Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jon, Jack, et al., As I wrote in my previous note (excerpt copied below), both Kant and Peirce presented positions that neither one had fully proved. Although I prefer Peirce's position, I must admit that his proof in CP 5.525 is flawed, and your version does not correct the flaw. JAS> By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before. CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) The flaw in this paragraph is in the phrase "after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate". Question: What words are being considered? Do we consider all the words that have been defined in the current state of Engllish (or some other languages)? If Peirce meant 1905, that would rule out the huge number of new concepts of quantum mechanics and other innovations in the physics of the 20th and later centuries. It's quite certain that no words could be found in 1905 that could adequately explain the life of a snail. In fact, nobody has proposed a precise definition of the word 'life' today. Physicians cannot reliably detect the precise moment when a patient dies. And quantum mechanics makes many issues impossible to detect or measure precisely. There is a huge amount that is unknown. In summary, Kant's claim is true for most of the things we encounter in our daily lives. Our descriptions cover only the parts we can detect with our senses and any scientific instruments at our disposal. As science progresses, people keep inventing more precise instruments. But there is still a huge amount that is unknowable in nearly every object we encounter. John Excerpt from: "John F Sowa" Sent: 6/7/23 1:24 AM The quotation below summarizes Peirce's theory of science in the first paragraph, where the final opinion is a goal that might never be reached. One way to explain the difference between Kant and Peirce is that (1) they both understood the difficulty of analyzing every detail of the full complexity of the things we experience. (2) Kant was a pessimist who did not believe that anybody could ever really understand all those details. (3) Peirce was an optimist who believed that any question about the things we experience could eventually be answered if given enough scientists enough time to study the question and test it with all possible experiments. As a pessimist, Kant was correct in saying that the overwhelming majority of the details of the things we perceive are unknowable by us, But as an optimist, Peirce was correct in claiming that scientific methodology, as pursued by an untold number of scientists, could ultimately discover any of those details that may be needed to answer any questions we might ask. . "There is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given... This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought, in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else... This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, - a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent, would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensation". [CP 8.12-13, emphasis Peirce's] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Jack, List: I appreciate the latest attempt at simplification, but it is still not a deductively valid argumentation. In fact, its conclusion is an incorrect *definition*. JRKC: 13. Elemental qualities, in the absence of human (or, all organic) experience, must exist in themselves. 14. This is what Kant calls the “thing in itself”. On the contrary, this is *not *what Kant calls the "thing in itself." #13 is not controversial at all, as long as we are using "exist" in the logical sense of belonging to a universe of discourse; from the metaphysical standpoint, qualities have their *being *in themselves (1ns), but they do not *exist *except as embodied in things (2ns). Moreover, we agree that cognition (and representation in general) is always *mediation *such that things with their embodied qualities can and do exist without ever *actually *being cognized; again, the *real *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about it*, and the *external *is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks *about anything*. We further agree that no cognition or other sign of an external thing is *identical *to that thing. In short, no one is disputing that external things *exist *independently of mediation or human cognitive processes, but at issue is whether external things and/or some of their embodied qualities are *incognizable*, i.e., impossible to *represent *by means of mediation (semiosis) including human cognitive processes. You still have not provided a series of premisses from which *that *conclusion follows necessarily, like I did by reformulating and formalizing Peirce's straightforward proof that the *Ding an sich* is nonsensical (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2023-06/msg00016.html). Instead, you seem to be *assuming *that whatever is *independent *of any representation of it is *incapable *of being represented at all, thus begging the question. JRKC: I just want to add, with respect to that draft, that it cannot be a "dynamical object" for the thing in itself is posited in absentia of all organic experience. Therefore, whilst Peircean semeiotic remains vital, to me, and I use it in the relata (though only proto as of now), it is not accurate to say that the Semeiotic can account for the thing in itself except to help infer its necessary existence, which it does. These remarks reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peircean semeiotic. Strictly speaking, it is true that nothing *serves *as a dynamical object unless/until it *actually *determines a sign (such as a cognition) to represent it. Nevertheless, whatever logically exists, in *any *of the three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908), is *capable* of being represented and thus a *potential *dynamical object for a sign. Again, the problematic concept here is not so much the thing-in-itself as the *incognizable *thing-in-itself, the claim that something can exist yet be *impossible *to cognize/represent. For both Kant and Peirce, metaphysics depends on logic for principles, not the other way around. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 7:18 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps > it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the > thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how > to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the > problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That > is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but > surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow > each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the > primary points - semantic - are all sound. > > Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used > to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I > cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation > (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - > comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa > have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary > objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only > because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going > through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of > articulation. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
[PEIRCE-L] Symbolic Logic and Religious Symbolism, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 - CfP - Extended Deadline June 15
Workshop organized by Jean-Yves Beziau and Caroline Pires Ting Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Logica Universalis Association (Geneva, Switzerland) Part of the 4th World Congress on Logic and Religion, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 CALL FOR PAPERS On the one hand symbolism is important in most religions, on the other hand modern logic is often characterized as symbolic. This workshop, part of WoCoLoR4, explores the relation between these two symbolic approaches. Suggested topics include - but are not limited to - the following: > Boole's symbolic mathematical notation in logic and abstract religious notions > Zoroastrianism's dualism, Pythagoras's table of opposites, Trinity Christian triangle, Islamic geometrical objects and the theory of oppositions > Yin/Yang and the notion of complementary contradiction > the symbolism of the cross, crucifixion, negation and abnegation > Venn symbolic logic, Venn diagrams and their application for understanding religious phenomena > the universal quantifier and catholicism as a religion for all > is the existential quantifier really symbolizing existence? > Cabala symbolism and logic in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Charles Dodgson, aka Lewis Carroll, deacon in the Church of England and symbolic logician > logical "interpretation" of Gödel's proof of the existence of God in symbolic logic Submit a one page abstract by June 15 Religious Symbolism and Symbolic Logic, Sinaia, Sept 3-8, 2023 https://sites.google.com/view/symbol-relog _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
