Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate quality.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning



Jack, List:
 

When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.

 

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY  wrote:



just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an impossibility.

 


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net ; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning





A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:


Helmut, List,

 

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as conduit) which embodies the feeling as such. 

 

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

 

best

 

Jack





_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

When Peirce associates *feeling *with 1ns, he is not referring to that
which is *felt *by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is
instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any
individual instantiation. It is indeed a *prescissive *abstraction of the
1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note,
until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note *in
itself*--prescinded from anyone *actually *hearing it--corresponds to 1ns,
the contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a
series of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce
> conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an
> impossibility.
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
> *Sent:* Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
> *To:* s...@bestweb.net ; Helmut Raulien <
> h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Cc:* Peirce List ; CG <
> c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning
>
> A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its
> being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for
> example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself;
> whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:
>
> Helmut, List,
>
> Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he
> often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I
> think it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains
> it better in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from
> that which embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is
> not in feeling alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point)
> requires the body (as conduit) which em*bodies* the feeling as such.
>
> I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read
> through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context
> ommitted.
>
> best
>
> Jack
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

i.e., if we take "tone" in its literal sense as "sound" then we can say that a 
key played upon an instrument is what it is regardless of all subjectivity but 
that this does not exclude subjectivity - the evidence being subjectivity 
itself. That is, if five people hear the "same" tone, it may signify five 
distinct ways which polysemy highlights the independence of the signifying 
entity (feeling/tone) on one level as well as the independence of the 
subjectivities to which that entity signifies, variously, on another level 
(thus potentiality seems to square the abstract circle).

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:32 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca ; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Helmut,

Yes I agree. Although he does give himself typically clever wiggle-room insofar 
as he mentions potentiality which would seem to both include and exclude the 
subject depending on one's level of analysis.

best

jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:19 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, 
and can be false.

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the 
subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories 
with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

Best, Helmut


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol.



gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?



Best Regards



Helmut





Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths.

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



Best Regards



Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Helmut,

Yes I agree. Although he does give himself typically clever wiggle-room insofar 
as he mentions potentiality which would seem to both include and exclude the 
subject depending on one's level of analysis.

best

jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:19 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, 
and can be false.

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the 
subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories 
with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

Best, Helmut


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol.



gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?



Best Regards



Helmut





Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths.

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



Best Regards



Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343.

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, and can be false.

 

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning




Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol. 

 


gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg


 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, mightn´t they?



 



Best Regards



 



Helmut



  


  



Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning





Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the “defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some readers.


Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs


 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



  



Best Regards



 



Helmut













Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce 
conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an 
impossibility.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net ; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning


A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:

Helmut, List,

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he 
often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think 
it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better 
in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which 
embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling 
alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as 
conduit) which embodies the feeling as such.

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read 
through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:40 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

John, Gary F., List,

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the 
three modes of being:

"
So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, 
in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric 
possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of 
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living 
intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is 
rational necessity and necessitation.
A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, 
consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its 
being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is 
to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.
"

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant 
universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this 
more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as 
well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a 
system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it 
is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to 
uncover them? Examples are galore.

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before 
composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they 
first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, 
other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good 
or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I 
think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if 
the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act 
of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in 
Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal 
christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, 
and since their prophets have declareded them.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Cc: "CG" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning
Helmut, Gary F, List

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary.  But 
I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) 
public speech; (3) conversation; (4)  thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing 
thought, unspoken word, purpose, design.  (Liddell & Scott, 9th edition)

>From those basic meanings, it came to be applied to tales, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol. 

 

gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

  

  

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca  
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense   works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.

  

Best Regards

 

Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:

Helmut, List,

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he 
often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think 
it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better 
in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which 
embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling 
alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as 
conduit) which embodies the feeling as such.

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read 
through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:40 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

John, Gary F., List,

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the 
three modes of being:

"
So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, 
in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric 
possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of 
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living 
intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is 
rational necessity and necessitation.
A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, 
consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its 
being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is 
to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.
"

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant 
universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this 
more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as 
well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a 
system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it 
is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to 
uncover them? Examples are galore.

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before 
composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they 
first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, 
other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good 
or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I 
think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if 
the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act 
of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in 
Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal 
christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, 
and since their prophets have declareded them.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Cc: "CG" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning
Helmut, Gary F, List

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary.  But 
I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) 
public speech; (3) conversation; (4)  thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing 
thought, unspoken word, purpose, design.  (Liddell & Scott, 9th edition)

>From those basic meanings, it came to be applied to tales, stories, and 
>narratives.  Since many of those stories contained a mixture of fact and 
>fiction and sometimes more fiction than fact, critics such as Plato condemned 
>them as false.

But the same criticism could be made of any scientific theories of any time 
past, present, or future.  The goal of science is a deeper understanding of 
experience, but any theory is at best a good generalization of certain kinds of 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., List,

 

But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, mightn´t they?

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning




Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the “defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some readers.


Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs


 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



  



Best Regards



 



Helmut













Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other species of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing regarded from different points of view. …

We must conclude, then, that the reason why different things have to be differently thought of is that their modes of metaphysical being are different.

Aristotle, however, failed to strike the nail squarely on the head when he said that generals are known by reason and singulars by sense. Generals are predicates. Now while the structure, not only of predicates, but of all kinds of thought, is known by 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[Helmut Raulien]

John, Gary F., List,

 

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the three modes of being:

 

"


So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is rational necessity and necessitation.

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.



"

 

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to uncover them? Examples are galore.

 

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, and since their prophets have declareded them.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Cc: "CG" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning


Helmut, Gary F, List

 

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary.  But I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

 

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) public speech; (3) conversation; (4)  thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing thought, unspoken word, purpose, design.  (Liddell & Scott, 9th edition)

 

From those basic meanings, it came to be applied to tales, stories, and narratives.  Since many of those stories contained a mixture of fact and fiction and sometimes more fiction than fact, critics such as Plato condemned them as false.

 

But the same criticism could be made of any scientific theories of any time past, present, or future.  The goal of science is a deeper understanding of experience, but any theory is at best a good generalization of certain kinds of experience.  And all scientific theories are eventually recognized as inadequate in one or more ways.  Furthermore, many of the old myths still embody deep insights into human nature and experience -- many of them are still good guides for new scientific theories (abductions).

 

Summary:  Science and myth represent insights (abductions) obtained through a deep analysis of experience.  We should recognize them for what they contribute, but realize that they have limitations which may be clarified and extended by further analysis, and testing against new observations.

 

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ â–º PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . â–º To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . â–º PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

[gnox]

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense   works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

 

Gary F., List,

 

In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.

  

Best Regards

 

Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs 
that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, 
being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our 
converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or 
diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain 
the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to 
symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which 
we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate 
the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of 
subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of 
ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those 
three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring 
before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other 
species of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we 
think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the 
thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing 
regarded from different points of view. …

We must conclude, then, that the reason why different things have to be 
differently thought of is that their modes of metaphysical being are different.

Aristotle, however, failed to strike the nail squarely on the head when he said 
that generals are known by reason and singulars by sense. Generals are 
predicates. Now while the structure, not only of predicates, but of all kinds 
of thought, is known by reason, that is, by symbols, like words, the matter of 
predicates, simple predicates, is not known by reason, but by the senses and by 
other feelings. A subject of every judgment — and it is the subject par 
excellence — is a singular; and every singular,