Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Terry list,



The surprising fact, *climate change*, is observed;
But if ‘grandchildren will pay the price of our neglect’ were true..



*The world is not doing enough.*
*We have to learn from our procrastination.*
*We cannot afford to fail.*



It’s just the latest..
We *have* to..



Do reports like this one, do they have any impact?
Does public shaming actually work, is what I’m trying to ask.



What about for the general public?
How effective are reports like these in

*grabbing* people’s attention
and *changing* people’s behaviors?



I’m curious about the choice of language when trying to alert the public
about the *urgency* of this problem.


The use, for example, of the word ‘fail’..



“You are failing us.

The eyes of all future generations are upon you.
And when you *choose to fail us*, I say, ‘we will never forgive you!"



*Failure*.
Does the world need more language like that,

if we’re going to see the kind of rapid transformational action

that today’s report calls for?



https://www.npr.org/2019/11/26/783069685/u-n-report-says-world-is-not-doing-enough-when-it-comes-to-climate-change




With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 4:53 PM Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Helmut, et al.,
>
>
>
> By casting “reasons” as a can of worms, I certainly didn’t intend to
> diminish their semiotic significance in the least! Does it constitute its
> own category of indexicality? If so, how does human causal agency (where I
> assume at least some ‘reasons’ originate) interweave semiotically with
> empirical causality?
>
>
>
> The (so-called) ‘climate change’ problem would be an especially
> interesting case to explore from the indexical perspective. IMHO, crucial
> distinctions between ‘climate change’ on one hand and ‘climate crisis’ on
> the other are all too easily obscured and lost precisely because of
> difficulties in grasping the semiotics of causality, especially with
> respect to human causal agency. Again … more to ponder, research, and
> study.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
> Terry
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 30, 2019 4:33 PM
> *To:* Terry L Rankin 
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee ; Peirce List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?
>
>
>
> Thank you, Terry, List,
>
>
>
> you wrote, that regarding reasons for prerequisites (for the capacity to
> send and receive different kinds of signs) strikes you as opening another
> can of worms, regarding purposes etc. This can contents is exactly what I
> find interesting: reasons as different kinds of causality (efficient,
> final, volitional), and their emergences as system qualities, corresponding
> to inventions/emergences of nature, like matter/energy, life, neurons.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
>
>  30. November 2019 um 18:43 Uhr
>  "Terry L Rankin" *wrote:*
>
>
>
> Thanks, Helmut!
>
>
>
> My question was more philosophical than scientific, I think. Perhaps “sign
> utterance and reception” as such roughly maps onto linguistics and
> communications, while the “capability of uttering and receiving signs”
> refers to the cognitive (semiotic) predispositions to utter and receive
> signs. Simple ‘send / receive’ seems more fitting than ‘utterance and
> reception’ perhaps – both humans and microwave towers possess inherent
> predispositions to send and receive signs (or signals), but the difference
> is categorical, I think: signal towers are neither sentient nor sapient but
> semiosic humans are both (in name at least).
>
>
>
> My initial response would be ‘yes’ to both questions: the (communications
> or linguistic) science of sending and receiving signs (or signals) would
> include or at least intersect with the (physical and cognitive) sciences
> concerning the (electronic or neurological) predispositions forming the
> capacity to do so – specifically as prerequisites for that capacity.
> “Reasons” for doing so strikes me as another can of worms entirely,
> regarding motives, intents, purposes, etc. for exercising that capability.
>
>
>
> RE: organisms as signs, or specifically “Man is a sign” -- don’t
> semioticians generally agree that signs may be primitive, compound,
> complex, more or less systematically or haphazardly arranged, sent,
> received, etc.? As sign systems, ordinary languages (all 7,000+ of them) as
> well as specialized languages (maths, programming, codes, etc.) appear to
> be clear examples where form and structure (syntax?) contain and carry
> (send / receive) meaning and relevance, belief and truth (semantics?),
> usually (but not always) to serve some purpose (pragmatics?). Inasmuch as
> these all relate mainly if not entirely to *symbolic* semiotics, when the
> wider 1stness and 2ndness of iconicity and indexically fold into the
> semiotic fabric, then it seems quite plausible to view 

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Terry, List,

 

you wrote, that regarding reasons for prerequisites (for the capacity to send and receive different kinds of signs) strikes you as opening another can of worms, regarding purposes etc. This can contents is exactly what I find interesting: reasons as different kinds of causality (efficient, final, volitional), and their emergences as system qualities, corresponding to inventions/emergences of nature, like matter/energy, life, neurons.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 30. November 2019 um 18:43 Uhr
 "Terry L Rankin" wrote:

 

Thanks, Helmut!




 

My question was more philosophical than scientific, I think. Perhaps “sign utterance and reception” as such roughly maps onto linguistics and communications, while the “capability of uttering and receiving signs” refers to the cognitive (semiotic) predispositions to utter and receive signs. Simple ‘send / receive’ seems more fitting than ‘utterance and reception’ perhaps – both humans and microwave towers possess inherent predispositions to send and receive signs (or signals), but the difference is categorical, I think: signal towers are neither sentient nor sapient but semiosic humans are both (in name at least).

 

My initial response would be ‘yes’ to both questions: the (communications or linguistic) science of sending and receiving signs (or signals) would include or at least intersect with the (physical and cognitive) sciences concerning the (electronic or neurological) predispositions forming the capacity to do so – specifically as prerequisites for that capacity. “Reasons” for doing so strikes me as another can of worms entirely, regarding motives, intents, purposes, etc. for exercising that capability.

 

RE: organisms as signs, or specifically “Man is a sign” -- don’t semioticians generally agree that signs may be primitive, compound, complex, more or less systematically or haphazardly arranged, sent, received, etc.? As sign systems, ordinary languages (all 7,000+ of them) as well as specialized languages (maths, programming, codes, etc.) appear to be clear examples where form and structure (syntax?) contain and carry (send / receive) meaning and relevance, belief and truth (semantics?), usually (but not always) to serve some purpose (pragmatics?). Inasmuch as these all relate mainly if not entirely to symbolic semiotics, when the wider 1stness and 2ndness of iconicity and indexically fold into the semiotic fabric, then it seems quite plausible to view both living (organisms) and non-living things (everything else) as being (more or less) complex arrangements of (more or less) systematically interrelated signs of all three kinds. I take this to be the “perfusion of signs” often cited in what Sebeok calls Peirce’s “bedazzling sentence.”

 

Closing note: a semiotic extension of the communications concept of ‘signal-to-noise ratio’ would seem to play an important role here – e.g., wouldn’t superstring theory suggest that all things living and non-living alike exist or not based on the harmonious resonance, as it were, through which all things coalesce into wholes of their semiotic parts, all within a universally semiotic brane? Would those wholes dissipate, dissolve, disintegrate,  collapse, implode, or shatter as that resonance became dissonant due to noise levels in their semiotic structure (recall those cheesy “Is it live or is it Memorex?” commercials)? I realize I’m stretching a metaphor here, of course, but intuitively at least, this SNR idea seems to have an intriguing semiotic relevance. Perhaps it’s a case of the “much unfinished research still to do” …?

 

Terry   

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Saturday, November 30, 2019 11:33 AM
To: Terry L Rankin 
Cc: Jerry Rhee ; Peirce List 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?



 



 




Terry, All,



 



I dont know. My question would be: Does the science about sign utterance and reception by organisms include the science about their capabilty of uttering and receiving signs, and the reasons and prerequisites for having and using this capability, or not?



And: To just call organisms signs too, isnt that a quick shot? On the other hand: To dualize it in the way of Luhmann and Maturana and Varela, by saying that the communications are one system, the communicators another, both being structurally coupled, is this a shortcut too, explaining the problem (of the epistemic cut or whatever) away by introducing the term "structural coupling"?



If the answer to both questions is "yes" (which I just suspect, but am not sure about), then I guess there is much unfinished research work still to do.



 



Best,



Helmut



  



 30. November 2019 um 02:21 Uhr
 "Terry L Rankin" 
wrote:





All,

 

Am I missing something or isn’t this the primary focus of biosemiotics and cybersemiotics? 

 

Still in One Peace,

Terry

 

From: Jerry Rhee 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Terry list,



I think you are giving your explanation for how one goes

from ‘the primary focus of biosemiotics and cybersemiotics’ to ‘Man is a
Sign’.



That is the thought we are in,

but I suppose there are other ways..



Hth,

Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 11:43 AM Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Thanks, Helmut!
>
>
>
> My question was more philosophical than scientific, I think. Perhaps “sign
> utterance and reception” as such roughly maps onto linguistics and
> communications, while the “capability of uttering and receiving signs”
> refers to the cognitive (semiotic) predispositions to utter and receive
> signs. Simple ‘send / receive’ seems more fitting than ‘utterance and
> reception’ perhaps – both humans and microwave towers possess inherent
> predispositions to send and receive signs (or signals), but the difference
> is categorical, I think: signal towers are neither sentient nor sapient but
> semiosic humans are both (in name at least).
>
>
>
> My initial response would be ‘yes’ to both questions: the (communications
> or linguistic) science of sending and receiving signs (or signals) would
> include or at least intersect with the (physical and cognitive) sciences
> concerning the (electronic or neurological) predispositions forming the
> capacity to do so – specifically as prerequisites for that capacity.
> “Reasons” for doing so strikes me as another can of worms entirely,
> regarding motives, intents, purposes, etc. for exercising that capability.
>
>
>
> RE: organisms as signs, or specifically “Man is a sign” -- don’t
> semioticians generally agree that signs may be primitive, compound,
> complex, more or less systematically or haphazardly arranged, sent,
> received, etc.? As sign systems, ordinary languages (all 7,000+ of them) as
> well as specialized languages (maths, programming, codes, etc.) appear to
> be clear examples where form and structure (syntax?) contain and carry
> (send / receive) meaning and relevance, belief and truth (semantics?),
> usually (but not always) to serve some purpose (pragmatics?). Inasmuch as
> these all relate mainly if not entirely to *symbolic* semiotics, when the
> wider 1stness and 2ndness of iconicity and indexically fold into the
> semiotic fabric, then it seems quite plausible to view both living
> (organisms) and non-living things (everything else) as being (more or less)
> complex arrangements of (more or less) systematically interrelated signs of
> all three kinds. I take this to be the “perfusion of signs” often cited in
> what Sebeok calls Peirce’s “bedazzling sentence.”
>
>
>
> Closing note: a semiotic extension of the communications concept of
> ‘signal-to-noise ratio’ would seem to play an important role here – e.g.,
> wouldn’t superstring theory suggest that all things living and non-living
> alike exist or not based on the harmonious resonance, as it were, through
> which all things coalesce into wholes of their semiotic parts, all within a
> universally semiotic brane? Would those wholes dissipate, dissolve,
> disintegrate,  collapse, implode, or shatter as that resonance became
> dissonant due to noise levels in their semiotic structure (recall those
> cheesy “Is it live or is it Memorex?” commercials)? I realize I’m
> stretching a metaphor here, of course, but intuitively at least, this SNR
> idea seems to have an intriguing semiotic relevance. Perhaps it’s a case of
> the “much unfinished research still to do” …?
>
>
>
> Terry
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 30, 2019 11:33 AM
> *To:* Terry L Rankin 
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee ; Peirce List <
> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?
>
>
>
>
>
> Terry, All,
>
>
>
> I dont know. My question would be: Does the science about sign utterance
> and reception by organisms include the science about their capabilty of
> uttering and receiving signs, and the reasons and prerequisites for having
> and using this capability, or not?
>
> And: To just call organisms signs too, isnt that a quick shot? On the
> other hand: To dualize it in the way of Luhmann and Maturana and Varela, by
> saying that the communications are one system, the communicators another,
> both being structurally coupled, is this a shortcut too, explaining the
> problem (of the epistemic cut or whatever) away by introducing the term
> "structural coupling"?
>
> If the answer to both questions is "yes" (which I just suspect, but am not
> sure about), then I guess there is much unfinished research work still to
> do.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>  30. November 2019 um 02:21 Uhr
>  "Terry L Rankin" 
> *wrote:*
>
> All,
>
>
>
> Am I missing something or isn’t this the primary focus of biosemiotics and
> cybersemiotics?
>
>
>
>
> Still in One Peace,
>
> Terry
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee 
> *Sent:* Friday, November 29, 2019 5:22 PM
> *To:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Cc:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?
>
>
>
> Dear Helmut list,
>
>
>
> ‘Man

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Terry, All,

 

I dont know. My question would be: Does the science about sign utterance and reception by organisms include the science about their capabilty of uttering and receiving signs, and the reasons and prerequisites for having and using this capability, or not?

And: To just call organisms signs too, isnt that a quick shot? On the other hand: To dualize it in the way of Luhmann and Maturana and Varela, by saying that the communications are one system, the communicators another, both being structurally coupled, is this a shortcut too, explaining the problem (of the epistemic cut or whatever) away by introducing the term "structural coupling"?

If the answer to both questions is "yes" (which I just suspect, but am not sure about), then I guess there is much unfinished research work still to do.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 30. November 2019 um 02:21 Uhr
 "Terry L Rankin" 
wrote:




All,

 

Am I missing something or isn’t this the primary focus of biosemiotics and cybersemiotics? 

 

Still in One Peace,

Terry

 

From: Jerry Rhee 
Sent: Friday, November 29, 2019 5:22 PM
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Semiotics nonhumanist?

 


Dear Helmut list,

 

‘Man is a Sign.’

 

Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.

 

With best wishes,
Jerry R


 



On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 3:32 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:






Hello List,



 



I am having the idea that maybe semiotics is non-humanist. But what would be humanist? Examples:



 



- Kant said, that humans do not have value, but dignity, and that you should not treat them merely as means, but always as aims too.



- In Buddhism people (and other organisms) have an innate Buddha-nature.



- In Judaeo-Christian-Islamic religions, and in Brahmanism people have an immortal soul. It is arguable however, whether religions are humanist or rather their antithesises are. Depends on interpretation, I guess, and whether one conceptualizes a benign or a wrathful God.



 



In Semiotics it is all about signs, performance. In Capitalism it is about the value in the sense of performance people give for serving the rich ("human capital"). In Semiotics it is about the value/performance for the phaneron. The interpreting system is not denied, but mostly ignored. So I donot suspect,that semiotics is antihumanist, just nonhumanist, like just not talking about the interpreters, but only about the interpretants. I guess that is ok for some time, but at some point maybe it would be ok too to take the interpreting systems, like people and other organisms into account too, and combine semiotics with systems theories? What do you think?



 



Best,



Helmut



 



 



 



 



 












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