Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> After that one can consider
> the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
> all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
> monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
> haven't really said that much at all.

Glad I’m not alone in thinking that. 



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Awbrey]

Helmut, John, List ...

I'll answer Helmut's question first as I can think of something
right off to say about it, whereas JFS and I have had this same
discussion every 3 or 4 years for going on the last 20 and I'll
need a while to see if I can think of anything new to say on it.



I confess I have never found going on about Firstness Secondness Thirdness
all that useful in any practical situation.  Firstness means one has some
monadic predicate in mind as relevant to a phenomenon, problem, or other
subject matter, Secondness means one has a dyadic relation in mind to
the same end, and Thirdness means one has a triadic relation in mind
as bearing on the situation at hand.  After that one can consider
the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
haven't really said that much at all.



What I really think is interesting in all this is the fact that Peirce,
from 1865 on, maintains in the background of his thought the idea that
information is the solid substance born by concepts and symbols, while
comprehension and extension are its complementary aspects, its shadows.

I have been studying this integration of comprehension and extension
in the form of information for quite a while, and there is my set of
excerpts and comments on this page:

Information = Comprehension × Extension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

But I just ran across a shorter sketch of the main ideas
that I must have begun some time ago but not yet finished:

Peirce's Logic Of Information
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce%27s_Logic_Of_Information

It has the advantage of having a nicely self-explanatory figure right up front.
At any rate, try taking a look at that ...

Regards,

Jon

On 4/20/2017 4:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Jon, John, List,
> Is it reasonable to say that a relation has an intension and an extension, the
> intension is firstness, and the extension secondness (of the relation, which 
is
> secondness)?
> Best,
> Helmut
> 20. April 2017 um 15:14 Uhr
> *Von:* "John F Sowa" 
> Jon,
>
> That is an extensional definition of a relation:
>
>> Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation
>> “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by
>> three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular
>> subset of their cartesian product X × Y.  As before we have
>> two choices, either let L = (X, Y, graph(L)) or let “L” denote
>> graph(L) and choose another name for the triple.
>
> Nominalists prefer extensional definitions.  But Peirce would
> usually state intensional definitions (rules) for the functions
> or relations he was considering.
>
> Alonzo Church (1941) stated the intensional definition:
>> A function is a rule of correspondence by which when anything is
>> given (as argument) another thing (the value of the function for
>> that argument) may be obtained. That is, a function is an operation
>> which may be applied on one thing (the argument) to yield another
>> thing (the value of the function).
>
> For further discussion of the distinction between intensions
> extensions, see pp. 1 to 3 of Church's book:
> http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm
>
> By the way, Church was not a nominalist. See the transcript of his
> talk "On the ontological status of women and abstract entities":
> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm
>
> John
>

--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi John,

Thank you for sending the links to the excerpts from Church's work in logic. 
His explanation of the assumptions behind extensional approaches in formal 
logic and the philosophical theory of logic are remarkably clear. If you have 
additional thoughts to add that help to explain why it is that nominalists such 
as J.S. Mill and Nelson Goodman strongly prefer extensional systems--and have 
significant reservations about using intensional systems in philosophy--I'd be 
interested to hear what you think. In particular, I'd like to hear more about 
the connections that you see between (1) the motives for developing intensional 
systems, (2) Church's remarks about the treatment of things such as functions 
and relations as objects in these systems (e.g., in the lambda operator), and 
(3)  the treatment of the infinite character of some collections and the 
continuity of some operations at both the object level and the meta-level 
within intensional systems.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Thursday, April 20, 2017 6:14 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jon Awbrey
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon,

That is an extensional definition of a relation:

> Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation
> “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by
> three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular
> subset of their cartesian product X × Y}.  As before we have
> two choices, either let L = (X, Y, graph(L)) or let “L” denote
> graph(L) and choose another name for the triple.

Nominalists prefer extensional definitions.  But Peirce would
usually state intensional definitions (rules) for the functions
or relations he was considering.

Alonzo Church (1941) stated the intensional definition:
> A function is a rule of correspondence by which when anything is
> given (as argument) another thing (the value of the function for
> that argument) may be obtained. That is, a function is an operation
> which may be applied on one thing (the argument) to yield another
> thing (the value of the function).

For further discussion of the distinction between intensions
extensions, see pp. 1 to 3 of Church's book:
http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm

By the way, Church was not a nominalist.  See the transcript of his
talk "On the ontological status of women and abstract entities":
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm

John
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, John, List,

Is it reasonable to say that a relation has an intension and an extension, the intension is firstness, and the extension secondness (of the relation, which is secondness)?

Best,

Helmut

 

20. April 2017 um 15:14 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 

Jon,

That is an extensional definition of a relation:

> Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation
> “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by
> three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular
> subset of their cartesian product X × Y}. As before we have
> two choices, either let L = (X, Y, graph(L)) or let “L” denote
> graph(L) and choose another name for the triple.

Nominalists prefer extensional definitions. But Peirce would
usually state intensional definitions (rules) for the functions
or relations he was considering.

Alonzo Church (1941) stated the intensional definition:
> A function is a rule of correspondence by which when anything is
> given (as argument) another thing (the value of the function for
> that argument) may be obtained. That is, a function is an operation
> which may be applied on one thing (the argument) to yield another
> thing (the value of the function).

For further discussion of the distinction between intensions
extensions, see pp. 1 to 3 of Church's book:
http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm

By the way, Church was not a nominalist. See the transcript of his
talk "On the ontological status of women and abstract entities":
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

In the long quote that I included in my last post, Peirce acknowledged that
the Sign sometimes *creates *its Object; but nevertheless, it remains the
case that the Object *determines *the Sign, which shows that Peirce's usage
of "determination" is not at all equivalent to *causation*.

CSP:  It may be asked, for example, how a lying or erroneous Sign is
determined by its Object, or how if, as not infrequently happens, the
Object is brought into existence by the Sign ... The Object of a Sign may
be something to be created by the sign ... The Object of the sentence
"Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it
is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command
"Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far
as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be
understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to
the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the
Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or
since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his
expectation. At any rate, it [the Object] determines the Sign although it
is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is
relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer. (CP 8.178; 1909)


What do you mean by "metrological potentials" or "metrological
considerations"?  How do they relate to the thread topic?  Would you mind
providing some examples?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 12:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon, List:
>
> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring?
>
> I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/
> antecedent /…
>
> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object
>> determines the Sign,
>>
>> The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object
> determines the sign is open.  The meaning is context dependent in normal
> linguistic usage.
>
> *In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the
> Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to
> determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the
> argument.)  *
>
> N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological
> sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical
> and mathematical disciplines.
>
> What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?
>
> My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference
> terms) that have meaning such that a message can be composed.
>
> In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering
> symbols infer metrological potentials.
>
> In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological
> considerations are often excluded.
>
> IMHO, of course.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon:
>>
>> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>
>>
>>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object
>> determines the Sign,
>>
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>>
>> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of
>> the interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>
>>
>> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary
>> hypothesis”;
>>
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
>>
>> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical
>> or scientific reasoning?
>>
>> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the
>> propositions you are proposing?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
>> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List, Jon:
>>>
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object
>>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>>>
>>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>>
>>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>>
>>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>>>
>>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, List:

> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring? 

I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/ 
antecedent /…

>> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object determines 
>> the Sign, 


The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object 
determines the sign is open.  The meaning is context dependent in normal 
linguistic usage.

In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the 
Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to 
determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the 
argument.)  

N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological 
sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical and 
mathematical disciplines.


> What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?
> 
My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference terms) 
that have meaning such that a message can be composed.  

In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering symbols 
infer metrological potentials.

In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological 
considerations are often excluded.

IMHO, of course.

Cheers

Jerry 





> Thanks,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Jon:
>> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> 
>>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object 
>> determines the Sign, 
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> 
>> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary hypothesis”; 
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
> 
> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical or 
> scientific reasoning?
> 
> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the 
> propositions you are proposing?  
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> 
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>> > wrote:
>> List, Jon:
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object 
>>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>> 
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> 
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> 
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>> 
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
>> range of metrologies.
>> 
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of 
>> interpretant while other measurements are essential to determining the 
>> identity of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
> 
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> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Kirsti: 
> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:51 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> Why would any pragmatic sign (even limited to science & techology 
> perspectives) be of natural kind? - Scientists and engineers do read and 
> write, do they not?

Perhaps we mis-understand one another. 

I wrote: 

It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:

1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
range of metrologies.

So, I think I agree with your perspective.

My intent was to avoid the multiplicity of philosophical / linguistic meanings 
associated with the concept of “object” / “objective".  So, by implication, a 
pragmatic object has actual existence / beingness. The assignment of 
purposefulness is arbitrary.

Equally important, the I sought to stress the dependency of the interpretant on 
the interpreter. That is, the mental object generated by the communication 
between the natural kind and the interpretive capacities of the interpreter 
such that a written symbol can be generated by voluntary action.

The interpretant can be symbolically expressed only in the symbol system that 
the interpreter has a competency. 

Cheers

jerry


> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 19.4.2017 17:33:
>> List, Jon:
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
>>>  wrote:
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the
>>> Object determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering
>> perspective:
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of
>> signs” by a range of metrologies.
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of
>> interpretant while other measurements are _ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINING
>> THE IDENTITY_ of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>> Cheers
>> Jerry
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A, John C, List,

Jon wrote:

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to
serve as a sign relation in one measure or another.


I would tend strongly to agree.

JA: In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are
present from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons
and indices so much as icons and indices devolve from their geI suspect you
are right, Jon.

Jon S and I have argued for this approach (3ns as ur-Continuity present in
the earliest cosmos, i.e., pre-Big Bang so to speak) as Peirce considers it
in the final lecture of 1898 RLT in the famous 'Blackboard' metaphor.

John C, who wrote that he suspects Jon S is correct in this matter of
triadic relations being 'there' from the get-go, added:

JC: I think this means that you would disagree with Terry Deacon’s
approach, which starts with icons and has the rest evolve.


I'm not sure I read Deacon exactly that way. While I found problems with
his first book, *The Symbolic Species*, and discussed some of these
problems (including this 'starting with icons') with him after a talk he
gave at ICCS U. of Alabama, Huntsville, a number of years ago, I don't see
his repeating those same errors in *Incomplete Nature*. However, I'm away
from my desk and do not have the book with me at the moment.

However, what I think you may be pointing to, John, is suggested by this
comment by Deacon (reproduced in a review of the book by Robert Logan--all
quotations below are from this long review and precis.
See: file:///C:/Users/Gary/Downloads/information-03-00290%20(1).pdf)

The core hypothesis of this book is that all teleodynamic phenomena
necessarily depend upon, and emerge from, simpler morphodynamic and
homeodynamic [i.e., thermodynamic] processes (p. 487).

What Logan calls Deacon's 'triality' (as opposed to 'duality') takes the
following form of levels built upon levels:


RL: Each level of interaction gives rise to a different set of properties
or behaviors of matter and hence I suggest that if Deacon is right (and I
believe he is) then we are possibly dealing with property “triality” not
property duality, with three distinct property domains of matter, namely,

(1)  the thermodynamic dissipation of order as exemplified by an ideal gas;
(2)  inanimate, non-self-maintaining self-organization (or morphodynamics)
as exemplified by crystal formation and Bénard cells; (3)  self-organizing
and self-maintaining systems as exemplified by all living teleodynamic
organisms.


But with Deacon's concerns in this book we are very far from "the get go"
at this point in the evolution of the cosmos, nor is he dealing directly
with semiosis, icons, indices, symbols and the rest. While even Peirce
(this in reference to (2) above) for example, saw even crystal formation as
a triadic process.

Still, I will want to re-read parts of *Incomplete Nature *to see if Deacon
writes specifically of an iconic basis for all that follow. So thanks for
the hint, John.

Perhas, as does Logan, what I admire most about Deacon's book is its
emphasis on the need for a return to values in science. As Logan writes:

As Deacon points out despite all the achievements of science to understand
our physical universe science has

"at the same time conceived the realm of value as radically alienated from
this seeming complete understanding of the fabric of existence …. The
removal of any approach to value from a scientific perspective is the
ultimate expression of having accepted the presumed necessity of that
elective surgery" (p. 544).


Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:36 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> I suspect you are right, Jon. I think this means that you would disagree
> with Terry Deacon’s approach, which starts with icons and has the rest
> evolve. Perhaps the origin of the first third *is* the beginning. Nothing
> is outside of that. That would be a bit like some gnostic views.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 19 April 2017 7:00 PM
> *To:* Gary Richmond 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
> interaction
>
>
>
> Gary, all ...
>
>
>
> I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of
> the universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential
> to serve as a sign relation in one measure or another.
>
>
>
> In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are
> present from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons
> and indices so much as icons and indices devolve from their generic
> precursors in the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}The Church definition of a function is exactly why I define the
semiosic  triadic process as a function, where the Object [Argument] 
is mediated by the Representamen/Function to provide the Interpretant
[value].

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 20/04/17  9:14 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jon, 
 That is an extensional definition of a relation: 
 > Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation 
 > “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified
by 
 > three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular 
 > subset of their cartesian product X × Y}.  As before we have 
 > two choices, either let L = (X, Y, graph(L)) or let “L” denote

 > graph(L) and choose another name for the triple. 
 Nominalists prefer extensional definitions.  But Peirce would 
 usually state intensional definitions (rules) for the functions 
 or relations he was considering. 
 Alonzo Church (1941) stated the intensional definition: 
 > A function is a rule of correspondence by which when anything is 
 > given (as argument) another thing (the value of the function for 
 > that argument) may be obtained. That is, a function is an
operation 
 > which may be applied on one thing (the argument) to yield another 
 > thing (the value of the function). 
 For further discussion of the distinction between intensions 
 extensions, see pp. 1 to 3 of Church's book: 
 http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm [1] 
 By the way, Church was not a nominalist.  See the transcript of his 
 talk "On the ontological status of women and abstract entities":  
 http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm [2] 
 John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jfsowa.com%2Flogic%2Falonzo.htm
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jfsowa.com%2Fontology%2Fchurch.htm

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: The object of reasoning is to find out ...

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

Here is the prettified blog version,
with links and references filled in:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/04/20/the-object-of-reasoning-is-to-find-out/

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

That is an extensional definition of a relation:


Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation
“L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by
three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular
subset of their cartesian product X × Y}.  As before we have
two choices, either let L = (X, Y, graph(L)) or let “L” denote
graph(L) and choose another name for the triple.


Nominalists prefer extensional definitions.  But Peirce would
usually state intensional definitions (rules) for the functions
or relations he was considering.

Alonzo Church (1941) stated the intensional definition:

A function is a rule of correspondence by which when anything is
given (as argument) another thing (the value of the function for
that argument) may be obtained. That is, a function is an operation
which may be applied on one thing (the argument) to yield another
thing (the value of the function).


For further discussion of the distinction between intensions
extensions, see pp. 1 to 3 of Church's book:
http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/alonzo.htm

By the way, Church was not a nominalist.  See the transcript of his
talk "On the ontological status of women and abstract entities": 
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/church.htm


John

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[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Manuscripts (was Dyadic relations within the triadic)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

"MS" is just a standard abbreviation for manuscript.  Robin assigned
numbers to Peirce's many manuscripts while preparing his catalogue back in
the 1960s, so some (myself included) prefer to reference them with "R" for
Robin.  The catalogue itself is online at
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/robin/robin.htm.  As you will see, it is
organized topically, and each entry has a brief description of the
contents, as well as a known or estimated date of composition.  R 612 has
Peirce's title, "Common Ground," is dated November 1908, and includes among
its contents, "Definition of 'determination.'"

Jeff's worthy project seeks to transcribe many of the later manuscripts
that have not yet been published in the Writings.  The introductory
paragraph at https://www.fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16
includes a link to the transcription guidelines.  I think it would be
fantastic if more List participants could get involved in this effort.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 11:11 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Mike,
>
> See the Robin catalogue and the introductions to the CP and the W. The
> editors provide fairly detailed explanations. Also see the
> published articles by the editors, including those by Nathan Houser and
> André, and the information avaible online--such as through Arisbe and at
> the Houghton Library where the archives are kept.
>
> Others may have more to add.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
> --
> *From:* Mike Bergman 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 19, 2017 8:17 PM
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Hi Jeff,
>
> Thank you. I now realize that MS refers to this project. I appreciate the
> links to retrieve citations in the future.
>
> I see that MS 611-15 is from 1908 and is untitled. Is there more to
> establish its provenance? Is there a link that describes the correspondence
> between MS numbering and actual pages; I see there are about 135 in this
> set alone. And, also, what is the authority by which the MS prefix is
> granted, or is that simply by practice?
>
> I hope to be able to contribute to this site myself at some point. Is
> there a general intro for noobies?
>
> Again, thanks for clarifying.
>
> Mike
>
> On 4/19/2017 7:53 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
> Hi Mike,
>
> The relevant portion of the MS is dozens of pages long--and they haven't
> yet been transcribed accurately or completely.  Feel free to join in the
> effort.
>
> You can access all of the MS through this site and through the link Ben
> provided earlier:
>
> See:  https://www.fromthepage.com/display/read_work?work_id=149
> MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) | FromThePage
> 
> www.fromthepage.com
> MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) - read work. MS 611-15
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php?login=true
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
> --
> *From:* Mike Bergman  
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 19, 2017 4:42 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Hi Jeff, List,
>
> When you or others on the list make reference to sources such as MS 612
> (or, frankly, other sources than CP), it would be helpful to provide
> relevant quotations, edited for length. Has there been a list policy on
> this before?
>
> I've been trying to assemble a no- or low-cost library of Peirce
> materials, and it is hard to be even relatively complete.
>
> Thanks!
>
> Mike
>
>

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