Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Helmut,

I tend to concur with some of your analysis, Jon. Certainly it is essential
to remember that in the 1903 classification of signs that the three
trichotomies are, or perhaps more accurately, *represent* *relations*. But
it's equally important to remember that they are not, shall we say,* living
relations* themselves, those occurring only in actual semioses (which can,
however, be semeiotically analyzed).

JAS: [Peirce] later clarifies that they are for the sign itself
(tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its *dynamical *object
(icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its *final *interpretant
(seme/pheme/delome).

I'm not sure that Peirce's later terming the relations to the sign to
itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) by, in my view, less 'scientific' but,
perhaps, more 'evocative' terms (tone, token, type) in itself constitutes
an across the board *clarification.* This matter has, however, not gotten
extensive discussion in the literature, at least to my knowledge. Suffice
it to say that there are those who see the changes as more or less
principally changes in terminology.

 I myself remain a bit conflicted about the matter. For there seems to me
to be a kind of technical specificity to the earlier terminology lacking in
the more 'poetic' later terminology. For example, 'qualisign', "a quality
which is a sign," specifies the very character of the object of that
relationship, while 'tone' merely 'evokes' it. Much the same might be said
of sinsign, "a single sign," which becomes 'token' in the later
terminology. Thus, 'sin-, or 'single sign,' seems to gel more with Helmut's
comment ("An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before").
Finally, legisign, "a law which is a sign," seems to me both more specific
and more inclusive than the later 'type'.

Meanwhile, if one is familiar with the earlier terminology, then the latter
terminology immediately brings the earlier one to mind, while the
alliteration of the three 't's' in the latter terminology is quite useful
as, for example, a mnemonic device in teaching or explaining semeiotic
grammar. Nevertheless, while there seems to be *no difference* that I can
see between the two sets of terminology as regards the sign itself, yet,
and as Jon wrote, the latter terminology" clarifies that the
icon/index/symbol concerns "the relation of the sign to its *dynamical *
object*,*" or, in other words *constrains* the use and meaning of
icon/index/symbol to the *dynamical* object and, *therefore*, *not* to the
immediate object. That seems to me to be an interesting and important
distinction.

Similarly, the trichotomy rheme/dicent/symbol recast as seme/pheme/delome
as specifying the relation of the sign to its *final interpretant* seems to
me to be an *addition* to the earlier, apparently more generalized(?)
rheme/dicent/argument trichotomy. However, I have not myself found much use
of this trichotomy, i.e., seme/pheme/delome, nor, for that matter, much
discussion of it in the literature: it seems to me something of possible
interest in the development of a fuller, rich taxonomy. However, in my view
the mixing of the two trichotomies such that they overlap to some extent (*vide
supra*, the sign itself, for prime example), but not completely, needs
further clarification if it isn't to become an obstacle, rather than an
aid, to a fuller, more complete and useful taxonomy and tool for semeiotic
analysis.

JAS: "The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant
to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative
complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three
interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate)."

As I see it this is more a mathematical -- and less phaneroscopic  --
analysis of the characters of the three categories. In my view, after
practicing phaneroscopy (the pure *opening* to and *observation* ofthe
phaneron), one may *retrospectively* looks back at pure mathematics to find
these essentially *valental relations* to be phaneroscopically
*present*, *while
pure phaneroscopy initially finds only qualities, actions/reactions, and
signs* which can then -- after this backwards glance at this valental
branch of pure mathematics -- be analyzed trichotomically (as 1ns/2ns/3ns).
This is not to suggest that the 3 -- and *only* three, following the
reduction thesis -- categories aren't present from the get go. But one
cannot assume trichotomy in the categorial sense to be an essential
character of the phaneron since observing categorial characters requires a
kind of abstraction, not allowed within pure phaneroscopic practice.

JAS: I agree that real semiosis is a *continuous *process, such that our
demarcation of *individual *signs with their objects and interpretants is
at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: And I'd add to 'arbitrary', for the taxonomies we've been discussing,
'abstract'. De Tienne, in his paper, "Iconocopy," did make an initial stab
at identifying 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

Thank you for the correction, I remember it now too. And for your hint to the distinction between classes and individual signs: An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before, so it is hard to speak of a relation in the mathematical sense, because there relations are parts of the structure. A structure is something permanent, pre-existed. Therefore, I guess it might be ok to say, that the relations exist between the variables sign, object, interpretant, forming new variables (like "legisign", "icon", "rheme", and so on), and not between the individuals the variables stand for. At least, if we are talking about the sign classes table. Otherwise, if we say, that real individual signs have relations with real objects and interpretants, these relations would be parts of the structure of a somehow all- encompassing realm of possibilities, about which it is hard or useless to talk.

 

So, maybe (in the sign classes table) the relations are process variables, because they are not distinct, but parts. In the vertical direction, you might call the distinctions (e.g. between legisign and sinsign) relations too, which are state variables. Well, maybe. And what kind of variables are the connections between the relations` relations (such as "rhematic indexical legisign")? On one hand, real signs are continuous, on the other, these variables are distinct, each showing an irreducible triad. Perhaps you cannot easily transfer thermodynamics to semiotics.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 03. Juli 2023 um 01:03 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes



Helmut, List:
 

One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are not for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the relation of the sign to its object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its dynamical object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its final interpretant (seme/pheme/delome).

 

The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future (3ns).

 

I agree that real semiosis is a continuous process, such that our demarcation of individual signs with their objects and interpretants is at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




List,

 

in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument.

 

Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes.

 

The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic.

 

As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view