Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind
Supp-supplement: Corrections: - Eukaryotes, not Prokaryotes. - Quasi-utterer, Quasi-interpreter versus utterer, interpreter: I don´t know which would be which, but one would be the individual, and the other the whole classification chain. - Complete individuation: Not possible. Even Obelix feared the sky to fall on his head (nature). Supplement: In the post below you may replace "sign" with "mind" or "piece of mind", depending on which suits where better. I don´t see a necessity to distinguish "mind" from "quasi-mind", so no necessity to say "quasi" at all. I only said "quasi-symbol" to force to distinguish it from the commonly agreed concept of "symbol" that bases on convention, and to call natural laws conventions would be far fetched. I would like to amplify the "symbol" concept towards convention, habit, law, but I cannot do that just so, right now. I am not competent enough as a term-designer (terminator?) List, I think, that every sign is an argument. Everything that happens aka every sign has a reason, thus contains a "because", which makes it an argument. The quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter are each not only the respective individual, but the whole classification chain, such as: (nature(organisms(prokaryotes(animals(multicellers(segmented animals(insects(bees(individual bee). The symbolicity can ly in each of the sets. If a bee is slain by a meteor, it is in nature, with force (attraction between masses) as a quasi-symbol. If a bee takes a cheating orchid flower for a mating partner, the symbolicity and the "because" lies somewhere in the DNAs of the co-evolution of orchids and bees. The symbolicity of human language means, that nature has handed down most genuity aspects of the sign to the individuals, or, that they have conquered it in their biological and cultural evolution. It may be seen both ways. So, genuinity or degeneracy is not a matter of completeness or incompleteness of a sign, but a matter of more or less complete individualization of the quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter. Best, Helmut 17. Februar 2018 um 04:52 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and provides the context for, Gary's second selection. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind. (CP 4.550) 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet, upon which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any manner (even though they be incised) can be erased. (CP 4.553) 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the g
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind
Supplement: In the post below you may replace "sign" with "mind" or "piece of mind", depending on which suits where better. I don´t see a necessity to distinguish "mind" from "quasi-mind", so no necessity to say "quasi" at all. I only said "quasi-symbol" to force to distinguish it from the commonly agreed concept of "symbol" that bases on convention, and to call natural laws conventions would be far fetched. I would like to amplify the "symbol" concept towards convention, habit, law, but I cannot do that just so, right now. I am not competent enough as a term-designer (terminator?) List, I think, that every sign is an argument. Everything that happens aka every sign has a reason, thus contains a "because", which makes it an argument. The quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter are each not only the respective individual, but the whole classification chain, such as: (nature(organisms(prokaryotes(animals(multicellers(segmented animals(insects(bees(individual bee). The symbolicity can ly in each of the sets. If a bee is slain by a meteor, it is in nature, with force (attraction between masses) as a quasi-symbol. If a bee takes a cheating orchid flower for a mating partner, the symbolicity and the "because" lies somewhere in the DNAs of the co-evolution of orchids and bees. The symbolicity of human language means, that nature has handed down most genuity aspects of the sign to the individuals, or, that they have conquered it in their biological and cultural evolution. It may be seen both ways. So, genuinity or degeneracy is not a matter of completeness or incompleteness of a sign, but a matter of more or less complete individualization of the quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter. Best, Helmut 17. Februar 2018 um 04:52 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and provides the context for, Gary's second selection. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind. (CP 4.550) 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet, upon which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any manner (even though they be incised) can be erased. (CP 4.553) 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389) 5. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the inter
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind
List, I think, that every sign is an argument. Everything that happens aka every sign has a reason, thus contains a "because", which makes it an argument. The quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter are each not only the respective individual, but the whole classification chain, such as: (nature(organisms(prokaryotes(animals(multicellers(segmented animals(insects(bees(individual bee). The symbolicity can ly in each of the sets. If a bee is slain by a meteor, it is in nature, with force (attraction between masses) as a quasi-symbol. If a bee takes a cheating orchid flower for a mating partner, the symbolicity and the "because" lies somewhere in the DNAs of the co-evolution of orchids and bees. The symbolicity of human language means, that nature has handed down most genuity aspects of the sign to the individuals, or, that they have conquered it in their biological and cultural evolution. It may be seen both ways. So, genuinity or degeneracy is not a matter of completeness or incompleteness of a sign, but a matter of more or less complete individualization of the quasi-utterer and the quasi-interpreter. Best, Helmut 17. Februar 2018 um 04:52 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and provides the context for, Gary's second selection. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind. (CP 4.550) 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby becomes the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, being a Seme of The Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the Phemic Sheet, upon which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any manner (even though they be incised) can be erased. (CP 4.553) 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389) 5. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions. It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind;
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind
List: Still attempting to avoid any interpretive commentary just yet, here is what those quotes tell us about Quasi-minds, in their likely order of composition. - EP 2:389 - Every Sign, or nearly every Sign, is a determination of a Quasi-mind. - EP 2:391 - The Object determines the Sign only in the respect that enables the Sign to act upon the interpreting Quasi-mind as if the Object itself were acting upon it. - EP 2:391 - A Sign is best regarded as a determination of a Quasi-mind, rather than as an outward object that addresses itself to a Quasi-mind. - EP 2:544n22 - A Sign is a medium for communication of a Form among at least two (if not three) Quasi-minds. - EP 2:544n22 - Quasi-minds are things capable of varied determination as to Forms of the kind communicated, but it is not logically necessary that they possess consciousness. - EP 2:545n25 - A Quasi-mind is a perfect Sign, the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs which its occurrence carries with it. - EP 2:545n25 - A Quasi-mind is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs. - EP 2:545n25 - A Quasi-mind is, like anything else, susceptible to determination in a certain way; and each such determination is an event occurring once for all and never again. - SS 195 - Every Sign must be a determination of a Quasi-mind, which is itself a determinable Sign, even if that Quasi-mind is one's future self. - CP 4.536 - A Sign produces an Interpretant in the Quasi-mind that is its interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, exertion, or Sign. - CP 4.550 - Whatever represents The Truth in our Diagram must be regarded as the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on it. - CP 4.550 - Signs so connected that a complex of two of them can have one Interpretant are the determinations of one Sign, which is a Quasi-mind. - CP 4.551 - Connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, and there are no isolated Signs. - CP 4.551 - Every Sign requires at least two distinct Quasi-minds, a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter, which are at one (welded) in the Sign itself. - CP 4.553 - The Phemic Sheet is the Quasi-mind, which is determined by the Graph-instances scribed on it, and in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one. - CP 4.553 - This Quasi-mind is a Seme of The Truth, the widest Universe of Reality, and a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter. Peirce wrote all of these passages during the early months of 1906--the EP manuscripts in January, the SS letter in March, and the CP article in May (published in October). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that they are mutually consistent, and attempt to ascertain *his *concept of a Quasi-mind accordingly. Combining and rearranging the information above--and thus finally injecting a little bit of interpretation on my part--yields the following condensed version. 1. A Quasi-mind is a *perfect *Sign, the aggregate or complex of all Signs that have previously determined it, which are so connected that they can have *one *Interpretant. 2. A Quasi-mind is a *determinable *Sign, capable of varied determination as to Forms of the kind communicated by a Sign, but not necessarily *conscious*. 3. Every such determination of a Quasi-mind is an *event *that occurs once for all and never again. 4. A Sign cannot be isolated, but is *always *connected to other Signs, and thus *must *have a Quasi-mind. 5. A Sign in fact requires at least* two* distinct Quasi-minds, its utterer and its interpreter, which are at one (welded) in the Sign itself. 6. A Sign is a medium for communication of a Form *between *these Quasi-minds, which may be past and future versions of the *same * Quasi-mind. 7. A Sign is determined by its Object *only *in the respect that enables it to act upon a Quasi-mind (its interpreter) *as if* the Object itself were acting upon that Quasi-mind. 8. A Sign is the determination of a Quasi-mind (its interpreter) to produce a feeling, exertion, or other Sign *as *its Interpretant. 9. A Sign is best regarded as this *determination *of a Quasi-mind (its interpreter), rather than as an outward *Object *that addresses itself to that Quasi-mind. 10. For Existential Graphs, the sheet of assertion or Phemic Sheet that represents *The Truth* is the Quasi-mind of all Signs scribed on it, in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one. 11. This Quasi-mind is a *Seme *[Rheme] of the widest Universe of Reality, and a *Pheme *[Dicisign] of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter. Does anything here seem incongruent with the original quotes, or have I accurately summarized them? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonA
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 41
List, Peirce returned often to the subject of relations between logic and mathematics. Defining mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" implies that "necessary reasoning" is essentially mathematical. As Peirce explains here, that's because the premisses in a mathematical argument are mere assumptions and are not taken as facts or truths about the real world. Statements of fact are probable (i.e. testable), so no necessary conclusion can follow from them. The necessity of a conclusion is that it really follows from the premisses, regardless of whether the state of things they describe is factual or wholly imaginary. The unusual feature of this passage is Peirce's reply to the objection "that much necessary reasoning is not at all mathematical." Peirce's counter-claim is that necessary reasoning is always mathematical, but is often not recognized as such by people (even good reasoners) who have an inadequate notion of what mathematics is, "owing to bad instruction." These people have been scared away from mathematical symbolism and therefore don't recognize their own necessary reasoning as "amenable to mathematical representation." Hence the importance of defining mathematics as Peirce does here. Gary f. From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 16-Feb-18 12:37 Here's the first instalment of the fourth Lowell Lecture of 1903. My transcription is of two manuscripts, Robin numbers 466 and 467. 467 is identified on its first page as Lecture 4, about the gamma part of existential graphs; but 466 is a bit of a puzzle, as it starts off "Ladies and Gentlemen," ends abruptly, doesn't connect coherently with 467, and doesn't seem to fit anywhere in the sequence. But it's interesting enough to be worth posting serially, I think. So that's where "Lowell 4" will begin. The MS is at https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-466-467-1903 -lowell-lecture-iv/display/13956 Gary f. Ladies and Gentlemen: Mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclusions. Such was the definition given first by my father as early as 1870. At that day, when the new mathematics was in its infancy, the novelty of this definition was disconcerting even to the profoundest mathematicians; but today nobody would propose a definition differing much from that. The only doubt that should entertain is whether we ought not to recognize as a part of mathematics, what is certainly a most important part of the mathematician's business, the formation of the assumptions on which his reasoning is to be based. Some of the mathematicians who have the most deeply studied the fundamentals of their science have even gone so far as to pronounce mathematics to be a branch of logic. Dedekind is one of these whose two little books published in one volume in translation by the Open Court Company, which is doing so much for American culture, I should strongly recommend to your attention. The fact that so profound a mathematician can hold this opinion is a sufficient justification of my devoting several lectures of this short course to a study of the nature of mathematics. I do not quite agree with Dedekind, myself; and I will tell you why presently. The question of whether mathematics was a branch of logic was the subject of careful discussion between my father and me at the time be had his definition under consideration. But first I had better notice an objection which will seem weighty to superficial minds. Namely, it will be said that much necessary reasoning is not at all mathematical. On that I take direct issue. Eminent jurists, moralists, and philosophers can be found whose powers of reasoning are famous, and who yet declare that they have no head for mathematics. This is, in part, a delusion owing to bad instruction which has given rise to such an aversion to everything that seems mathematical that as soon as one talks to them of x, y, z, they stop thinking. But what is also true of those persons is that they cannot hold clearly before their minds intricate relations between objects that are almost exactly alike except in respect to abstract relations. But when I ask one of those gentlemen to give me an example of a necessary reasoning that he considers not to be mathematical, it turns out to be one of those that are most readily amenable to mathematical representation, differing only from the reasoning he cannot grasp in its extreme simplicity. But that which conclusively stamps all necessary reasoning as mathematical is that in such reasoning, it makes not the slightest difference whether the premisses express observed facts (as strictly speaking they seldom do) or whether they describe wholly imaginary states of things. The conclusion follows as necessarily concerning the imaginary state of things as it would if that state of things had been observed. This, indeed, is precisely what the necessity of such reasoning consists in. For the purposes of the reasoning, therefore
