[PEIRCE-L] Existential graphs for the Semantic Web (was Signs, Types, and Tokens
Mike, Common Logic (CL) is a very general version of logic, and OWL is just a tiny subset of the capabilities of CL. Peirce's existential graphs, with a small extension, have the full expressive power of CL. For an overview of the issues and the mappings to and from EGs, see http://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf . These are the slides (with references to all the systems and logics mentioned) for a keynote speech at the 2020 European Semantic Web Conference. It was originally scheduled for Crete, but it was Zoomifiied because of Covid. John PS: "sowa" in Polish (and other Slavic languages) means 'owl". But I much prefer Common Logic, especially its graphic expression in EGs and other digrammatic forms. I worked on the committee that specified Common Logic, and I made sure that it had a simple mapping to and from EGs. I don't like OWL, and my goal is to persuade people to adopt EGs and related graphic notations From: "Mike Bergman" Sent: Friday, November 5, 2021 2:17 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens Hi All, This is a frequent question, between token and type, in knowledge representation systems. Of course, the answer to this question is context. When talking about a thing or its attributes, token is your choice. When talking about external relationships or group membership, type is your choice. Sometimes, for the same given thing, either might be appropriate, again depending on context. A real advance in the second version of the OWL language, one of the W3C standards, was to enable a metamodeling technique called 'punning'. Depending on context, the same 'thing' may be either a class (type) or instance (individual) [1]. I think Charlie would approve, but I do not have song and verse to cite for that immediately at hand. Mike _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?
Gary F., List: FYI, your post once again had some white-on-white text, which I have fixed below. GF: A *narrative *is basically a representation of *a sequence of events* which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" ... GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a *representation*, and a representation is a sign. Its dynamic *object* is a sequence of events, and that *object* (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any way. Here we have a clear example of a *mis*interpretation on my part--specifically, I misidentified the *dynamical *object of a sign because I misunderstood its *immediate *object. I incorrectly took the referent of the pronoun "which" to be "representation," so I misread your statement as, "A narrative is basically a representation which is not necessarily meaningful in any way." That is why I replied by insisting that every *sign *is meaningful. It turns out that you intended the referent of the pronoun "which" to be "sequence of events," so I should have read your statement as, "A narrative is basically a representation whose object is a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way." On this, we are in agreement, since a sequence of events is not necessarily meaningful *in itself*--only by virtue of a sign *about *it that determines an interpretant, which is the meaning *of that sign*. GF: Point a camera out a window, set it to record for an hour, go off and do something else, and when you return you’ll have an hour-long visual narrative in which no events are selected or treated as significant. Only the point of view and the time frame was deliberately selected. Except that by deliberately selecting "the point of view and the time frame," one is deliberately selecting *only *those events that occur *within *the camera's field of view *during *that time frame for inclusion in the resulting visual narrative, thus ignoring any and all events that occur elsewhere and/or outside that time frame--i.e., treating the latter as *insignificant *relative to one's purpose in making the recording. In other words, I am having a hard time imagining anything qualifying as a narrative that is *not *"deliberately constructed" to at least this minimal extent. GF: The same would apply to a recording of a concert of aleatory music: it represents a *sequence *of sonic events which can be meaningless in themselves. It seems to me that this defines "meaning" too narrowly. For Peirce, *any *effect of *any *sign is its "meaning," namely, its interpretant. The compression and decompression of air molecules that constitute those "sonic events" are an "existential meaning"--a dynamical interpretant--of the sign token that is the musicians' *actual *performance, which is itself a dynamical interpretant of the score as another sign token, even if it consists only of verbal instructions rather than the conventional marks on a staff that convey specific notes to be played. GF: I would say that the score, the set of instructions for the performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or sequence of sounds) was a sign. Why not? What essential aspect of the definition of "sign" was it lacking? GF: Some of my favorite music is, to me at least, quite meaningless, because what I’m hearing in it is pure Secondness, quite innocent of Thirdness (unless you count the time it takes as Thirdness). Again, this strikes me as defining "meaning" too narrowly. If it is some of your *favorite *music, then it is quite obviously *meaningful *to you--your *actual *feeling of enjoyment is an *energetic *interpretant of the music (2ns of 3ns), and the *quality *of that feeling is an *emotional *interpretant of the music (1ns of 3ns). GF: A friend of mine is a fan of plotless novels; and it seems to me that the universe as sign can be a narrative without being an argument. "Plot" and "narrative" are virtually synonymous, so how could a "plotless novel" be accurately characterized as a narrative *at all*? As for the universe, if it is truly a narrative, then I continue to maintain that it must have a narrator who deliberately selects which events to actualize within it in accordance with a purpose. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Nov 7, 2021 at 12:11 PM wrote: > Jon, list, > > GF: A *narrative *is basically a representation of *a sequence of events* > which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. > > JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign … > > GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a *representation*, and a > representation is a sign. Its dynamic *object* is a sequence of events, > and that *object* (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any > way. The mere fact of *being represented* does not make anything >
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?
Supplement: Maybe the universe is both the text and the writer (pantheism), or the universe is the text and the writer´s body (panentheism), or the universe is the text alone (theism). Which of these three possibilities are real, we can never know, because it is impossible to conclude from the text to the writer (Goedel`s incompleteness-theorem). But if we assume, that things we cannot know may well be, because why not, then theism appears quite likely. But we should not pay homage to, or picture something that is based on "why not". Why not? Because that would be presumption, pretension, usurpation. We are condemned aka free to sort out our affairs with our own means. There is something like the "label paradoxon": Who labels himself "good" acts worst, because he thinks, that the act of self-labelling already is a good act, which excuses all bad actions under that label. You know the examples. List, I think, a narrative is not necessarily an argument, or a set of propositions and arguments, it may also be a set of propositions only. I agree, that a narrative has a purpose, which is the narrator´s intention to narrate. Narrative intention is the intention to fixate belief. If the narration/narrative is merely a set of propositions, the method of belief-fixation is tenacity. If the narration contains one or more deductive arguments, the scientific method too is applied. If merely one or more arguments are part of it, which are abductions, the a-priori-method, additionally to the tenacity-method, is applied. What about inductive arguments? I am not sure. If the induction follows the sequence of abduction-deduction-induction, this is scientific method. But you cannot say, if it does, by merely regarding the inductive argument. All in all, I think, a narrative is not necessarily a rheme, nor a proposition/dicent, nor an argument, but a composition of items from these classes. It may even be a set of just rhemes. Mostly it is a composition, when the term is used- but why not also call one rheme, one proposition, one argument a narrative too? I think, the term "narrative" can be boiled down to any sign that is due to an utterer´s intention. Any intention of any utterer is the intention to fixate belief, at least: "Believe in what I utter". Without this intention, nothing would be uttered. False signs, misunderstandings, misinterpretations, imputations are signs too, but self-uttered. So they may be called narratives too, but the narrator/utterer is identical with the interpretator. But the intention is missing. Erring has no clear intention. So the question remains: Does a narrative base on intention? I think yes. If the intention is unclear- Is it still a narrative? Answer: This is unclear. Mathematically this affair of inability to define is an example of "error propagation". Best, Helmut 06. November 2021 um 22:21 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Gary F., Gary R., List: GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an argument? An argument is a specific kind of sign as distinguished from a proposition or a name in that it distinctly represents its interpretant, namely, its conclusion (CP 2.95, 1902). Accordingly, I suggest that the question is really whether a narrative qualifies as an argument, or is merely a copulative proposition. If "every true poem is a sound argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:194, 1903), then it is at least plausible that a narrative could also be an argument. But what exactly is a true poem as opposed to a false poem? Is the latter still an argument, though presumably an unsound one? Is a true narrative likewise a sound argument, while a false narrative is an unsound argument? What about a fictional narrative? GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.) Peirce maintains that "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony" (ibid). My proposed argumentation for the reality of God relies on the semeiotic principle that every sign must be determined by an object that is external to, independent of, and unaffected by that sign itself--namely, its dynamical object. Of course, a case for the same conclusion could also be made on the basis that every work of art requires an artist, every poem requires a poet, and every symphony requires a composer. Likewise, if the entire universe is conceived as "a single grand narrative," then it seems to me that it requires a narrator. GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html): A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" by virtue of having an immediate interpretant that is internal to it and a final interpretant that it would determine under ideal circumstances, as well as a dynamical interpretant that it does
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?
List, I think, a narrative is not necessarily an argument, or a set of propositions and arguments, it may also be a set of propositions only. I agree, that a narrative has a purpose, which is the narrator´s intention to narrate. Narrative intention is the intention to fixate belief. If the narration/narrative is merely a set of propositions, the method of belief-fixation is tenacity. If the narration contains one or more deductive arguments, the scientific method too is applied. If merely one or more arguments are part of it, which are abductions, the a-priori-method, additionally to the tenacity-method, is applied. What about inductive arguments? I am not sure. If the induction follows the sequence of abduction-deduction-induction, this is scientific method. But you cannot say, if it does, by merely regarding the inductive argument. All in all, I think, a narrative is not necessarily a rheme, nor a proposition/dicent, nor an argument, but a composition of items from these classes. It may even be a set of just rhemes. Mostly it is a composition, when the term is used- but why not also call one rheme, one proposition, one argument a narrative too? I think, the term "narrative" can be boiled down to any sign that is due to an utterer´s intention. Any intention of any utterer is the intention to fixate belief, at least: "Believe in what I utter". Without this intention, nothing would be uttered. False signs, misunderstandings, misinterpretations, imputations are signs too, but self-uttered. So they may be called narratives too, but the narrator/utterer is identical with the interpretator. But the intention is missing. Erring has no clear intention. So the question remains: Does a narrative base on intention? I think yes. If the intention is unclear- Is it still a narrative? Answer: This is unclear. Mathematically this affair of inability to define is an example of "error propagation". Best, Helmut 06. November 2021 um 22:21 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Gary F., Gary R., List: GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an argument? An argument is a specific kind of sign as distinguished from a proposition or a name in that it distinctly represents its interpretant, namely, its conclusion (CP 2.95, 1902). Accordingly, I suggest that the question is really whether a narrative qualifies as an argument, or is merely a copulative proposition. If "every true poem is a sound argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:194, 1903), then it is at least plausible that a narrative could also be an argument. But what exactly is a true poem as opposed to a false poem? Is the latter still an argument, though presumably an unsound one? Is a true narrative likewise a sound argument, while a false narrative is an unsound argument? What about a fictional narrative? GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.) Peirce maintains that "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony" (ibid). My proposed argumentation for the reality of God relies on the semeiotic principle that every sign must be determined by an object that is external to, independent of, and unaffected by that sign itself--namely, its dynamical object. Of course, a case for the same conclusion could also be made on the basis that every work of art requires an artist, every poem requires a poet, and every symphony requires a composer. Likewise, if the entire universe is conceived as "a single grand narrative," then it seems to me that it requires a narrator. GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html): A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" by virtue of having an immediate interpretant that is internal to it and a final interpretant that it would determine under ideal circumstances, as well as a dynamical interpretant that it does determine whenever it is actually interpreted. Moreover, events are entia rationis that must be prescinded from the continuous flow of time and change, so constructing a narrative involves deliberately selecting and demarcating which events in the sequence to include rather than ignore--i.e., which events to treat as significant. GF: However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. Exactly, and we also use our "narratives" in an effort to influence how others make sense of their lives and the world. This is especially evident in the media these days--which events and details are selected vs. ignored reflects a certain point of view that the narrator takes for
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?
Jon, list,
GF: A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is
not necessarily meaningful in any way.
JAS: On the contrary, a narrative is a sign …
GF: Nothing “contrary” here; a narrative is a representation, and a
representation is a sign. Its dynamic object is a sequence of events, and that
object (unlike the sign) is not necessarily meaningful in any way. The mere
fact of being represented does not make anything meaningful. This is how I
distinguish sequences from consequences. I do not believe that everything that
happens is a sign with its own object(s) and interpretant(s). Perhaps we
disagree on that point.
JAS: … so constructing a narrative involves deliberately selecting and
demarcating which events in the sequence to include rather than ignore--i.e.,
which events to treat as significant.
GF: Yes, that’s true, to the extent that the narrative is deliberately
constructed, as of course a fictional narrative or documentary film usually is.
A narrative constructed for some purpose can also be an argument, or perhaps a
quasi-argument if it doesn’t “separately show what interpretant it is intended
to determine” (EP2:204). But narratives in the basic sense I’m using are not
necessarily deliberately constructed. Point a camera out a window, set it to
record for an hour, go off and do something else, and when you return you’ll
have an hour-long visual narrative in which no events are selected or treated
as significant. Only the point of view and the time frame was deliberately
selected.
The same would apply to a recording of a concert of aleatory music: it
represents a sequence of sonic events which can be meaningless in themselves. I
attended a John Cage concert at the University of Rochester in 1965.
Afterwards, one of my professors asked to see the score. Cage replied “It’s
verbal.” I would say that the score, the set of instructions for the
performers, was a sign, but I don’t believe that the piece of music (or
sequence of sounds) was a sign. Since then I’ve never felt that a musical
composition was necessarily a sign with an “emotional interpretant.” Some of my
favorite music is, to me at least, quite meaningless, because what I’m hearing
in it is pure Secondness, quite innocent of Thirdness (unless you count the
time it takes as Thirdness). Likewise I think a narrative doesn’t have to be an
argument. A friend of mine is a fan of plotless novels; and it seems to me that
the universe as sign can be a narrative without being an argument.
JAS: For better or for worse, a good story can often be more persuasive than a
sound argument.
GF: Yes indeed. Especially if the person hearing the story is not conscious of
being persuaded.
Gary f.
} O Loud, hear the wee beseech of thees of each of these thy unlitten ones!
[Finnegans Wake 259] {
