Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The Pragmatic Trivium)

2020-06-27 Thread Edwina Taborsky
 

Helmut

As Peirce noted, often enough, you don't need a brain for the
function of Mind. I think I've quoted this from Peirce about 100
times: "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears
in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical
world"4.551

I'd say the function of habits or Thirdness [which we can also call
Mind or rationality]  is to introduce the organization of matter such
that it can, first, exist in its single instantiations [molecule,
cell, insect, rabbit, tree, society] for longer than a nanosecond.
That is, the habits provide an infrastructure both to enable the
existence of matter - and to enable its continuity over time. Without
such organization of matter into a form - entropy as a basic reality
of physics would dissipate the matter in that nanosecond. The
universe would revert to: not merely chaos but..nothing. 

And second, such habits permit continuity of type, such that the
earth's instantiations can continue as that molecule of oxygen, that
cell, that insect...over time and - into the future. This continuity
enables productive interactions [such that the planet develops
species that can make use of that oxygen to live]...and so on.
Stability introduces continuity of type and enables productive
networking. 

Why is there Secondness? Thirdness as a habit-of-organization,
doesn't 'exist' per se. It only 'exists' if we can call it that in
the form of the habits of organization. It does this within
particular instantiations of matter, ie, within that molecule, within
that cell, that insect, that society. Secondness is the mode of
organization into discrete particular instances. 

Why is there Firstness? This action is aligned with the natural
entropy or dissipation of both an instantiation and a habit. It
enables change, adaptation - and permits the expansion and change of
interaction, network, the development of complex systems.

I'd agree that the universe works like a brain/Mind. 

Edwina
 On Sat 27/06/20  6:35 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 List,   I have problems with this kind of cosmology. On one hand it
is astounding, that Peirce´s cosmology, like his whole philosophy,
seems to have anticipated many aspects of modern hypotheses (e.g. the
hypothesis that there will be a GUT), and scientific insights. On the
other hand it seems to me like what I would call "explainism". In the
beginning there is a "why"- question: Why are there laws? This
question is then answered with a "because"- answer, which contains
unexplained concepts too: Habit and mind. But next there are not
asked more "why"- questions such as "Why is there habit?", or "Why is
there mind?", but habit and mind are just naturalized by presenting
these concepts as functions of the three categories. These three
categories now do not have to be questioned why they are there, as
they are purely logical and mathematical entities, and clear
commonsensal axioms. Though this whole argument seems consistent, I
still have an uneasy feeling about the move presenting habit and mind
as functions of the categories. That is, because one might argue, that
habits are only existing if there is a mind, and a mind is only
existing if there is a brain. Ok, it is possible to say, that the
universe works like a brain too (pantheism), or that there is an
external brain or quasi-brain (theism). But the whole inquiry stops
at the same point as it had in the middle age and in the antique:
With religion or something like it. I am not against both, personally
I prefer pantheism over theism, but I think it is better to admit that
there is a point where explanation has come to an end, and not to say
that habit and mind are completely explained now with the categories.
Because this would be a blockade of inquiry. Admitting not having
explained habit and mind on the other hand would motivate us to
inquire on: How do both work, what different kinds of habit and mind
are there in nature, and so on.   Best,   Helmut  Gesendet:
Samstag, 27. Juni 2020 um 04:04 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 An: "Peirce-L" 

, "Gary Richmond" 
 Betreff: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The
Pragmatic Trivium)  

  Gary - I'm puzzled. Who suggested that the three categories are
not always operative - in the meantime? I don't see that either Auke
or myself made such a suggestion. 

What I was referring to, was Peirce's cosmological outline [6.207-] 
and Peirce says nothing about 'ideal limits'. Instead - his outline
refers, not to the 'ideal' but to the emergence of the categories and
matter/mind from 'Nothing'. 

Edwina
 On Fri 26/06/20 8:49 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent: Jon, Auke, Edwina,   Jon wrote: . . . according to Peirce
neither the absolutely indeterminate "initial stage" (1ns) nor the
absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is actual.  Instead, these
are  ideal limits that 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The Pragmatic Trivium)

2020-06-27 Thread Helmut Raulien
List,

 

I have problems with this kind of cosmology. On one hand it is astounding, that Peirce´s cosmology, like his whole philosophy, seems to have anticipated many aspects of modern hypotheses (e.g. the hypothesis that there will be a GUT), and scientific insights. On the other hand it seems to me like what I would call "explainism". In the beginning there is a "why"- question: Why are there laws? This question is then answered with a "because"- answer, which contains unexplained concepts too: Habit and mind. But next there are not asked more "why"- questions such as "Why is there habit?", or "Why is there mind?", but habit and mind are just naturalized by presenting these concepts as functions of the three categories. These three categories now do not have to be questioned why they are there, as they are purely logical and mathematical entities, and clear commonsensal axioms. Though this whole argument seems consistent, I still have an uneasy feeling about the move presenting habit and mind as functions of the categories. That is, because one might argue, that habits are only existing if there is a mind, and a mind is only existing if there is a brain. Ok, it is possible to say, that the universe works like a brain too (pantheism), or that there is an external brain or quasi-brain (theism). But the whole inquiry stops at the same point as it had in the middle age and in the antique: With religion or something like it. I am not against both, personally I prefer pantheism over theism, but I think it is better to admit that there is a point where explanation has come to an end, and not to say that habit and mind are completely explained now with the categories. Because this would be a blockade of inquiry. Admitting not having explained habit and mind on the other hand would motivate us to inquire on: How do both work, what different kinds of habit and mind are there in nature, and so on.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Samstag, 27. Juni 2020 um 04:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Gary Richmond" 
Betreff: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The Pragmatic Trivium)




Gary - I'm puzzled. Who suggested that the three categories are not always operative - in the meantime? I don't see that either Auke or myself made such a suggestion.

What I was referring to, was Peirce's cosmological outline [6.207-]  and Peirce says nothing about 'ideal limits'. Instead - his outline refers, not to the 'ideal' but to the emergence of the categories and matter/mind from 'Nothing'.

Edwina

 

On Fri 26/06/20 8:49 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:





Jon, Auke, Edwina,

 

Jon wrote: . . . according to Peirce neither the absolutely indeterminate "initial stage" (1ns) nor the absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is actual.  Instead, these are  ideal limits that correspond to the infinite past and the infinite future, respectively.  In the meantime, all three categories are always operative.

I have sometime wondered, considering all the "interpretations" of Peirce's thought that, if anything he thought and wrote might be agreed upon by all Peirceans that it would be this: that until the end of that time which might have any meaning for our human race -- or for that matter, any sentient race which might consider such matters -- that "all three categories are always operative."

 

Thanks for putting it so starkly, Jon.

 

Best,

 

Gary

 

 


















 

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 




















 


On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 8:12 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:



Auke, Edwina, List:

 

Just to clarify, according to Peirce neither the absolutely indeterminate "initial stage" (1ns) nor the absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is  actual.  Instead, these are ideal limits that correspond to the infinite past and the infinite future, respectively.  In the meantime, all three categories are always operative.

 


CSP:  We look back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from law. (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8)

 



CSP:  The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and 

[PEIRCE-L] Option To Tag One's Own Post For Deletion

2020-06-27 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

It may be of interest to note that if a member
logs in to the web interface there is a button
at the upper right corner of one's own post to
tag it for deletion from the web record, which
normally happens fairly quickly.

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Please disregard my offline note to Gary R.

2020-06-27 Thread Ben Udell

That mistake happened because of an email address complication.

Auke until recently was sending some (not all) of his messages for 
peirce-l from an unsubscribed email address.  I was getting an 
occasional notice from the IUPUI server of a message (from Auke) stuck 
in moderation, so I used to approve it and wonder why it got stuck, 
since it happened with only some, not all, of his messages, and they 
didn't contain too many large-file-size images or the like. The messages 
that needed approval got distributed to the list as being from *Auke 
Breeman *.  So when you type Auke's name into a 
field, your email program may auto-fill it with the peirce-l email 
address!  Anyway, starting a few weeks ago both of Auke's email 
addresses have been subscribed to peirce-l, but his name may still 
appear in the To: or cc: fields with the *peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
*address on a sufficiently long-running thread. And one wouldn't even 
notice it when a message is sent to peirce-l as well as to particular 
individuals.  But with off-list notes, it makes a difference.


Best, Ben

On 6/27/2020 3:24 PM, John F. Sowa wrote:


I apologize for accidentally sending my note to Peirce-L.  I intended 
it only for Gary and with a cc to Auke and Edwina.


John

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] (offline) Nasty behavior by JAS

2020-06-27 Thread Jerry Rhee
Gary,

I have also sent my support to auke in private.
"But instead of reprimanding him, you told me that you would cut off my
access to Peirce-L."

With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 2:15 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I agree with Auke that JAS is frustrating to the point of nastiness
> Trying to communicate with JAS is like beating your head against a concrete
> wall.  See the thread attached below.
>
> JAS has a right to his own opinions.  But instead of recognizing that
> other people are making valid observations, JAS unleashes a barrage of
> quotations that do not support his position.  We all agree with Peirce.
> But we do not agree with JAS's interpretation of Peirce.   And we're
> frustrated by his wall of irrelevant quotations.
>
> I keep emphasizing that Peirce's writings are just the tip of an
> iceberg.   In order to understand his words, it's essential to understand
> his methods.   That is not just my opinion, please look at the 1024
> instances of method- (with various endings) in CP.
>
> I did my best in trying to get through to JAS.  But instead of
> reprimanding him, you told me that you would cut off my access to Peirce-L.
>
> My solution:  direct messages from JAS to directly to Trash.  But I keep
> seeing copies of his messages in notes by people I respect.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Please disregard my offline note to Gary R.

2020-06-27 Thread John F. Sowa



I apologize for accidentally sending my note to Peirce-L.  I intended
it only for Gary and with a cc to Auke and Edwina.
John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] (offline) Nasty behavior by JAS

2020-06-27 Thread John F. Sowa



Gary,
I agree with Auke that JAS is frustrating to the point of
nastiness  Trying to communicate with JAS is like beating your head
against a concrete wall.  See the thread attached below.
JAS has a
right to his own opinions.  But instead of recognizing that other people
are making valid observations, JAS unleashes a barrage of quotations that
do not support his position.  We all agree with Peirce.  But we do not
agree with JAS's interpretation of Peirce.   And we're frustrated by his
wall of irrelevant quotations.
I keep emphasizing that Peirce's
writings are just the tip of an iceberg.   In order to understand his
words, it's essential to understand his methods.   That is not just my
opinion, please look at the 1024 instances of method- (with various
endings) in CP.
I did my best in trying to get through to JAS.  But
instead of reprimanding him, you told me that you would cut off my access
to Peirce-L.
My solution:  direct messages from JAS to directly to
Trash.  But I keep seeing copies of his messages in notes by people I
respect.
John
--- Begin Message ---
Jon Alen,

You are a nasty kind of guy, trying to expose yourself by reading all kind of 
opinion to be corrected in others messages.

Disgusting rethorical tactics. As disgusting as the neighbour cat that allways 
is pissing against the same doorpost.

Auke


> Op 27 juni 2020 om 2:12 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, Edwina, List:
> 
> Just to clarify, according to Peirce neither the absolutely indeterminate 
> "initial stage" (1ns) nor the absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is 
> actual.  Instead, these are ideal limits that correspond to the infinite past 
> and the infinite future, respectively.  In the meantime, all three categories 
> are always operative.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  We look back toward a point in the infinitely 
> distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to 
> a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy 
> or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the 
> past, however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and 
> at any assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from 
> law. (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8)
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > CSP:  The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, 
> tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of 
> regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the 
> nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of 
> all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in 
> which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree 
> of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth 
> of habit. (CP 8.317, 1891)
> > 
> > > 
> In other words, the ongoing evolution (3ns) of our existing universe is 
> such that it is always becoming more determinate in accordance with Gary 
> Richmond's vector 
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm of 
> process (1ns→3ns→2ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 2:19 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Yes - I like that outline by Peirce as well. The first stage if we 
> > can call it that, after 'nothing', is chaos [Firstness] and then, the 
> > second stage is Thirdness where Mind begins to take charge and develop 
> > habits of organization - which permit the discrete 'bits' of Secondness to 
> > actually exist for more than a nanosecond, and, to reproduce as types 
> > [whether as chemical molecules or as cells].
> > 
> > Firstness continues within Thirdness; and therefore, there cannot 
> > be a final state of pure habits.
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Fri 26/06/20 2:59 PM , Auke van Breemen peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> > mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Edwina,
> > > 
> > > With regard to the estimate of final stage I always am of the 
> > > opinion that we can only reasonably  discuss it afterwards as to its true 
> > > nature.  
> > > 
> > > I have no religious inclinations, but can have sympathy with 
> > > certain religious expressions.  I do like Spinoza's naturalization of 
> > > god.   What I did value in Peirce's estimate is this fragment:
> > > 
> > > We exist in time, which is the second stage of cosmological 
> > > evolution, that of thirdness, characterized by both regularity (laws) and 
> > > diversity (spontaneity and "chance"). As the universe evolves, laws and 
> > > habits develop and become more and more 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Sign Relations

2020-06-27 Thread Jon Awbrey

Alex, All ...

Those are just ordinary unicodes for things like
bullets, ellipses, mdashes, quotes, right arrows,
math symbols, etc.

Every now and then some processor along the way fails to do its duty
and I get those triple question marks.  It doesn't seem to be anything
I've done and or can do and it usually goes away after a couple of days.

I've been to the Mozilla help forums and no one seems to know why.
It appears to be an ISP issue, not anything at my source since my
automatic bcc: to myself is okay, nor anything at the listserves.

It started late last year after some changes at Yahoo,
the middleman AT imposed on me a few years back.

I'll append a fresh copy below to see if
it's worked its way out of the system.

At any rate, I always include a link my blog copy,
which is much better formatted in LaTeX with Figs
and Tables and all.

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 7
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/26/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-7

Regards,

Jon

Test
=
bullet •
ellipses …
mdash —
quotes “ ”
rightarrow →

Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 7
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/26/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-7/

Re: Sign Relations • Definition
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/01/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-definition/
Re: Ontolog Forum
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/overview
Re: Alex Shkotin
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/cpgB6B6UjRs/1pPLJheLAQAJ

Dear Alex,

Please forgive the long and winding dissertation.  I've been through many discussions of Peirce's definition of “logic 
as formal semiotic” but I keep discovering new ways of reading what I once thought a fairly straightforward proposition. 
 That's all useful information but it makes me anxious to avoid all the missteps of exposition I may have made in the 
past.  At any rate, I think I've set enough background and context — it will take more, but later — to begin addressing 
your comments now.


For ease of reference here is Peirce's twofold definition again.



Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human 
thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. 
 Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the 
same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.  It is from this 
definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a 
historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no 
novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally 
recognized.  (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).




Turning to your first comment —

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/06/13/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-3/



A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:

A (a sign) brings B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of 
sign).

Moreover, A determines B or even creates B.

It would be nice to get an example of such an active sign, its interpretant sign, and an object.  My point is to make 
the Peirce definition as clear as to be formalized.




Several issues stand out.  There are questions about paraphrases,
the active character of signs, and the nature of what is being defined.

• The problem of paraphrases arises at this point because it affects
  how literally we ought to take the words in a natural language proxy
  for a logical or mathematical formula.

For example, a conventional idiom in describing a mathematical function f : X → Y is to say f “maps” or “sends” an 
element of X to an element of Y.  A concrete verb may quicken the intuition but the downside is its power to evoke 
excess meanings beyond the abstract intention.  It is only as we become more familiar with the formal subject matter of 
sign relations that we can decide what kind of “bringing” and “creating” and “determining” is really going on in all 
that sign, object, interpretant relating, whether at the abstract level or in a given application.


• There is the question of a sign's active character.
  Where's the dynamic function in all this static structure?
  Klaus Krippendorff raised the same question in regard to the
  Parable of the Sunflower back at the beginning of this discussion.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/05/28/sign-relations-%e2%80%a2-discussion-1/



[Peirce's] triadic explanations do not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s behavior.  It favors static descriptions 
which cybernetics is fundamentally opposed to, moreover including the cybernetician as enactor of his or her conceptual 
system.




I have not forgotten this question.  Indeed, it's the
question at the heart of my work on Inquiry Driven Systems


Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Hyperbolic Cosmology (was The Pragmatic Trivium)

2020-06-27 Thread Auke van Breemen
Jon Alen,

You are a nasty kind of guy, trying to expose yourself by reading all kind of 
opinion to be corrected in others messages.

Disgusting rethorical tactics. As disgusting as the neighbour cat that allways 
is pissing against the same doorpost.

Auke


> Op 27 juni 2020 om 2:12 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, Edwina, List:
> 
> Just to clarify, according to Peirce neither the absolutely indeterminate 
> "initial stage" (1ns) nor the absolutely determinate "final stage" (2ns) is 
> actual.  Instead, these are ideal limits that correspond to the infinite past 
> and the infinite future, respectively.  In the meantime, all three categories 
> are always operative.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  We look back toward a point in the infinitely 
> distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to 
> a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy 
> or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the 
> past, however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and 
> at any assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from 
> law. (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8)
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > CSP:  The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, 
> tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of 
> regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the 
> nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of 
> all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in 
> which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree 
> of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth 
> of habit. (CP 8.317, 1891)
> > 
> > > 
> In other words, the ongoing evolution (3ns) of our existing universe is 
> such that it is always becoming more determinate in accordance with Gary 
> Richmond's vector 
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm of 
> process (1ns→3ns→2ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 2:19 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Yes - I like that outline by Peirce as well. The first stage if we 
> > can call it that, after 'nothing', is chaos [Firstness] and then, the 
> > second stage is Thirdness where Mind begins to take charge and develop 
> > habits of organization - which permit the discrete 'bits' of Secondness to 
> > actually exist for more than a nanosecond, and, to reproduce as types 
> > [whether as chemical molecules or as cells].
> > 
> > Firstness continues within Thirdness; and therefore, there cannot 
> > be a final state of pure habits.
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Fri 26/06/20 2:59 PM , Auke van Breemen peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> > mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Edwina,
> > > 
> > > With regard to the estimate of final stage I always am of the 
> > > opinion that we can only reasonably  discuss it afterwards as to its true 
> > > nature.  
> > > 
> > > I have no religious inclinations, but can have sympathy with 
> > > certain religious expressions.  I do like Spinoza's naturalization of 
> > > god.   What I did value in Peirce's estimate is this fragment:
> > > 
> > > We exist in time, which is the second stage of cosmological 
> > > evolution, that of thirdness, characterized by both regularity (laws) and 
> > > diversity (spontaneity and "chance"). As the universe evolves, laws and 
> > > habits develop and become more and more regular. What was originally 
> > > spontaneity becomes law. But new spontaneities continue to arise, 
> > > increasing the variety of the world (Peirce, 1931-1935, 6.101). 
> > > 
> > > It is an improvement on Spinoza, a process approach. 
> > > 
> > > best,
> > > 
> > > Auke
> > > 
> > > Op 26 juni 2020 om 17:05 schreef Edwina Taborsky :
> > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > Auke, list
> > > > 
> > > > Thanks for the link and the interesting comments about 
> > > > the artistic process.
> > > > 
> > > > My comment is only about the cosmological outline, and 
> > > > of course reflects my own view. As an atheist, I have a problem with 
> > > > the anthropomorphic transformation of 'Mind' [which is a term Peirce 
> > > > also uses to refer to 'god' ] to the term of 'God', which is a term 
> > > > overloaded with anthropomorphic meanings, including agency, 
> > > > predetermined goals, interventionism, etc.
> > > > 
> > > > But my other quibble is