Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon A.S., List,

The introduction of psychological considerations into this discussion is, I
think, important, posing perhaps some interesting challenges for Peirce's
logic.

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one
mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a
“dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of
the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant?
There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is
between object, sign and interpretant.

GF: This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted
above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a
binocular
vision  (both logical and
psychological) of semiosis. . . Anyway I think it’s compatible with your
own explanation.

That "loose talk" includes, however, this rather telling 'binocular'
comment:

"Accordingly, it is not merely *a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity
of Logic*, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. (CP
4.551 , 1906)


Yet even here the psychology/logic *distinction* is adumbrated, for
dialogic, Peirce writes, is a mere *fact* for psychology, but a *necessity*
for logic.

That passage in turn reminded me of this remark by Peirce to the effect
that approaching research into Speculative Rhetoric his rule of excluding
psychological content could be relaxed in the interest of making the last
branch of logic as semeiotic "practically useful."


CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how
we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful?
CP 2.107

A few years ago Ben Udell and I contributed a short chapter, "Logic is
rooted in the social principle, and vice versa" in a volume, C*harles
Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and
Cognition*, edited by Torkild Thellefsen and Ben Sorensen. I had long been
intrigued by the juxtaposition of these two snippets of Peirce. . .

1. Logic is rooted in the social principle. CP 2.653
2. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.CP 5.354


. . . and the invitation to contribute a chapter to that volume offered the
opportunity to think more deeply on that juxtaposition. I've more to say on
the topic of course, but for now I will only remark that Peirce was clear
that the work of science was essentially not that of individuals but of
communities of common scientific interest over sometimes great lengths of
time. But having run out of time as I approach a busy evening, for now I
will only leave those two snippets as a kind of intellectual koan for List
members to reflect on. Of course they're taken out of context (one can get
by reading the CP passages surrounding the two snippets and, perhaps,
reading Ben's and my paper). But even as given above, stripped of context,
I think they're worth contemplating.

Best,

Gary R

(PS I see Jon has also responded to your post, Gary, but I'd written most
of this before it appeared on the List and wanted to send it off today;
I'll  have to read Jon's post late this evening or tomorrow.)

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 8:59 AM  wrote:

> Jon AS, List,
>
> JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including
> both motivation and intention, cannot be *any *interpretant of the sign
> that is *currently *being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that
> such determinations must pertain somehow to the *object* of that sign,
> since they are *antecedent *to it.
>
> GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an
> interpretant of *the dialogue in which he was currently engaged*, which
> continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is
> *not* an isolated sign.
>
> CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
> be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
> least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
> although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself,
> they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say,
> *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a
> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be
> dialogic. (CP 4.551 , 1906)
>
> GF: If two minds can 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an
interpretant of *the dialogue in which he [Peirce] was currently engaged*,
which continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text


As a determination of the mind of the *utterer *of the specific sign being
analyzed--here the mind of Peirce as the author of the text--the
intentional interpretant is *only *an interpretant of the portion of the
overall dialogue that came *before *that utterance. It is *not* an
interpretant of the text *itself*, nor of the portion of the overall
dialogue that came *after *its utterance, including our reading of the
text. Instead, it is an *object *of those later signs. As R 1345 states,
there is a sense in which all three correlates of "the triad" (i.e., "the
representation") are signs (i.e., "representamens") undergoing semiosis.
Specifically, a sign that is an *interpretant *of a previous sign then
becomes an *object *of a subsequent sign. Again, these discrete correlates
are artifacts of phaneroscopic analysis, *entia rationis *abstracted at a
hypothetical instant of time from the real inferential process, which is
continuous.

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one
mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a
“dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of
the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant?


According to Peirce, the intentional, effectual, and communicational (or
com-) interpretants are determinations of the mind of the utterer, the mind
of the interpreter, and the commens (or commind), respectively (EP 2:478).
He does not say that the first two interpretants/determinations are
"welded" into the third interpretant/determination, he says that the first
two (quasi-)minds are "welded" into the third (quasi-)mind in the uttered
sign itself (CP 4.551). In other words, the three
interpretants/determinations remain distinct, even though the two
communicating minds are "fused" into one mind. As a determination of that
commind, the cominterpretant is *internal *to the uttered sign, and
therefore must be the *immediate *interpretant of that sign. By contrast,
the intentional interpretant is a *dynamical *interpretant of a previous
sign, while the effectual interpretant is a *dynamical *interpretant of the
uttered sign.

GF: There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is
between object, sign and interpretant.


On the contrary, it seems to me that in a communicational context, the
intentional interpretant (utterer) antecedes the cominterpretant (sign),
which antecedes the effectual interpretant (interpreter)--at least
logically, if not temporally. When identifying objects and interpretants,
we always need to pay careful attention to the specific sign being
analyzed. In the case of a text, any connected determination of the mind of
its author is an object (antecedent) of that sign, and any connected
determination of the mind of a reader is an interpretant (consequent) of
that sign. In the case of a dialogue, any signs internal to it are
constituents of that sign itself, any connected signs preceding it are
constituents of its object (antecedent), and any connected signs succeeding
it are constituents of its interpretant (consequent). At least, that is how
I am inclined to see it right now.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 7:59 AM  wrote:

> Jon AS, List,
>
> JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including
> both motivation and intention, cannot be *any *interpretant of the sign
> that is *currently *being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that
> such determinations must pertain somehow to the *object* of that sign,
> since they are *antecedent *to it.
>
> GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an
> interpretant of *the dialogue in which he was currently engaged*, which
> continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is
> *not* an isolated sign.
>
> CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
> be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
> least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
> although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself,
> they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say,
> *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a
> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be
> dialogic. (CP 4.551 , 1906)
>
> GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one
> mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a
> “dialogue” 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JLRC:  the text in no way addresses such as enormous constraint. ...
Furthermore, phanerscopy is merely a term that is not a science in the
usual sense of meaning. ... So, the suggestion that Peirce is "plainly
referring" to phanerscopy is speaking for CSP ex cathedra.


Here again is the text in question.

CSP: But preliminary to normative science, which is essentially
*classificatory*,--stop to take that well in, I beg you, gentle
reader,--there should be a *nomological *science, which shall make out all
the different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is
conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how they can
be varied and combined. This science I hesitate to call phenomenology after
Hegel, for fear of marring his peculiar conception of it; and therefore,
though I think it is essentially the same thing under a somewhat different
aspect, I will name [it] *phaneroscopy*. It is the science of the different
elementary constituents of all ideas. Its material is, of course, universal
experience,--experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as well as
of the concrete and real. Yet to suppose that in such experience the
elements were to be found already separate would be to suppose the
unimaginable and selfcontradictory. They must be separated by a process of
thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand. They must be
picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter; and
therefore it is that phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of
mathematics. (R 602:12-13, SWS 243-244, 1906 per Bellucci 2020)


In this paragraph, Peirce is specifically defining/describing "a
*nomological *science" that, in accordance with the *logical *basis of his
entire classification, should be "preliminary to normative science."
Although it is very similar to Hegel's "phenomenology," Peirce prefers to
give it the new name "phaneroscopy" because it studies the totality of
whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way, which he elsewhere
dubs "the phaneron." He also explains in other writings that "the different
indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is conceivably
possible"--i.e., "the different elementary constituents of all ideas"--are
1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.

Peirce adds that these are not "found already separate," but "must be
separated by a process of thought," namely, prescission of 2ns from 3ns and
of 1ns from both 3ns and 2ns. He describes this as "pick[ing them] out of
the fragments that necessary reasonings scatter," giving this as the reason
why "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of mathematics." He
thus emphasizes not only the dependence of phaneroscopy on mathematics, but
also the distinction of phaneroscopy from mathematics--the necessary
reasonings of mathematics produce scattered fragments, from which
phaneroscopy must pick out the three universal/formal categories.

JLRC: One can image anything one wishes, but it seems relatively clear what
the nature of realism is. ... could you search for some significant
SCIENTIFIC arguments that address the structures of realism and addresses
the foundational issues essential to a nomological science or realism?


Realism is not germane to phaneroscopy because this science is only
concerned with what *seems*, encompassing not just "the concrete and real"
but also "the fanciful and the abstract." Within Peirce's classification,
distinguishing the real from the fictional is instead a task for
metaphysics, employing principles of the normative science of logic as
semeiotic.

JLRC: CSP held that chemistry was the ”bedrock” of his logical system


As John Sowa has previously requested, "For any claims about what Peirce
believed, please give exact quotations." Are there any texts where he
*explicitly
states* that chemistry is the "bedrock" of his logical system? If not, what
is the basis for claiming that this was *his own *position?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 10:02 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> On Oct 25, 2021, at 2:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> In context, Peirce is plainly referring to phaneroscopy, so "the different
> indecomposable elements" are simply 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
>
> Jon:  the text in no way addresses such as enormous constraint.   One can
> image anything one wishes, but it seems relatively clear what the nature of
> realism is.
>
> Furthermore, phanerscopy is merely a term that is not a science in the
> usual sense of meaning.
>
>  The vagueness of the concepts 1 ns, 2ns and 3 ns in no way restrict the
> meaning of sentence.
>
> Certainly, the terminology of the trichotomy can be read in terms of 1ns,
> 2ns, and 3ns.
>
> So, the suggestion that Peirce is "plainly referring" to phanerscopy is
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon AS, List,

JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including both 
motivation and intention, cannot be any interpretant of the sign that is 
currently being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that such determinations 
must pertain somehow to the object of that sign, since they are antecedent to 
it.

GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an 
interpretant of the dialogue in which he was currently engaged, which continues 
both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is not an 
isolated sign.

CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be 
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least 
two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these 
two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless 
be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not 
merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical 
evolution of thought should be dialogic. (CP 4.551 
 , 1906)

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously distinct and welded into one mind in the 
sign, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one 
sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and 
interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? There is no relation of 
antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and 
interpretant.

This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted above 
may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a binocular 
vision   (both logical and psychological) 
of semiosis. (Follow that link for an explanation relevant to 21st-Century 
concerns.) Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own explanation:

JAS: I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as 
well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that ... 
[the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). This 
"co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each interpreter 
because connecting the same uttered sign with a different interpreter's mind 
results in a system that constitutes a different new sign.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 25-Oct-21 19:04
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary F., Helmut, List:

 

Your longer Peirce quotation below brings to mind his famous opening remarks in 
"The Fixation of Belief"--"Few persons care to study logic, because everybody 
conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But 
I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and 
does not extend to that of other men" (CP 5.358, EP 1:109, 1877). It is also 
consistent with his observation that we reconstruct argumentations consisting 
of discrete premisses and conclusions only in retrospect, since the real 
inferential process is continuous (CP 2.27, 1902).

 

GF: With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” 
with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes.

 

That might be appropriate for psychology, but as applied to the object and 
interpretant in speculative grammar, Peirce states repeatedly that "immediate" 
simply means "as the sign represents it." This explains why his late taxonomies 
for sign classification include trichotomies according to the mode of 
presentation of the immediate object and interpretant vs. the mode of being of 
the dynamical object and interpretant (and the purpose of the final/normal 
interpretant), as well as additional divisions according to the sign's dyadic 
relations with the dynamical object and interpretant (and final/normal 
interpretant) but not with the immediate object and interpretant.

 

GF: But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a text 
also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine what gets 
selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is generated.

 

As I said before, I have had trouble accounting for this undeniable aspect of 
real semiosis. Where do the interpreter's established habits of interpretation 
come into play, such that the uttered sign determines his/her mind to this 
particular dynamical interpretant rather than another one? How does Peirce's 
theory of signs explain the fact that there can be (and often are) different 
dynamical interpretants--some of which are clearly misinterpretations--that are 
determined by the same uttered sign, which has the same immediate and final 
interpretants?

 

I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as well. 
The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that ... [the] 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:



> On Oct 25, 2021, at 2:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> In context, Peirce is plainly referring to phaneroscopy, so "the different 
> indecomposable elements" are simply 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.

Jon:  the text in no way addresses such as enormous constraint.   One can image 
anything one wishes, but it seems relatively clear what the nature of realism 
is.

Furthermore, phanerscopy is merely a term that is not a science in the usual 
sense of meaning.

 The vagueness of the concepts 1 ns, 2ns and 3 ns in no way restrict the 
meaning of sentence.  

Certainly, the terminology of the trichotomy can be read in terms of 1ns, 2ns, 
and 3ns.

So, the suggestion that Peirce is "plainly referring" to phanerscopy is 
speaking for CSP ex cathedra.



> 
> JLRC: Does the "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?
> 
> No, that is studied within the special science of chemistry, not 
> phaneroscopy. The quote refers to whatever is or could be present to the mind 
> in any way.

The meanings of the attributes of matter and the coherence of natural sciences 
and natural philosophy of the concept of elements are not restricted.
Since CSP held that chemistry was the ” bedrock” of his logical system, any 
wholistic notion would necessary relate to chemical abstractions. 

> 
> JLRC: It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological 
> science that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?
> 
> No, those are studied within the normative science of logic as semeiotic, not 
> phaneroscopy. The "should" here is logical, not ethical.

Arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the grammar of “should”.  

In short, I find these comments disappointingly shallow, given the GRAVITY of 
the assertion of the sentence.

John:  could you search for some significant SCIENTIFIC arguments that address 
the structures of realism and addresses the foundational issues essential to a 
nomological science or realism?

Cheers

Jerry   


> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 1:41 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List:
>> On Oct 25, 2021, at 10:14 AM, robert marty > > wrote:
>> (Cited as from MS0602_012)
>> ...there should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the 
>> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is 
>> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be 
>> varied and combined.
> 
> This sentence has little or any meaning to the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
> forms of mathematics or physics, but fits the compositions of logical 
> elements into unbounded numbers of unique compounds (such as the careful 
> discrimination needed to identify handedness (optical isomers)!)  Does the 
> "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?  How dark a 
> shadow does this citation cast on the role of mathematics in phaneroscopy? 
> 
> It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological science 
> that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?
> 
> It is possible that such a nomological science would be interdependent with 
> the numerical calculations that relate the propositions of rhema, dici-signs 
> and arguments such that coherent truths are generated from the 
> correspondences between quali-signs, iconic forms, numerical indices?
> 
> These two possible assertions are consistence with the coherence of the 
> sin-signs of natural sorts and kinds in both the 2 nd half of the 19 th 
> Century and in the third decade of the 21 th Century.
> 
> Robert, the question to you is, if you remained interested in exploring 
> Peircian mathematics is: what is the quantitation of your models of lattices 
> such that a nomological sciences of numbers corresponds with natural sorts 
> and kinds?
> 
> In other words, how is it possible to compose the factors of a polynomial 
> index of elements into an exact symbolic legi-sign?
> 
> After all, this is the central thesis of the trichotomy - with both 
> hypo-theses and hyper-theses . 
> 
> As I have previously asserted, I believe that the polynomial index of logical 
> factors as well as a symbolic obligatory logic is essential to such a 
> nomological science, such as the perplex numbers in relation to the 
> compositions of organic mathematical symbols.
> 
> I will close by expressing a revealing but abstractly-encoded tease. Beware 
> of Skolemization! 
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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