have already drawn in 
metaphysics (or in the special sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences 
about the ideals and principles that ought to govern inquiry.


On that front, I believe the differences between these types of positions are 
quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are real practical 
differences between the views with respect to understanding how we ought to 
engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative theory of logic itself). 
Having seen the differences more clearly from within the context of the logical 
theory, it is considerably easier to engage in the disputes in metaphysics with 
some assurance that we are engaged in real disputes over questions that really 
matter.


When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their proper 
order, I support these sorts of moves.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Clark Goble 
Sent: Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism


On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> wrote:

As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and 
realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's System of Logic and 
Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different philosophical 
accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.

Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I'd be extremely interested 
if you can give some examples of that. I confess I'm skeptical since to my eyes 
from a logical perspective there's not a lot of difference between a real 
general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. Now the logical 
properties of various notions of infinity do of course matter a great deal. 
There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity playing a very different 
role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly content to allow terms to 
refer to an infinite number of entities even if some are more like mathematical 
constructivists requiring a bit more care.

As I think I said a week or two ago when we get to set theory things may get a 
bit trickier since of course famously allowing loose set membership leads to 
paradoxes. Perhaps one can make a stronger argument in set theory and set 
construction that realism vs. nominalism matters far more.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:09 AM, Eric Charles  
> wrote:
> 
> There, as now, I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would 
> adhere one to a particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would 
> imagine it was relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing 
> the field in such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases 
> predisposed you one way or the other. 

Nominalism and the more minority view of realism are still both very broad 
categories. Lots of different views can be found under each category. That’s 
partially why, as Ben noted, it’s hard to draw out implications. While I’m a 
big believer in looking at the cash value of an idea, with nominalism I’m not 
as convinced as some there is one. I mentioned the problem of what is 
changeable. I think a second consideration is a certain overskepticism towards 
generalities we find in nature.

However the reality is that the examples I gave of skepticism towards certain 
regularities science finds really aren’t due to nominalism. People completely 
ignorant of nominalism can make those same mistakes. Especially if there are 
political incentives towards doing so.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

Peirce's architectonic required that metaphysics must derive its principles
from logic, rather than the other way around.  My impression is that there
is not consensus on this arrangement, and in particular, that at least some
nominalists would insist that metaphysics is more basic than logic.  Once
again, the question arises--what practical difference does it make?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Eric, Ben, List,
>
> Would it make any difference if, in addition to the different
> interpretations of the regularities concerning the apples in the orchard,
> we also included different interpretations of the principles of reasoning?
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. Does
> the adoption of these different theories of reasoning lead to different
> practical results when it comes to criticizing and evaluating the abductive
> and inductive inferences in virtue of which one formulates and tests
> hypotheses concerning the regularities we observe with respect to such
> things as apples in an orchard or bags of beans in a barn?
>
> To what extent can we evaluate the adequacy of competing metaphysical
> theories without also taking into account the theories of logic from which
> they derive their structure and much of their content.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
> --
> *From:* Eric Charles 
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 11:09 AM
> *To:* Benjamin Udell
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
> Ben,
> There was an attempt, on the earlier thread I initiated, to provide an
> example similar to your east-west divide of the apple field. There, as now,
> I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would adhere one to a
> particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would imagine it was
> relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing the field in
> such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases predisposed you one
> way or the other.
>
> I could, as a nominalist, insist that though the division be an arbitrary
> convention, we follow the rule none the less. I also could insist, as a
> realist, that east-west is far more than a *mere* convention of language,
> and explain the logic of using it as a criteria.
>
> Similarly I could, as a nominalist, insist that the arbitrary convention
> of east-west have no hold over my ability to pick apples where I please. I
> could also insist, as a realist, that east-west, while having a local
> relative meaning has no global meaning that would allow it to serve as a
> useful arbiter in this case.
>
> Etc., etc.
>
> Whether or not 'generals' are 'real' doesn't necessitate my using - or
> rejecting the use of - those concepts in such an abstracted example. Or, to
> phrase it differently, whether I suspect that, in the end times, the
> opinion of honest investigators will allow for 'east' and 'west', doesn't
> matter a lick to how divide up the field right now. This is similar to the
> how we can have fruitful discussions about the impact of race in America,
> and solutions to the problems race-based thinking has caused, all while
> also acknowledging that 'race' is a BS concept, which is likely to be done
> away with by honest inquirers long before the end times are here.
>
> If you think that being a nominalist is likely to correspond to certain
> other tendencies, based on your observations of the distribution of ideas
> we happen to see in current society, that is another matter all together.
> Such matters are not logical consequences of adopting one view or the
> other, they are happenstance correlates, and so (as far as I understand it)
> would not count for Peirce's pragmatic maxim.
>
> ---
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
> U.S. Marine Corps
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Awbrey]

o~o~o~o~o~o~o

On 2/6/2017 9:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00043.html

Is it right to say that “generals are constituted of individuals”?
For Peirce, generality is continuity, and my understanding is that
no continuum is “constituted of individuals”, since no collection
of individuals is truly continuous.

o~o~o~o~o~o~o

Jon, List,

I would be content to say that, in the same vein I might say,
“the real line is a continuum constituted of individual points”.
If it's merely the word “constituted” that is causing difficulty
then I would substitute “consisting” and it would mean the same
thing for all practical mathematical and scientific purposes:
“the real line is a continuum consisting of individual points”.
Continuity is a matter of the relations among individual points
not a matter of their ontologies per se.

An adequate discussion of mathematical continua and their relation
to physical continua and whether there really are such things would
make for a long and diverting digression at this point, but it's not
really called for since the concept of continuity that Peirce relates
to logical generality does not demand the full power of those sorts of
continua but only a logical sort of continuity that is more general or
simply weaker, depending on your point of view.

I know I've remarked on this point before ... so let me go hunt that up ...

o~o~o~o~o~o~o

JA:https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/11/09/continuity-generality-infinity-law-synechism-1/

The concept of continuity that Peirce highlights in his
synechism is a logical principle that is somewhat more
general than the concepts of either mathematical or
physical continua.

Peirce’s concept of continuity is better understood as
a concept of lawful regularity or parametric variation.
As such, it is basic to the coherence and utility of
science, whether classical, relativistic, quantum
mechanical, or any conceivable future science that
deserves the name.  (As Aristotle already knew.)

Perhaps the most pervasive examples of this brand of continuity
in physics are the “correspondence principles” that describe the
connections between classical and contemporary paradigms.

The importance of lawful regularities and parametric variations
is not diminished one bit in passing from continuous mathematics
to discrete mathematics, nor from theory to application.

Here are some further points of information, the missing of which
seems to lie at the root of many recent disputes on the Peirce List:

It is necessary to distinguish the mathematical concepts of
continuity and infinity from the question of their physical
realization.  The mathematical concepts retain their practical
utility for modeling empirical phenomena quite independently of
the (meta-)physical question of whether these continua and
cardinalities are literally realized in the physical universe.
This is equally true of any other domain or level of phenomena —
chemical, biological, mental, social, or whatever.

As far as the mathematical concept goes, continuity is relative
to topology.  That is, what counts as a continuous function or
transformation between spaces is relative to the topology under
which those spaces are considered and the same spaces may be
considered under many different topologies.  What topology
makes the most sense in a given application is another one
of those abductive matters.

o~o~o~o~o~o~o

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 7:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Yes, I agree with your outline of the neglect of Aristotle during the period 
> when the Church controlled knowledge - and the 13th c. re-emergence of his 
> works [Aquinas etc]..

I’m not sure it’s quite that simple. A lot of the texts, for whatever reason, 
simply weren’t widely available. I’d add that they heyday of Aristotle in the 
13th century was still a period of Church controlled knowledge - thus the 
various condemnations at the University of Paris largely tied to Aristotelian 
works. Even those who became dominant in this era (Scotus and Ockham) arguably 
did so because they engaged with Aristotle and frequently disagreed with him. 
So that’s not really neglect. It’s later as Aquinas becomes more popular (he 
was always popular with the Dominicans) that an Aristotilean fused Christianity 
becomes more acceptable. Although of course other major figures from the early 
13th century like Albertus Magnus were thoroughly engaged with Aristotle. 

Anyway I think while one can blame the church for the condemnations at Paris 
it’s unfair to blame them for a lack of engagement with Aristotle. And the 
condemnations occurred precisely because everyone had engaged seriously with 
him.

One should also note that the identities of Plato and Aristotle weren’t always 
clear in the texts. That affected how people read them. The relative clarity of 
who wrote what we have today is of much more recent development. I’m not sure 
the timing on all that but I assume it’s a product of early modernism even if 
some roots go back earlier.





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Benjamin Udell]

Eric, Jon S., list,

I don't think that the nominalist and realist views are symmetrical as 
you suggest with regard to generals and individuals. A Peircean realist 
will say that individuals have some generality but still can only be in 
one place at a time, unlike "more-general" generals, and would never say 
that every term designating an individual is a mere _/flatus vocis/_ as 
many a nominalist has called every general term. The individual in 
Peirce's view is not a mere construct but instead is forced indexically 
on a mind by reaction and resistance. Peirce somewhere also says that a 
universe of discourse is likewise distinguished indexically. For Peirce, 
the individual is the reactive/resistant, and reaction/resistance is 
Secondness, a basic phaneroscopic category.


Let's bring into your apple-picker scenario some non-extraneous generals 
that would make a difference between the two apple pickers. For example, 
they get into an argument about which apples each of them is allowed to 
pick. Apple picker Alf says that he's allowed to pick any apples only in 
the eastern area and that apple picker Beth is allowed to pick any 
apples only in the western area, while Beth says that each of them 
should be able to pick any apples anywhere in the area. Alf says that 
the rules prescribe the east-west split, while Beth says that those 
rules are unfair and should be ignored or evaded. Alf says not that the 
rules are fair but instead that there is no such thing as "fair" apart 
from what the rules state in individual documents or announcements. Beth 
doesn't expound a full-blown doctrine of either natural law or 
revolutionary justice, but simply insists, "fair is fair." I won't say 
that Alf is a strict nominalist and Beth a strict scholastic realist, 
but just that they tend respectively toward nominalism (Alf) and realism 
(Beth). At their respective worsts, Alf promotes conformity with a cruel 
and unjust regime, while Beth promotes the breakdown of the rule of law. 
Alf's attitude is more congenial to the idea that there is no idea of 
fairness above that of the state. On the other hand, some nominalists 
would argue that nominalism and the more-nominalistic brands of 
positivism are at least a good holding action against the militant ideas 
that contributed to the vast bloodshed in the 20th Century. My picture 
doesn't quite converge with Edwina's picture but I don't mean to deny 
her picture either. Nominalism and realism are pretty general ideas that 
could get rooted in practice in disparate ways.


I once read a web page where somebody argued that HTML markup that 
complies with official, explicit HTML standards is right "by 
definition."  This was as if the standards themselves had not been 
devised according to some more general and probably less definite idea 
of what standards should be like and as if there could be no idea of 
HTML rightness that would require the revision of the official, explicit 
standards promulgated on individual dates in specific documents by the 
World Wide Web Consortium. Now, for a while the Mozilla Firefox browser 
adhered to the standards in certain cases where the standards were 
problematic. I don't think that the Firefox designers denied the need 
for revised standards, based on a more general idea of standards, but 
they didn't like the idea of rebellion by browser designers (such 
rebellion does make it more difficult to design web pages that work in 
all browsers). But they took this "letter of the law" attitude to an 
extreme.  (I'm thinking in particular of how Firefox treated two or more 
directly successive hyphens in a hidden comment - IIRC, it treated them 
as a hidden comment's closing tag (except the double hyphen in the 
opening tag), whereas other browsers and most webpage designers treated 
-->, a double hyphen followed directly by a greater-than sign, as the 
one and only way to do a hidden comment's closing tag. For a while I 
found myself deleting or replacing with equals-signs many strings of 
hyphens that Joe Ransdell had placed between hidden-comment tags at 
Arisbe. Anyway, Mozilla finally gave in and said something like "We 
don't have to change our browser for this, but we will.")


Best, Ben

On 2/6/2017 9:58 AM, Eric Charles wrote:

JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists 
entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to 
facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality 
consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to 
facilitate discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's 
original question about the practical differences that one view 
manifests relative to the other?


Uh oh.

I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list 
discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were 
/just/ people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads 
to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I agree with your comments, but they involve a shift in the meaning of
"individual" from "singular subject" (logical/metaphysical) to "human
being" (social/political).  What I take Eric to be asking--and what has
come to interest me, as well--is whether there are other "conceivable
practical effects" (CP 5.196; 1903) that are clearly different between
these two concepts.

   - Extreme nominalism = reality consists entirely of individuals, so
   there are no real generals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk
   about things that are similar in some way.
   - Extreme realism = reality consists entirely of generals, so there are
   no real individuals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about
   things that are distinct in some way.

Given Peirce's nearly lifelong crusade against all forms of nominalism, it
seems like we should be able to identify additional "conditional
experiential consequences" (CP 6.470; 1908) that sharply distinguish it
from his own "extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208; c. 1905).  I think you
are probably on the right track with the idea that science studies objects
in their generality, rather than their individuality.  I also keep coming
back to the related notion that nominalism accepts aspects of reality as
incognizable and laws of nature as inexplicable, thus blocking the way of
inquiry.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Eric - great fun.
>
> But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual
> 'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space.
> So, both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And
> after all, that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all
> probability, neither cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So,
> does the concept of 'general' have any  value?
>
> I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But,
> when one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things
> and have continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral
> concepts, and general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then,
> philosophical realism moves in to declare that these concepts have a
> general reality that is articulated in individual instantiations.
> TREE--->this particular tree.
>
> What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I
> think that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the
> individual as the key agent of thought and moves the community, the
> long-term community, into that role. It prevents subjective relativism,
> prevents the notion that each individual can directly and individually
> perfectly KNOW the world and insists instead on that community of scholars
> and indeed, denies full knowledge...because, realism says that information
> is not found in ONE individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and
> as such, requires a different approach than direct singular observation.
>
> I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects
> of the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great
> difference in actual knowledge of our external world.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Eric Charles 
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Cc:* Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) 
> *Sent:* Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
> JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists
> entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate
> discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely
> of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.
> If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the
> practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other?
>
> Uh oh.
>
> I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list
> discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just*
> people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to
> convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again
> being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question
> resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what
> distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be
> different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful.
>
> -
>
> Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill
> baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end
> of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to
> the truck. "Look at  how similar those two are," you say to yourself one
> day while watching them.
>
> "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 5, 2017, at 11:12 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> At the beginning of the 13th c, the translations of Aristotle
> were denounced by theologians who had a vested interest in Plato.
> The fact that they were translated from Arabic sources also raised
> suspicions of heresy.  But scientists such as Roger Bacon were
> inspired by the science, and Thomas Aquinas made Aristotle safe
> for Christianity.

To be fair there were some theological reasons they were distrustful of the new 
innovations in scholastic thinking by Aristotle. A lot of the condemnations of 
1210-1277 have fairly compelling reasons behind them (even if we don’t in the 
least buy the theology they were defending). Some seem a bit silly admittedly, 
like the debate about whether there was a single shared intellect or separate 
intellects for each person. (Roughly a debate about whether propositions were 
individual or shared - although it often came to have a form more akin to what 
platonic mystics asserted of a shared mind)

It’s interesting that the greatest of the Aristotilean influenced scholastics, 
Aquinas, really had his heyday in the early Renaissance rather than during his 
life or the immediate years following.

> Crosby, Alfred W. (1997) The Measure of Reality: Quantification
> and Western Society, 1250-1600, Cambridge University Press.
> 
> Sample factoid:  In 1275, there were no mechanical clocks in Europe.
> By 1300, every town of any size had a church with a clock tower,
> and neighboring towns were competing with each other in building
> the most elaborate clocks.  The European emphasis on measuring time
> is a major difference between European civilizations and traditional
> societies everywhere else.  And it started in the 13th c.

This is an important feature often overlooked. It’s very hard to do 
reproducible empirical studies without accurate time keeping. There were some 
primitive methods like using hour glasses but having ubiquitous and 
synchronizable clocks probably transformed the world more than anything else 
before the age of steam and plumbing.







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[John F Sowa]

On 2/6/2017 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I myself tend to view causality as more economic and population-size
driven than ideologically driven.


I agree.  In fact, that's a major reason why the Homo saps were
so far ahead of the neanderthals in technology:  they had a warmer
climate in Africa that made food more abundant to support a larger
population.  The most rapid advances occurred after the development
of farming, when the food supply and population grew rapidly.


Bernal's "The Extension of Man'- a very detailed outline of
technology development 'extending' man's physical capacities
to interact with the world...


In places where the two overlapped (middle east), the neanderthals
adopted the new technology.  And the anthropologists today are
discovering innovations that the neanderthals had invented on their
own (some of which the anthropologists still have not been able
to duplicate with the kind of technology available then).


"the development of capitalism as the leading method of production
also witnessed that of experiment and calculation as the new method
of natural science"


I wasn't considering the metaphysical differences between Plato and
Aristotle, but the different emphasis on the value of observation
and record keeping.  The "experiment and calculation" was introduced
a century before banking and capitalism.  (And both depended on
Arabic numerals, which the Muslims adopted from the Hindus, who
were influenced by the Chinese number system.)

Plato was a mathematician, who considered the mathematical forms as
the ideal source of knowledge.  But Aristotle's father was a physician
who emphasized careful observation and detailed record keeping of what
was observed and the results of various procedures.

Aristotle was a pioneer in experimental science.  A famous example
is his experiment with chicken eggs.  He and his students collected
a batch of eggs laid on the same day.  Then they broke open one egg
each day and made detailed observations of the embryos.

Philosophically, Galen was more of a Platonist, but he was very
strongly influenced by Aristotle's biological writings.  When the
Arabs took over the middle east, they weren't interested in Greek
literature.  Greek medicine (Galen) was their first interest, and
that led them to Aristotle and Greek science and mathematics.

By the 11th c, Arabic technology and economic power was the greatest
in the world.  But the crusaders (AKA Christian terrorists) came
from a primitive civilization (Europe) and were amazed at the glories
of Muslim economic achievements.

Unfortunately, those invasions gave the Islamic conservatives the
upper hand.  They squelched the liberals with their "infidel" books.
They burned libraries, banished teachers, and destroyed their own
economic and technological foundation.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Eric - great fun.

But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual 
'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space. So, 
both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And after all, 
that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all probability, neither 
cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So, does the concept of 
'general' have any  value?

I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But, when 
one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things and have 
continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral concepts, and 
general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then, philosophical realism 
moves in to declare that these concepts have a general reality that is 
articulated in individual instantiations. TREE--->this particular tree.

What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I think 
that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the individual as the 
key agent of thought and moves the community, the long-term community, into 
that role. It prevents subjective relativism, prevents the notion that each 
individual can directly and individually perfectly KNOW the world and insists 
instead on that community of scholars and indeed, denies full 
knowledge...because, realism says that information is not found in ONE 
individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and as such, requires a 
different approach than direct singular observation. 

I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects of 
the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great difference 
in actual knowledge of our external world.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Eric Charles 
  To: Peirce List 
  Cc: Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) 
  Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism


  JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely 
of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; 
while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, 
so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.  If so, how does 
this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that 
one view manifests relative to the other?


  Uh oh. 


  I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, 
that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were just people who denied 
that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now 
(here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again being attributed more positive 
beliefs, and my original question resurfaces: What difference does it make? 
That is, what distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be 
different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. 


  -


  Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill baskets, 
and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end of the day, 
they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to the truck. "Look 
at  how similar those two are," you say to yourself one day while watching 
them. 


  "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been 
speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he 
continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more 
different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You 
continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. 


  "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or 
generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking up 
distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with each 
basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes points 
out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any two 
picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind 
bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is collecting 
'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is just, he insists, a 
weird language game we have agreed to play, and doesn't correspond at all with 
reality." 


  After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the 
pickers. 


  "... and?..." you ply. 


   "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over 
there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that 
these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what makes 
'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of individuality. What 
about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the store shelf? Heck, he 
would even claim that it is odd to believe that Bill-on-the-left is the same 
person he was a year ago. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Eric Charles]

JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely
of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse;
while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of
generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.  If
so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical
differences that one view manifests relative to the other?

Uh oh.

I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list
discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just*
people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to
convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again
being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question
resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what
distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be
different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful.

-

Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill
baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end
of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to
the truck. "Look at  how similar those two are," you say to yourself one
day while watching them.

"Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been
speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he
continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more
different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You
continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on.

"You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or
generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking
up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with
each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes
points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any
two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind
bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is
collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is
*just*, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and
doesn't correspond at all with reality."

After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the
pickers.

"... and?..." you ply.

 "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over
there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that
these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what
makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of
individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the
store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that
Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago. Bill-on-the-left has
the properties of being a singular thing, but the identity label itself
is just convenient ways to refer to complex composite beings, and don't get
at any sort of 'essence' at all. Those individual names are *just*, he
insist, a weird linguistic device to facilitate discourse. Quite to the
contrary, Jim would insist, if there is anything going on here that honest
inquirers would agree about after the dust settles, it is that 'apples'
were put in 'baskets', and that makes those generals real."

"Huh," you insist, "that is all very fascinating, but I can detect no
difference in their behavior that would correspond to such a dramatic
seeming difference in thinking. Do they not both pick, and bucket, and
deliver in the same manner? And wait in the same line, in the same way, to
receive the same pay, with the same sullenness?"

"Well yes," says the stranger, "but trust me, they are very, very
different. As I said, one is a nominalist, and the other a realist in the
pragmatic vein. Men with such contrasting sets of ideas couldn't be more
different."

"Huh," you repeat, "aside from the words and phrases they would invoke in a
conversation about the specific topic you brought up, what conditions could
we arrange so as to see the difference in belief manifest as clear
differences in behavior? (Granting probability, and all that.) "

"Well, you couldn't," says the stranger, "they are differences in belief,
not differences in habit."

"Ah," you reply confidently, "it is too bad your thinking is not as clear
as mine. Belief is habit. As such, if there is no difference in habit
between the two that would - granted probability, and all that - manifest
itself under some arranged circumstances, then the two beliefs are
equivalent, no matter what the words might mislead you into thinking. Thus,
if you don't mind, I'll continue to think that the two people are very
similar."

Another long pause ensued, and the man offered, sounding less certain,
"Well, I suppose they would relatively-reflexively complain differently,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

Is it right to say that "generals are constituted of individuals"?  For
Peirce, generality is continuity, and my understanding is that no continuum
is "constituted of individuals," since no collection of individuals is
truly continuous.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I've been sticking to the minimal term set of “generals”
> and “individuals”, partly because several years of real
> and functional analysis and topology have attached other
> meanings to words like “continuous” and “singular” that,
> even though Peirce anticipated many aspects of them,
> would divert us too much if I interjected them here.
>
> But, more importantly, I want to avoid the illusion
> that we can escape the bounds of semiotic relativity
> by introducing any number of ontological distinctions.
>
> This leaves where we always are, signing in a sign relation
> as fish swim in a sea, partly aware our local environment,
> dimly conscious of the vastness beyond.  In that semiotic
> setting all our signs have general or plural denotations
> and connotations.  It is only in relation to one another
> that signs can be sorted in accord with the ways that
> some of their senses subsume the senses of others.
>
> The language of instances and instantiations can be useful here,
> allowing us to express the idea that generals are constituted of
> individuals but individuals are constituted of further instances.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
> On 2/3/2017 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
>> Jon A., List:
>>
>> These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter.
>>
>> JA:  It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake
>> a general name for the name of a general.  But should we then turn around
>> and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual?
>>
>> JA:  Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse,
>> that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse,
>> and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than
>> an ontological essence.
>>
>> JA:  This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy
>> between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal
>> thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less
>> ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in
>> their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds
>> than
>> mere grammatical category.
>>
>> Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals
>> are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in
>> every conceivable respect)?  In other words, the nominalist says that
>> reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we
>> use
>> to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality
>> consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to
>> facilitate discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's original
>> question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative
>> to the other?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[Edwina Taborsky]

John- I fully agree.  Yes, I agree with your outline of the neglect of 
Aristotle during the period when the Church controlled knowledge - and the 
13th c. re-emergence of his works [Aquinas etc]..
Although I myself tend to view causality as more economic and 
population-size driven than ideologically driven. That is, I think that 
Aristotle's re-emergence was linked to the rise in population of that era 
and the need to provide more means of wealth production than the local 
feudal holding.


Your Crosby book sounds exactly right.  I'll try to get ahold of it. The 
sources I've used are


J.D. Bernal's five volumes of 'Science in History'.  In this era, it's Vol. 
2..the era of the beginning of market trade...and 'money payments rather 
than forced services' and.."the development of capitalism as the leading 
method of production also witnessed that of experiment and calculation as 
the new method of natural science" .
These volumes detail the emergence and development of all kinds of methods 
of 'measuring the world'. Bookkeeping and banking methods would have been 
vital to the development of larger economies and trade.


Then, there's J.D. Bernal's "The Extension of Man'- a very detailed outline 
of technology development 'extending' man's physical capacities to interact 
with the world...i.e., moving away from basic human labour, to adding more 
power, via such things as the horse harness, water mills, the compass, the 
magnet


And, Fernand Braudel's volumes on 'Civilization and Capitalism', 
Particularly Vol 1, 'The Structures of Everyday life, which focuses on 
population sizes and economies.
And Vol.3, 'The Perspective of the World', which focuses on economics, 
city-states, and technology.


Ideologically - one saw the emergence of a focus on the individual capacity 
to observe and reason.


Edwina


- Original Message - 
From: "John F Sowa" 

To: 
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 1:12 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -



On 2/5/2017 12:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

that knowledge is derived from the evidence of the senses, is as old
as Aristotle - who espoused just that [along with the use of reason].

But as a societal force, with its insistence that the individual and
that individual's direct contact with the world, is the source of
knowledge - that emerged, in my view, from at least the 13th century


I agree, but I'd add that the rediscovery of Aristotle in the 13th c
led to revolutionary innovations in logic and science.

Before the 12th c translations of Aristotle from Arabic to Latin,
Plato and Neoplatonism had the strongest influence on the Greek
Church Fathers -- and through them -- the Latins.

At the beginning of the 13th c, the translations of Aristotle
were denounced by theologians who had a vested interest in Plato.
The fact that they were translated from Arabic sources also raised
suspicions of heresy.  But scientists such as Roger Bacon were
inspired by the science, and Thomas Aquinas made Aristotle safe
for Christianity.

As an interesting history of the upsurge in observation and
measurement in the 13th c and later, I suggest

Crosby, Alfred W. (1997) The Measure of Reality: Quantification
and Western Society, 1250-1600, Cambridge University Press.

Sample factoid:  In 1275, there were no mechanical clocks in Europe.
By 1300, every town of any size had a church with a clock tower,
and neighboring towns were competing with each other in building
the most elaborate clocks.  The European emphasis on measuring time
is a major difference between European civilizations and traditional
societies everywhere else.  And it started in the 13th c.

Although Aristotle didn't say much about music or money, the
emphasis on logical notation and measurement also inspired the
development of modern musical notation, bookkeeping, and banking.

John









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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Awbrey]

Jon, List,

I've been sticking to the minimal term set of “generals”
and “individuals”, partly because several years of real
and functional analysis and topology have attached other
meanings to words like “continuous” and “singular” that,
even though Peirce anticipated many aspects of them,
would divert us too much if I interjected them here.

But, more importantly, I want to avoid the illusion
that we can escape the bounds of semiotic relativity
by introducing any number of ontological distinctions.

This leaves where we always are, signing in a sign relation
as fish swim in a sea, partly aware our local environment,
dimly conscious of the vastness beyond.  In that semiotic
setting all our signs have general or plural denotations
and connotations.  It is only in relation to one another
that signs can be sorted in accord with the ways that
some of their senses subsume the senses of others.

The language of instances and instantiations can be useful here,
allowing us to express the idea that generals are constituted of
individuals but individuals are constituted of further instances.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/3/2017 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Jon A., List:

These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter.

JA:  It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake
a general name for the name of a general.  But should we then turn around
and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual?

JA:  Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse,
that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse,
and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than
an ontological essence.

JA:  This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy
between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal
thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less
ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in
their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than
mere grammatical category.

Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals
are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in
every conceivable respect)?  In other words, the nominalist says that
reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use
to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality
consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to
facilitate discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's original
question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative
to the other?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

>> [ https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00017.html ]

o~o~o~o~o~o~o

March 2015

JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00099.html

Because it has come up once again, let me just mention one more time
why I think Peirce's theory of individuals has such a radical bearing
on the whole question of nominalism vs. realism.

It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake
a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn
around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual?

Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse,
that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse,
and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an
ontological essence.

This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy
between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal
thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily
any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether
signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on
more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category.
 ...
o~o~o~o~o~o~o


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