RE: RE: RE: [biosemiotics:9293] [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems theory, DNA entanglement, agents and semiosis
HELMUT >groupthink is quite identical with culture This is a category error. The characteristics that govern groupthink need to be distinguished from the principles that govern culture. Culture relates to pragmatism, knowing how to be, Heideggers Dasein. Groupthink describes something different. Some cultures are more predisposed to groupthink than others, and NO culture is exempt. My own humble estimation is that the problem of groupthink revolves around some kind of failure of firstness, in the mediation of secondness and thirdness. Reflexive and automaton-like behavior can take place with emphasis on secondness and thirdness (association and habituation) and the muting or degeneration of firstness, perhaps as a product of fear and the need to belong. Both the Left and the Right in politics are capable of groupthink. Paul Joseph Watson nails the groupthink of the left in his video on NPC-bots: https://youtu.be/M0aienuCBdg And we are all too familiar with the iconic groupthink of the right: https://www.gettyimages.ch/detail/nachrichtenfoto/jubilant-crowd-salutes-naz i-leader-adolf-hitler-nachrichtenfoto/81512242 sj From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: Thursday, December 6, 2018 4:10 PM To: sjaro...@iinet.net.au Cc: tabor...@primus.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Aw: RE: RE: [biosemiotics:9293] [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems theory, DNA entanglement, agents and semiosis Stephen, As I see it, groupthink is quite identical with culture. Noncultural references would be e.g. species-think (the ways all humans think, like wanting to take part, be noticed, be treated justly), organism-think-and reactions (e.g. the awarenesses and instincts of handling organism-specific problems like having to eat), and universal reactions like the constraints that the natural laws provide. Noncultural references have their roots in precontemporary-cultural ancient times, but of course are integrated into contemporary cultures. If some trait is the same in all existing cultures, it is likely, that this trait is a non-, meaning pre-cultural reference. E.g., that parents dont eat their children, Id say, is a mammal-trait, and also a bird-trait, not an animal-trait, as some animals eat some of their children, as I vaguely recall. Problem solving of mimetic desire may be a universal value: The Pauli-principle. Values are means to solve problem-patterns, or to avoid their expressions. I think it is valuable to analyse values regarding from which time scale aka taxonomical node they origin. My suspicion is, that many values are being assigned to one or the other culture, but for real stem from much earlier, much more general origins. This is the point of my opposition against culturalism/ overestimation of culture. Intention is to help deescalate culture clashes. Best, Helmut 06. Dezember 2018 um 11:20 Uhr "Stephen Jarosek" HELMUT >"This is the first day of the rest of my life", and can therefore rely on noncultural references, like humanism based on panhuman traits, universal logic (like Kant´s pure reason), or so. Therefore I am trying to emphasize these noncultural references. Are you allowing yourself to be swayed by universal logics illusion of objectivity? Todays pure reason of universal logic relies on materialistic comforts to be realized. A fix for every disease, a relief for every inconvenience. Pressures for survival are absent, and therefore courage is not required. The question is, is this comfortable state of mind sustainable? Can a cultural narrative that successfully averts the challenges of survival really apprehend the limits that test the self? Previous eras were dumbed down by their superstitions and prejudices, but they never had the opportunity to indulge in todays scale of lazy, indulgent groupthink, because ultimately their superstitions and prejudices had to be tested against the realities of survival. So despite all this complexity in the pure reason of this information age, why is our groupthink dumbing us down? How can a people know so much, yet be so ignorant? It is because we are having everything defined for us. We are having our thinking served up for us on a platter. We are being told what to believe. Fake news and social media do our thinking for us. We don't have to think for ourselves, we have no need for courage or individualism. Ours is a smug, sanctimonious morality that judges harshly those that do not conform to our narrow, cognitively dissonant boundaries diversity is good, but diverse opinion that is politically incorrect is bad. Compare this with before the 20th century or the industrial revolution. People may once have led simpler lives, but there comes a point in their less materialistic lives, closer to the coalface, where they have to confront their limitations and access their courage and individualism, in order to survive. Witchburnings have limited currency when famines or floods hit. But in this hi-tech era with solutions to every
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
Jon, list, Thanks for this post as it appears to me from these passages (and many other which I'm sure could be cited and which I vaguely recall) that I will *not* have to revise/upend/reverse everything I've ever thought about how Peirce viewed form and matter; and that I can continue to safely associate form with 1ns, matter with 2ns. Whew! I was worried there for a moment! Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 9:52 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Gary F., List: > > Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906). > > CSP: *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny > grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate > grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις > *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might > still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of > what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an > instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he > pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that > remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund; > and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy > that has shown any marked uberosity. > > > Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*. > Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently > discussed "the way to read" are missing. That only gives greater weight to > his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view > from which the force of that remark appears." > > It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that " > *form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while > *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to > Firstness and *form* to Secondness." On the contrary, Peirce quite > unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in > "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM > 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts. For example ... > > CSP: A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*, > are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of > anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or > resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists > entirely in its reactions with other quoddams. As reacting, it really > exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904) > > > And even more so ... > > CSP: *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but > is quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a > form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and > suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of > consciousness. When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly > experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose > that something like that fills the outer world. This philosophy cannot be > improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904) > > > He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form > vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning > himself with the latter. > > CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of > evolutionary systems ... Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in > itself. Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and > is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics, > on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is > what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this > point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or > that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and > so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*. It is not > necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I > prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904) > > > Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this > over the ensuing two years ... > > CSP: Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact > known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute > force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is > comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906) > > > He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to > Existential Graphs. > > CSP: ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go > back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and > the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
Gary F., List: Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906). CSP: *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund; and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy that has shown any marked uberosity. Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*. Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently discussed "the way to read" are missing. That only gives greater weight to his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view from which the force of that remark appears." It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "*form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to Secondness." On the contrary, Peirce quite unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts. For example ... CSP: A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*, are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists entirely in its reactions with other quoddams. As reacting, it really exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904) And even more so ... CSP: *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but is quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of consciousness. When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose that something like that fills the outer world. This philosophy cannot be improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904) He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning himself with the latter. CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of evolutionary systems ... Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself. Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics, on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*. It is not necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904) Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this over the ensuing two years ... CSP: Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906) He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to Existential Graphs. CSP: ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds to me like some late Ionic philosopher, and not a bit like Aristotle, whom it would also have been more like to claim it, if it were his). Form is that which makes anything such as it is, while matter makes it to be. From this pair of beautiful generalizations are born a numerous family of harmonious and interresemblant acceptions of the two words. In speaking of Graphs we may well call the Principles of their Interpretation (such as the Endoporeutic Principle) the Form; the way of shaping and scribing them (such as leaving the Line without barbs) the Matter. Nothing could be in better accord with the general definitions of Form and of Matter. (NEM 4:329-330; 1906) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
Very nice outline - and I agree with the matter corresponding to 1ns, and Form to 2ns. However, I don't consider passive as a clear explanation of matter. I see matter as 'energy'; unformed energy, with the potential to be a Form, i.e., a particular entity. But, matter without form is, in a sense, indeterminate and thus, could be seen as passive. I see Mind as transforming this potentiality, this energy, into particular forms. Again - very nice explanation. Edwina On Fri 07/12/18 6:15 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: John S, list, Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the connection between De Anima and Peirce’s concept of quasi-mind , there is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his Monist series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce deals here not with the mind-matter distinction but with the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter. A close look at this shows that the concept of matter emerging from this distinction is very different from the concept of matter that is usually contrasted with mind in current metaphysical thinking. This essay, “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” points out that “Idioscopy,” which includes all of the “special sciences” (such as physics, biology, psychology and sociology), depends for its basic principles on “cenoscopy” (which “embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience”). “A sound methodeutic requires heuretic science to found its researches upon cenoscopy, passing with as slight a gap as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar” (EP2:373). But formulating this methodeutic “presents a certain difficulty” because it involves reconsidering some of our own beliefs, which requires critical thinking. “Each criticism should wait to be planned, and each plan should wait for criticism. “Clearly, if we are to get on at all, we must put up with imperfect procedure.” This is where Peirce appeals to Aristotle’s De Anima (as the EP2 editors point out in an endnote) for a “key … to be tried upon this intricate grim lock.” This “key” is “The idea of growth,— the stately tree springing from the tiny grain” (Peirce’s italics). Now, growth is one of the key semeiotic ideas in Peirce’s late philosophy, which frequently asserts an analogy (if not an identity) between sign processes and life processes. The example (or metaphor) he gives here, and indeed nearly all of Peirce’s uses of the term “growth” in semeiotic contexts, suggest that the idea is very close if not identical to what we now call self-organization. Peirce does not quote a Greek term which Aristotle used for this idea of “growth,” but he does quote some other Greek terms which he calls “wonderful conceptions” that Aristotle “came upon” in developing the idea: “δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος, or, as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, the coup.” The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are typically translated as “potentiality” and “actuality” respectively; ὕ λη and μορφή or εἶδος are the terms for “matter” (ὕλη) and “form” (either μορφή or εἶ δος). This gives us a pair of metaphysical dualities, which is itself significant in that Peirce focusses in this essay on the “hard dualism” of Normative Science, which “forms the midportion of cenoscopy and its most characteristic part” (EP2:376). Peirce had earlier introduced the concepts of Aristotelian matter and form as a complementary pair in his “New Elements” essay (EP2:304), where they correspond to subject and predicate, or denotation and signification. But in this 1906 essay he gives a new twist to this matter/form distinction by saying (as quoted above) that instead of μορφή or ε ἶδος, Aristotle might better have used the term “τύπος, the blow, the coup.” (As I showed in a blog post recently, the earliest meaning of τύπος — which later evolved to mean the same as the English “type” — was “a blow.”) This suggests that form is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while matter is the passive side. In phaneroscopic terms, matter corresponds to Firstness and form to Secondness. This is a bit startling at first — at least it struck me that way — but as Peirce explains it (using the duality of the sexes as a metaphor) it does become a key to the methodeutic of cenoscopy and thus to the very nature of reasoning, inquiry and semiosis itself. Perhaps I don’t need to show how this duality plays out in Peirce’s 1906 essay (but I will in another post if anyone wants me to). But I think it’s significant that around this same time, Peirce was saying to Lady Welby that “the Form is the Object of the Sign,” and defining the Sign as a “medium for the communication or extension of a Form” (EP2:477). He was saying this in a draft which dealt largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he explained in this paragraph (SS:195): I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
Gary f, list, Fascinating and provocative post which I'll want to study before responding.. But for now just one question: if 1ns is matter, what is 2ns? formed matter? Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 6:15 PM wrote: > John S, list, > > Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the > connection between *De Anima* and Peirce’s concept of *quasi-mind*, there > is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his *Monist* > series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce deals here not > with the mind-matter distinction but with the Aristotelian distinction > between *form* and *matter*. A close look at this shows that the concept > of *matter* emerging from this distinction is very different from the > concept of *matter* that is usually contrasted with *mind* in current > metaphysical thinking. > > This essay, “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” points > out that “Idioscopy,” which includes all of the “special sciences” (such as > physics, biology, psychology and sociology), depends for its basic > principles on “cenoscopy” (which “embraces all that positive science which > rests upon familiar experience”). “A sound methodeutic requires heuretic > science to found its researches upon cenoscopy, passing with as slight a > gap as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar” (EP2:373). But > formulating this methodeutic “presents a certain difficulty” because it > involves reconsidering some of our own beliefs, which requires critical > thinking. “Each criticism should wait to be planned, and each plan should > wait for criticism. “Clearly, if we are to get on at all, we must put up > with imperfect procedure.” This is where Peirce appeals to Aristotle’s *De > Anima* (as the EP2 editors point out in an endnote) for a “key … to be > tried upon this intricate grim lock.” > > This “key” is “*The idea of growth*,— the stately tree springing from the > tiny grain” (Peirce’s italics). Now, *growth* is one of the key > *semeiotic* ideas in Peirce’s late philosophy, which frequently asserts > an analogy (if not an identity) between *sign* processes and *life* > processes. The example (or metaphor) he gives here, and indeed nearly all > of Peirce’s uses of the term “growth” in semeiotic contexts, suggest that > the idea is very close if not identical to what we now call > *self-organization*. Peirce does not quote a Greek term which Aristotle > used for this idea of “growth,” but he does quote some other Greek terms > which he calls “wonderful conceptions” that Aristotle “came upon” in > developing the idea: “δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος, or, > as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, the *coup*.” > > The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are typically translated as “potentiality” > and “actuality” respectively; ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος are the terms for > “matter” (ὕλη) and “form” (either μορφή or εἶδος). This gives us a pair > of metaphysical dualities, which is itself significant in that Peirce > focusses in this essay on the “hard dualism” of *Normative Science*, > which “forms the midportion of cenoscopy and its most characteristic part” > (EP2:376). Peirce had earlier introduced the concepts of Aristotelian > *matter* and *form* as a complementary pair in his “New Elements” essay > (EP2:304), where they correspond to subject and predicate, or denotation > and signification. But in this 1906 essay he gives a new twist to this > matter/form distinction by saying (as quoted above) that instead of μορφή > or εἶδος, Aristotle might better have used the term “τύπος, the blow, the > *coup*.” (As I showed in a blog post recently, the earliest meaning of > τύπος — which later evolved to mean the same as the English “type” — was “a > blow.”) > > This suggests that *form* is the active and forceful side of the > matter/form duality, while *matter* is the passive side. In phaneroscopic > terms, *matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to Secondness. This > is a bit startling at first — at least it struck me that way — but as > Peirce explains it (using the duality of the sexes as a metaphor) it does > become a key to the methodeutic of cenoscopy and thus to the very nature of > reasoning, inquiry and semiosis itself. Perhaps I don’t need to show how > this duality plays out in Peirce’s 1906 essay (but I will in another post > if anyone wants me to). But I think it’s significant that around this same > time, Peirce was saying to Lady Welby that “the Form is the Object of the > Sign,” and defining the Sign as a “medium for the communication or > extension of a Form” (EP2:477). He was saying this in a draft which dealt > largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he explained in this > paragraph (SS:195): > > I should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of Thoughts’ in
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
John S, list, Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the connection between De Anima and Peirce’s concept of quasi-mind, there is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his Monist series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce deals here not with the mind-matter distinction but with the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter. A close look at this shows that the concept of matter emerging from this distinction is very different from the concept of matter that is usually contrasted with mind in current metaphysical thinking. This essay, “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” points out that “Idioscopy,” which includes all of the “special sciences” (such as physics, biology, psychology and sociology), depends for its basic principles on “cenoscopy” (which “embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience”). “A sound methodeutic requires heuretic science to found its researches upon cenoscopy, passing with as slight a gap as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar” (EP2:373). But formulating this methodeutic “presents a certain difficulty” because it involves reconsidering some of our own beliefs, which requires critical thinking. “Each criticism should wait to be planned, and each plan should wait for criticism. “Clearly, if we are to get on at all, we must put up with imperfect procedure.” This is where Peirce appeals to Aristotle’s De Anima (as the EP2 editors point out in an endnote) for a “key … to be tried upon this intricate grim lock.” This “key” is “The idea of growth,— the stately tree springing from the tiny grain” (Peirce’s italics). Now, growth is one of the key semeiotic ideas in Peirce’s late philosophy, which frequently asserts an analogy (if not an identity) between sign processes and life processes. The example (or metaphor) he gives here, and indeed nearly all of Peirce’s uses of the term “growth” in semeiotic contexts, suggest that the idea is very close if not identical to what we now call self-organization. Peirce does not quote a Greek term which Aristotle used for this idea of “growth,” but he does quote some other Greek terms which he calls “wonderful conceptions” that Aristotle “came upon” in developing the idea: “δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος, or, as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, the coup.” The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are typically translated as “potentiality” and “actuality” respectively; ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος are the terms for “matter” (ὕλη) and “form” (either μορφή or εἶδος). This gives us a pair of metaphysical dualities, which is itself significant in that Peirce focusses in this essay on the “hard dualism” of Normative Science, which “forms the midportion of cenoscopy and its most characteristic part” (EP2:376). Peirce had earlier introduced the concepts of Aristotelian matter and form as a complementary pair in his “New Elements” essay (EP2:304), where they correspond to subject and predicate, or denotation and signification. But in this 1906 essay he gives a new twist to this matter/form distinction by saying (as quoted above) that instead of μορφή or εἶδος, Aristotle might better have used the term “τύπος, the blow, the coup.” (As I showed in a blog post recently, the earliest meaning of τύπος — which later evolved to mean the same as the English “type” — was “a blow.”) This suggests that form is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while matter is the passive side. In phaneroscopic terms, matter corresponds to Firstness and form to Secondness. This is a bit startling at first — at least it struck me that way — but as Peirce explains it (using the duality of the sexes as a metaphor) it does become a key to the methodeutic of cenoscopy and thus to the very nature of reasoning, inquiry and semiosis itself. Perhaps I don’t need to show how this duality plays out in Peirce’s 1906 essay (but I will in another post if anyone wants me to). But I think it’s significant that around this same time, Peirce was saying to Lady Welby that “the Form is the Object of the Sign,” and defining the Sign as a “medium for the communication or extension of a Form” (EP2:477). He was saying this in a draft which dealt largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he explained in this paragraph (SS:195): I should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of Thoughts’ in which the introductory chapter should introduce the reader to my existential graphs, which would then be used throughout as the apparent subject, the parable or metaphor, in terms of which everything would be said,—which would be far more scientific than dragging in the “mind” all the time, in German fashion, when the mind and psychology has no more to do with the substance of the book than if I were to discourse of the ingredients of the ink I use. He goes on to explain that in EGs, “the blank
