Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., Helmut, List:

Your longer Peirce quotation below brings to mind his famous opening
remarks in "The Fixation of Belief"--"Few persons care to study logic,
because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of
reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's
own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men" (CP 5.358, EP
1:109, 1877). It is also consistent with his observation that we
reconstruct argumentations consisting of discrete premisses and conclusions
only in retrospect, since the real inferential process is continuous (CP
2.27, 1902).

GF: With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word
“immediate” with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes.


That might be appropriate for psychology, but as applied to the object and
interpretant in speculative grammar, Peirce states repeatedly that
"immediate" simply means "as the sign represents it." This explains why his
late taxonomies for sign classification include trichotomies according to
the mode of *presentation *of the immediate object and interpretant vs. the
mode of *being *of the dynamical object and interpretant (and the *purpose *of
the final/normal interpretant), as well as additional divisions according
to the sign's *dyadic relations *with the dynamical object and interpretant
(and final/normal interpretant) but not with the immediate object and
interpretant.

GF: But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a text
also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine *what gets
selected from that “range”* when the dynamic interpretant is generated.


As I said before, I have had trouble accounting for this undeniable aspect
of real semiosis. Where do the interpreter's established habits of
interpretation come into play, such that the uttered sign determines
his/her mind to *this particular* dynamical interpretant rather than
another one? How does Peirce's theory of signs explain the fact that there
can be (and often are) *different *dynamical interpretants--some of which
are clearly *mis*interpretations--that are determined by the *same
*uttered sign,
which has the *same *immediate and final interpretants?

I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as
well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that
... [the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). This
"co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each interpreter
because connecting the same uttered sign with a different interpreter's
mind results in a system that constitutes a different new sign. Does that
seem right? I remain open to other suggestions.

GF: Attentively reading or re-reading the texts themselves in their
original context will normally modify, in some measure, the reader's
internalized understanding of the author – unless the reader is more
motivated to find confirmations of his or her prior understanding.


I strongly agree, which is why I keep returning to Peirce's texts as the
only evidence against which we can inductively evaluate anyone's previous
interpretations of them as abductive/retroductive hypotheses, including my
own.

GF: As for the Intentional Interpretant of a Peirce text, I agree that it
can’t be the Final Interpretant; but it can very well be the *motivation* of
his participation in the dialogue in which he was currently engaged
(remember he considered all thought to be dialogic). It is thus the
Immediate Interpretant of whatever *received* signs he had in mind when
constructing the dynamic interpretant of that stage of the dialogue or
inquiry, that dynamic interpretant being the external sign which is the
text we now have.


According to Peirce's definitions, any *actual *effect of a sign is a
dynamical interpretant, not an immediate interpretant. Within a
communicative context, any "determination of the mind of the interpreter,"
as distinguished from a determination of the "commind" into which the minds
of the utterer and interpreter are "fused" or "welded" by the sign itself,
is an "effectual" (dynamical) interpretant. Likewise, any "determination of
the mind of the utterer," including both motivation and intention, cannot
be *any *interpretant of the sign that is *currently *being uttered.
Instead, it still seems to me that such determinations must pertain somehow
to the *object* of that sign, since they are *antecedent *to it.

GF: He really believed that there is such a “thing” as Truth, and I think
his work deserves our respect and close attention because his *prime
*motivation
was to work toward it.


Again, I strongly agree.

HR: There obviously are many interpretants. I hope they can be classified
according to the principle, that firstness has one mode (or part?),
secondness has two modes (or parts?), and thirdness has three.


As I see it, that principle is manifested instead in Peirce's
identification of two objects and three interpretants 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Oct 25, 2021, at 10:14 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> (Cited as from MS0602_012)
> ...there should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the 
> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is 
> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be 
> varied and combined.

This sentence has little or any meaning to the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
forms of mathematics or physics, but fits the compositions of logical elements 
into unbounded numbers of unique compounds (such as the careful discrimination 
needed to identify handedness (optical isomers)!)  Does the "enter into 
everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?  How dark a shadow does this 
citation cast on the role of mathematics in phaneroscopy? 

It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological science 
that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?

It is possible that such a nomological science would be interdependent with the 
numerical calculations that relate the propositions of rhema, dici-signs and 
arguments such that coherent truths are generated from the correspondences 
between quali-signs, iconic forms, numerical indices?

These two possible assertions are consistence with the coherence of the 
sin-signs of natural sorts and kinds in both the 2 nd half of the 19 th Century 
and in the third decade of the 21 th Century.

Robert, the question to you is, if you remained interested in exploring 
Peircian mathematics is: what is the quantitation of your models of lattices 
such that a nomological sciences of numbers corresponds with natural sorts and 
kinds?

In other words, how is it possible to compose the factors of a polynomial index 
of elements into an exact symbolic legi-sign?

After all, this is the central thesis of the trichotomy - with both hypo-theses 
and hyper-theses . 

As I have previously asserted, I believe that the polynomial index of logical 
factors as well as a symbolic obligatory logic is essential to such a 
nomological science, such as the perplex numbers in relation to the 
compositions of organic mathematical symbols.

I will close by expressing a revealing but abstractly-encoded tease. Beware of 
Skolemization! 

Cheers
Jerry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

In context, Peirce is plainly referring to phaneroscopy, so "the different
indecomposable elements" are simply 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.

JLRC: Does the "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?


No, that is studied within the special science of chemistry, not
phaneroscopy. The quote refers to whatever is or could be present to the
mind in any way.

JLRC: It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological
science that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?


No, those are studied within the normative science of logic as semeiotic,
not phaneroscopy. The "should" here is logical, not ethical.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 1:41 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List:
>
> On Oct 25, 2021, at 10:14 AM, robert marty 
> wrote:
> (Cited as from MS0602_012)
>
> ...there should be a *nomological* science , which shall make out all the
> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is
> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be
> varied and combined.
>
> This sentence has little or any meaning to the iconic, indexical or
> symbolic forms of mathematics or physics, but fits the compositions of
> logical elements into unbounded numbers of unique compounds (such as the
> careful discrimination needed to identify handedness (optical isomers)!)
>  Does the "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?
> How dark a shadow does this citation cast on the role of mathematics in
> phaneroscopy?
>
> It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological
> science that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?
>
> It is possible that such a nomological science would be interdependent
> with the numerical calculations that relate the propositions of rhema,
> dici-signs and arguments such that coherent truths are generated from the
> correspondences between quali-signs, iconic forms, numerical indices?
>
> *These two possible assertions are consistence with the coherence of the
> sin-signs of natural sorts and kinds* in both the 2 nd half of the 19 th
> Century and in the third decade of the 21 th Century.
>
> Robert, the question to you is, if you remained interested in exploring
> Peircian mathematics is: what is the quantitation of your models of
> lattices such that a nomological sciences of numbers corresponds with
> natural sorts and kinds?
>
> In other words, how is it possible to compose the factors of a polynomial
> index of elements into an exact symbolic legi-sign?
>
> After all, this is the central thesis of the trichotomy - with both
> hypo-theses and hyper-theses .
>
> As I have previously asserted, I believe that the polynomial index of
> logical factors as well as a symbolic obligatory logic is essential to such
> a nomological science, such as the perplex numbers in relation to the
> compositions of organic mathematical symbols.
>
> I will close by expressing a revealing but abstractly-encoded tease. *Beware
> of Skolemization*!
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[gnox]

We should mention that John Sowa quoted part of R 602 back on August 16 (Re: 
[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25 (mail-archive.com) 
 ), 
claiming that it contradicted “ADT’s slide 25”. There was some follow-up 
discussion (which I think did not bear out that claim). But it’s good to have a 
more complete transcription, which shows that the whole manuscript is an 
explanation of why phaneroscopy has to precede the normative sciences in the 
classification. By the way there is a PDF of the manuscript at 
https://www.unav.es/gep/MS602.pdf. 

 

Gary F.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 25-Oct-21 13:51
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of 
normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

 

Robert, List:

 

Indeed, Peirce likely wrote R 602 no earlier than 1904 since it uses his new 
name "phaneroscopy" for the distinct science in question, mainly to distinguish 
it from Hegel's "phenomenology." Its contents appear to be fully consistent 
with his mature classification, including the dependence of phaneroscopy on 
mathematics for principles.

 

Moreover, just as "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of 
mathematics," likewise "in order successfully to prosecute the study of logic, 
we ought to prepare the ground by a preliminary study of ethics in general" (R 
602:8-9). Again, this is a major revision of the early classifications in R 
1345, which situate ethics as the first branch of pragmatics--below not only 
logic, but also metaphysics and all the special sciences as the branches of 
empirics.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 10:15 AM robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Jon Alan, List

 

Jon Alan, perhaps this classification - which I extract from MS 602 - will 
leave you less perplexed. First, because of its date (1902-1908 according to 
Robin, 16 p.), and second, because of the extreme accuracy and clarity of its 
exposition. I have not finished examining all of them, but for the moment, this 
one is the best I have come across. But I have no doubt that your extreme rigor 
of thought will find at least one asperity to catch some powerful criticism, 
because that is how science works  I add as an attachment my transcription 
of the whole MS.

 


  ...beginning of the quote 
.

MS0602_012

[M 12] [ ...] But preliminary to normative sciences, which is essentially 
classificatory, -stop to take that well in, I beg you, gentle reader, there 
should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the different 
indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is conceivably 
possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be varied and 
combined. This science I hesitate to call phenomenology  after Hegel, for fear 
of marring his peculiar conception of it; and therefore , though  I think it is 
essentially the same thing under a somewhat different aspect, I will name 
Phaneroscopy. It is the science of the different elementary constituents of all 
ideas. Its material

MS0602_013

[M 13] is, of course, universal experience, -experience I mean of the fanciful 
and the abstract, as well as of the concrete and real. Yet to suppose that in 
such experience the elements were to be found already separate would be to 
suppose unimaginable and selfcontradictory. They must be separated by a process 
of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand. They must be picked 
out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter; and therefore it is 
that phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of mathematics. 
[emphasize mine]

With this remark our ladder of the sciences is completed and may be exhibited 
in tabula form as follows:

MS0602_014

[M 14]   HEURETIC SCIENCE

MATHEMATICS

  CENOSCOPY

   Phaneroscopy

   Normative Science 

Esthetics

Ethics 

Logic

  Metaphysics

   IDIOSCOPY

  PhysiognosyPsychognosy

  Nomology   Nomology

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

Indeed, Peirce likely wrote R 602 no earlier than 1904 since it uses his
new name "phaneroscopy" for the distinct science in question, mainly to
distinguish it from Hegel's "phenomenology." Its contents appear to be
fully consistent with his mature classification, including the dependence
of phaneroscopy on mathematics for principles.

Moreover, just as "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of
mathematics," likewise "in order successfully to prosecute the study of
logic, we ought to prepare the ground by a preliminary study of ethics in
general" (R 602:8-9). Again, this is a major revision of the early
classifications in R 1345, which situate ethics as the first branch of
pragmatics--below not only logic, but also metaphysics and all the special
sciences as the branches of empirics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 10:15 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, List
>
> Jon Alan, perhaps this classification - which I extract from MS 602 - will
> leave you less perplexed. First, because of its date (1902-1908 according
> to Robin, 16 p.), and second, because of the extreme accuracy and clarity
> of its exposition. I have not finished examining all of them, but for the
> moment, this one is the best I have come across. But I have no doubt that
> your extreme rigor of thought will find at least one asperity to catch some
> powerful criticism, because that is how science works  I add as an
> attachment my transcription of the whole MS.
>
> 
> ...beginning of the quote
> .
>
> MS0602_012
>
> [M 12] [ ...] But preliminary to normative sciences, which is essentially
> *classificatory,* -stop to take that well in, I beg you, gentle reader,
> there should be a *nomological* science , which shall make out all the
> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is
> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be
> varied and combined. This science I hesitate to call phenomenology  after
> Hegel, for fear of marring his peculiar conception of it; and therefore ,
> though  I think it is essentially the same thing under a somewhat
> different aspect, I will name *Phaneroscopy*. It is the science of the
> different elementary constituents of all ideas. Its material
>
> MS0602_013
>
> [M 13] is, of course, universal experience, -experience I mean of the
> fanciful and the abstract, as well as of the concrete and real. Yet to
> suppose that in such experience the elements were to be found already
> separate would be to suppose unimaginable and selfcontradictory. They must
> be separated by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise
> on demand. They must be picked out of the fragments that necessary
> reasonings scatter;* and therefore it is that phaneroscopic research
> requires a previous study of mathematics*. [emphasize mine]
>
> With this remark our ladder of the sciences is completed and may be
> exhibited in tabula form as follows:
>
> MS0602_014
>
> [M 14]   *HEURETIC SCIENCE*
>
> *MATHEMATICS*
>
> *  CENOSCOPY*
>
> *   Phaneroscopy*
>
> *   Normative Science *
>
> *Esthetics*
>
> *Ethics *
>
> *Logic*
>
> *  Metaphysics*
>
> *   IDIOSCOPY*
>
>   Physiognosy
> Psychognosy
>
>   Nomology   Nomology
>
> MS0602_015
>
> [M 15]  Dynamics
>   General Psychology
>
>  Molar Physics
>Gravitation
>
>  Molecular Physics
>Elaterics; Crystallography
>
> Etherial Physics
>Optics
>Electrics
>
> Classificatory Science
>  Classificatory Science
>
>Chemistry
>  Special
> Psychology
>
> Biology
> Linguistics
>   Physiology
>   Anatomy
>   Ethnology
>
>
> Explanatory 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List

 

There obviously are many interpretants. I hope they can be classified according to the principle, that firstness has one mode (or part?), secondness has two modes (or parts?), and thirdness has three. For example the dynamic object in my understanding has two modes, resp. consists of two parts: The conceptual and the material part. Both of course those which exist independently of, and external to the sign. In the same way, I think, all the interpretants should be classifiable, otherwise I am out (not off the list, ha-ha, but off the interpretants-topic.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

 25. Oktober 2021 um 17:07 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jerry R, Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which will surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, though, that my own internal context for thinking about these matters is weighted toward the psychological perspective on them. Peirce was always careful not to base his logic, or his semeiotic, on psychological theories — but his work “betrays” plenty of psychological insight. Jerry’s response to my earlier post gave added emphasis to this one: “In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe” (EP2:2). Another one appears here:

CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that this is largely illusory: they are much less guided by reason, much more guided by instinct, than they seem to themselves to be; because their reasonings are prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts they are hardly aware of, except later when they come to review their conduct. Even then, they are so immersed in instinct that they are hardly able to perceive it. (R 410:1–2, c. 1894)

In our time, cognitive science and social psychology have taken this a step further with the study of “motivated cognition” and “motivated reasoning”, which shows that our conscious reasoning itself is driven by subconscious motivations and intentions, or “instincts” as Peirce called them. Jonathan Haidt encapsulates this in the metaphor of the elephant (instinctive motivation or intuitive judgment) and the rider (reason): the rider may think he controls the elephant, but much of our reasoning is a more or less desperate attempt to rationalize our actions or our intuitive beliefs. And many of our intuitive beliefs are determined by conformity to the beliefs of some group that we belong to, or wish to belong to. This is one reason why your neighbors are yourself, as Peirce put it. 

“Motivated reasoning” often leads to the “hypocrisy” that Jerry mentioned, among other effects on communication between humans. For an obvious example, just consider a typical campaign speech by any politician. But we all act this way in matters that we care about, and getting to the Truth (or Final Interpretant) is not always our prime motivation, even in a process of inquiry. Often it takes some effort to make it prevail over other motivations.

With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. When it comes to Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants, this bias of mine may be hard to reconcile with Jon’s more purely semiotic definitions.

JAS: As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the sign. As I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of possible understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules of grammar for the language in which it is written.

GF: OK, that fits with the Firstness and indeterminacy of the first in a triad of interpretants. But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a text also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine what gets selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is generated. And that selection itself tends to be pre-conscious or “immediate” in my psychological sense of the word. The reader may even be subconsciously motivated to overlook “the syntax and other rules of grammar” and the external context of the text when constructing a dynamic interpretant.

Peirce's theories and applications of those theories, whether directly quoted, paraphrased or summarized, come out of a context which (for us) is the whole body of Peirce's extant work. That work came out of an even larger context, which is the whole body of scientific discourse extending at least from the time of Aristotle up to Peirce's lifetime. In order to situate his work in that larger context, Peirce had to internalize it, to develop an implicit understanding of it which served as the internal context of his explicit thoughts. Likewise, students of Peirce internalize an understanding of Peirce which is vastly simplified 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jerry R, Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which will 
surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, though, that 
my own internal context for thinking about these matters is weighted toward the 
psychological perspective on them. Peirce was always careful not to base his 
logic, or his semeiotic, on psychological theories — but his work “betrays” 
plenty of psychological insight. Jerry’s response to my earlier post gave added 
emphasis to this one: “In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, 
yourself, and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, 
you would believe” (EP2:2). Another one appears here:

CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that 
this is largely illusory: they are much less guided by reason, much more guided 
by instinct, than they seem to themselves to be; because their reasonings are 
prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts 
they are hardly aware of, except later when they come to review their conduct. 
Even then, they are so immersed in instinct that they are hardly able to 
perceive it. (R 410:1–2, c. 1894)

In our time, cognitive science and social psychology have taken this a step 
further with the study of “motivated cognition” and “motivated reasoning 
 ”, which shows that our 
conscious reasoning itself is driven by subconscious motivations and 
intentions, or “instincts” as Peirce called them. Jonathan Haidt encapsulates 
this in the metaphor of the elephant (instinctive motivation or intuitive 
judgment) and the rider (reason): the rider may think he controls the elephant, 
but much of our reasoning is a more or less desperate attempt to rationalize 
our actions or our intuitive beliefs. And many of our intuitive beliefs are 
determined by conformity to the beliefs of some group that we belong to, or 
wish to belong to. This is one reason why your neighbors are yourself, as 
Peirce put it. 

“Motivated reasoning” often leads to the “hypocrisy” that Jerry mentioned, 
among other effects on communication between humans. For an obvious example, 
just consider a typical campaign speech by any politician. But we all act this 
way in matters that we care about, and getting to the Truth (or Final 
Interpretant) is not always our prime motivation, even in a process of inquiry. 
Often it takes some effort to make it prevail over other motivations.

With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” with 
spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. When it comes to 
Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants, this bias of mine may be hard to 
reconcile with Jon’s more purely semiotic definitions.

JAS: As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the sign. As 
I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of possible 
understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise 
it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules 
of grammar for the language in which it is written.

GF: OK, that fits with the Firstness and indeterminacy of the first in a triad 
of interpretants. But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter 
reading a text also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine 
what gets selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is 
generated. And that selection itself tends to be pre-conscious or “immediate” 
in my psychological sense of the word. The reader may even be subconsciously 
motivated to overlook “the syntax and other rules of grammar” and the external 
context of the text when constructing a dynamic interpretant.

Peirce's theories and applications of those theories, whether directly quoted, 
paraphrased or summarized, come out of a context which (for us) is the whole 
body of Peirce's extant work. That work came out of an even larger context, 
which is the whole body of scientific discourse extending at least from the 
time of Aristotle up to Peirce's lifetime. In order to situate his work in that 
larger context, Peirce had to internalize it, to develop an implicit 
understanding of it which served as the internal context of his explicit 
thoughts. Likewise, students of Peirce internalize an understanding of Peirce 
which is vastly simplified in comparison with the totality of Peirce's work. It 
may include a few familiar quotations which are represented in memory more or 
less accurately, but onboard memory is limited. Attentively reading or 
re-reading the texts themselves in their original context will normally modify, 
in some measure, the reader's internalized understanding of the author – unless 
the reader is more motivated to find confirmations 
  of his or her prior 
understanding.

As for the Intentional Interpretant of a Peirce