Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[John F Sowa]

On 2/2/2019 8:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Peirce did not introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 
1908, so anything that he wrote about Propositions prior to that 
reflects a different analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern 
predicate logic, which you continue to advocate.


No.  Peirce's later extensions are built on his core semantics,
which is the foundation for 20th c. logics.  See the short (5 page)
history by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

Furthermore, he never wrote anything about semes after 1906, except
for one brief mention of the triad in a letter to Lady Welby in 1908.
Therefore, nothing he wrote in 1908 or later could have any effect
on what he wrote about semes in 1906.


I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
to accept our disagreement and move on.


That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined
a seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have
any effect on that definition.  There is nothing more to say.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, list,



To my open mind and eyes, all that appears to be metaphysical rubbish.



Perhaps not so obvious, then..



Best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 10:53 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, John, List,
>
> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
> analysis of a proposition.
> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>
>
> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>
> It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence
> says that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever
> there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
> proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
> interpreter is requisite," such that "*everything in a proposition that
> possibly can should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the pure
> predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or
> 'self-containing" (emphasis added).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> John S., List:
>>
>> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we
>> will simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
>> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
>> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
>> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
>> you continue to advocate.
>>
>> JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity
>> represent predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
>> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
>> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,
>>
>> JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler
>> and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
>> predicates and quasi-predicates.
>>
>>
>> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
>> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
>> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
>> Interpretant.
>>
>> JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
>> quasi-predicate.
>>
>>
>> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose
>> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
>> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or
>> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).
>>
>> JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
>> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>>
>>
>> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
>> that means "Subject."
>>
>> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
>> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
>> analysis of a proposition.
>> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>>
>>
>> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
>> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
>> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
>> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
>> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
>> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
>> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
>> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
>> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
>> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>>
>>
>> JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
>> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
>> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.
>>
>>
>> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
>> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Jon wrote:

I am curious to learn exactly how you . . . would define panentheism in
this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
independent of the sign" . . ., rather than something *greater than *but
still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In its
relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
unaffected". . .


One has at least to admit, I think, in positing the Universe as Sign
(Symbol) and God as the Object of that Sign, that both are *wholly* unique,
that they are atypical, even peculiar among *all* other Signs and Objects:
that they are, indeed, sui generis both in themselves, so to speak, and in
their relationship.

As for *panentheism*, it is generally held that it is an attempt to
avoid *separating
*God from a (created) universe (as theism does) while at the same time not
*identifying* God with the universe (pantheism). Pan*en*theism, as you
know, holds that God not only *pervades* the cosmos and all that this
universe includes and involves, but also *transcends* it in the sense of
simultaneously being beyond space and time.

[In my view it is *possible *that the God of *all possible Universes* this
Cosmos is not necessarily to be identified with the *God of our Universe*.
I'll admit, however, that that sounds a bit odd even to me; yet I've been
entertaining the idea for many years now (this is not, btw, an argument for
the multi-universe theories prevalent in our time)].

JAS: Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God,
but also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
*warranted *those views about God--perhaps even *required *them.


I agree with you that at first blush that Peirce's views about Signs and
the Universe "warrant, perhaps even require" something like the theistic
view you've been arguing for. Yet, while I think the pantheistic view has
been generally debunked, perhaps the panentheistic notion that God creates
but *also* transcends space and time can help in your "attempt to revise
the major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion."

Finally, in my view, historically and to this day, our idea of God has been
far too small, far too limited, and often dogmatic and doctrinaire,
striking some (but not all) scientists as at least naive and typically
incompatible with science. I think these limited views of God have in ways
contributed to many of the "wicked problems" of our world, not the least of
which is the chasm that has been developing for centuries between science
and religion. It should be noted, however, that science, at least as it has
led to the development of socially and environmentally problematic
technologies (for example, gun powder, fossil fuels, Facebook), has itself
contributed to the emergence of a number of horrifying"wicked problems.

I believe that Peirce's science, phenomenology, logic as semeiotic,
cosmology, scientific metaphysics, and theological insights might in time
help us to bridge the gap between religion and science, perhaps to finally
contribute evenkmj to solving some of those "wicked problems."

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 7:30 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for your very kind words.  I look forward to further feedback
> and discussion.
>
> I actually debated formatting the summary just as you proposed, but
> ultimately decided to add the fourth bullet as tacit acknowledgement that
> identifying God as the Object that determines the Universe as a Sign is not
> strictly entailed by the syllogism itself.  Instead, it follows from the
> other considerations that I highlighted toward the end of my original post.
>
> I am curious to learn exactly how you (or others) would define panentheism
> in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
> major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
> Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
> independent of the sign" (R 145; 1905), rather than something *greater
> than *but still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated
> plainly, "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the
> Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>
> Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God, but
> also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
> *warranted *those views about God--perhaps even *required *them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, List,

JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
analysis of a proposition.
JFS:  No.  Definitely not.


Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain that
"the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of
which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).  Likewise,
Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried analysis so far
as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate
elements" (SS 72; 1908).

It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence says
that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "*everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects*, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing" (emphasis added).

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John S., List:
>
> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we will
> simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
> you continue to advocate.
>
> JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity
> represent predicates.
>
>
> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,
>
> JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler and
> clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
> predicates and quasi-predicates.
>
>
> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
> Interpretant.
>
> JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
> quasi-predicate.
>
>
> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose
> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or
> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).
>
> JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".
>
>
> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
> that means "Subject."
>
> JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
> analysis of a proposition.
> JFS:  No.  Definitely not.
>
>
> Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain
> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is
> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).
> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried
> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908).
>
>
> JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.
>
>
> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they
> diagram.
>
> JFS:  This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
> subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ...
>
>
> On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme
> is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute
> an Icon of the Continuous Predicate.
>
> JFS:  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we will
simply have to accept our disagreement and move on.  Peirce did not
introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything
that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different
analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which
you continue to advocate.

JFS:  EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity represent
predicates.


No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate
represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which
corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity.,

JFS:  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler and
clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both
predicates and quasi-predicates.


No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name
the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the
Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final
Interpretant.

JFS:  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and
quasi-predicate.


No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose as
a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative
or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or Object of a
sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906).

JFS:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be
replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate".


No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word
that means "Subject."

JAS:  ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable
detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical
analysis of a proposition.
JFS:  No.  Definitely not.


Again, the evidence says otherwise.  Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain that
"the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of
which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself,
but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite,"
such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown
into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection"
that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908).  Likewise,
Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried analysis so far
as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate
elements" (SS 72; 1908).


JFS:  His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most
elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses.  In fact, they're
superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.


No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the
elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they
diagram.

JFS:  This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ...


On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme
is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute
an Icon of the Continuous Predicate.

JFS:  The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb
'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with the verb
'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal."


No, it would classify "mammal," "breathing," and "oxygen" as Subjects; and
"_ is in the relation of _ to _" as the Continuous Predicate.
The first blank is Designative (quantified noun), while the other two
blanks are Descriptive (verb and common noun).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:12 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon AS, list
>
> I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion.
>
> To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological
> developments.  In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way
> that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906:
>
> > An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character
> > consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274)
>
> But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320):
>
> > A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a
> > proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although
> > the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the
> > proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that
> > this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index.
>
> A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign).  In effect,
> the image is used as a kind of predicate.  In that same paragraph,
> he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way:
>
> > A better example is a photograph. The mere print does 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your very kind words.  I look forward to further feedback and
discussion.

I actually debated formatting the summary just as you proposed, but
ultimately decided to add the fourth bullet as tacit acknowledgement that
identifying God as the Object that determines the Universe as a Sign is not
strictly entailed by the syllogism itself.  Instead, it follows from the
other considerations that I highlighted toward the end of my original post.

I am curious to learn exactly how you (or others) would define panentheism
in this context, as contrasted with theism, and then attempt to revise the
major premise accordingly in order to obtain a compatible conclusion.
Peirce explicitly described the Object as "something external to and
independent of the sign" (R 145; 1905), rather than something *greater than
*but still somehow *inclusive of *the Sign; and he also stated plainly, "In
its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive ... the Object remaining
unaffected" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Frankly, I am seeking not only to argue for Peirce's views about God, but
also to demonstrate that his views about Signs and the Universe
*warranted *those
views about God--perhaps even *required *them.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:56 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
> extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This
> is to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
> assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
> representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
> course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It
> brings together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient
> passages *in Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour
> de force. I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious
> views, but I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects.
> So, I'm eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it
> holds up upon examination.
>
> For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
> make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
> syllogism. So:
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>- The entire Universe is a Sign.
>- Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
>itself; and this we call God.
>
> I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
> argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
> the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
> you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God
> as the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately
> tied up with his theory of signs.
>
> As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
> deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
> some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
> much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
> logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
> hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.
>
> I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
> logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
> argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
> have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
> panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
> close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
> and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
> creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
> long run.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Jon, Gary

I suggest that while signs point to the Light or whatever universal name we
use to refer to the Cause, Creator, Force, etc.that it is this source that
makes semiotics the realization that it is -- in other words the basis of
Peirce's statement that all thought is in signs. I see semiotics as the
basis for a co-creation understanding. I am not objecting to these posts,
merely suggesting that it may not be in the nature of thought alone that
the unfathomable Reality can be be ir is perceived. It is in the nature of
the so-called subjective realm. These terms are inadequate because there is
ultimately no division between truthful science and truthful metaphysics,
heart and mind, heaven and earth. Etc.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:56 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
> extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This
> is to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
> assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
> representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
> course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It
> brings together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient
> passages *in Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour
> de force. I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious
> views, but I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects.
> So, I'm eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it
> holds up upon examination.
>
> For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
> make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
> syllogism. So:
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
>- The entire Universe is a Sign.
>- Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
>itself; and this we call God.
>
> I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
> argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
> the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
> you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God
> as the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately
> tied up with his theory of signs.
>
> As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
> deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
> some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
> much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
> logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
> hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.
>
> I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
> logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
> argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
> have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
> panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
> close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
> and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
> creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
> long run.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the
>> Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it
>> was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.
>>
>> CSP:  The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the 
>> *definable
>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator
>> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)
>>
>>
>> The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a 
>> *plausible
>> *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily
>> *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908).
>> However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the
>> latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's
>> other late writings.
>>
>> The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other
>> than itself.
>>
>> CSP:  The object is something external to and independent of the sign
>> which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145;
>> 1905)
>>
>>
>> CSP:  ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some
>> principle, and by some species of 

[PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[John F Sowa]

Jon AS, list

I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion.

To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological
developments.  In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way
that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906:


An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character
consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274)


But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320):


A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a
proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although
the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the
proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that
this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index.


A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign).  In effect,
the image is used as a kind of predicate.  In that same paragraph,
he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way:


A better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in  itself,
convey any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section
of rays projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a Dicisign.
Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes,
is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object.
It is not, perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis.
It will be remarked that this connection of the print, which is the
quasi-predicate of the photograph, with the section of the rays,
which is the quasi-subject, is the Syntax of the Dicisign;


By referring to EGs, Peirce emphasizes the similarity between the
iconic structure of an EG and images of any kind.  EGs with pegs
that are not attached to any line of identity represent predicates.
The act of attachment is "a further determination" that converts
a predicate or a quasi-predicate into a dicisign (proposition).

Chronology:

1902:  An image is a quasi-predicate when it combines with an index
   or quasi-index to state a proposition (dicisign).

1903:  An index and a seme are synonymous.  That is very different
   from his definition of 1906.  That implies that (a) Peirce's
   terminology was unstable, and (b) the ethics of terminology
   does not apply to unstable terms.

1906:  A seme is a widening (generalization) of predicate to include
   percepts and other image-like signs when used as predicates.
   In effect, seme means "predicate or quasi-predicate".

Interpretation:  With the prefix 'quasi-', Peirce modified the word
'predicate' for images used as predicates.  In 1903, he introduced
the word 'seme' as a synonym for index.  But that made it redundant.

When he was writing the Monist article in 1906, he wanted a single
word for both predicates and quasi-predicates.  So he dusted off
the word 'seme'.  After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because
it was simpler and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad',
'triad'... for both predicates and quasi-predicates.

Summary:  Peirce used the word 'predicate' for examples in logic
and ordinary language.  He used 'quasi-predicate' for images used
as predicates.  In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of
predicate and quasi-predicate.

Conclusion:  The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word
'seme' may be replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-
predicate".  Therefore, the word 'predicate' may be generalized
to include every use of 'quasi-predicate'.  That eliminates any
need for the word 'seme'.

See below for comments about the quotations from 1906 and 1908.

John
__

JAS

there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable detail
what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis
of a proposition.  In his letter of December 5, 1908 to Jourdain...


No.  Definitely not.  His existential graphs and diagrammatic
reasoning are the most elegant and powerful basis for his logical
analyses.  In fact, they're superior to the systems by Frege,
Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen.  See the slides for "Peirce,
Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry":
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

In the letter to Jourdain, Peirce was writing for a reader who
was familiar with Aristotelian syllogisms, as taught in textbooks
from the 13th c. to the early 20th c:


A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more
ways than one... The result is that everything in a proposition that
possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure
predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a
character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _ to _ ,' 'and'
= 'is at once _ and _ ,' etc. ... (NEM 3:885-886, 1908)


This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical
subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs or his 1885 notation for
predicate calculus.  For a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an
extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This is
to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I
assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory,
representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of
course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It brings
together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient passages *in
Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour de force.
I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious views, but
I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects. So, I'm
eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it holds up
upon examination.

For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to
make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a
syllogism. So:

   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself.
   - The entire Universe is a Sign.
   - Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
   itself; and this we call God.

I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive
argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But
the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what
you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God as
the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately tied
up with his theory of signs.

As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your
deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And
some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so
much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a
logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already
hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support.

I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any
logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your
argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I
have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward
panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite
close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically
and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's
creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the
long run.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the
> Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it
> was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.
>
> CSP:  The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the *definable
> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of
> all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)
>
>
> The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a 
> *plausible
> *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily
> *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908).
> However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the
> latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's
> other late writings.
>
> The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other
> than itself.
>
> CSP:  The object is something external to and independent of the sign
> which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145;
> 1905)
>
>
> CSP:  ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some
> principle, and by some species of causation, with something else, called
> its Object. (R 283:109; 1905)
>
>
> CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined
> (i.e., specialized, *bestimmt*) by something *other than itself*, called
> its Object ... (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909)
>
> CSP:  I start by defining what I mean by a Sign. It is something
> determined by something else, its Object ... (EP 2:500; 1909)
>
>
> Anticipating the outcome, one might expect instead the assertion that
> every Sign requires an *utterer*; but Peirce explicitly denied this, even
> while just as explicitly acknowledging God as Creator.
>
> CSP:  But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I
> mean such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of
> experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:403; 1907)
>
> CSP:  But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of weather,
> etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly 

[PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it
was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.

CSP:  The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the *definable
proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of
all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)


The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in
a *plausible
*explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily
*from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908).
However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the latter
nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's other
late writings.

The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other
than itself.

CSP:  The object is something external to and independent of the sign which
determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145; 1905)


CSP:  ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some
principle, and by some species of causation, with something else, called
its Object. (R 283:109; 1905)


CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e.,
specialized, *bestimmt*) by something *other than itself*, called its
Object ... (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909)

CSP:  I start by defining what I mean by a Sign. It is something determined
by something else, its Object ... (EP 2:500; 1909)


Anticipating the outcome, one might expect instead the assertion that every
Sign requires an *utterer*; but Peirce explicitly denied this, even while
just as explicitly acknowledging God as Creator.

CSP:  But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I mean
such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of
experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:403; 1907)

CSP:  But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of weather,
etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly say that God *utters
*any sign when He is the Creator of all things. (CP 8.185, EP 2:496; 1909)


Instead, Peirce identified "the essential ingredient of the utterer" as
precisely "the Object of the sign" (EP 2:404-407; 1907).  As for the
"otherness" requirement, while we can say that every Object is a Sign of
itself, this is true only in a *degenerate *sense; i.e., it is
trivially an *Icon
*and *Index *of itself, but the fundamental aspect of *representation *or
(more generally) *mediation* is completely absent.  A *genuine triadic
*relation
is always among three *distinct *correlates and cannot be reduced to
their *dyadic
*relations--including the likewise degenerate one of *identity*.

CSP:  A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object. The triadic relation is *genuine*, that is, its three members are
bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of
dyadic relations. (EP 2:272-273; 1903)


CSP:  There are, however, *degenerate *dyadic relations ... Namely, they
are individual relations of identity, such as the relation of *A* to *A*.
(EP 2:306; 1904)


The *minor premise* is that the entire Universe is a Sign.

CSP:  ... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... an
argument ... a great work of art, a great poem ... (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194;
1903)

CSP:  The entelechy of the Universe of being, then ... will be that
Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. (EP 2:304; 1904)

CSP:  There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is
that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system
constitutes one sign ... (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904)

CSP:  ... the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but
all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the
universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth"--that all
this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of
signs. (CP 5.448n1, EP 2:394; 1906)


There is no contradiction in understanding the entire
Universe--encompassing all three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP
2:435; 1908)--*both *as a Sign (singular) *and *as composed of Signs
(plural).  *Any *complex of connected Signs is also *itself *a Sign, and
the Universe may be conceived as a *semiosic continuum* whose material
parts are its constituent Signs.

CSP:  Whatever is continuous has *material parts* ... The *material parts* of
a thing or other object, *W*, that is composed of such parts, are whatever
things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other than *W*; secondly
are all of some one internal nature ... thirdly, form together a collection
of objects in which no one 

[PEIRCE-L] Seminar (Associazione Pragma): NEW WINE IN OLD BARRELS

[Gary Richmond]

List, FYI.
Associazione Pragma


Seminars on Pragmatism and the Sciences
NEW WINE IN OLD BARRELS
EXAPTATION BETWEEN BIOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCIENCE
February 19th, 2019
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan
[image: Image may contain: text]


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

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