Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

JAS: It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to
address it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its
cosmological implications and will do so again now.


GR: I agree "that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general and
abstract semeiotic perspective," while I see no reason to limit my thinking
about it to that "more general and abstract semeiotic perspective." and I
am certainly relieved that you do not as well as you are also reflecting
"on some of its cosmological implications." In truth, I actually find
Champagne's view to be in some ways problematic in the extreme.

JAS: As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of
the universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang.


GR: I disagree. Your view would seem to imply that there is only one
possible universe for all time and in all space. Peirce's cosmological
lectures of 1898 seem to me to allow for any number of possible universes,
that is, so many ways for universes with characters far different from
our own to be born out of the infinite Platonic qualities Peirce
adumbrated. Why limit God's power to create to a single universe?

JAS: In that sense, [Peirce] maintains that semiosis likewise had no
beginning and will have no end, while *physico*semiosis came about with the
very first instance when primordial mind became specialized and partially
deadened as matter.

GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end.  ." Are you
saying that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this
notion  when one considers the possibility of multi-universes. And
while "primordial
mind became specialized and partially deadened as matter" is certainly true
in one sense, it can't be so in, for example, another strictly theistic
sense (God's 'mind' "partially deadened as matter"? --that makes no sense).
Mind' here must connote something quite different than God's Mind.

So, a question: what do we (including Peirce) mean when we refer to
"primordial mind"? From a theological standpoint, is that 'mind' created or
uncreated?

You quoted me as writing: "Several Peircean concepts are involved in
Deacon's theory of the emergence of life and mind," and commented:
JAS: That might be so, but again, [Deacon's] book's subtitle is *How Mind
Emerged from Matter.*

GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind
Emerged from *constraints* on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in the
cosmos -- *not* God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' mind,
for example, is *not* given primordially, but evolves in the sense that the
whole cosmos is evolving. 'Constraints', in this sense, result in habits,
result in evolutionary development.

JAS (quoting Peirce): "The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to
suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason. . ."

GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of
"materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific
insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism* will feel." Rather a
certain kind of *organism* will feel. (I don't claim that this is *strictly*
Deacon's view, but it is in my view possible to argue it based in part on
certain of his insights; but Deacon himself is a materialist.)

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 10:06 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: I have been reflecting on Champagne's article critically from a
> cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that of the early cosmos, while
> you seem to have been looking at it from a more general and abstract
> semeiotic perspective.
>
>
> It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general
> and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to address
> it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its cosmological
> implications and will do so again now.
>
> GR: If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which
> I, for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appear*? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed?
>
>
> As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of the
> universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang. That particular
> theory is based on the assumption that the physical laws of the universe as
> we observe and understand them to be operating today have been unchanging
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: I have been reflecting on Champagne's article critically from a
cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that of the early cosmos, while
you seem to have been looking at it from a more general and abstract
semeiotic perspective.


It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general
and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to address
it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its cosmological
implications and will do so again now.

GR: If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which
I, for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
appear*? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
formed?


As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of the
universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang. That particular
theory is based on the assumption that the physical laws of the universe as
we observe and understand them to be operating today have been unchanging
for all those alleged billions of years, whereas he was quite adamant that
they must be products of an evolutionary process that extends from the
infinite past through any assignable date to the infinite future. In that
sense, he maintains that semiosis likewise had no beginning and will have
no end, while *physico*semiosis came about with the very first instance
when primordial mind became specialized and partially deadened as matter.

GR: Several Peircean concepts are involved in Deacon's theory of the
emergence of life and mind.


That might be so, but again, his book's subtitle is *How Mind Emerged from
Matter*; and Peirce writes, "If mind is nothing but a highly complicated
arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are
landed in *materialism*, and nominalism is not much in error after all" (R
936:3, no date). Moreover, "The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to
suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason--an ultimate, inexplicable
regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it
should make things clear and reasonable" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292, 1891).

Accordingly, Peirce takes exactly the opposite approach. "But if, on the
other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under
the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have
lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the
more elevating theory of *idealism*" (R 936:3). "The one intelligible
theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 6:41 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
> definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
> “interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
> chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."
>
>
> GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
> cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And
> at the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't 
> "justif[y]
> reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."
>
> I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
> have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on
> Champagne's article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps
> especially that of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking
> at it from a more general and abstract semeiotic perspective.
>
> If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
> for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
> as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?
>
> Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
> titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
> paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).
>
> For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads
> to a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
> beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
> (431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your
final paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.


I am not surprised, and some pushback is understandable, even welcome. It
comes down to whether one explains the intelligibility of the universe by
taking it to be (a) composed exclusively of signs or (b) merely perfused
with signs, either of which can be reasonably supported from Peirce's
writings and other considerations. I am trying to sort out the implications
of the stronger hypothesis, and to ascertain whether and how well I can
defend it.

GF: There are dyadic relations between A and B, and between B and C, but
there is no *triadic *relation between the three of them, not even a
degenerate one; there is only a chain of efficiently caused events.


On the contrary, a *degenerate *triadic relation is one that is reducible
to its constituent dyadic relations, and *any *sequential pair of
efficiently caused events involving exactly three correlates fits this
definition. I readily acknowledge that treating such a phenomenon as an
instance of physicosemiosis is not terribly insightful for studying it
within the special sciences. For me, its significance is instead
metaphysical, specifically cosmological--the idea being that triadic
semiosis alone is primordial, dyadic action is derived and special.

GF: For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will be passively
moved, but it will not *respond *actively to a kick as a dog, being biotic,
probably would.


Does Peirce ever require an interpretant to be an *active *response to the
sign? As far as I know, he always describes the sign as the agent and the
interpretant as the patient within their dyadic relation; and likewise, he
always describes the object as the agent and the sign as the patient within
their dyadic relation. The object determines the sign, and the sign
determines the interpretant, but the key to a *genuine *triadic relation is
that it is *not *reducible to these two dyadic relations.

In other words, for *genuine *semiosis it is *not *sufficient that there is
a dynamical object that determines a *token *to determine a *dynamical
*interpretant--there
must be a *type *to which the token conforms, and the sign that it thus
embodies must be in a genuine triadic relation with its dynamical object
and its *final *interpretant. That leads me to suspect that another
distinguishing feature of (degenerate) physicosemiosis is its *lack *of a
final interpretant, since it is entirely a matter of efficient causation
rather than involving final causation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 3:49 PM  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final
> paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.
>
>
>
> JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are
> *degenerate* triadic relations, reducible to their constituent *dyadic 
> *relations
> … Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a
> dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical
> interpretant.
>
>
>
> GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball
> B, efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently
> causing it to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is
> *dynamical*, all right, but it is not really an *interpretant *simply
> because some intelligent being chooses to call it so. There are dyadic
> relations between A and B, and between B and C, but there is no *triadic*
> relation between the three of them, not even a degenerate one; there is
> only a chain of efficiently caused events. There is no object-interpretant
> relation between A and C that is *in any way* different from the relation
> between B and C or the relation between A and B. A sequence of events has a
> temporal order, but that’s not sufficient to create a triadic sign
> relation, in my view.
>
>
>
> I think you’ve also glossed over a crucial difference between biotic and
> abiotic entities. For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will
> be passively moved, but it will not *respond* actively to a kick as a
> dog, being biotic, probably would. Living embodied beings, even the
> simplest, are complex adaptive systems which *respond* to contacts with
> their environments, and semiosically respond to signs in such a way that
> their interpretant responses are triadically related to the signs *and
> their objects*. The cells of our immune systems respond to other
> microscopic entities by distinguishing between those that belong to the
> body-system and those that don’t, and attacking the latter kind. The attack
> is certainly an interpretant, in my view. I don’t see that you’ve given any
> examples of abiotic entities doing anything comparable to that.
>
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

List, This just published study may have some bearing on the topic of this
thread. GR

*ScienceAlert* summarizes a new cosmological theory:
Our Universe Is Finely Tuned For Life, And There's an Explanation For Why
That Is So

https://www.sciencealert.com/we-could-have-a-new-way-to-explain-why-our-universe-is-as-finely-tuned-for-life-as-it-is

Excerpt:

This latest suggestion mashes together the idea of unknown physics behind
the Higgs boson's shockingly itty-bitty mass with a kind of quantum
multiverse effect, one that this time could feasibly be tested.

Their model puts the Higgs particle at the center of the fine-tuning
explanation. By coupling the boson with other particles in such a way that
its low mass would effectively 'trigger' events in physics we observe, it
provides a link between forces and mass.

From there, the authors show how weakly interacting variables in a field
might affect different kinds of empty space, specifically patches of
nothingness with varying degrees of expansion. This potentially
demonstrates the link between Higgs bosons
 and the cosmological
constant.

It's a multiverse in a way, given the triggers occurring in different
patches of infinite expanding space could plausibly give rise to a
seemingly well balanced Universe like ours.

Their math suggests these triggers would be limited to a few possibilities,
and even has room for explanations of dark matter
. Better still, it also predicts
the existence of multiple Higgs particles of varying masses, all smaller
than the one we've already observed. That gives the hypothesis something
that can be tested, at least.

The study is published in *Physical Review *as:
Weak scale as a triggerNima Arkani-Hamed, Raffaele Tito D’Agnolo, and Hyung
Do KimPhys. Rev. D 104, 095014 – Published 15 November 2021
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.104.095014

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 7:40 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
> definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
> “interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
> chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."
>
>
> GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
> cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And
> at the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't 
> "justif[y]
> reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."
>
> I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
> have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on
> Champagne's article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps
> especially that of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking
> at it from a more general and abstract semeiotic perspective.
>
> If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
> for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
> as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?
>
> Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
> titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
> paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).
>
> For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads
> to a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
> beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
> (431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
> little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
> word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
> "originates from some other non-physical reality."]
>
> It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
> origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
> exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
> technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
> which is *necessarily*, in my view, involved and complex. Gary, you no
> doubt recall our attempt to get a discussion of *Incomplete Nature* going
> on the LIst a few years back. After a very few weeks I think we both had
> the feeling that few here 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,

GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
“interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."


GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And at
the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't "justif[y]
reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."

I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on Champagne's
article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that
of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking at it from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective.

If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?

Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).

For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads to
a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
(431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
"originates from some other non-physical reality."]

It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
which is *necessarily*, in my view, involved and complex. Gary, you no
doubt recall our attempt to get a discussion of *Incomplete Nature* going
on the LIst a few years back. After a very few weeks I think we both had
the feeling that few here -- if any -- had read the book which, again,
really needs not only to be read, but also studied (esp., for example, the
material on constraints, homo-, morpho-, and teleodynamics, supervenience,
and top-down causality is challenging).

Several Peircean concepts are involved in Deacon's theory of the emergence
of life and mind. For example, his central notion of *constraints* is "a
complementary concept to order, habit, and organization because something
that is ordered or organized is restricted in its range and/or dimensions
of variation, and consequently tends to exhibit. . . regularities." What
Deacon calls "constraint propagation" has more than a family resemblance to
Peirce's notion of "habits begetting habits" (see: 183-85, 197, esp. 202-3).

Several features of Peirce semeiotic also appear prominently in *Incomplete
Nature*, For example, interpretants are discussed in consideration of the
communication theory involved in Deacon's theory (see, for example, 443).
However, in an endnote he remarks that he is "less satisfied" with his
"effort to map Peirce's object terms" onto his theory than he is with his
use of the concept of interpretants (564, n.9), a remark which I found
telling.

I hope my comments aren't too much of a divergence from the topic of
abioticsemiosis while they most likely are from Champagne's article.

Best,

Gary R





“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 4:49 PM  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final
> paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.
>
>
>
> JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are
> *degenerate* triadic relations, reducible to their constituent *dyadic 
> *relations
> … Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a
> dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical
> interpretant.
>
>
>
> GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball
> B, efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently
> causing it to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is
> *dynamical*, all right, but it is not really an *interpretant *simply
> because some intelligent being chooses to call it so. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[gnox]

Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final 
paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.

 

JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are 
degenerate triadic relations, reducible to their constituent dyadic relations … 
Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a 
dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 

GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball B, 
efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently causing it 
to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is dynamical, all right, 
but it is not really an interpretant simply because some intelligent being 
chooses to call it so. There are dyadic relations between A and B, and between 
B and C, but there is no triadic relation between the three of them, not even a 
degenerate one; there is only a chain of efficiently caused events. There is no 
object-interpretant relation between A and C that is in any way different from 
the relation between B and C or the relation between A and B. A sequence of 
events has a temporal order, but that’s not sufficient to create a triadic sign 
relation, in my view.

 

I think you’ve also glossed over a crucial difference between biotic and 
abiotic entities. For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will be 
passively moved, but it will not respond actively to a kick as a dog, being 
biotic, probably would. Living embodied beings, even the simplest, are complex 
adaptive systems which respond to contacts with their environments, and 
semiosically respond to signs in such a way that their interpretant responses 
are triadically related to the signs and their objects. The cells of our immune 
systems respond to other microscopic entities by distinguishing between those 
that belong to the body-system and those that don’t, and attacking the latter 
kind. The attack is certainly an interpretant, in my view. I don’t see that 
you’ve given any examples of abiotic entities doing anything comparable to that.

 

Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of 
“life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an “interpretant” to one end 
of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the chain of efficient causations 
that precede it in time. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 21-Nov-21 21:09
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

 

Gary R., List:

 

GR: But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the 
near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning than 
its modern biological one?

 

I agree that Peirce often advocates a much broader and deeper conception of 
"life" and "living," such that he might plausibly be understood as viewing 
"biotic" vs. "abiotic" semiosis to be a false dichotomy. I was simply 
highlighting the narrower conception that Champagne evidently adopts in the 
article, presumably because his purpose is to propose a rigorous criterion for 
a phenomenon to qualify as physicosemiosis, which he defines as "sign-action 
purportedly occurring at the level of purely material interactions." Consider 
how he restates his thesis near the end.

 

MC: [F]or a sign to be truly abiotic, confirmation that a sign-vehicle and 
object are abiotic does not suffice, as the interpretant which such a pair 
produces must likewise not depend on a living entity.

 

Aside from the inclusion of the problematic term "sign-vehicle," this seems 
like a reasonable limitation as far as it goes, but its validity ultimately 
hinges on what is allowed to count as an interpretant. Champagne references an 
earlier paper of his 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275293999_A_Note_on_M_Barbieri's_Scientific_Biosemiotics)
 "for more on the often misunderstood term-of-art 'interpretant.'"

 

MC: Peirce insisted that a representamen must be capable of determining an 
interpretant which will "assume the same triadic relation to its Object" ... 
such that the interpretant in question is henceforth "capable of determining a 
Third of its own" and lead interpretation to the same object. (quotations are 
from EP 2:272-273, 1903; emphasis added by Champagne)

 

In that particular text, Peirce indeed plainly maintains that the interpretant 
of every sign is another sign of the same object, which is consistent with his 
contemporaneous taxonomy for classifying signs. However, he abandons that 
position within a couple of years, after coming to recognize that a sign has 
three interpretants--immediate, dynamical, and final--and that the actual 
(dynamical) interpretant of a sign-token is not necessarily another sign but 
might instead be an exertion or a feeling (CP 4.536, 1906). In fact, he no 
longer requires a sign to have an actual (dynamical) interpretant at all-- 

[PEIRCE-L] Call for article submission - Linguistic Frontiers

[Vinicius Romanini]

Call for article submission

Please consider submitting a complete article for the special issue of the
international journal Linguistic Frontiers with the theme “Discursive
Practices in Digital Media”. The guest editors will be Professors Anderson
Vinícius Romanini (ECA/USP) and Paulo Roberto Gonçalves-Segundo
(FFLCH/USP). Articles that fall into the following topics will be accepted
for peer evaluation:


   -

   The impact of digital media on the constitution of text and discourse.
   -

   The ways in which dialogic, interactional, argumentative and identity
   processes are affected and reshaped by digital media.
   -

   The methodological and theoretical innovations in the studies of text
   and discourse, such as the adoption of new technologies for data
   collection, analysis and visualization.
   -

   Theoretical contributions from semiotics, cognitive linguistics and
   argumentation studies.

Linguistic Frontiers (eISSN: 2544-6339, https://sciendo.com/journal/LF) is
a journal of the Sciendo publishing house, which belongs to the De Gruyter
group, with Open Access. Linguistic Frontiers does not charge publication
fees to its authors.

Submissions can be made in Portuguese or English until February 1, 2022 by
email (especiallinguisticfronti...@gmail.com). Articles must comply with
the publication rules of the Linguistic Frontiers journal:
https://sciendo-parsed-data-feed.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/LF/Instructions_for_Authors.pdf
-- 
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br

Skype:vinicius_romanini
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