Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

Would a one who thinks universally not be a world spectator who agrees with
Pinker and others that things actually are improving? No conspiracy there.
Peirce might have been in the camp derisively called globalist if it aimed
at a world where greed is reined in and agapaic things are not scoffed at.


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:02 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> "world spectator"?
>
> I've never heard such a thing. That sounds crazy.
> Does anyone else know what it is and why it would even belongs on this
> list?
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry,
>>
>> Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
>> response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
>> "conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
>> You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
>> idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
>> of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
>> Really?
>>
>> Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
>> list.
>>
>> Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Dear list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That sounds like conspiracy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
>>> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Gene, list,

 You concluded:

 EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
 deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
 and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
 admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
 technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
 with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
 technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.


 I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been
 emphasizing.

 I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
 "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
 very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
 political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
 locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
 technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
 scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
 "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
 disagree.

 Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on
 a number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are
 causing global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and
 studies that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
  (1999). "Climate
 Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
 
 (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
 439–455.

 In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most
 part scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and
 greedy and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to
 support policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the
 detriment of the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind,
 water, etc.) The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of
 scientists who deny human caused global warming in service to their greed,
 power, and "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."

 But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
 scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
 unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
 the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
 That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
 for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
 science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
 did find the essential "wicked problems"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my
current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.

Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object.  The Matter is what
the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the Form is
what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*.  A pure
Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a pure
Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation.

Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant.  It is what the Sign *determines
*as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form,
corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth).  As you noted, the
latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only
their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*.

As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the
Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my
description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes."  This
is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign" (EP
2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the communication
of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM,  wrote:

> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in
> this thread.
>
> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much like
> an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course vital to
> triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate distinction
> in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon mentions in
> Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign *itself*--not its
> Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation)
> and Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination).” How then can
> an immediate *object *consist of “attributes” (or characters or
> predicates) of the Dynamic Object?
>
> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s
> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate
> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous
> predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in
> December 1909:
>
> [[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea
> that mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates, I
> call its "Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world
> between the *Object *of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some
> *collateral *experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all
> what it is that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that
> point simply fails to understand what I mean by the Object, and confounds
> it with the Interpretant. The latter is *all *that the sign *conveys. *The
> Object is the otherwise known something concerning which what it conveys
> relates. The distinction is a *real *distinction and yet it is *purely
> relative, *in the sense that the line of demarcation between the two can
> just as well be drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The point is that
> the artificiality of a line of demarcation does not prove that the *twoness
> *of the parts that line of demarcation may be regarded as separating does
> not correspond to any twoness *in re.*— RL 36 ]]
>
>
>
> So I have nothing more to say on that subject!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } In a consumer society there are inevitably two kinds of slaves: the
> prisoners of addiction and the prisoners of envy. [Ivan Illich] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Jerry Rhee]

"world spectator"?

I've never heard such a thing. That sounds crazy.
Does anyone else know what it is and why it would even belongs on this list?

Best,
Jerry R

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jerry,
>
> Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
> response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
> "conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
> You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
> idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
> of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
> Really?
>
> Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
> list.
>
> Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> That sounds like conspiracy.
>>
>>
>>
>> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>>
>>
>>
>> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
>> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Gene, list,
>>>
>>> You concluded:
>>>
>>> EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
>>> deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
>>> and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
>>> admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
>>> technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
>>> with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
>>> technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been
>>> emphasizing.
>>>
>>> I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
>>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
>>> very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
>>> political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
>>> locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
>>> technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
>>> scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
>>> "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
>>> disagree.
>>>
>>> Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
>>> number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
>>> global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
>>> that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
>>>  (1999). "Climate
>>> Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
>>> 
>>> (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
>>> 439–455.
>>>
>>> In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most
>>> part scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and
>>> greedy and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to
>>> support policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the
>>> detriment of the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind,
>>> water, etc.) The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of
>>> scientists who deny human caused global warming in service to their greed,
>>> power, and "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."
>>>
>>> But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
>>> scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
>>> unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
>>> the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
>>> That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
>>> for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
>>> science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
>>> did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
>>> political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
>>> view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
>>> science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of
>>> what we humans *ought* to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the
>>> world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and
>>> political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane
>>> good of science in

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry,

Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
"conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
Really?

Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
list.

Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> That sounds like conspiracy.
>
>
>
> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>
>
>
> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, list,
>>
>> You concluded:
>>
>> EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
>> deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
>> and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
>> admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
>> technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
>> with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
>> technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.
>>
>>
>> I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing.
>>
>> I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
>> very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
>> political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
>> locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
>> technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
>> scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
>> "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
>> disagree.
>>
>> Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
>> number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
>> global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
>> that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
>>  (1999). "Climate
>> Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
>> 
>> (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
>> 439–455.
>>
>> In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most part
>> scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy
>> and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support
>> policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of
>> the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.)
>> The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who
>> deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."
>>
>> But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
>> scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
>> unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
>> the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
>> That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
>> for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
>> science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
>> did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
>> political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
>> view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
>> science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of
>> what we humans *ought* to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the
>> world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and
>> political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane
>> good of science in the interest of their own greed. And how unfortunate
>> that so few can experience Nature in the direct way that even Peirce and
>> Whitman and the generation were still able to. How amazing it has been for
>> me when, far away from my beloved NYC, say in northern Michigan or central
>> Colorado, I've looked up to the sky and been able to see myria

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



That sounds like conspiracy.



Surely there is a better story to be told..



"world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.



Best,

Jerry R




On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gene, list,
>
> You concluded:
>
> EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
> deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
> and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
> admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
> technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
> with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
> technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.
>
>
> I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing.
>
> I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
> very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
> political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
> locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
> technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
> scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
> "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
> disagree.
>
> Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
> number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
> global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
> that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
>  (1999). "Climate Science:
> An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
> 
> (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
> 439–455.
>
> In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most part
> scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy
> and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support
> policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of
> the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.)
> The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who
> deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and
> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."
>
> But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
> scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
> unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
> the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players. That
> they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising for
> our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
> science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
> did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
> political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
> view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
> science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of
> what we humans *ought* to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the
> world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and
> political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane
> good of science in the interest of their own greed. And how unfortunate
> that so few can experience Nature in the direct way that even Peirce and
> Whitman and the generation were still able to. How amazing it has been for
> me when, far away from my beloved NYC, say in northern Michigan or central
> Colorado, I've looked up to the sky and been able to see myriad stars!
>
> As an aside notice that the "powers that be," at least in the US, have
> also undermined public education, stripping many, perhaps most school
> systems of opportunities for aesthetic education (the arts, music, etc.)
> and critical thinking (for example, the GOP platform in Texas a few years
> ago had a clause which stipulated that critical thinking *not* be taught
> in the schools), while what one might call an ethical education (which, in
> my view, builds upon aesthetic education and is facilitated by reflection
> and discussion around works of art, literature, philosophy--including
> philosophy of science--and, in my opinion, comparative religion, including
> in the US, First Nation spirituality) is almost entirely missing from
> American public education (itself under siege under the present
> administration).
>
> In addition, some of the most potent media in the USA ar

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

You concluded:

EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.


I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing.

I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
"crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
"deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
disagree.

Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
 (1999). "Climate Science:
An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science

(PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
439–455.

In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most part
scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy
and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support
policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of
the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.)
The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who
deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and
"crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."

But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players. That
they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising for
our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of
what we humans *ought* to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the
world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and
political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane
good of science in the interest of their own greed. And how unfortunate
that so few can experience Nature in the direct way that even Peirce and
Whitman and the generation were still able to. How amazing it has been for
me when, far away from my beloved NYC, say in northern Michigan or central
Colorado, I've looked up to the sky and been able to see myriad stars!

As an aside notice that the "powers that be," at least in the US, have also
undermined public education, stripping many, perhaps most school systems of
opportunities for aesthetic education (the arts, music, etc.) and critical
thinking (for example, the GOP platform in Texas a few years ago had a
clause which stipulated that critical thinking *not* be taught in the
schools), while what one might call an ethical education (which, in my
view, builds upon aesthetic education and is facilitated by reflection and
discussion around works of art, literature, philosophy--including
philosophy of science--and, in my opinion, comparative religion, including
in the US, First Nation spirituality) is almost entirely missing from
American public education (itself under siege under the present
administration).

In addition, some of the most potent media in the USA are owned and
operated by those in league with the political-economic powers mentioned
above, so that much of the population seems, well, almost brain-washed by
the propaganda and "alternative facts" thrown at them every day such that
they, for example, often vote against their own best interests. And all
this too is, I believe, anticipated in a close reading of certain of
Peirce's writings, including those on education, because he saw it *well on
its w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sounds like we are pretty much agreed, John. I have posited that we have
about a century to get things right and that would include leeching science
of nominalism and I would add binary proclivities. Peirce and Abbot were
staunch realists who are one in moving metaphysics into a configuration
that would have made it amenable to the stringent demands of the
pragmaticist maxim. My background is on the liberal side of American
religion and I can suggest that Peirce and Abbot would have felt just as
alienated as I have by what has passed for liberalism even in its
Niebuhrian garb. The theological makeover desired by both men would have
led them inexorably toward both universalism and nonviolence and away from
the creedal messianism that continues to hold sway. The late Gene Sharp
would have appealed to both men.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Stephen and Helmut,
>
> SCR
>
>> I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown.
>>
>
> I did not say 'breakdown'.  I said 'fragmentation'.
>
> SCR
>
>> The civilization the two men aimed at philosophically is an
>> integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with science,
>> arriving at a post-religious spirituality. Of course it builds
>> on the past, but not all of it.
>>
>
> That is certainly what Peirce was aiming at.  From your citation
> of Abbot's defense, he seems to have similar hopes.
>
> But the "Unified Science" that Carnap & Co. were trying to achieve
> in the 1930s was nominalism at its most pernicious.  He used the
> phrase "That's poetry!" to denounce any kind of value judgments
> -- or any concept that resembled Thirdness.
>
> I recall one anecdote about a student who came to the first lecture
> of a philosophy class taught by a highly regarded logician.  At the
> end of the lecture, the student raised his hand and timidly asked
> a question:  "Professor, when will we get to the meaning of life?"
> The professor glared at him, pointed to the door, and shouted "OUT!"
>
> For evidence of fragmentation, the political sphere is the worst,
> and it's affecting every aspect of our daily lives.
>
> I would not agree that [Abbot] had wide influence or even that
>> he could have had.
>>
>
> I did not say that he had.  I said that he had a position as pastor,
> which gave him a weekly opportunity to preach to his congregation.
> I don't know his personal style, but I suspect it was more preachy
> than sympathetic.  Any teacher who listens to the students could
> get an excellent education in how to communicate.
>
> From reading Peirce's writings chronologically, one can see that much
> of his best writings came after his travels abroad, his occasional
> lecture series, and the few years he taught at Johns Hopkins.  I also
> believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby was a very important
> influence on getting him to clarify and systematize his insights.
>
> Since I don't know much about Abbot, I can't say anything certain.
> But I do know colleagues who started with an abysmal teaching style,
> listened to feedback from their students, and revised their methods
> to the point where they became very popular as teachers.  One extreme
> example is James Martin, who made a fortune as a lecturer and author:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Martin_(author)
>
> Martin was no genius.  But he listened to students and colleagues.
> After ten years of teaching IBM employees, he developed his style,
> published some popular textbooks, and took a leave of absence from
> IBM to go on a world-wide tour -- from which he earned more money
> than he ever got from IBM.  So he never went back.
>
> HR
>
>> I like Abbot very much, especially for showing progressive or
>> enlightened people a way to worship god and divinity, instead
>> of having to become atheists like Dawkins. Abbot is literally
>> a soul-saver, I think.
>>
>
> Perhaps so.  But I think he could have been more successful in saving
> souls and himself if he had listened to the people in his congregation.
> Like the people who heard him preach, Abbot started with a Christian
> background.  Instead of alienating people, he could have listened
> sympathetically.  As Unitarians, they would have been happy to hear
> how their Judeo-Christian background was related to other religions.
>
> If Abbot had listened to their complaints, he could have included
> more Christian and Jewish stories and proverbs in his sermons without
> in any way compromising his own beliefs.  He could have gradually
> broadened his perspective while increasing his audience instead of
> losing it -- and falling into the despair that led to suicide.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[John F Sowa]

Stephen and Helmut,

SCR

I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown.


I did not say 'breakdown'.  I said 'fragmentation'.

SCR

The civilization the two men aimed at philosophically is an
integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with science,
arriving at a post-religious spirituality. Of course it builds
on the past, but not all of it. 


That is certainly what Peirce was aiming at.  From your citation
of Abbot's defense, he seems to have similar hopes.

But the "Unified Science" that Carnap & Co. were trying to achieve
in the 1930s was nominalism at its most pernicious.  He used the
phrase "That's poetry!" to denounce any kind of value judgments
-- or any concept that resembled Thirdness.

I recall one anecdote about a student who came to the first lecture
of a philosophy class taught by a highly regarded logician.  At the
end of the lecture, the student raised his hand and timidly asked
a question:  "Professor, when will we get to the meaning of life?"
The professor glared at him, pointed to the door, and shouted "OUT!"

For evidence of fragmentation, the political sphere is the worst,
and it's affecting every aspect of our daily lives.


I would not agree that [Abbot] had wide influence or even that
he could have had.


I did not say that he had.  I said that he had a position as pastor,
which gave him a weekly opportunity to preach to his congregation.
I don't know his personal style, but I suspect it was more preachy
than sympathetic.  Any teacher who listens to the students could
get an excellent education in how to communicate.

From reading Peirce's writings chronologically, one can see that much
of his best writings came after his travels abroad, his occasional
lecture series, and the few years he taught at Johns Hopkins.  I also
believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby was a very important
influence on getting him to clarify and systematize his insights.

Since I don't know much about Abbot, I can't say anything certain.
But I do know colleagues who started with an abysmal teaching style,
listened to feedback from their students, and revised their methods
to the point where they became very popular as teachers.  One extreme
example is James Martin, who made a fortune as a lecturer and author:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Martin_(author)

Martin was no genius.  But he listened to students and colleagues.
After ten years of teaching IBM employees, he developed his style,
published some popular textbooks, and took a leave of absence from
IBM to go on a world-wide tour -- from which he earned more money
than he ever got from IBM.  So he never went back.

HR

I like Abbot very much, especially for showing progressive or
enlightened people a way to worship god and divinity, instead
of having to become atheists like Dawkins. Abbot is literally
a soul-saver, I think.


Perhaps so.  But I think he could have been more successful in saving
souls and himself if he had listened to the people in his congregation.
Like the people who heard him preach, Abbot started with a Christian
background.  Instead of alienating people, he could have listened
sympathetically.  As Unitarians, they would have been happy to hear
how their Judeo-Christian background was related to other religions.

If Abbot had listened to their complaints, he could have included
more Christian and Jewish stories and proverbs in his sermons without
in any way compromising his own beliefs.  He could have gradually
broadened his perspective while increasing his audience instead of
losing it -- and falling into the despair that led to suicide.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Gary R.,
 Yes, thanks, you understood my critique and likely difference of
opinion.
 From my point of view your response, like that of many Peirceans, and
sci-tech proponents more generally, takes an ideal of what science and
technology should be as an excuse to deny their actual complicity in the
delusion of limitless development of human-all-too-human purposes that has
brought us to the likelihood of an emerging collapse. The greed, power, and
especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not
simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are
essential features of the system, despite the many admirable individuals
within it. That is why actually existing science and technology represent
possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world with humans still a
part of it, and why actually existing science and technology must be
critically confronted as part of the problem.
  Gene


On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:27 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gene, list,
>
> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>
> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
> overpopulated earth.
>  Such is man's glory!
>
>
> You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
> comment. All​
> ​
> ​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive*
> results of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
> incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
> well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
> been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
> application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)
>
> However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
> earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
> power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
> can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
> haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
> that's because of greed, etc.)
>
> Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
> replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
> books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
> there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
> computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
> technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than the
> greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that you
> wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.
>
> In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
> matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
> technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
> too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
> population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
> which they have almost unlimited control.
> Best,
> Gary
>  ​
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen. list,

SR: I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
reading of the lectures is in question.


While the 1898 Cambridge lecture series--which Kirsti explicitly referred
to--doesn't express his "despair," there is little doubt that Peirce in
such places as the quotation your offered, which is *not* from this lecture
series but from the essay "Evolutionary Love," did see the Gospel of Greed
as having supplanted the Gospel of Love in American political economy.

As for my own thoughts on this supplanting, see my response today to Gene
Halton's post.

I am happy to hear that you don't think that my reading of the *Reasoning
and the Logic of Thing*s isn't in question, but we'll see about that since
Kirsti referenced *that* lecture series and not "Evolutionary Love."

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:25 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
> reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
> reading of the lectures is in question. It would be fairly easy to go
> through CP and pick and choose a small quilt of expressions that amount to
> a sort of despair about American culture or a critique of her theology--
> greed and such.
> *"Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is this:
> Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the
> fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between
> men, and leads to the summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort.
> Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to
> say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy,
> the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. But the study of
> doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily encourage
> generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has encouraged
> necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to
> economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the
> beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment,
> until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that
> greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the
> evolution of the universe.* " 6.290
>
> On a more encouraging note, "*In general, God is perpetually creating us,
> that is developing our real manhood, our spiritual reality. Like a good
> teacher, He is engaged in detaching us from a False dependence upon Him."
> 6.507*
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 12:51 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Kirsti, list,
>>
>> You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:
>>
>> KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his
>> true views on science and vitally important matters.
>>
>> ​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see
>> any "despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my
>> interpretation of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis
>> and feel confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
>> offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
>> but from many sources.
>>
>> But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them
>> so often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce
>> claimed he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the
>> structure and content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps
>> the principal theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of
>> despair at all, but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he
>> explicitly argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair
>> whatsoever in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely
>> positive estimate of both within their own provinces.
>>
>> So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
>> offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
>> with no basis in fact.
>>
>> KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe
>>
>> I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
>> moment I have confidence that my view is supported not only by Peirce's
>> discussion in the 1898 lectures, but in *many* other places in his work,
>> as always, and in the spirit of Peirce, I would be delighted to have you
>> prove me wrong. Then I'd have learned something I hadn't known and
>> corrected an error in my thinking. Peirce called this approach 'Critical
>> Commonsensism', and commented that his Pragmatism could be thought of as
>> but a development of it.
>>
>> Bes

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"

Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
overpopulated earth.
 Such is man's glory!


You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
comment. All​
​
​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive* results
of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)

However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
that's because of greed, etc.)

Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than the
greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that you
wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.

In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
which they have almost unlimited control.

Best,

Gary
 ​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>
> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
> overpopulated earth.
>  Such is man's glory!
>  Gene H
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
reading of the lectures is in question. It would be fairly easy to go
through CP and pick and choose a small quilt of expressions that amount to
a sort of despair about American culture or a critique of her theology--
greed and such.
*"Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is this:
Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the
fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between
men, and leads to the summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort.
Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to
say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy,
the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. But the study of
doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily encourage
generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has encouraged
necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to
economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the
beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment,
until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that
greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the
evolution of the universe.* " 6.290

On a more encouraging note, "*In general, God is perpetually creating us,
that is developing our real manhood, our spiritual reality. Like a good
teacher, He is engaged in detaching us from a False dependence upon Him."
6.507*


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 12:51 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Kirsti, list,
>
> You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:
>
> KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his
> true views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> ​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see
> any "despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my
> interpretation of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis
> and feel confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
> offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
> but from many sources.
>
> But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them so
> often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce claimed
> he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the structure and
> content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps the principal
> theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of despair at all,
> but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he explicitly
> argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair whatsoever
> in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely positive
> estimate of both within their own provinces.
>
> So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
> offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
> with no basis in fact.
>
> KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe
>
> I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
> moment I have confidence that my view is supported not only by Peirce's
> discussion in the 1898 lectures, but in *many* other places in his work,
> as always, and in the spirit of Peirce, I would be delighted to have you
> prove me wrong. Then I'd have learned something I hadn't known and
> corrected an error in my thinking. Peirce called this approach 'Critical
> Commonsensism', and commented that his Pragmatism could be thought of as
> but a development of it.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:
>
>> Gary R.
>>
>> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
>> views on science and vitally important matters.
>>
>> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>>
>> Kirsti
>>
>> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>>
>>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>>
>>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
 facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
 reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
 deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
 admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
 tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
 _

>>>
>>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>>
>>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>>> of a jury, now is it?
>>>
>>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderato

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut, list:

Yes, the interpreter is also a Sign [semiosic triad] and part of the
phaneron. ..which is made up of these triadic Signs in constant
interaction with other triadic SignsThis semiosic action 'makes'
matter, so to speak. It 'forms' matter-as-mind.

Peirce wrote that the Relation between nodes is a dyad, [I don't
have time at the moment to look it up]...BUT, this relation
Functions..within the semiosic triad. So- it's not really as linear
as you fear; the Relation between one 'thing' and another 'thing' may
seem at first glance to be a simple dyadic contact, but the processing
of that interaction is usually triadic. Otherwise - nothing would
happen.

Edwina
 On Sat 03/03/18 12:14 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, yes, Peirce wrote about the interpreter. On the other
hand there is his phaneron quote (I dont find it), where he writes
that if one asks to whose mind a sign is present, he would not
entertain a doubt, that it is present to all minds (to the phaneron).
  But maybe this seeming contradiction can be solved by saying that
the interpreter is a sign too, and as such part of the phaneron.
He/she just is a very slow sign, and this slow scale identifies
him/her as something that may be called "interpreter". Like
(analogy:) matter is effete mind, and this effeteness makes this
piece of mind something that may be called "matter", though it still
is mind.   In the "network" metaphor I have missed the triadic
aspect. A string between two nodes seemed like a dyadic picture to
me. But maybe the string is not depicting the relation, but a node
with three strings going away from it, like in the logic of
relations. My bias against the term is based on my fear, that
digitalism replaces concepts like "friendship" with it.   Best,
Helmut   02. März 2018 um 22:28 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut - with regard to the word 'Interpreter' - that's a direct
quote from Peirce. 

 And after all, in his reference to a Quasi-mind, Peirce refers to
an 'utterer' and an interpreter..."there can be no isolated sign.
Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter; and although the two are at one [i.e., are one
mind] in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the
Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a
fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every
logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" 4.551. 

That is - semiosis is a Relational process; it is interactional
[there can be no isolated sign] ...I read the above that, in a
dialogue of at least two agents, an utterer and an interpreter...even
if they agree on the interpretation [and are of 'one mind']...the
requirement for relation, for interaction...is vital. 

As for 'networking' - heh - I can't help you out with your bias
against the term - but - think of it as interaction, as
interconnections, as free links, and necessary links - and optional
links - and so on. 

Edwina 
 On Fri 02/03/18 4:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
  Edwina, List, you have introduced two things: The interpreter, and a
network. Interpreter: I had thought, that Peirce´s theory does not
require identifying an interpreter. Network: I aways had taken this
term for a mechanistic metaphor Silicon Valley nerds use to replace
with algorhithms things they do not understand. But sorry! I admit
allergy against certain terms: My problem only, don´t take offence!
Best, Helmut  Freitag, 02. März 2018 um 21:49 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 Jon, list, 

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only
to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where
and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis? 

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation
between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this
Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization: 
i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I
divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. . 

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic
objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus
depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition
of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335... 

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a
mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction
functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the
Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral
component of the 'Sign/representamen'. 

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do.
There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in
the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I
semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpret

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:

KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
views on science and vitally important matters.

​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see any
"despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my interpretation
of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis and feel
confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
but from many sources.

But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them so
often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce claimed
he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the structure and
content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps the principal
theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of despair at all,
but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he explicitly
argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair whatsoever
in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely positive
estimate of both within their own provinces.

So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
with no basis in fact.

KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe

I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
moment I have confidence that my view is supported not only by Peirce's
discussion in the 1898 lectures, but in *many* other places in his work, as
always, and in the spirit of Peirce, I would be delighted to have you prove
me wrong. Then I'd have learned something I hadn't known and corrected an
error in my thinking. Peirce called this approach 'Critical Commonsensism',
and commented that his Pragmatism could be thought of as but a development
of it.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
> views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>
>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>> _
>>>
>>
>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>
>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>> of a jury, now is it?
>>
>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>
>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>
>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
>> theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
>> (CP 1.634).
>>
>> Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . .
>> has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637),
>> and it is best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly
>> untrammeled a scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's
>> concluded this discussion of topics of vital importance being little
>> aided by our vain power of reason (witness the ju

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Edwina,

yes, Peirce wrote about the interpreter. On the other hand there is his phaneron quote (I dont find it), where he writes that if one asks to whose mind a sign is present, he would not entertain a doubt, that it is present to all minds (to the phaneron).

 

But maybe this seeming contradiction can be solved by saying that the interpreter is a sign too, and as such part of the phaneron. He/she just is a very slow sign, and this slow scale identifies him/her as something that may be called "interpreter". Like (analogy:) matter is effete mind, and this effeteness makes this piece of mind something that may be called "matter", though it still is mind.

 

In the "network" metaphor I have missed the triadic aspect. A string between two nodes seemed like a dyadic picture to me. But maybe the string is not depicting the relation, but a node with three strings going away from it, like in the logic of relations.

My bias against the term is based on my fear, that digitalism replaces concepts like "friendship" with it.

 

Best, Helmut


 02. März 2018 um 22:28 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut - with regard to the word 'Interpreter' - that's a direct quote from Peirce.

 And after all, in his reference to a Quasi-mind, Peirce refers to an 'utterer' and an interpreter..."there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although the two are at one [i.e., are one mind] in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" 4.551.

That is - semiosis is a Relational process; it is interactional [there can be no isolated sign] ...I read the above that, in a dialogue of at least two agents, an utterer and an interpreter...even if they agree on the interpretation [and are of 'one mind']...the requirement for relation, for interaction...is vital.

As for 'networking' - heh - I can't help you out with your bias against the term - but - think of it as interaction, as interconnections, as free links, and necessary links - and optional links - and so on.

Edwina


 

On Fri 02/03/18 4:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

Edwina, List,

you have introduced two things: The interpreter, and a network. Interpreter: I had thought, that Peirce´s theory does not require identifying an interpreter. Network: I aways had taken this term for a mechanistic metaphor Silicon Valley nerds use to replace with algorhithms things they do not understand. But sorry! I admit allergy against certain terms: My problem only, don´t take offence! Best, Helmut


Freitag, 02. März 2018 um 21:49 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 





Jon, list,

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization:  i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. .

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral component of the 'Sign/representamen'.

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do. There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that mediate process.

Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate Object-Representamen...is producing in 'the Quasi-mind/Interpretera feeling. Or an action/exertion. Or - Thirdness/a concept...all of which can be expressed as 'the Interpretant'.

4. And I read this differently from you: " For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one inter

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[gnox]

Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in this 
thread. 

My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much like an 
interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course vital to triadic 
semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate distinction in 
propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon mentions in Peirce’s 
1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign itself--not its Immediate 
Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) and Form 
(signification) in its Interpretant (determination).” How then can an immediate 
object consist of “attributes” (or characters or predicates) of the Dynamic 
Object?

But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s late 
semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate can 
alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous 
predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in 
December 1909:

[[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea that

mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates, I call its

"Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world between the

Object of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some collateral

experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all what it is

that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that point simply

fails to understand what I mean by the Object, and confounds it with

the Interpretant. The latter is all that the sign conveys. The Object is the

otherwise known something concerning which what it conveys relates.

The distinction is a real distinction and yet it is purely relative, in the

sense that the line of demarcation between the two can just as well be

drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The point is that the artificiality of

a line of demarcation does not prove that the twoness of the parts that

line of demarcation may be regarded as separating does not correspond

to any twoness in re.— RL 36 ]]

 

So I have nothing more to say on that subject!

 

Gary f.

 

} In a consumer society there are inevitably two kinds of slaves: the prisoners 
of addiction and the prisoners of envy. [Ivan Illich] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > 
Sent: 1-Mar-18 11:52
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a 
Quasi-mind?

 

Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual Sign 
that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something like the 
prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing in EP 2:304 
to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion of Signs," 
although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as "the aggregate formed by 
a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it."  I am not quite 
ready to say anything further about the latter passage just yet; I would prefer 
to cover a bit more semiotic and metaphysical ground first.

 

JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of 
the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the entire 
effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. 
EP 2:391; 1906). 

 

GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include) 
attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate Object 
sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman includes 
attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you think of an 
Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?

 

In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a Sign 
"is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to 
act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its 
function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that 
of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it."  I have posited 
that this "respect" is precisely the Immediate Object, and stated that 
determination "must always occur with respect to a character or quality; i.e., 
a Form."  Hence the Dynamic Object determines the Sign with respect to some, 
but not all, of its characters or qualities; and that partial combination of 
attributes is the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates.  Only 
the Sign itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that 
unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant 
(determination).

 

GF:  By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with another 
existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined onl

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

There is ambivalence running through Peirce which is vitiated by an
academic exegetical approach which ignores such passages. It has all sorts
of ramifications including the present political divide between what we
call populism and establishment. Peirce was genuinely not liked by his own
ilk and for good reason. He had their number. Brant picked up on the pathos
of having to live as he did. but if we just deal with the problems related
to words alone there is indeed a fertile field for reevaluation.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
> views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>
>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>> _
>>>
>>
>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>
>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>> of a jury, now is it?
>>
>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>
>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>
>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
>> theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
>> (CP 1.634).
>>
>> Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . .
>> has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637),
>> and it is best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly
>> untrammeled a scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's
>> concluded this discussion of topics of vital importance being little
>> aided by our vain power of reason (witness the jury illustration!), he
>> moves on in the lectures to follow to discussions of topics of
>> scientific importance.
>>
>> Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results
>> of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied
>> to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> GARY RICHMOND
>> PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
>> COMMUNICATION STUDIES
>> LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
>> 718 482-5690
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory!_
>>>
>>> _Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††_
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
>>>
>>> -
>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Links:
>> --
>> [1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>> [2] http://www.c

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Eugene Halton]

Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"

Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
overpopulated earth.
 Such is man's glory!
 Gene H

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[kirstima]

Gary R.

I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true 
views on science and vitally important matters.


The issue should be rethougth, I believe.

Kirsti

Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:

Stephen quoted Peirce:


_We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
_


In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.

But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
of a jury, now is it?

Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.

When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.

In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
"theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
(CP 1.634).

Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . .
has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637),
and it is best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly
untrammeled a scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's
concluded this discussion of topics of vital importance being little
aided by our vain power of reason (witness the jury illustration!), he
moves on in the lectures to follow to discussions of topics of
scientific importance.

Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results
of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied
to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)

Best,

Gary R

Best,

Gary R

GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
718 482-5690

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:


_We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory!_

_Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††_

amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .




Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

1. Well, we both disagree on 'what we understand to be Peirce's own
usage' - so, there's no point in using that assertion in our debate.
However, if you are now saying that when you refer to 'Sign', you
mean the semiosic triad and not just the mediate node in the triad
[sign/representamen] - then, I can go along with that. However, the
reason I've added the DO to the triad of [IO-R-II] is because, as
Peirce noted, no Sign is isolate. There HAS to be that interaction
for a triadic semiosis [aka Sign] to even exist.

I would say that this whole triad is the Quasi-Mind; i.e., a local
articulation within a local semiosic process of the more general
Mind.

2. OK

3. 'A feeling, an exertion, a Sign [aka symbol???] are ALL within
the semiosic triadic processes operating in 1stness, 2ndness and
3rdness. They are all, therefore, Signs - understood as functioning
within the triad.

4. A DI [Dynamic Interpretant] doesn't exist on its own; it's
related to the basic semiosic triad. Other than that - I agree with
your outline.

Edwina
 On Fri 02/03/18  5:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1.  My problem with your terms is that you consistently use them in
ways that deviate significantly from what I understand to be Peirce's
own usage.  In any case, we both agreed about a year ago to use "Sign"
for the internal triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and
Immediate Interpretant.  Lately you have been insisting that "Sign"
also includes the Dynamic Object, rather than being content with the
affirmation--which no one is disputing--that every Sign  requires a
Dynamic Object to determine it.  It has also become apparent that
what you mean by "Representamen" is much closer to what I mean by
"Quasi-mind" than anything else.
 2.  No one is disputing that the classification of a Sign as a
Symbol depends entirely on its relation to its (Dynamic) Object being
a Necessitant (3ns).
 3.  No one is disputing that the Quasi-mind is the interpreter.  CP
4.536 states that the Interpretant is what the Sign  produces in the
interpreter; i.e., the effect of the Sign on the interpreting
Quasi-mind.  It further states that this effect--this determination
of the interpreter--is to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign. 
Furthermore, since this is an actual effect, it is clearly the
Dynamic Interpretant of the Sign.
 4.  What I quoted from CP 4.550 is about multiple Signs that are
semiotically connected in such a way that they must be determinations
of one Quasi-mind, which is also a Sign.  What you quoted from
Peirce's footnote to CP 4.550 is about multiple Dynamic
Interpretants--again,  actual effects of Signs--that are dynamically
connected.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:49 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list, 

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only
to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where
and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation
between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this
Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization: 
i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I
divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. . 

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic
objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus
depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition
of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a
mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction
functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the
Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral
component of the 'Sign/representamen'. 

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do.
There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in
the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I
semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that
mediate process. 

Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and
an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the
Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a
feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the
Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906). 

I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the
Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the
interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate