Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supp: Sorry, wrong term: Modifies, not moderates, feeling modifies reason.




Dear Jerry, List,

I think reason/feeling, Yin/Yang, Kantian/Peircean "A-Priori" should not be assigned to men/women, and also not be seen as contradictory (not that I think that you do so, I am just saying). I think, feeling moderates reason, and internalized reason shows up as feeling.

I agree that the end is an object- but it does not have to exist. Its reality is the final interpretant: The function of something that probably does not, and never will, exist: The truth. Teleology is (in reality) pursuing something inexistent. That is the motor of evolution, inquiry, ethics, everything, I guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. August 2018 um 20:44 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee" 
 



Dear Helmut, list,

 

There is a crying scandal in philosophy.  

This is the paradox of an extreme diversity of opinion in regard to the immediately given as such (that is to say, apparently, in regard to the obvious in its very obviousness).

 

The experiment therefore ought to be made, whether we should not succeed better with the problems of metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must conform to our mode of cognition, for this would better agree with the demanded possibility of an a priori knowledge of them, which is to settle something about objects, before they are given us.

 

We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus..

 

and I must therefore, even before objects are given to me, 

presuppose the rules of the understanding as existing within me a priori, 

these rules being expressed in concepts a priori, 

to which all objects of experience must necessarily conform, 

and with which they must agree.  

 

This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity with that of the chemists, 

which they sometimes call the experiment of reduction, 

or the synthetical process in general..

 

In this case, speculative reason has at least gained for us room for such an extension of knowledge, though it had to leave it empty, so that we are not only at liberty, but are really called upon to fill it up, if we are able, by practical data of reason.

 

"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in the physical sciences, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details.

 

The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years I had been carefully maturing, was not composed in a sufficiently suitable manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion in some four to five months, in the fear that, on longer delay, so prolonged a labour might finally become burdensome, and that my increasing years.. would perhaps incapacitate me, while I am still the sole possessor of my complete system.

 

You see at once that we have here all the main elements of moral conduct.



 

So, why one two three; esthetics ethics logic; from CP 5.402 to CP 5.189 ?

Well, I would think that is obvious in its very obviousness, for 

 

The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.

 

As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.

 

But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences; 

whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End.

 

And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.

 

 “Aristotle thinks that the deliberator begins with a goal or target or end, the realization of which is both desirable and difficult: she cannot immediately see how to bring it about.  She reasons backwards from this end, working out the process by which she might bring it into being.  Drawing the end into the sphere of her own agency, she eventually hits upon something she sees she can do.  This action then becomes the object of her choice. Aristotle’s agent evaluates neither the goal with which she begins her 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear Jerry, List,

I think reason/feeling, Yin/Yang, Kantian/Peircean "A-Priori" should not be assigned to men/women, and also not be seen as contradictory (not that I think that you do so, I am just saying). I think, feeling moderates reason, and internalized reason shows up as feeling.

I agree that the end is an object- but it does not have to exist. Its reality is the final interpretant: The function of something that probably does not, and never will, exist: The truth. Teleology is (in reality) pursuing something inexistent. That is the motor of evolution, inquiry, ethics, everything, I guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. August 2018 um 20:44 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee" 
 



Dear Helmut, list,

 

There is a crying scandal in philosophy.  

This is the paradox of an extreme diversity of opinion in regard to the immediately given as such (that is to say, apparently, in regard to the obvious in its very obviousness).

 

The experiment therefore ought to be made, whether we should not succeed better with the problems of metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must conform to our mode of cognition, for this would better agree with the demanded possibility of an a priori knowledge of them, which is to settle something about objects, before they are given us.

 

We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus..

 

and I must therefore, even before objects are given to me, 

presuppose the rules of the understanding as existing within me a priori, 

these rules being expressed in concepts a priori, 

to which all objects of experience must necessarily conform, 

and with which they must agree.  

 

This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity with that of the chemists, 

which they sometimes call the experiment of reduction, 

or the synthetical process in general..

 

In this case, speculative reason has at least gained for us room for such an extension of knowledge, though it had to leave it empty, so that we are not only at liberty, but are really called upon to fill it up, if we are able, by practical data of reason.

 

"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in the physical sciences, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details.

 

The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years I had been carefully maturing, was not composed in a sufficiently suitable manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion in some four to five months, in the fear that, on longer delay, so prolonged a labour might finally become burdensome, and that my increasing years.. would perhaps incapacitate me, while I am still the sole possessor of my complete system.

 

You see at once that we have here all the main elements of moral conduct.



 

So, why one two three; esthetics ethics logic; from CP 5.402 to CP 5.189 ?

Well, I would think that is obvious in its very obviousness, for 

 

The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.

 

As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.

 

But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences; 

whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End.

 

And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.

 

 “Aristotle thinks that the deliberator begins with a goal or target or end, the realization of which is both desirable and difficult: she cannot immediately see how to bring it about.  She reasons backwards from this end, working out the process by which she might bring it into being.  Drawing the end into the sphere of her own agency, she eventually hits upon something she sees she can do.  This action then becomes the object of her choice. Aristotle’s agent evaluates neither the goal with which she begins her deliberation nor the action in which her deliberation ends.  Instead, her 

[PEIRCE-L] Open Questions on the Meaning of CP 5.376?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gene, Gary R. Gary F, Stephen:

> Gene quoted Peirce: 
> "But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not 
> stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and 
> living doubt, and without this all discussion [is?] idle" (CP 5.376).
> Gary

>From the perspective of universal knowledge and representations by symbols,
what is the meaning of CP 5.376?

How do you interpret it in logical terms?
Does it place any constraints on the origins of logical terms?
Does is place any constraints on the lexical field of origin of the belief?
Does it constrain origin of the doubts to the simplest symbol system, that of  
language / linguistics?  (simplest in the sense of Tarsi’s meta-languages)
Does it limit doubts to a particular individual who is trained to communicate 
in only one symbol system?  trained in two symbol systems?
Three? Four? Five? more?   (How many symbol systems did CSP use?)

Do doubts have breadth and depth?  
Can doubts span multiple symbol systems?

Pick any poster to this list.
Can they express doubts in more than one symbol system?

What is the relationship between between the symbol systems in which doubts are 
expressed and the depth of inquiry of the doubter?

Is the following syllogism meaningful for inquiry into CSP texts?

Antecedent premises: 
Doubts from one symbol system are less meaningful than doubts grounded in two 
different symbol systems.
Doubts from two symbol systems are less meaningful than doubts grounded three 
symbol systems.
---
Conclusion (by subtraction of middle term):
 Doubts from one symbol system are less meaningful than doubts grounded in 
three symbol systems.

Can one construct a sorties that extensions this syllogism to a deeper levels 
of doubt?  How many symbol systems are used in modern science?

Gene, Gary F. and Stephen Rose   - I am particularly interested in your logical 
analysis of this post.  I would appreciate it if you would take the time to 
write a philosophically serious response.

Cheers

Jerry







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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Helmut, list,



*There is a crying scandal in philosophy.  *

*This is the paradox of an extreme diversity of opinion in regard to the
immediately given as such (that is to say, apparently, in regard to the
obvious in its very obviousness).*



The experiment therefore ought to be made, whether we should not succeed
better with the problems of metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must
conform to our mode of cognition, for this would better agree with the
demanded possibility of an *a priori* knowledge of them, which is to settle
something about objects, *before* they are given us.



We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus..



and I must therefore, even *before* objects are given to me,

presuppose the rules of the understanding as existing within me *a priori*,

these rules being expressed in concepts *a priori*,

to which all objects of experience must necessarily conform,

and with which they must agree.



This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity with that of the
chemists,

which they sometimes call the experiment of reduction,

or the synthetical process in general..



In this case, speculative reason has at least gained for us room for such
an extension of knowledge, though it had to leave it empty, so that we are
not only *at liberty*, but are really called upon to *fill it up*, if we
are able, by *practical data* of reason.



"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to
outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire
work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
mathematics, in psychology, in the physical sciences, in history, in
sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as
the *filling up* of its details.



The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years
I had been carefully maturing, was not composed in a sufficiently suitable
manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition
several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion
in some four to five months, in the fear that, on longer delay, so
prolonged a labour might finally become burdensome, and that my increasing
years.. would perhaps incapacitate me, while I am still the sole possessor
of my complete system.



You see at once that we have here all the main elements of moral conduct.





So, why one two three; esthetics ethics logic; *from CP 5.402 to CP 5.189 *?

Well, I would think that is obvious in its very obviousness, for



The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason.



As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical
with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these
follow as a conclusion from deliberation.



But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some
object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference
to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End,
but this is a starting-point or assumption, like the postulates in the
theoretic sciences;

whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about
the means that lead to their End.



And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is,
the question of object. For one who deliberates deliberates if he has
considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him
to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.



 “Aristotle thinks that the deliberator begins with a goal or target or
end, the realization of which is both desirable and difficult: she cannot
immediately see how to bring it about.  She reasons backwards from this
end, working out the process by which she might bring it into being.  Drawing
the end into the sphere of her own agency, she eventually hits upon
something she sees she can do.  This action then becomes the object of her
choice. Aristotle’s agent *evaluates* neither the goal with which she
begins her deliberation nor the action in which her deliberation ends.
Instead,
her deliberation consists in the mental activity of *deriving the action
from the goal*.”



Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought,

but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of
action..

The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of
which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is
not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End.



"Ethics is not practics; ..

it involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum;

and .. in so far as ethics studies the conformity of conduct to an ideal,
it is limited to a particular ideal, which  is 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

I agree that it is puzzling.

1. The nature of the connection I see as the connection between interpreting systems and signs.

2. Ecosystems and niches have already complex relations, while each (simple life form) individual is only interested in its own advantage. It is like Adam Smith´s invisible hand, I guess.

3. In a human, such complex relations may be individuated. A human is able to look for more than her/his own advantage. Maybe other animals too? But simple life forms not, I think.

4. Just an appeal to puzzle on. Discourse ethics is e.g. that a human does not merely look for her/his own advantage in a discussion, but also is interested to keep the discussion going and being fruitful.

So I think, Adam Smith´s theory of the invisible hand is good for ecosystems consisting of simple life forms, but not so much for a human society, and neither a discourse.

Best,

Helmut

 

03. August 2018 um 23:51 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 


List, Helmut:
 


On Aug 3, 2018, at 4:26 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 





List,

I think this topic is semiotically very relevant, and shows the connection between semiotics and systems theory, with us as systems.






 
I am puzzled by this association.

What is the nature of the connection?





I think the simplest relations between two systems are hierarchies. With simpler life forms it is all about hierarchies, eating each other, etc.






 
I am equally puzzled by this assertion.

Would you agree that the biology is basically about reproduction over generations and relationships between organisms and the surrounding niches?

 





Humans being able to create a non-hierarchical discourse situation is a great achievement of genetic and cultural evolution.






 
Again, a very puzzling statement…  What is the significance of this claim?  Meaning?






I think it is a good idea to analyse non-hierarchical complex relations-of-hierarchies, and develop a discourse ethics based on Peirce and systems theories.






 

Finally, this is the most puzzling of all the sentences in the message.

To me, it reads as a self-contradictory assertion.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 
 






Best,

Helmut

 

Gesendet: Freitag, 03. August 2018 um 03:13 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recommendation: In email notes, avoid the word 'you'


Edwina, List:

 

The principle that no one can make someone else feel any particular way does not "imply that people are almost in a state of self-sufficient isolation."  It merely implies that each of us has a measure of self-control, as Peirce clearly affirmed.  No one else has control over my feelings and responses, although others' behavior can and does influence how I am likely to feel or respond in a given situation.

 

Likewise, taking responsibility for those feelings and responses does not "mean that whatever another person argues/says has no effect."  It merely means that the Dynamic Interpretant of an utterance is not completely dictated by its Utterer.  The Interpreter also plays a role, as evidenced by the fact that the exact same statement can have very different effects on different people.  In Martin Luther's words, we can and should "put the best construction on everything."

 

If someone were to tell me, "What you suggest is a ridiculous brain-dead analysis," I probably would indeed be upset initially; but how I subsequently dealt with that emotion would be up to me.  As Alan Jacobs recommends in his recent book, How to Think, in such circumstances one should "take five minutes," rather than saying or doing anything right away.  Then deliberately choose a course of action, rather than just reacting in the heat of the moment.

 

In summary, what I am proposing is that List members conscientiously cultivate both specific habits of action (how we say things), as John S. is advocating, and specific habits of interpretation (how we take things), as Gary F. is advocating.  Conveniently, Peirce had a lot to say about how to go about this sort of thing; as I recently posted (again), "Logic [i.e., semeiotic] may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs [i.e., habits]" (CP 3.429; 1896).

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.






 




 

On Thu, Aug 2, 2018 at 7:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon, list

1] But is an assertive approach the best way to function within a scientific research community? That is, if it's the case that " Another principle of assertiveness is that no one can  make someone else feel any particular way, or respond in any particular way" doesn't this imply that people are almost in a state of self-sufficient isolation?

2]And, if it's the case that " Instead, each of us should take full responsibility for our own feelings and responses" - doesn't this mean that whatever another person argues/says has no effect?

 As an example, if someone says to me: "What you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sham Reasoning - Is Ethics Possible?

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I have generally assumed that decency is verifiable by looking at a decent
action or statement and having some basis for judging. I wish science was
simply assumed as a reasonable approach to evaluating all behavior. Ethics
and aesthetics are part of science I assume.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Aug 4, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Stephen, list
>
> Exactly.  I note also in 1.55, "all probable reasoning is despised.
> ...There is no room for doubt, which can only paralyze action. But the
> scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole
> cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them"
>
> But what if the issue is instead, one of interpretation, rather than
> a search for the natural laws of science? That is, if we are engaged in the
> study of history, of philosophy - I'm not sure that there is a
> final 'truthful interpretation'. I think there is a consensual
> interpretation, such that we can for example, differentiate the basic
> axioms of Plato and Aristotle - but, I'm puzzled about 'the truth' in such
> areas.
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 04/08/18 11:02 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Peirce: CP 1.57 Cross-Ref:††
>
> 57. When men begin to rationalize about their conduct, the
> first effect is to deliver them over to their passions and produce the most
> frightful demoralization, especially in sexual matters. Thus, among the
> Greeks, it brought about pæderasty and a precedence of public women over
> private wives. But ultimately the subconscious part of the soul, being
> stronger, regains its predominance and insists on setting matters right.
> Men, then, continue to tell themselves they regulate their conduct by
> reason; but they learn to look forward and see what conclusions a given
> method will lead to before they give their adhesion to it. In short, it is
> no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion shall be, but
> it is the conclusion which determines what the reasoning shall be. This is
> sham reasoning. In short, as morality supposes self-control, men learn that
> they must not surrender themselves unreservedly to any method, without
> considering to what conclusions it will lead them. But this is utterly
> contrary to the single-mindedness that is requisite in science. In order
> that science may be successful, its votaries must hasten to surrender
> themselves at discretion to experimental inquiry, in advance of knowing
> what its decisions may be. There must be no reservations.
>
> Peirce: CP 1.58 Cross-Ref:††
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sham Reasoning - Is Ethics Possible?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen, list

Exactly.  I note also in 1.55, "all probable reasoning is despised.
...There is no room for doubt, which can only paralyze action. But
the scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready to dump
his whole cartload of beliefs, the moment experience is against them" 

But what if the issue is instead, one of interpretation, rather than
a search for the natural laws of science? That is, if we are engaged
in the study of history, of philosophy - I'm not sure that there is a
final 'truthful interpretation'. I think there is a consensual
interpretation, such that we can for example, differentiate the basic
axioms of Plato and Aristotle - but, I'm puzzled about 'the truth' in
such areas.
Edwina
 On Sat 04/08/18 11:02 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose stever...@gmail.com
sent:
Peirce: CP 1.57 Cross-Ref:†† 

57. When men begin to rationalize about their
conduct, the first effect is to deliver them over to their passions
and produce the most frightful demoralization, especially in sexual
matters. Thus, among the Greeks, it brought about pæderasty and a
precedence of public women over private wives. But ultimately the
subconscious part of the soul, being stronger, regains its
predominance and insists on setting matters right. Men, then,
continue to tell themselves they regulate their conduct by reason;
but they learn to look forward and see what conclusions a given
method will lead to before they give their adhesion to it. In short,
it is no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion
shall be, but it is the conclusion which determines what the
reasoning shall be. This is sham reasoning. In short, as morality
supposes self-control, men learn that they must not surrender
themselves unreservedly to any method, without considering to what
conclusions it will lead them. But this is utterly contrary to the
single-mindedness that is requisite in science. In order that science
may be successful, its votaries must hasten to surrender themselves at
discretion to experimental inquiry, in advance of knowing what its
decisions may be. There must be no reservations.  

Peirce: CP 1.58 Cross-Ref:†† 
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]


Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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[PEIRCE-L] Sham Reasoning - Is Ethics Possible?

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Peirce: CP 1.57 Cross-Ref:††

57. When men begin to rationalize about their conduct, the
first effect is to deliver them over to their passions and produce the most
frightful demoralization, especially in sexual matters. Thus, among the
Greeks, it brought about pæderasty and a precedence of public women over
private wives. But ultimately the subconscious part of the soul, being
stronger, regains its predominance and insists on setting matters right.
Men, then, continue to tell themselves they regulate their conduct by
reason; but they learn to look forward and see what conclusions a given
method will lead to before they give their adhesion to it. In short, it is
no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion shall be, but
it is the conclusion which determines what the reasoning shall be. This is
sham reasoning. In short, as morality supposes self-control, men learn that
they must not surrender themselves unreservedly to any method, without
considering to what conclusions it will lead them. But this is utterly
contrary to the single-mindedness that is requisite in science. In order
that science may be successful, its votaries must hasten to surrender
themselves at discretion to experimental inquiry, in advance of knowing
what its decisions may be. There must be no reservations.

Peirce: CP 1.58 Cross-Ref:††

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Testing the filter

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Yes, that's the right suggestion! Instead of personally 'not being
offended' - and after all, someone can say they are not offended but
can act very offended..but the thing to do is: not give offense.

As you say, why should people post on a list if they might be
belittled or insulted?

Edwina
 On Fri 03/08/18 10:35 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 After I wrote the previous line in my response to Jerry, 
 I added the following: 
 > We should also remember that Peirce list has an international 
 > audience, including students and people from other professions 
 > who would like to learn more about Peirce and his writings. 
 >  
 > Many of them would be reluctant to ask questions if there's 
 > a threat of being insulted or belittled. 
 >  
 > Instead of saying that we shouldn't take offense, I believe 
 > that we should think of the audience and avoid giving offense. 
 But the filter didn't like some of those words. 

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